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THE SAXON AND THE CELT.

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THE SAXON AND THE CELT

A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY

BY

JOHN MACKINNON ROBERTSON

AUTHOR OF

"BUCKLE AND HIS CRITICS," "MODERN HUMANISTS," ETC., ETC.

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PREAMBLE.

Some repetitions occur in the following chapters, in respect that certain points touched on in their order in the two main treatises are also dealt with in one or other of the critiques which follow. It seemed advisable to let such iterations occur, at the risk of some objection, by way of preserving whatever degree of completeness was attained in the different sections. The reason for including the separate critiques in the volume is that, written as they were to rebut particular writings, they may still serve their purpose for readers who can take more interest in a special polemic than in a general discussion or exposition.

It may perhaps be well to anticipate one other probable objection, of a more important kind. This book is avowedly put together partly by way of discrediting the habit, common among the opponents of the Irish nationalist movement, of setting down Irish difficulties to peculiarities of character in the Irish race: and it is likely that I shall be told, for one thing, that the practice in question is kept in countenance by those who allege Irish peculiarities as a reason for an Irish legislature; and for another, that some eminent members of the Unionist party or school have repudiated the tenet.

Both of these rejoinders would be true. It is true that some Irish Nationalists, and some of their English sympathisers, persist in ascribing to the Irish people peculiarities of character which, apart from other considerations, necessitate Home Rule. Some on that side candidly specify even faults. Even such a pro-Irish writer as M. Paul Fournier is found avowing,[1] in respect of the laxity of old Irish land tenures, that "everything in Ireland is uncertain and mobile, like the Celtic genius, as inconstant as it is lively and penetrating." On this head I can but say that, seeking

[1] *La Question Agraire en Irlande*, 1882, p. 9.

as I do to upset such generalisations, and to discredit all claims of innate and unchanging racial peculiarity, I take up an independent and non-partisan position, and am not answerable for what I reckon to be fallacies in the talk of politicians with whose program I am in agreement. So, too, when so able a writer as Mr Prendergast speaks of the ancient Irish as "a people of original sentiments and institutions, the native vigour of whose mind had not been weakened by another mind,"[1] thus representing as a merit or advantage what is really a condition of animal stagnation in any society, I can but point out that such views have no necessary connection with any modern political program, being but a result of the general failure hitherto to realise the nature of civilisation, in every sense of the term.

Some such criticism must be made even in the case of writers who have done much to elucidate the laws of civilisation. Among these I gladly rank the late Professor Richey, whose *Lectures on Irish History*, afterwards incorporated in his posthumous *Short History of the Irish People*, constitute one of the best treatises, and contain some of the most valuable ideas, known to me in this connection. He offered in particular some excellent explanations, in terms of proximate causation, of tendencies in Irish history which are often idly set down to "innate" qualities of "race." Yet even this admirable writer, dealing with the crude talk of Mommsen on ancient Gallic and modern Irish characteristics, proceeds to develop, as against that, a thesis equally unscientific and uncritical, in which the "Celtic race" in the lump is credited with certain gifts and certain defects, irrespective of culture-stage or other causal circumstance. I can only ask the reader to weigh on their merits the answers hereinafter given to both theses, observing here that I regard them as alike survivals of the formerly general habit of ascribing all national action to race-character.

On the other hand, I find myself in agreement, on the racial question, with some writers whose political program I oppose. Several avowed "Unionists" have either explicitly or implicitly condemned the practice of setting down Irish difficulties to faults or peculiarities of Irish character. Thus, for instance, the anony-

[1] *The Cromwellian Settlement*, p. 11.

mous author of the *Speaker's Handbook on the Irish Question*, without taking the least note of the fact that thousands of his own allies attribute "Celtic" vices to the Irish people in general outside of Ulster, observes that "Thoughtless and inaccurate people speak sometimes of their [the Irish people's] Celtic origin; but when they do it only displays absolute ignorance." If it be so, the alleged ignorance is probably the prevailing state of mind among the party to which he belongs. As will be seen hereafter, I do not agree with this writer and his authorities (among whom he is able to include Mr Gladstone) in the assertion that "the larger number of the so-called Irish people are Anglo-Saxon":[1] but it is of course obvious that such a statement negates all imputation of "Celtic" sins to the Irish people.

And one of the most distinguished adherents of the party has given the last-quoted writer his cue. In the chapters of his *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* which he has rearranged as a *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, Mr Lecky has repelled the "Celtic" line of attack on Irish character as he has repelled others. "Ethnologically," he observes, "the distribution and even the distinction of Celts and Teutons are questions which are far from settled: and the qualities that are supposed to belong to each have very seldom the consistency that might be expected. Nations change profoundly in the very respects in which their characters might be thought most indelible; and the theory of race is met at every turn by perplexing exceptions."[2] And he is able to quote from the late Sir Henry Sumner Maine, in express connection with Irish history, the suggestion "that many, perhaps most, of the differences in kind alleged to exist between Aryan sub-races, are really differences merely in degree of development. It is to be hoped that contemporary thought will before long make an effort to emancipate itself from the habits of levity, in adopting theories of race, which it seems to have contracted. Many of these theories appear to have little merit except the facilities they give for building on them infer-

[1] *Speaker's Handbook*, p. 9.
[2] *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, new ed., i. 397.

ences tremendously out of proportion to the mental labour which they cost the builder."[1] But it is to be observed that this somewhat cumbrous sarcasm strikes as directly against much of Maine's own previous teaching as against anybody else's; and I make the observation not by way of mere disparagement, but by way of bringing out the fact that preconceptions as to race qualities are almost inseparable from the line of political thought with which Mr Lecky is now, like Sir Henry Maine, identified. It is in his *Ancient Law*,[2] his most widely circulated book, that Maine explains the relative stagnation of China by the suggestion that the Chinese laws "are co-extensive with all the ideas of which the race is capable"; and though he cancels this view not only implicitly, as in the above cited passage of his later work on the *Early History of Institutions*, but explicitly, in the remark in the same work[3] that "doubtless our assumption of the absolute immobility of the Chinese and other societies is in part the expression of our ignorance," he never withdrew or qualified his previous teaching as to "the stationary and progressive races." On the contrary, he reaffirmed it in his latest volume, *Popular Government*,[4] though he there cited also[5] his previous remark just quoted as to China. As I have elsewhere urged, this reiteration of contradictions revealed a failure on Maine's part to reach any coherent philosophy of history. To stand consistently by his criticisms of theories of race would have been to pull to pieces his partisan teachings, and this he would not do.

Now, Maine's case is typical of that of the party of which he was one of the ornaments. In the practice of political conservatism, enlightened views must always subordinate themselves to prejudices: and when for any reason an enlightened man enters on reactionary courses, he will not only find himself in alliance with those who affirm the contrary of his most important teachings: he will further tend to say what they say. Thus we find the Duke of Argyll, who might have been supposed to be committed to the rejection of the Celtophobic view of the Irish question, whether or not he considers himself a Celt,

[1] *Early History of Institutions*, pp. 96-97.
[2] P. 23. [3] P. 227. [4] P. 22. [5] P. 192.

and who in his work on *Irish Nationalism* makes at times a profession of disclaiming any assumption as to race tendencies, nevertheless lapsing repeatedly into expressions which set down Irish troubles to "ineradicable" vices of primeval Irish character. Mr Lecky is now in political alliance with the Duke of Argyll; and Mr Lecky, being not a more but perhaps even a less consistent teacher than the Duke, is inevitably following the Duke's intellectual path in this matter. Like Maine, he has failed to reach any coherent sociology; and as we find him, on the hustings, making the declaration "I am a Christian," after writing a great deal which implied that he was not, so we find him unconsciously lapsing into the ordinary Conservative view of the Irish problem, after doing a great deal to put that view out of court.

For there is a certain psychological compulsion, so to speak, on nearly all opponents of Irish nationalist claims, to revert in some way to the attitude of race prejudice. Mr Lecky, having begun literary life as a sympathiser with the cause of the country in which he was born, was saved like Burke from the ordinary English prejudice against it; and it would certainly be difficult for him to get into the attitude, say, of the late Mr Froude, or of Mr Goldwin Smith. But under pressure of party ties Burke came to hold a tolerably Anglican tone towards the Irish Catholics; and Mr Lecky's work on *Democracy* serves to show how his temperament is settling for him the practical problems of sociology. He is coming to the political philosophy of the Duke of Argyll and the author of the *Speaker's Handbook* — a philosophy which consists in making out all Irish nationalist claims, protests, and discontents to be utterly unreasonable, and to be the manufacture of unscrupulous men. From this it is but a step to the surmise that these unscrupulous men are so because they come of a bad stock, and that the people who listen to them must be of a bad stock too.

All political strifes, broadly speaking, may be resolved into oppositions of interest, when they are not strifes of simple religious fanaticism, or of mere habitual faction. Now, the Unionist party cannot well concede, even as regards their main body, that

they are proceeding upon the mere habit of opposing Liberal measures or upon the mere inspiration of religious bigotry. Either they must admit that there are real interests involved—that the Irish majority stands on its interest, and that the English majority, in so far as it reasons, stands with the contrary interest—or they must fall back on the imputation of some general vice of character to the Irish people. They might argue, of course, that national interests are often misunderstood, and that the Irish people in the mass misunderstands its interest. But that relatively humane way of arguing comes too near the attitude of reasoning reform to be compatible with the policy of a party which in the case in hand has no reform to offer. So, whatever may be the humanity of numbers of the silent adherents of what we may call the anti-Irish cause, and whatever may be the former scientific teaching of some of its nominal authorities, the ostensible reasoning of the mass tends always to assume what Mr Gladstone calls the savage form. Hence it has seemed well to track down that species of argument to its roots of ignorance and animal instinct.

I say its roots, meaning simply that the conviction originates in or can be traced back to these elements, not at all that it is cherished only by the ignorant and the unreflecting. It must be expressly admitted, as I have already done, that the habit of imputing specific and permanent characters to nations in the lump is to be seen among men of great acuteness and abundant information. The most intellectual of our living novelists, Mr Meredith, evidently expresses to some extent his own views when he makes certain of his characters expatiate on national characteristics, especially contrasting the German and the English. In his pages, Germans talk in Mr Meredith's tongue of "you" and "us," making out Germans, collectively, to be of one habit of mind and action, and Englishmen, collectively, to be of another.[1] Mr Meredith, despite a strong tincture of the militarist spirit, has the merit of holding the scales pretty even between the anti-English and the pro-English view, giving us a

[1] See, in *The Adventures of Harry Richmond*, chapter 29, and compare *One of our Conquerors*, and *Lord Ormont and his Aminta*, passim.

good deal of each, but rather more of criticism than of patriotism, as an intelligent man had need do. On their merits, however, Mr Meredith's generalisations are rather more arbitrary than even those of somewhat arbitrary nationalists, having perhaps the excessive symmetry which belongs to nearly all presentments of life and thought in fiction. No real German thinker and observer could well have quite such cut-and-dry conceptions of an English genius and a German genius as are heaped upon us by Mr Meredith's Germans. These personages are really dramatic mouthpieces for the novelist's own verdicts, which do but represent the imaginative and epigrammatic play of a tendency that, in minds of a lower order, comes out in more or less absurd docketings of the characters of villages, parishes, towns, counties, provinces, and denominations. Thus it is that the Manxman in Mr Brown's tale of *Betsy Lee* [1] calls the loblolly boys "Irish curs," when his own Manx dialect proves the largely Irish kinship or derivation of his own people. There is in all of us, in fact, a primordial psychological tendency to simplify the vast labour of judgment in human things, by child-like artifices of classification, following on the lines of demarcation which first obtrude themselves. Not only the amateur sociologist—and in sociology the novelist, as such, cannot be more than an amateur without ceasing to be an artist—but the special student of history and institutions, is found resorting at times to this primordial device, against whose seductions there is no safeguard save a vigilant habit of analysis. When the case has been put in this way, with an eye to human nature in general, there may perhaps be less resentment than before set up by the suggestion that the whole tendency is biologically traceable to the kind of blind animal instinct which in general divides dog and cat, while setting up a special friendship between dog and cat of one household, and a further potential enmity between dog and dog.

It is not to be denied, indeed, that propositions as to race-character are sometimes made not only in complete good faith, but without any semblance of prejudice. Thus Mr Hoffman, the

[1] *Fo'c's'le Yarns*, 1881, p. 54.

author of an industrious compilation on the negroes of the United States, is found declaring that "there lie at the root of all social difficulties or problems, racial traits and tendencies which make for good or ill in the fate of nations as well as of individuals."[1] Yet the work to which this doctrine is prefixed not only gives no proof of such primordial "race tendencies" as it alleges, but on the contrary shews that a race's tendencies are constantly determined by its environment. Here the fallacy is one of uncritical use of terms. And I take leave to offer a similar explanation of the results reached by Mr Grant Allen, when, after impartially enough deciding that probably "not one half the population of the British Isles is really of Teutonic descent" (meaning *pure* Teutonic descent), he goes on to formulate in the old fashion "our" possession at once of the "Teutonic" qualities of "general sobriety, steadiness, and persistence . . . scientific patience and thoroughness, . . . political moderation and *endurance*, . . . *impatience* of arbitrary restraint," etc., and the "intellectual quickness and emotional nature of the Celt."[2] In the same breath Mr Allen speaks of the Teutonic differentiation of "our somewhat slow and steady character from the more logical but volatile and unstable Gaul." I can see no scientific coherence in these generalisations. To be impatient of arbitrary restraint is not to be enduring; to be volatile and unstable is to be the reverse of logical; and if the Celt, as Gaul, be volatile and unstable, that is, impatient, he ought, on Mr Allen's principle of chemical mixture of character, to have given the due proportion of volatility and instability to the "impatient" English blend, where "almost all . . . at the present day possess at least a fraction of Celtic blood." Again, if the volatility and instability of the Gaul go with logicality, it would seem to follow that the lack of them in the Teuton would infer excessive illogicality, which can hardly be compatible with general sobriety and scientific thoroughness. Yet again, if Teutonic mixture so modified Celtic characteristics in Britain, it ought to have similarly modified them in France,

[1] *Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro*, by Fred. L. Hoffman, 1896, Preface. (American Economic Association's series of publications.)

[2] *Anglo-Saxon Britain*, pp. 228-229.

where it certainly took place on a large scale. And yet again, the Gaul, *qua* Celt, taken as unmodified by Teutonic mixture, ought in the terms of the theory to possess "the Celtic wealth of fancy," "poetry and romance," as well as volatility and instability. But it happens that conventional ethnology credits to the slow and "unimaginative" Teuton of Mr Allen's system a far greater share of "poetry and romance" than it allows to the "Gaul," who, further, is sometimes explained as having been made unpoetical by the large admixture of Norman (*i.e.* Norse, *i.e.* Teutonic) blood in the Middle Ages! So Mr Allen's terms had to be gingerly handled; and yet withal we have a series of inconsistencies within the scope of his own statement, inconsistent as that further is with other schemata.

In view of such incoherence, which will be found exemplified in nearly every form of the race-doctrine dealt with in the following pages, it will at least be allowed to be worth arguing whether the doctrine be not fundamentally fallacious, and whether we ought not to look for the cause of differences of national culture and well-being in institutions, political and other, and for the cause of these in preliminary conditions of environment, natural and political—in anything, in short, rather than in primordial and perpetual qualities of "race." The suggestion may seem the more specious, at least, when it is found that all the methods yet employed to make out a case for one race, as the Teutonic, can be and have been employed to make out a contrary case for the other, as in that very pro-Celtic treatise *The New Exegesis of Shakspere* (1859) attributed by M. Littré, in his review of it, to a Mr O'Connell, but fitted to serve, in respect of its utter arbitrariness of theory, as a "typical" example of a kind of philosophy often held to be peculiarly Teutonic.

I am well aware that I have against me not only Teutomaniacs and Celtomaniacs in turn, but much cultured opinion, and that I shall be opposed by many who are not only incapable of race animosity in the ordinary sense, but highly cosmopolitan in feeling. Even in the felicitous work of Mr W. M. Fullerton on *Patriotism and Science*, so excellent in temper and intention, I find a variety of assumptions made as to national types of char-

acter which I cannot always square with my own observation, or indeed with each other. In the same way I find among acute Frenchmen, who profess to reject the hasty theorising of Taine on race, a point of view which for me is not distinguishable from his. Taine made great critical play with a formula of "the race, the environment, the moment," in which "the moment" is sometimes "the time" and sometimes "acquired momentum," so that each factor might at a pinch be any of the others. In the concrete, as I have said elsewhere, Taine's method slumped all sections of the French stock, including the Norman, into one imaginary primary type,[1] and so with other nationalities. The closer and harder French students of to-day cast aside these generalisations; yet they often put others of a similar sort on the same bases.

There is something disquietingly tenacious in the tendency. Even the late Mr Huxley, who was I think the first powerful and systematic English critic of the ordinary English creed as to "Celt and Teuton," and who has observed that more nonsense, much of it pernicious, has been talked on national character than on any other subject—even he, in repudiating the ordinary way of thinking, so far countenanced it as to say: "Do not let what I have said mislead you into the notion that I disbelieve in the importance of race. I am a firm believer in blood, as every naturalist must be; and I entertain no doubt that our Iberic forefathers have *contributed a something to the making of the modern Englishman totally distinct from the elements which he has inherited from his Aryan forefathers. But which is the Aryan element and which the Iberian, I believe no man can tell; and he who affirms that any quality needful for this, that, or the other form of political organisation is present in the one and absent in the other, makes a statement which I believe to be as baseless in natural science as it is mischievous in politics.* I say again that I believe in the immense influence of that fixed hereditary transmission which constitutes a race. I believe it just as I believe in the influence of ancestors upon children. But the character of a man

[1] See, on this, the criticisms of Frédéric Morin, *Les Hommes et les Livres Contemporains*, 1862, pp. 27-33, and of Emile Hennequin, *La Critique Scientifique*, 1888, pp. 93-128.

depends in part upon the tendencies he brought with him into the world, and in part upon the circumstances to which he is subjected—sometimes one group of influences predominates, sometimes the other. . . . If what I have to say in a matter of science weighs with any man who has political power, I ask him to believe that the arguments about the difference between Anglo-Saxons and Celts are a mere sham and a delusion."[1] I confess I cannot see how the politician is to hold steadily by the last teaching if he is also to believe devoutly in the "immense influence of that *fixed* hereditary transmission which constitutes race"; nor can I feel sure that the sentences above italicised, standing in their context, will ultimately escape such criticism as the critic has passed upon other people's doctrine. To allege the immense and differentiating influence of a factor of which it is impossible to recognise either the nature or the results, is to take up a position that seems to fall a good deal short of science. The statement that our "Iberic" ancestors gave us "something totally distinct" from what we inherit from our "Aryan" ancestors, implies that among certain original "Iberians" there were certain mental characteristics found in no original "Aryans," and *vice versa*—this though Aryans and Iberians alike had presumptively descended from an older stock or species. To me, this proposition is unintelligible. I know of no mental characteristic seen in any one "race" which is not also seen in others; and if I believed there were such in "Iberians" and "Aryans" I should be led to surmise that they evolved from different organic beginnings. I can only suggest that Mr Huxley had confused physical heredity with mental sameness or continuity, and so held by the latter idea on one side of his thought when he had negated it on the other. The notion of a fixed racial physique is dealt with at some length in the following pages: here it may suffice to say that the notion of a "totally distinct" racial type of mind, which yet nobody can specify, is quashed in the same breath by Mr Huxley himself, as well as by common sense.

[1] Lecture on *The Forefathers and Forerunners of the English People*, reported in the *Anthropological Review*, April, 1870, p. 203.

In the passage above quoted from, where I have marked an omission, Mr Huxley gave a notably well-meant if loosely worded counsel to his contemporaries. It runs: "And there is this further truth which lies within every one's observation—that by diligent and careful observation you may help a child to be good and wise and keep it out of evil and folly. But the wisest education cannot ensure its being either good or wise; while, on the other hand, a few years of perverted ingenuity would suffice to convert the best child that ever lived into a monster of vice and wickedness. The like applies to those great children, nations, and their rulers, who are their educators. The most a good government can do is to help its people to be wise and noble, and that mainly by clearing obstacles out of their way. But a thoroughly bad government can debauch and demoralise a people for generations, discouraging all that is good, cherishing all that is evil, until it is as impossible to discover the original nobleness of the stock as it is to find truthfulness and self-restraint in a spoiled and demoralised child. Let Englishmen ponder these things." May it not be that the somewhat general failure of Englishmen to act in the spirit of this teaching, even in the special application given to it, is partly due to the logical counteraction of it by its context?

Where Mr Huxley missed being scientific, it was not to be expected that Mr Arnold should attain to it; and in fact the race-theories laid down in the charming essay *On the Study of Celtic Literature* are among the most arbitrary of its author's doctrines. Finding the poetic formulas of M. Renan on Celtic character inconsistent with many of the facts, he lays down others which are just as inconsistent with other facts; and in the end we have an account of Celtic and Norman and German types which does but set down every supposed phase of each race's life and mind at a given moment, in the old style, to innate and permanent racial peculiarities, without in the least accounting for the presence of the same phases in the other races, and without giving a thought to the explanation set up by differences of culture stage—this though it was the essayist's professed object to induce the races to "transform themselves." Lord

Strangford's commentary, which upset so much of Mr Arnold's philology, wrought equal havoc with his sociology when it tersely raised the question why Ohthere and Wulfstan did not write in the style which Mr Arnold held to be specifically Teutonic; and why the modern Dutch do not do so either. Indeed, more theories of Teutonism than Mr Arnold's are made short work of by trying to square them for a moment with the History of Holland.

And yet again we find the politician, the observant man of the world, failing like the essayist to secure coherence in his estimates of race character. Sir Charles Dilke in one passage, hereinafter quoted, speaks of the Irish as still exhibiting in America the character of a "fierce and easily roused people," and thus constituting a danger for the future.[1] Yet in another passage of the same work he writes: "Not only is it a fact known alike to physiologists and statisticians that the children of Irish parents born in America are physically not Irish but Americans, but the like is true of the moral type: the change in this is at least as sweeping. The son of Fenian Pat and bright-eyed Biddy is the normal gaunt American, quick of thought but slow of speech, whom we have begun to recognise as the latest product of the Saxon race. . . ."[2] Here, once more, formulas of race fail us.

With all these examples of incoherence before me, of course, I can hardly hope that I have escaped inconsistency in the following chapters. It is indeed difficult to prevent the doctrine that effects of conditions are partly transmissible by heredity, from sounding sometimes like the doctrine that all races have a distinct hereditary character; and it is difficult to explain the causation of certain defects in a subject race without seeming to give credit for relative perfection to the race which listens. Gustave de Beaumont, in his admirable work *L'Irlande Sociale, Politique et Religieuse* (1839 and 1863), perhaps the most thorough and considerate study ever made by an alien of the troubles of a troublous land—even he sometimes misses his mark by carrying on the business of "apology," in the classic sense of the word, in

[1] *Greater Britain*, 4th ed., 1869, p. 31. [2] *Id.* p. 224.

the manner of a criminal-counsel pleading extenuating circumstances before a jury of sinless middle-class Englishmen, of whose character he accepts the picture drawn by their own newspapers. In this work, however, the risk mainly run is probably the other just mentioned. Perhaps then I can best emphasise the difference between the conceptions of heredity and race character by taking a concrete case. A brilliant Irishman, when subscribing in advance for a copy of this work, wrote: "I trust the book will explain ME—if it can." I might say, in answer to my friend, that sociology does not explain individual variations, but only general developments; but I shall here try to go further. He is a tall "mesocephalic" or "sub-dolichocephalic" reddish-blond, with a Germanic name, and would thus be described by many ethnologists as a descendant of one of the typical Germans of Tacitus, whose intermediate descendants had intermarried only with Teutons. But he has qualities of wit and literary refinement and unseriousness and irresponsibility which many people would say are "Celtic" or "un-Teutonic," qualities which sometimes suggest Heine and sometimes Goldsmith. I surmise that the character of his ancestors of a thousand or more years ago, whatever their pedigree, has had practically nothing to do with deciding his character; but that the moral and intellectual conditions and experiences of much nearer ancestors have had a great deal to do with it. And in the last ten generations of Irish life there has been enough of hope and fear, weeping elation and laughing despair, fury and cynicism and defiance and surrender, to produce a crop of "ids" (if I may so pervert Dr Weismann's vocable) that should attune the nerves of a numerous posterity to a subtlety and versatility and instability much seldomer seen among the physically healthy of happier lands, and not likely to be long fully reproduced in a more equable environment.

Perhaps this is unsound speculation. Perhaps ancestral climate and ancestral whisky count for more in congenital character than ancestral nervous experience. But in the play of all these factors together I see an infinitely more plausible explanation of whatever average variation there may be between

people and people than is yielded by any theorem of fixed race character going back to "Aryan" and "non-Aryan" foundations, or the soil below these, whether such theorem be Weismannised or not. It only needs to add to these considerations one more. It is a fallacy to conceive of one race or people as "older" than another, in the way many people do when they call China a "decrepit" nationality. The Chinese race or stock is physiologically no older and no more decrepit than that of the Japanese or the Bulgarians or the Zulus. But a nation as such may be described as psychologically "young" relatively to another in this sense, that it has mainly subsisted for a long time at a less advanced stage of culture than has been general for a long time in the other. In this sense China may be termed "young" in comparison with Holland. And in a somewhat similar sense Ireland is to be pronounced "young" in comparison with England. So we may say with a good Protestant Irish landlord [1] that some of the faults which are more normal in Ireland than in England are faults of "national youth," a view which perhaps puts them in a more hopeful light than the indurated faults of a world of internecine commerce. For international criticism of the self-conceited and vain-glorious sort always comes home to roost; and the research for the national faults of the Irish does but reflect a new light on the national faults of the fault-finders. It may be well then, by a thorough ventilation of this one matter, in some measure to clear the air.

[1] See hereinafter, p. 290.

THE SAXON AND THE CELT.

I.

THE QUESTION OF RACE.

§ 1. *The Present Trouble.*

THE main hindrances to a right treatment of the "Irish problem" by Englishmen hitherto, apart from mere blind aversion to all change, have been two states or habits of mind which have an unlucky tendency to establish each other. One is, the inability of the bulk of the English "ruling class" to understand the Irish case on the economic side, their class bias or self-interest shutting out all scientific light: the other is the common English tendency to regard the Irish people, in the lump, as incapable alike of orderly self-government and of industrial development. Men who take the latter view to start with will naturally fail to reach any idea of a solution of the problem: they place the source of all evil in the faults of national character which they impute, and conceive of no cure save through a cure of these, which they imply to be impossible. On the other hand, men faced by the age-long trouble of Irish discontent, and unready or unable to see the economic side of the explanation, promptly fall back on the theory of "original sin," on phrases about "the Celt," and on the political doctrine called Unionism. That these alternative or complementary forms of feeling set up or strengthen the opposition to Irish Home Rule in nine cases out of ten, is within the knowledge of all practical politicians, though the fact is naturally denied by most Unionists.[1] It matters nothing that the latter profess a contrary

[1] I apply this name, not to those who have simply opposed Mr Gladstone's bills as bad measures, but to those who would reject on principle even a scheme of Federal Home Rule.

or different feeling, when every dispute on the subject brings out the fact that one of the main inspirations of their cause is positive ill-will to the bulk of the people with whom they insist on remaining so peculiarly "united." So far are even the leaders of the Unionist party from a critical consciousness of their own position, that they have habitually opposed the project of Home Rule on the score that it has been supported only by a majority of English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish together, not by a majority of Englishmen separately. Such a plea is of course the negation of the very principle of union insisted on; and the fallacy it represents could only be fallen into by men too strongly swayed by an animus to frame for themselves a logical doctrine.

That there are some men who took up the "Unionist" position on better grounds, it would of course be unfair to deny. As one of those who, before the sudden change of Mr Gladstone's policy, deprecated the Home Rule solution, pointed out its conceivable dangers, and pleaded for a solution by way of real union, I have no difficulty in understanding as much. It is moreover obvious to all candid disputants that the very principle of Home Rule at certain points works logically against simple Nationalism; the case of Ulster furnished many Liberals with a fair argument against Mr Gladstone's solutions. But it is the hard fate of those who stand on the side of the party of prejudice, that they inevitably take on the colour of their surroundings; and I have seen Celtophobia developed by contagion in men who once seemed incapable of it. The most pathetic illustration I have met with, was supplied by some esteemed Liberal-Unionists in a discussion over this very proposition, that their cause stood for racial malice. They could justly argue, as against the school of uncritical Irish Nationalists, that there are abundant sources of evil in Irish conditions apart from English interference. But they took the further line of denying that ill-will to "the Celt" had ever been common in England, and asserted that, on the contrary, while Irishmen in England are allowed free scope for all their powers, the Irish Nationalists aim at the exclusion of Englishmen from Ireland. For this last assertion, the sole justification was the bare citation of the current phrase, "Ireland for the Irish." Now, everybody knows that that phrase is simply a short way of putting the claim that the laws specially affecting Irish life shall be made by the Irish people, through an Irish Parliament. It is surely too idle to pretend that a party of whose leading members many are settled in England, intending to remain there for life, has any idea of

setting up a war of reprisals which would injure a hundred Irishmen for one Englishman. When Liberal-Unionists, then, come to be capable of thus representing the case, we are bound to conclude that their environment has acted on their temperament to the point of making them develop race prejudice, even if they set out as fair reasoners.

There is, in fact, no alternative open to them save that between embitterment and disillusionment. Those of us who, before 1883, hoped to see the problem solved by a really "unionist" policy, had only to wait till 1886 to see that we had hoped for too much. It then became clear that not only the bulk of the English people, but those who specially stand for "the Union," are essentially incapable of unionistic politics. True unionism would mean the cordial deliberation of all four elements of the House of Commons—English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh—on all questions which come before them, whether Irish, Welsh, Scotch, or English. But the majority of the English members never disguise, and never have disguised, that Irish and Scotch and Welsh questions are for them either a bore or a nuisance, and that they only deal with them perforce. The recurrence of an Irish problem every few years they regard as an unwarrantable strain on their patience. They sit through or vote upon Irish debates because party pressure makes them; they deal with the question of Welsh Disestablishment because they cannot help it; they gladly leave Scotch questions, wherever the whips permit it, to be dealt with by the Scotch members at the close of the Session. In this state of things the parade of Unionism is a farce. Englishmen, it must be plainly said, are in the lump incapable of a real legislative union with provinces whose domestic problems need separate legislative treatment. I do not say this by way of invective. It is simply a sociological fact which ought to be reckoned with by practical politicians. And it follows from this fact, that even a well-meaning English effort to unite Ireland with England under the present constitution must end either in confession of miscalculation or in irrational embitterment against Ireland, as a gratuitously froward nation. Many Englishmen have thus indignantly decided, with regard to Ireland, that "the dog, to gain his private ends, went mad, and bit the man." When we turn to what ought to be the most rational statement of the "Unionist" case against Home Rule, that of a University Professor of Law, we find, breaking intermittently through the surface of quasi-scientific argument, gasps of the mere rage of race-prejudice and faction. The voice of the Irish

majority, Mr Dicey tells us, "is the voice of Ireland in the same sense in which a century ago the shouts or yells of the Jacobin Club were the voice of France."[1] The Parnell movement, as a whole, is for Mr Dicey a "base conspiracy."[2] When the professedly cool and qualified spokesman of the cool and self-controlled race takes this tone, the degree of coolness and self-control of his faction in general can be readily estimated.[3]

The situation is thus in some respects less hopeful, more embittered, than it was thirty or fifty years ago. The pseudonymous Irish author of a work on the Irish problem fifty years ago, could say that "the enlightened English of every sect acknowledge that the Irish have always been an oppressed and injured people: they value their generous efforts in the great cause of civil and religious liberty; and they wish for the establishment of a lasting friendship between the two countries, whose energies and industry should always render them emulous of each other, but who have been made almost enemies by the detestable policy of interested and corrupt statesmen."[4] And Mr John George MacCarthy of Cork, writing his excellent work on the land question in 1870, could say that "the *Pall Mall Gazette* and other leading journals have repeatedly and reasonably asked Irishmen to tell clearly and quietly what they wish in reference to the Irish land questions, and for what reasons they wish it." We are to-day in a less wholesome atmosphere. In the generation from 1840 to 1870, whatever were the policy of English statesmen, the literary lead in such matters lay with the school of Mill, the school of reason and science. To-day we have gone distinctly backwards. Since 1880 there has been much Celtophobic writing by distinguished literary men; the opportunist politics of Mr Gladstone has ended in a marked reaction; and though as of old there is small sign of political wisdom or knowledge on the Conservative side, there is plenty of literary prestige. It seems as if the ten years of adroit aggression in Parliament and in the constituencies by the Nationalist party under Mr Parnell, the

[1] *A Leap in the Dark*, by A. V. Dicey, 1893, p. 147.

[2] *Id.*, p. 137.

[3] It is instructive to note that in 1893 Mr Dicey pointed to the demand for an amnesty for imprisoned dynamiters as one of the aspects of the Irish cause which proved the unfitness of Irish Nationalists to wield any executive power. Now (1896) the dynamiters have been released by the Unionist Government, by way of buying Irish votes.

[4] *Ireland as a Kingdom and a Colony*, by "Brian Borohme the Younger," 1843.

anger roused by dynamite outrages, and the excitement of the final right-about-face of Mr Gladstone, had together roused dormant elements of unreason in the English people.

It is true that the tactical exigencies of the situation have modified alike the stolid refusal of the English majority to deal with the economic Irish problem on its merits, and the tendency to meet all Irish protest with primitive insult. One tentative Land Bill after another has carried us so far from the old position of *laissez-faire*, that we see a Conservative Government quarrel with the Irish landlords in the interests of the Ulster tenants, whom it fears to drive over to the side of Home Rule; and the comradeship of "loyal" Irish in general has imposed on Anglican prejudice some restraint of aspersion against "the Celt." None the less, the two hindrances remain. English curative legislation, above all Conservative legislation, is always behind the development of the economic problem, which of necessity modifies from year to year with the changing economic conditions; and English sentiment will always tend to be strongly anti-Irish so long as Irishmen lay their troubles at England's door, as they certainly will do till they have Home Rule. New expressions of the old animus against "the Celt" crop up every little while; and there is in circulation a mass of literature which was designed to inoculate it; while religious fanaticism has been developed in Ulster to a degree that a century ago would have been thought impossible, and has been thence diligently spread in England and Scotland. If there is to be any escape from the deadlock, then, it must seemingly be through Englishmen learning to see, in larger numbers than of old, that the Celtophobic explanation of the trouble, the theory of Celtic incapacity, is mere barbaric absurdity; that the religious feud is something still worse; and that if Irishmen are in more constant social trouble than their neighbours, it must be either because they are not free to manage their own affairs now, or because they have been kept deplorably backward by outside interference in the past. And to prove this afresh is the object of the following pages.

§ 2. *English and Irish.*

The question might be simplified if, before proceeding to examine historically "the Irish character," we meet English accounts of it (1) by the admission that it certainly exhibits faults, and (2) by the question whether Englishmen really sup-

pose themselves, as a nation, to be anything like faultless. That they make some such assumption might be seriously taken for granted, if it were not that one half of the English nation, broadly speaking, is chronically denouncing the other half as unprincipled, dishonourable, treacherous, and unfit to exercise political power. According to the party of Mr Balfour and Mr Chamberlain, the party of Lord Rosebery is a traitorous faction, either incapable of sane political action or shamelessly bent on sacrificing the highest interests of the nation to the mere lust of place and power. But the very framers of this indictment urge on the very faction indicted that they ought not to give Home Rule to Irish Nationalists, because *these* in turn are unfit for political power. On the principles laid down, the whole "Gladstonian" party are equally unfit, and ought to have been disfranchised. It seems impossible to doubt that the general charge against the "Gladstonians" is not believed-in by those who make it. Then, if that is but a fashion of speech, is the charge against Irish character believed-in by those who make it? Perhaps the complete explanation is that Conservatives would gladly disfranchise Liberals if they could, but, not caring to venture on such a proposal, content themselves with affirming the unfitness for self-rule of the race with which they profess to keep "united" on terms of "equality"; thus expressing to its full extent their twofold temper of hostility to the alien and to the opponent.

That Irish Nationalists are "traitors," is the beginning and end of the reasoning of many English Unionists, who find their fit poets in Mr Swinburne and Mr Kipling; and it falls to be said that if we are to pronounce logically, from the Kipling point of view, on any citizen's fitness for self-government, those politicians themselves must be reckoned about as unfit as any one not under restraint can well be. They represent the spirit of civil strife at an extreme strain; being really further from true "loyalty" to the constitution than the Nationalists they vituperate. Constitutions obviously exist just because men are quarrelsome and unreasonable. Wise men would not need any; and to argue that any amount of frowardness disentitles one's neighbours to exercise fuller self-government is to be at least as froward as they are alleged to be. To say that for self-government we need great wisdom is to shew little; for when men are really wise all round they will need no government whatever. As it is, with wisdom but scantily developed in most of us, loyalty to constitutional government consists in accepting without indecent fury any turn of affairs decided on by the majority. In brief, Irishmen cannot

possibly be more unfit for Home Rule than the Englishmen in question are for Union.

But this conclusion, however logically drawn, will of course not recommend itself to any one with Conservative sympathies; and persuasion must take a more concrete form if it can take any. And the best way to begin seems to be by asking Englishmen, in all seriousness, whether there are any faults in the Irish character which do not exist in their own in varying degrees. Quaintly enough, many of them point to the quarrelsomeness of Irish politicians among themselves as a proof of their unfitness for self-rule, when it is actually only the quarrelsomeness of English politicians that has kept the existing Irish party on the stretch up to the point of developing disastrous strife within its own ranks. Had not the English Liberal party earlier split up, as the Parnellite party did later, Home Rule would have been carried ere now, and the Parnellite party first split on a rock that would have shivered any English party whatever. It is true that the Conservative party has, in general, less internal strife than the Liberal, the reason being, not any wisdom or self-restraint among its members, but the fact that they are united mainly in order to prevent any Liberal legislation; whereas Liberals, having among them a great variety of plans, tend to divide on these.[1] But no English Conservative leader of modern times could have held his party together any better than did Mr Parnell, if he had personally figured in similar circumstances.

We shall deal later with the historical aspects of the comparison between the two races, so called; but it may be profitable at the outset to press it a little further as regards our own generation. When anti-Irish Englishmen are not speaking of Irish quarrelsomeness, they are heard to call Irishmen unstable and untruthful. The latter charge seems peculiarly supererogatory, when we remember that at any moment the leaders of parties in England are confidently believed to be untruthful by myriads of the opposite side. Hundreds of thousands of Englishmen have habitually regarded Mr Gladstone as a prevaricator. Hundreds of thousands more have rather more confidently taken the same view of his antagonists, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury. Mr Chamberlain cannot possibly be more convinced of the untrustworthiness of the Irish members with whom he used to plot, than multitudes of his own countrymen are convinced of his.

[1] Now that we have a Coalition Ministry, with a variety of plans for activity, the principle of discord at once comes into fresh play in the coalition ranks.

It seems, therefore, quite idle to discuss the question of Irish truthfulness. It can hardly matter, for purposes of practical politics. I would only note in passing, first, that Englishmen in the mass are pronounced perfidious by large numbers of Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians; secondly, that so early as the fourteenth century, Petrarch, when assigning the qualities of the nations in the entertaining way in which those things were done then as now, pronounced "craftiness" to be the special English characteristic; and, thirdly, that an accomplished and thoughtful Englishman who lived a great deal in France, the late Mr P. G. Hamerton, seemed to be somewhat of Petrarch's opinion. This is what he says[1] on the subject of comparative lying, French and English.

"I notice . . . a difference in kind and quality between French and English lying. The French are daring enough, but they are not really clever in the art. They have much audacity, but little skill. They will say what is not true with wonderful decision, and they will stick to it afterwards; but the English surpass them infinitely in craft and guile. The typical French lie is a simple, shameless invention; the typical English lie is not merely half a truth; it is entangled with half-a-dozen truths, or semblances of truth, so that it becomes most difficult to separate them. . . ."

After this, surely, the question of comparative truthfulness had better be dropped among us. The scientific fact seems to be that we all—all nations, that is—lie more or less, some in haste, some otherwise.

But the question of temperamental instability is worth discussing seriously. "Hysteria" used to be charged against Irishmen in the lump by some Englishmen, before "Ulsteria" became so epidemic: the phrase "the blind hysterics of the Celt" is one of the late Lord Tennyson's contributions to sociology. It happened that he was in his own politics, as in his philosophy of life,[2] one of the most hysterical men of genius of his time; some of his leading competitors in that character being men of his own political way of thinking, as Mr Carlyle and Dr Tyndall. But it is not necessary to rest here on a mere *tu quoque:* for it can be demonstrated that almost all the well-known English men of letters who in recent times have taken it upon them to expose the instability of the Irish character are themselves, to the medical

[1] *French and English*, 1889, p. 186.

[2] Compare *The Two Voices* and *In Memoriam*, in which the final problems of philosophy are disposed of in terms of mere hysteria.

and to the critical eye, visibly hysterical. Kingsley, who was one of the first prophets of the "Teutonic forefather" gospel in England; who made even sentimental patriots wince by his oracle, "the hosts of our (Teutonic) forefathers were the hosts of God"; and who aspersed the character of the Irish in mass, was, I suppose, the most flagrantly hysterical type in all modern literature. He seemed incapable of writing a page save in a tumult of hysteria; so that even the charm and the sincerity of his character cannot save much of his writing from being nauseous; and the constant affectation of strength cannot disguise the real weakness. And he has many congeners, of his own and other ethical schools. Take, after Mr Carlyle and Dr Tyndall, such distinguished writers as Mr Froude, Mr Goldwin Smith, Mr Swinburne, and Mr Kipling. Mr Froude and Mr Smith are dealt with separately in another part of this volume, for such readers as may demand rigorous demonstration; but I fancy that any really cool-headed and critical reader will admit at once that they are emphatically hysterical types, incapable of consistency, vacillating, blusterous, gustily sentimental, childishly self-contradictory, in a word, weakly emotional where for just judgment or wise counsel there is needed a high degree of sanity and coherence. As for Mr Kipling, his way of dealing with Irish matters, where meant to be funny, is lamentable, and where meant to be serious is very funny. This writer unconsciously typifies, with a success worthy of his own genius for type-drawing (to which I have pleasure in bearing here an impartial testimony), the extreme simplicity of the mental processes of his party. Whatsoever race happens at any moment to be the object of Mr Kipling's patriotic distrust is conceived of by him as consisting in mass of cads and cowards. Thus in one story he triumphantly presents an excessively caddish Russian officer as a type of everything Russian: there is no admission of possible exceptions. Natives of India in the mass, barring the specially warlike tribes, are commonly presented by him as cowards; but when in the tale a hysterical native prince, in the fulness of his loyalty to Her Majesty, goes as far as even after-banquet decorum will permit in the way of insulting the solitary Russian officer, Mr Kipling gleefully presents him as a hero who will be of value on the English side in what Mr Lang eloquently calls "that dreadful battle drawing nigh, to thunder through the Afghan passes sheer." So with Mr Kipling's treatment of the Irish problem. So long as Irishmen are content to fight for "the Queen, God bless her," Mr Kipling joyously recognises their merits. Mul-

vaney is his favourite soldier. But inasmuch as most Irishmen choose to work for Home Rule, and some of them commit brutal outrages, Mr Kipling sees, with the eye of genius, that the tendency to certain specific forms of outrage is hereditary in the stock; and so he constructs for us the pleasing tale of the Thibetan offspring of a disaffected Irish soldier who spontaneously take to cutting off cows' tails by night to avenge themselves in a quarrel. If only there had been any strong movement for Home Rule in the Scotch Highlands, with some of the crimes which follow on intense agrarain discontent, we should doubtless have had from Mr Kipling a similar tale concerning the Scottish Celt, as an offset to the study of "The Drums of the Fore and Aft," where the Celts are perhaps a little too favourably contrasted with the unlucky regiment of raw English. Mr Kipling can adjust his muse to most exigencies. When the late Mr Parnell, in his overbalanced contempt for English opinion, was reckless enough to meet a piece of cross-examination on an old speech with the remark that on a particular occasion he had perhaps "sought to deceive the House," Mr Kipling rose to heights of moral indignation where the Nonconformist conscience itself could scarcely breathe, and delivered a withering sermon in verse on the subject. One is disposed to meet it by asking Mr Kipling whether Mr Parnell was not as much entitled to latitude of exposition as he? Is all the deceit to be on the English side? Might it not suggest itself to a man with some sense of humour, and some eye for courage, that Mr Parnell did but show himself a stronger man than the unavowed prevaricators on the other side of the dispute? Is Mr Parnell's method so peculiar, in comparison with Lord Salisbury's direction to Lord Lytton to "make a pretext," in his dealings with Afghanistan; or with the systematic prevarication of the Foreign Office in Parliament on such a matter as the invasion of the Soudan?

The spectacle of Mr Kipling's political and ethnological propaganda leads us to a conclusion which it is often profitable to keep in mind—that a great deal of harm can be done in the world by irrational men of genius. For there is such a thing as irrational genius, as there is such a thing as witty stupidity; and both forces play a great part in most political strifes. In the case of Mr Swinburne, therefore, we may let the ascription of genius pass without qualification, leaving his verse in the mass to those who think it great poetry, only pointing out that of the several qualities which can fitly secure for the political opinions of a poet or anyone else a title to respect, Mr Swinburne's

poetry exhibits at most one—that of enthusiasm. Of wisdom or weight of character, of measure, of decent self-restraint, of gravity of reflection on disturbing themes, no English poet has ever given less sign. Furious abuse of Frenchmen in the mass, after loud laudation of Frenchmen in the mass; unworthy abuse of Walt Whitman after fervent acclamation of Walt Whitman; these are among the later illustrations Mr Swinburne has given us of his stability and his sense. If Irishmen lack strength, and self-control, and constancy, they are hardly to be convicted of it by the author of "Songs before Sunrise."

For many readers, it must be quite unnecessary to press these unpleasant points. Men with any turn for discrimination must have noted how little of solidity or strength enters into most literary proclamations of the greatness of English character; how much of windy weakness there is in the English rhetoricians who ascribe to weakness of character the misfortunes of the Irish people. Even on the Unionist side, the championship of Mr Froude and Mr Swinburne must cause some misgivings. And as regards the interference of poets in political disputes generally, the recent exhibitions of the Poet Laureate have done something to bring home to the public mind the fact that though a poet may happen to be inspired by a good cause, he is no better a judge of causes than anybody else; and that the opinion of the Poet Laureate on political problems has no more special weight than that of the President of the Royal Academy, or the head of the Academy of Music. But if we are to judge the frame of mind of the English majority by the general run of the literature of Unionism, we cannot escape the conviction that these outcries of primitive passion and prejudice find a ready echo and applause among a multitude similarly disposed, and thus tend to fix and worsen a state of mind which, being often entered into with youthful haste or in momentary exasperation, might otherwise yield to criticism and reflection. So the spirit of racial malice persists: indeed, the very nature of the dispute tends to foster it. It is almost inevitable that there should still be attacks by Irishmen on English character in the lump; and such attacks would produce rejoinders in the lump, even if there were not still the English disposition to make the aggression. Matters which, to a considerate eye, are in nowise proofs of deficiency in Irish character, are often founded on as justifying English disrespect. The composition of the Irish Nationalist party or parties, for instance, is often pointed to as proving a low level of qualification for political life in Ireland. Now, so far are the

shortcomings of the Nationalist party from justifying such a verdict, it may rather be said in fairness that in the circumstances the composition of that party did great credit to the Home Rule cause. The English Conservative party draws freely for its representation on the educated and monied leisure class, whose interests are mostly maintained by Conservatism: it numbers scores of university men, and hundreds of men of large incomes, among its parliamentary representatives. The Irish Nationalist party on the other hand, being the party of the peasantry, had almost no countenance from the educated and monied leisure class in Ireland, which is proportionally so much smaller to begin with, and had to draw its representatives from the ranks of its unmonied adherents, being able to offer them only the somewhat precarious support derivable from the subscriptions of the Irish race to the cause. Further, during Mr Parnell's life the party was certainly ruled in Parliament with a high hand. Strong and capable Irishmen, accordingly, might well hesitate to become parliamentary members of the Nationalist party even when they thoroughly sympathised with it, preferring to earn a surer income and play a freer part outside. Yet, withal, the party got together a number of representatives of good debating power, and despite some ruffianism the average of capacity and character was respectable; whereas in the large and rich English Conservative party the proportion of members of good debating power is very small, and the general level of capacity is noticeably low; to say nothing of the fact that that party in the past has given abundant proofs of its capacity for ruffianism. The general level of parliamentary capacity in any community can be properly tested only by establishing payment of members. It seems likely that if that existed in the United Kingdom, the Irish Nationalist party in Parliament would compare very well, man for man, with any other, save in the matter of leaders, who can only be made by long experience.

The strifes of the Irish Nationalist party after Mr Parnell's death, finally, while sufficiently unfortunate for the cause, are no extraordinary phenomena. They might even have been predicted. The organisation of the party by Mr Parnell was premature in the measure in which it was arbitrary: the dominance of one man, in this as in other fields of political action, is the worst of all securities for future harmonious procedure among the persons dominated. Disunion among Irish Nationalists after Mr Parnell's death was as natural as disunion among English Commonwealth men after Cromwell's death; and if the one phenomenon prove

political incapacity, so does the other. The German Socialist party at this moment are only withheld from internal strife by the severe pressure of the police laws against them. A self-governing and harmoniously co-operating party can only be built up by a lengthened tentative process; and Englishmen of any party must be singularly oblivious of their own political history if they see anything out-of-the-way in the dissensions of the Irish party as recently constituted, and as recently perturbed. It is merely the determined injustice of faction that can let Englishmen at this time of day fall back, as so many do, on the formula that the Nationalists were only held together by the Saxon domination of Mr Parnell, and have proved the unworkableness of an Irish Parliament. This line of argument, following on former dialectic, leads to awkward results. While Mr Parnell held his party together, he was habitually vilified by his English antagonists as a liar. Now that he is dead, they describe him as a "born leader of men," who was so in virtue of his Saxon descent. It does not seem to strike these ethnologists that they are now committed to the following twofold proposition:—

Mr Parnell was of purely English stock and English type.

Mr Parnell was a liar and trickster in politics.

From which it would seem to follow once more that unveracity is not an Irish or "Celtic" specialty, and that the philosophy of race-malice is a very risky weapon.

Still it is not to be hoped, of course, that these considerations will suffice to upset the fallacy of race prejudice in minds where it has long held sway. It is too old and too common a form of error to be readily discredited even by obvious logical rebuttals. The most discouraging fact in the case is the frequent reappearance and persistence of the fallacy, in its crudest form, among men with far more pretension to science than the average English Conservative, and in countries where better things might have been looked for. Though the war of 1870 did much to develop sanity of international estimate among Frenchmen, I have heard men of that nation, above the average in culture, express a quite naïf sense of the superiority of their race in hereditary qualities to the Italian. And whereas at the beginning of this century, and even after the fall of Napoleon, there had seemed to exist among historians and sociological writers in Germany a very general superiority to the vulgar instincts of racial malice and racial conceit, these instincts have since exhibited themselves, above all since 1870, more abundantly and more crudely in German historical literature than in any other. Sometimes it is merely

France that is disparaged; sometimes it is "the Latin races," so-called, that are comprehensively convicted of decadence. But the old dogma of innate racial qualities seems the favourite standing-ground. The doctrine of an innate and primordial excellence in the "Teutonic" character, and of an innate and primordial inferiority in the "Celtic" character—the latter being exemplified by France, and the former by United Germany (Austria not counting)—this teaching has, for a generation back, been flaunted with such crudity of arrogance, such fatuity of dogmatism, by a number of German writers of good repute as serious students of history, that it has become a little difficult for even an impartial outsider to escape the kindred hallucination of regarding Germany in the mass as thus fatuous; to remember that there, as elsewhere, there are sane and cosmopolitan thinkers and teachers, who recognise the importance of all civilised nations to each other's culture and well-being, and turn their backs on the blatancy of animal instinct which calls itself patriotism.[1]

There have been, and doubtless still are, Englishmen of the Teutomaniacal school who are well-pleased with these German demonstrations against France. Among the general run of English anti-Celticists, however, there is a prudent recoil from such lengths of consistency. Those who find the root of all Irish evil in the Celticity of the Celt are fain to surmise that the frugal and prosperous peasantry of France must be somehow non-Celtic, in order to account for its success. Those who know "Celtic" Brittany, too, have noted that there is, as one French ethnologist has put it, an "astonishing difference" between the average Breton and the average Irish temperament, the first so often grave and restrained, the second so often light-hearted and brilliant. The French, accordingly, are classed in mass, by some of our worst Celtophobes, in some other category, many counting them Teutons, on the score of the Germanic quality of the Franks. Yet the German patriots above characterised continue to speak of France very much as our Unionists speak of Ireland. A glance at the Franco-German controversy, then, may be a not unprofitable preliminary to a brief scrutiny of the whole racial question, which alone seems likely to shake the confidence of our amateur ethnologists in their simple solutions of sociological problems.

[1] For instance, the late Professor Curtius, whose tone contrasted nobly with that of some of his fellow-historians. And one who can hardly be called a "sane" teacher, Nietsche, has sharply countered the current tone of German self-praise.

§ 3. *French and Germans.*

In the classic works of historical science produced in France last century, there is little or no sign of any belief in any special qualities of race persisting independently of the influences of civilisation in general, and of institutions in particular. In the seventeenth century there had been a good deal of discussion among scholars as to the pedigree of the ancient Gauls, some insisting that the classical descriptions proved them to be Germans, others showing that their language was clearly non-Germanic.[1] After the philological discussion had died down, there was established a certain official doctrine as to the Germanic origin of the Kingdom of modern France; but to any ethnological implications of that doctrine the new rationalists were substantially indifferent. The two main works of Montesquieu are written not so much in contradiction as in disregard of any thesis of racial heredity; his treatise on the rise and decay of the Roman power being a study of the reactions of institutions; while the *Esprit des Lois* recognises physiological causation only in respect of the influence on character which it attributes to climate. He speaks of "our fathers the ancient Germans,"[2] accepting the current academic view; and there he lets the matter stand. In Voltaire's *Essai sur les Mœurs*, again, there is no suggestion that nations, as such, have unchangeable idiosyncrasies, good or bad. The cosmopolitan attitude of the French philosophic school was averse to any such supposition. They bore no ill-will to Prussia for the victories of Frederick, any more than to England for the victories of Marlborough. Looking and working for a reign of reason, they saw brothers in the enlightened men of all countries; and while they of course noted social differences, paid compliments to foreign excellences, jested at foreign imperfections, and admitted of a certain patriotic pride, such as is seen in Voltaire's *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, they never made their philosophy an instrument of race prejudice. It is fair to say that they had little temptation to do so. Montesquieu and Voltaire in particular were read with admiration throughout Europe; ultra-Protestant Scotland sat at their feet in the persons of a whole school of historical students; and Frederick the Great, so far from representing any Teutomania, read and wrote only French; while the

[1] See Roget, Baron de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie Gauloise*, Ptie. I., *Glossaire Gaulois*, 1858, p. 19, sq.; and Holzmann, *Kelten und Germanen*, Stuttgart, 1855, S. 2, sq., for sketches of the old dispute.

[2] *Esprit des Lois*, l. vi., ch. 18; l. xiv., ch. 14.

Berlin Royal Society astonished Goldsmith by carrying on its transactions in that language. Only in the acrid criticisms of Corneille's and Voltaire's tragedies by Lessing do we thus far catch the note of race prejudice, in the implication that there is a question of German *versus* French bound up with every question of artistic method, and in the unconcealed resentment at the vogue of French taste in Germany.[1]

It was inevitable, however, that, in the awakening of sociological speculation set up by such writers as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, the old conception of race characteristics should be revived; and as a matter of fact we find it developed elaborately enough in the anonymous treatise *La Physique de l'Histoire, ou Considérations générales sur les Principes élémentaires du Tempérament et du Caractère naturel des Peuples*, published in 1765. There, as in nearly all the philosophical treatises of the time, the position taken up is avowedly deistic; the writer even professes Christianity; but the Biblical account of things is no less avowedly set aside: and the writer seeks in the knowledge and the quasi-scientific lore of his time a naturalistic explanation, first of differences of aspect in races, and then of differences of temperament. He rejects the fantastic theory of Maupertuis[2] that the "first mother" may have been created with a store of "ova of different colours," destined to evolve in different orders, so that one day the white ova of Europe may give out, and the white races change colour, and *vice versa* with the black. Insisting on the simplicity of Nature, the essayist supplies a schema which certainly has that quality, his short and simple doctrine being that, as there are three main Zones, the northern, the southern, and the temperate, so there are three corresponding temperaments, the northern being (somehow) "hot" as well as "humid," the southern "dry" and "phlegmatic," while the temperate represents a golden mean. In practice, there results thoughtless violence among the northerns, adroitness in substitution for force among the southerns, and a due balance of tendencies among the midway populations. The endless diffi-

[1] "That a German should think for himself," jeers Lessing in the *Dramaturgie* (§ 32), "that of himself he should have the audacity to doubt of the superiority of a Frenchman—who can imagine such a thing?" The soreness thus expressed was, of course, not new in German life (see for instance, a citation in Ernest Newman's *Gluck and the Opera*, 1895, p. 216); but it is with Lessing that it first begins to make itself widely felt in literature. August von Schlegel carries it on.

[2] *Venus Physique*, Ptie II., ch. 2.

culties which the essayist's classification sets up are successively disposed of by jugglings with the machinery of climate and "the humours"; and when he comes to the chronic charge of "fickleness" against the French he sagaciously explains[1] that the hot and humid northern temperament lacks "vivacity of soul," the senses being vehement, but the intelligence sluggish; while the dry temperament of the south causes an excess of reflection, and so a lack of decision. The two opposite conditions of the humours thus make northerns and southerns alike unfitted for prompt action; hence their unjust imputation of levity to the midway French, who are neither sluggish nor over-calculating, but just prompt enough. It all constitutes an entertaining sample of the nationalist prepossession. Yet with all its naïveté the argument at times puts on a philosophic face, as in the plea[2] that nations are mutually complementary in the scheme of things, aiding each other by difference of function as do individuals in any one society; and in the concluding decision, chiming with that of Anacharsis, that the power of reason and law may override all physical influences.

Such a fluctuating body of sentiment, however, even apart from the obvious incoherence of its physiological system of "humours," could not long hold the ground; and accordingly, when later the revived nationalist prejudice in France took a definite shape, it was in more concrete theses, such as that of the renowned La Tour d'Auvergne, who, scholar as well as warrior, and equally in earnest in both pursuits, undertook to show that the people of his beloved Brittany were the true descendants of the ancient Gauls, and that not only was their language the ancient Gallic, but it was more ancient than Latin, which derived many words from it. His work, which though extravagant is not without merit, revived older researches[3] and stimulated new.

In the play of new intellectual forces which followed on the fall of the Empire and the restoration of peace, the sentiment of race, like others, took on a more considerate form. While Sismondi, Guizot, and Augustin Thierry were deciphering and constructing anew the history of the nation, Amedée Thierry, the brother of Augustin, was working specially at the problem of its racial origins. His book, though still familiar, is superseded for

[1] P. 266 *sq.* [2] P. 242.

[3] The *Origines Gauloises* of La Tour d'Auvergne (third and posthumous edition, Hamburg, 1801) proceeds upon the *Antiquité de la nation gauloise*, by D. Pezron, Paris, 1704, and the *Histoire des Celtes* of Simon Pelloutier (pastor of the French church in Berlin), Paris, 1771.

students by works of greater critical circumspection, resting on the much fuller archæological knowledge of later years; but it is of importance in culture-history for its statement, from a scholarly French point of view, of the traditional conception of the "Gallic" character, which the two Thierrys supposed to persist through the ages. While undertaking to give "to the subdivisions of the race their proper shades and their distinctive character," he insisted that "the Gallic race shows itself constantly identical with itself"; and he thus sets its character forth :—

"Let us open ancient history: let us follow in their brigand ages two hordes, one of Gauls, one of Germans: the situation is the same: on the two sides an equal ignorance, brutality, barbarism: but how one feels nevertheless that nature has not cast these men in the same mould! . . .

"The salient traits of the Gaulish family, those which most differentiate it, in my opinion, from the other human families, may be thus summarised: a personal bravery which is not equalled among the ancient peoples; a frank and impetuous spirit, open to all impressions, eminently intelligent; but along with that an extreme mobility, no constancy, a marked repugnance to the ideas of discipline and order prevailing among the Germanic races, great ostentation, in fine, a perpetual disunion, the fruit of excessive vanity. If one should summarily compare the Gaulish family with that Germanic family which we have just named, one might say that the personal sentiment, the individual *me*, is too much developed with the first, and that with the other it is not enough. Thus we find on every page of the history of the Gauls, original personages who keenly excite and concentrate on themselves our sympathy, making us forget the masses; while in the history of the Germans it is usually from the masses that all the impression comes."[1]

We have here little more than an uncritical repetition, by a Frenchman, of the comments passed on the ancient Galli by ancient writers, in particular Polybius, Cæsar, and Tacitus, from a Roman point of view; the old charge of disunity being endorsed presumably on the ground that modern France had undergone civil wars and revolutions; no inquiry being made as to whether the Germanic races had not had very similar fortunes. The value of the psychological distinction between the Gaul and the German may be speedily estimated from the fact that Giesebrecht, a modern German historian of the Teutophile school, has selected as the supreme Germanic

[1] *Histoire des Gaulois*, 1828, Tom. I., Introd., pp. iv.-v.

characteristic exactly that which Thierry finds so peculiarly Gallic—the untameable self-assertion of the *ego*, "the stiff subjectivity of the German nature (*des deutschen Wesens*) which admits of no outward restraint, even the holiest, when it is irritated or menaced."[1] But, whatever the value of Thierry's estimate, it was obviously well-fitted to pass current as the true account of French character among the enemies of France, especially among the Germans, whom it so generously certificated with a gift for discipline and order.

And it did not stand alone in French literature. In the turmoil of French politics, after the tyranny of the First Empire and the collapse of the Restoration, with the Conservative reactionaries abusing the generation of the Revolution, and the Liberals deploring the success of the reaction, there grew up a French tendency to visit on the French character the faults of both sides. The late M. Fustel de Coulanges, in a review of the first volume of Zeller's *Histoire d'Allemagne* in 1872, charges it in particular against the Liberal school of French historians and publicists for a long time back, that they had been wont to play into the hands of the enemy by wilfully blackening their own race, and gratuitously extolling that which had now become the enemy of enemies.[2] In their resentment of the elements of anarchy and of tyranny, which had alternately cursed their country for generations, the Liberal school, said M. Fustel, had turned in bitterness against France itself, and heaped upon the motherland aspersions which her rivals gleefully took for verities, coming as they did from French mouths. Perhaps M. Fustel exaggerated the amount of anti-Gallic criticism put out by his countrymen. One does not see in the popular histories of his Liberal predecessors any such cessation of normal patriotism as he implies: on the contrary, Michelet and Martin seem to have a sufficiency of pride in their country and their race.[3] On the other hand, M. Fustel clearly exaggerated the

[1] Cited by Zeller, *Histoire d'Allemagne*, Tom. II., Avant-propos, p. xvii.

[2] *Cp.* Buchez, *Histoire de la Formation de la Nationalité Française*, Introd.

[3] It is noteworthy that Dr Bodichon, who fifty years ago worked out a theory of racial types, puts all the Celts into his *blond* category, marked by the traits usually credited to the Teutons in particular, setting against that a *brown* race, marked by most of the defects commonly imputed to the Celts, but including such superior types as Hannibal, Cæsar, Cicero, Michelangelo, and Napoleon. Cuvier he puts, with Newton and Luther and Washington, among the blonds.—(*Etudes sur l'Algérie*, Alger, 1847.)

amount of blatant patriotism in Germany when he gave out that there had been virtually nothing but self-glorification and contempt of France in the modern treatment of French history by Germans. There have always been, as we have said, sane cosmopolitans in modern Germany as in other countries; and one of the most emphatic assertions which Fustel and Zeller could cite of the indebtedness of Germany to neighbouring civilisations was made by Waitz in his History of the German constitution. It was the German Holtzmann, again, who in his *Kelten und Germanen* revived the seventeenth century theory that the Gauls of history were actually Germans; and before him the German Leo had set forth a "Celtomaniac" thesis of which, according to Buchez,[1] he had to cut short the publication, by reason of the patriotic resentment it aroused. But it remains true, I think, that there has been more of impartial criticism of France by French publicists than has been bestowed on their own country by the publicists of any other; while there has been more of crude and puerile self-glorification done for Germany by German historians during the past fifty years than can be matched in the serious literature of any of the other leading European States in that period. It almost outdoes the English self-praise of the generation of Waterloo. And though Germany had clearly profited enormously by French influence in the eighteenth century, there had been little recent German acknowledgment of that in comparison with the amount of French eulogy bestowed on modern Germany for her services to culture. It was not only that, as M. Fustel observed, French Liberals gave a rash credit to the Germanic stock for all manner of primeval merit, and for vaguely vast services to the cause of self-government from time immemorial, but that they were disposed to see in German science the proofs of unique intellectual gifts, also to be set down to the credit of race. The language of Taine on this head, dating from his early Liberal period, remains to show how far the disinterested appreciation of young Frenchmen for things German could carry them in the two decades before Sedan:—

"From 1780 to 1830, Germany has produced all the ideas of our historic age; and during half-a-century to come, during a century perhaps, our main business will be to re-think them (*de les repenser*). . . .

"At the end of the last century there arose the German philosophic genius, which, having engendered a new metaphysic, a new theology,

[1] *Histoire de la Formation de la Nationalité Française*, Introd.

a new poesy, a new literature, a new linguistic, a new erudition, descends at this moment into the sciences and continues their evolution. No spirit more original, more universal, more fecund in consequences of every bearing and of every kind, has shown itself for three hundred years. . . .

"In the power of discovering general ideas . . . no nation and no age [has excelled] these Germans. That is their dominant faculty: it is by this force that they have produced what they have done. This gift is properly the gift of comprehending (*begreifen*). By it we reach synthetic conceptions (*conceptions d'ensemble — begriffe*): we unite under a master-idea all the scattered parts of a subject; we see under the divisions of a group the common tie which unites them. . . . It is the philosophic faculty *par excellence;* and in fine it is the philosophic faculty which has stamped its seal on all their works. By that means they have vivified dry studies which had only seemed fit to give occupation to pedants. By that, they have divined the involuntary and primitive logic which has created and organised languages, the great ideas which are hidden in every work of art, the deep poetic emotions and the vague metaphysical intuitions which have engendered myths and religions. By it they have divined the spirit of ages, of civilisations, and of races, and transformed into a system of laws of history what was only a pile of facts. By it, they have re-discovered or renewed the meaning of dogmas, re-united God to the world, man to nature, mind to matter, and perceived the successive concatenation and the original necessity of the forms of which the universe is the synthesis. By it they have made a linguistic, a criticism, an æsthetic, an exegesis, a history, a theology, and a metaphysic so new that they long remained unintelligible and could only be expressed by a special language. And this proclivity has proved so imperious that it has submitted to its empire the arts and poesy itself."[1]

And so on. We need not here do more than notice how little all this line of affirmation is reconcilable with other passages in the same work, as this:—

"The more one studies the Latin races and literatures in contrast with the Germanic, the more one becomes convinced that the peculiar and distinctive gift of the *former* is the art of *developing*, that is to say, of arranging ideas in continuous lines . . . by calculated transitions, with a regular progress. Jonson has acquired in his study of the ancients the habit of decomposing ideas, to unrol them piece by piece and in their natural order." . . .[2]

[1] *Histoire de la littérature anglaise*, v. 268-272.

[2] *Id.*, ii. 106.

A want of real co-ordination, a habit of random generalisation, flaws all Taine's sociological work. But what we are here concerned to note, as regards his eulogy of the Germans, is first its generosity, and secondly its extravagance. He has heaped up praise without a hint of detraction. And all the while it stood on scientific record, that of the most important generalising ideas of modern science, in the period mentioned, the majority had come from his own race, from Laplace, Lavoisier, Lamarck, Bichat, Cuvier, St Hilaire; while on the other hand, the successive theologies and metaphysical systems of Germany had been nullifying and undermining each other, and the German literature, at the moment of writing, exhibited an almost complete stoppage of inspiration. Taine, in truth, probably knew but little in detail concerning the manifold product he had been so confidently extolling. In any case, we may with better grounded confidence say to-day, that of the great mass of German theoretic construction of which he speaks, laborious and earnest as it undoubtedly was, an enormous amount has since been undone by German and other hands,[1] having been found ill-based, premature, incoherent, unsubstantial; and that while much good fresh work is always being done by Germans in practical science and practical research, German imaginative literature is now, and has been for a generation, mostly unoriginal, uninfluential, uninitiative. Germany, in fact, turns out to be like other countries, an amalgam of strength and weakness, insight and shortsightedness, achievement and failure.[2]

On the German side, however, apart from the searching and disinterested self-criticism set up by the Socialist movement (which again derived practically from English and French stimuli) there has been a growing tendency to self-exaltation, partly on the strength of such foreign praise as Taine's, partly on the strength of militarist vanity. Before 1870, Prussian official self-sufficiency had abundantly expressed itself[3] in depreciation

[1] Compare the tone of Noiré on the German thinking of the previous generation, when, he says, the writings of Theodor Waitz were "little regarded and less esteemed" because "all minds were under the spell of the Schelling-Hegelian phrase-mongering, and all healthy thought was stifled" (*Max Müller and the Philosophy of Language*, 1879, p. 48). I do not cite Noiré as a critic of any great judgment, but simply as exhibiting the upset made.

[2] It is true that epoch-marking work in imaginative literature has in the same period been produced by Scandinavians. But the same is true of Russians, who as Slavs used to be Teutonically disparaged like the Celts.

[3] Concerning the Gallophobia of the middle of the century, see Eberweck, *L'Allemagne et les Allemands*, 1851, p. 601.

of France, though the general temper of the people had not yet taken on that tone.[1] We are told, for instance, that even when the French prisoners were arriving in hosts during the war, there was manifested towards them a sentiment of self-diffident respect by the German civilians.[2] But M. Zeller, beginning his special studies for his history ten years before the war, had already been stung by the arrogance of German writers on the respective origins and the contrasted history of the two peoples. Moral worth and political capacity had been alike arrogated to the "Teutonic," and denied to the "Celtic" stock by a series of German specialists in the name of historical science; and M. Zeller, whose family was of German descent but entirely French sentiment for some generations back,[3] and who combined with sufficient German erudition a due measure of French incisiveness, proceeded to let the stuffing out of the German legend with much assiduity. It was impossible that any one work should put an end to the uproar of foolish patriotism beyond the Rhine; but M. Zeller's work, though finally an unsatisfactory history, lacking due gestation and tending unduly to loose polemic, remains a useful corrective of the more flatulent forms of Teutonic historiography, as well as of the anti-patriotic bias in France. It is a grievous thing that history should ever have to be written in such a spirit; but the blame lies with the side which first weighted the scales. When German historians systematically represent their race as monopolising private and public virtue, chastity and the political faculty, it becomes needful that some non-German should emphatically tell the truth about Merovingian vice and the long epochs of miserable anarchy in German history. As M. Fustel sums up the first volumes :—

"He (Zeller) shows that Germany, as a civilised nation, is the product of Rome and of Gaul. He makes always clear a characteristic fact: it is that progress, intellectual, social, and moral, has never taken place in the Germanic race by an internal development, and was never the fruit of an indigenous effort. It has arisen solely from without. From without has come to the Germans Christianity, implanted by the

[1] Holtzmann in 1855 speaks of the then "so-called Frenchman-eaters, *die Sogenannten Franzosenfresser*" (*Kelten und Germanen*, Vorrede, S. xiii.).

[2] See the article of Mr A. Eubule Evans, on "Germany under the Empire" in the *Contemporary Review*, February 1896, p. 167.

[3] Yet he was denounced as a "renegade" in the German press on the appearance of the first volumes of his history.

puissant sword of Charlemagne ; from without came those who taught them to build cities ; from without came laws which were something else than vague customs, a justice which was something else than private war and *wergeld*, a liberty which was something more than turbulence. Germany has received from without chivalry ; from without civic liberty ; from without the idea of empire ; from without letters and sciences ; from without universities, copies of the ancient Parisian school ; from without Gothic art, an imitation of the French cathedrals ; from without religious tolerance, taught by France to the Catholics, and by Holland to the Protestants. A German has made the avowal that 'the German race has never, of its own qualities and without an exterior impulsion, made a single step towards civilisation.'[1] M. Zeller notes in fact that from Cæsar and Tacitus to Charlemagne, that is to say, during eight centuries, Germany has given the spectacle, so rare in civilisation, of a country absolutely stationary, always barbarous, always hostile to the civilisation which flourished near it. To civilise there was needed force : the warriors of Charlemagne had to march twenty times from the banks of the Rhine, of the Seine, of the Loire, to protect in Germany the missionaries and the builders of cities. Germany did not *make* progress ; she received it, she underwent it."[2]

And yet it is to be noted, to the credit of French scholarship, that there was prompt deprecation on the French side, even in 1872, of the spirit in which Zeller wrote. He was actually

[1] M. Fustel has somewhat altered the quotation as given by Zeller. It is from Waitz, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, iii. :—"The German race would never of its own qualities and without an exterior impulsion and a rupture of its own traditions, have arrived at a superior development."

[2] Fustel de Coulanges, *L'Histoire en France et en Allemagne* (1872), reprinted in *Questions Historiques*, 1893, pp. 14-15. M. Fustel would doubtless have admitted, on challenge, that what he here says of the derivative character of German civilisation is at bottom equally true of all the northern civilisations, including the ancient Gallic and the historic French. It may be as well, however, to take due note of the fact here. The verdict of rational sociology must be that all modern European civilisation derives from the seeds of the ancient, and that the difference between Germany and France is mainly one of time, or order of development ; and as regards Germany the point has to be specially pressed only because of the vogue of the hallucination as to the self-civilising power of the Teutonic race. It is inconceivable that either France or Germany, peopled by any primitive race whatever, could to-day have reached anything like a high state of civilisation, either material or intellectual, had it not been for contact with the previous civilisations of the south. And in the south, too, the civilisation of Greece was clearly secondary to that of Egypt and Phœnicia, and the civilisation of Rome to that of Greece. (The theory of the case is set forth in the "Synthetic Summary" of the author's work on *Buckle and his Critics*, and in the *Free Review*, November, 1894, p. 173.)

blamed by many of his own countrymen, somewhat unfairly, for letting any trace of national animosity appear in his work; and he had to defend himself in a second preface wherein he dwelt anew on the German provocation, of which, sooth to say, some of his critics were unaware, reading as they did only in their own language. M. Fustel de Coulanges, whose agreement with Zeller's general estimate we have seen, put the verdict of historic science weightily enough:—

"It is not our recent disasters that have taught M. Zeller to know Germany. The book which he has just published was written ten years ago. The preface alone is new; and it is not that which we praise here: we even venture to say that it makes a blemish, that it lowers a work of pure science. It savours of enmity, and we would not have a historian an enemy. It is made for war; and we do not hold in France that a history should be a work of war. Even in the body of the work, too often a note of bitterness is heard. The author seems to have an antipathy and even a rancour towards his subject. He tells only the truth; but he does not hide the fact that he is pleased when the truth is unfavourable to Germany. The matter is that of exact and sure erudition: the form is too often that of recrimination and ill-will. . . . Assuredly it were preferable that history should always have a more pacific mien; that it should remain a pure and absolutely disinterested science. We would fain see it poised in the serene regions where there are neither passions nor rancours nor desires for vengeance. We demand of it that charm of perfect impartiality which is the chastity of history."

But historiography has not yet reached that stage, because historians in Germany even more than elsewhere, are apt to be mere instruments of the ruling ideal of the hour,[1] and so we cannot well have history written on a high plane for a society living in the main on the low plane of imperialism and military pride. Few eminent heads in Germany seemed to have resisted the intoxication of 1870. Mommsen and Strauss, both already tainted with racial malice, alike figured as mouthpieces of the insolence of victory, as if prouder to shout for once with the mob than to think in the study at the time when, of all times, the mob could be left to shout for itself. Let it be written of them that, claiming to be scientific historians, they had not

[1] Unfortunately the tendency is not confined to the province of historiography. It affects ethics, economics, and philosophy. Compare Levy-Bruhl, *L'Allemagne depuis Leibniz*, pp. 391-394, as to the fashion in which Hegel reshaped his political philosophy to suit his environment at Berlin.

enough of science or of sanity to rise at a critical moment above the most commonplace of passions; or, feeling it, had not the civilisedness to refrain from crudest expression of it. Mommsen's utterances remain to testify how much of scientific good faith underlies his partisan treatment of ancient history. At the outset of the war, he declaimed on the peace-loving disposition of his country, on its guiltlessness of aggression—the old formula from the region which had of old sent out more aggressors than any other in Europe; which had given almost the last great European illustration of absolutely wanton and unprovoked aggression, in the case of Frederick; and whose rulers, we now know, had zealously planned the very war in hand. But no sooner were the German arms seen to be carrying all before them than Mommsen, at the official hint, produced a historic demonstration that Alsace and Lorraine, in virtue of race heredity, rightly "belonged" to Germany. It was not a straightforward affirmation of the law of *væ victis*, of the title of the victor of the spoils; it was a mock-moral pretence of uniting a formerly German population to the new German empire on ethico-historical grounds. Carlyle thought fit to illustrate the depth of his ethics by taking up the same parable in England. No more transparent sophistry, however, was ever published by a scholar. On the principle laid down by Mommsen, as Fustel reminded him, Germany was entitled to annex by force a large part of Switzerland, and even Holland; France was entitled to annex much of Belgium and Switzerland; Austria was equally entitled to reannex parts of Germany; and England was entitled to try to reconquer the United States.

Historians who can reason in that fashion will not stick at trifles; and Mommsen has contributed to the world's stock of vain phrases his opinion that the "Celtic race" is "politically useless." Of the moral and scientific worth of that opinion in turn we shall speak later, only noting here that it passes current with multitudes of those Germans and English who think that all things said in the name of science are scientific, and that archæological learning is a security for wisdom. So there goes on a sham scientific war of words between the writing sections of the two States, in addition to the chronic exchanges of insolence between the journals, Germany doing most of the output in the former department,[1] whatever France may do in the latter.

[1] "The Frenchman has certainly a complacent belief in his own pre-eminence. And as certainly it lies latent at the back of British thought. But nowhere is it so aggressively displayed as in Germany. It is there a

It is difficult to overstate the nugatoriness of the great mass of the discussion, especially on the German side. To a certain extent it has a moral footing, as an expression of the old feeling that the greater sexual licence of France is a source of racial decadence. But the German assumption of virtue in this matter, always in large part hypocritical, is every day further from the fact; and German talk of the "decadence of the Latin races," which consistently alternates with equally judicious talk concerning the "Celtic" races, must strike most thoughtful and retrospective people in Germany as very idle indeed. A century ago, the German nation, in nearly all its fragments, seemed to the full as decrepit and decadent, politically speaking, as any State in Europe can seem to any observer to-day. If it has since attained to strength and relative soundness, so, surely, may any other people. And when we regard its apparent progress towards the political condition of Russia, the extraordinary abasement of public opinion before the personality of the emperor, the rapid gravitation of all the forces of freedom and progress to the side of Socialism, with the prospect of a death-struggle between that ideal and its opposite—when we consider all this, we shall see small reason to share the average Teutonic complacency over the condition of all things Teutonic.

As for the Teutophile tone towards France, it sometimes seems to amount to nothing more than a sub-rational animosity of blond people towards dark—a form of folly which, happily, one never meets with as between the blond and the dark of any one community, but which seems to germinate in the peculiarly primeval atmosphere of race sentiment. I have sometimes thought, in listening to German and other talk on the subject, that when a Teuton happens to be blond he feels entitled to be specially arrogant on the topic of nationality.[1] And yet not only does one

positive cult. It is encouraged by the authorities; it is fostered in the schools; perhaps some day it will form a subject for examination." (Art. "Germany under the Empire," by A. E. Evans, in *Contemporary Review*, February, 1896, p. 169.)

[1] The criterion of complexion is thus put forward in an ill-made but then-esteemed work of the last generation on ethnography:—"If the imperial government were simply to chop off the head of every demagogue who was not a blond *white*-man, they might 'get along' in France as tranquilly as in England, Germany, and the United States. *Dark*-skinned races, history attests, are fit only for military governments. It is the unique rule genial to their physical nature; they are unhappy without it, even now, at Paris. None but the fair-skinned types of mankind have been able to realise, in peaceful practice, the old Germanic system described by Tacitus—'De

see the majority of Germans to be dark, but one finds that distinguished Germans who are put forward as types of German capacity and German achievement are physiologically the very types given by the theory to the "Wälsch," the non-German races. Ranke, for instance, used to be often cited as the typical German historian, familiar with all historic fields, untiring in industry, a minute researcher in original documents, but passing freely from one province to another. Well, Ranke was a little dark man with bright black eyes, answering somewhat closely to that type of Ligurian or Aquitanian which is at times specified as the fundamental element in the so-called Celtic peoples—a type as far as possible from that of the traditional Teuton. And I have heard a brown Frenchman, an expert in history, but entirely free of the prejudice of race, impartially characterise much of Ranke's work as that of an imbecile[1]—the epithet being one which the critic would as readily bestow on members of his own race as on those of any other.

When we come to battles over complexion, it would seem as if the discussion had already ended in triviality. On the contrary, however, it affects to begin there. And he who would know how much or how little of scientific basis there is for the

minoribus rebus principes consultant; de majoribus, omnes' . . ." (Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind*, Philadelphia, 1854, pp. 404-405). It is interesting to follow the logic of this proposition:—1. The French are a dark-skinned race: therefore they are unhappy without military rule. 2. But, being dark, they are always upsetting such rule. 3. In their insurrections they have leaders of their own complexion, who, like the rest, find military rule genial to their physical nature, but, being dark, nevertheless resist such rule. 4. All that is needed to make the dark race accept the rule under which they are happy is to chop off all the dark heads. 5. The remaining blonds, *not* finding military rule genial to their physical nature, will quietly accept it. 6. There would still, in the terms of the case, be blond rebel demagogues; but these would not matter, as they would not be dark. It was within a few years of the publication of these absurdities that the 'tranquil' United States, of which Messrs Nott and Gliddon were natives, had their Civil War, set up by the action of presumably the oldest Anglo-Saxon stock in North America. The political state of Germany, under Bismarck and later, will finally serve to illustrate the force of the law that it is only the non-Germanic races which need and accept military rule. According to Messrs Nott and Gliddon, their view of French possibilities was universally shared. They state that (*ib.*) "the world shakes with laughter at Frenchmen for attempting a republic."

[1] Compare, however, the genial and cordial *éloge* of Ranke at his death, by Zeller, who, in criticising Ranke's occasional lapses into race prejudice, exhibits an exemplary urbanity and good humour.

presuppositions and prejudices of race with which we have been dealing, must give some heed to a discussion which largely turns on matters of complexion. I shall try to put the gist of the dispute before him as briefly as possible.

§ 4. *The Problem of Race Origins.*

The question of race origins is in the nature of the case one of the last biological problems to be brought under scientific treatment. Like all others affecting men's relations to the universe and to each other, it is first handled by the methods of myth-mongering ignorance, whose conclusions later become traditional truth for minds which would conceivably be capable of sounder ideas, but for the traditional misguidance: and even when the spirit of science begins definitely to scrutinise and modify tradition, it is long hampered by the old bias. Thus we still show in our current speech the traces of the ancient oriental guess which divided the varieties of mankind into three—the children of Shem, of Ham, and of Japhet. Ham and Japhet have receded somewhat from common view, but "Semitic" or "Shemitic" is still the name for the speakers of a certain group of languages; and we all know with how much of inconsistent prejudice and malevolent passion the adjective has become associated in modern continental politics. But matters are not much better, at times, in the region of professedly strict ethnological discussion; where, after a nominal acceptance of all the historical implications of the doctrine of evolution, the question is often treated in total disregard of those implications, nay, in disregard of the bearing of notorious and undisputed historic facts.

All historians are now agreed, for instance, that language is not at all a sure clue to the history or pedigree of any race or part of a nation. In recorded history there are many cases of large populations adopting a language which was not originally that of their stock, and completely giving up the language of their forefathers. It is indeed questionable whether this has not been true at some epoch of the majority of the peoples of Europe. When, therefore, we speak of the ancient Gauls and the ancient Germans, as we trace them in the earlier periods of their written history, it is obviously an arbitrary proceeding on our part to assume that either the one or the other represented a nation of only one general type, physical or mental, descended for ages solely from similar types, speaking the same language. That is simply the assumption of historic ignorance, guided

originally by the Biblical habit of supposing all nations to have arisen by direct descent from some one man, or by the coalition of groups descended from one man. It is difficult to express the essential absurdity of that idea of the growth of nations; but it is at the root of a great deal of modern opinion as to the pedigree and qualities of stocks or races.[1] It is true that we have no positive and demonstrated knowledge of the manner of the rise of races to set against the fables of primeval theology; but all the elements of real knowledge we possess are found to lead us to the general conception (1) of an inexpressibly slow and gradual evolution of a low human species from a still lower one of anthropoid apes, the evolution perhaps taking place over a very wide range of territory, and including from the first a number of variations; further, (2) of the killing out, during many ages, of an indefinite number of varieties, many of them perhaps less brutal than those which survived, in the struggle for existence; further, (3) of a gradual distribution of masses of primitive humanity in different quarters of the planet, with the result of the setting-up, in many more ages, of some marked general differences of colour, speech, and aspect in separated races; and, still further, (4) of the development in a relatively much shorter space of time, of more or less marked differences of speech, and minor differences of aspect, among populations whose language, on analysis, is found to give very plain traces of descent from one original stock—that is, a stock apparently formed in the third of the processes here sketched. Now, from the point of view of all inquirers alike, the differences of speech between so-called Celts and so-called Teutons, if not the alleged generic differences of character between them, have arisen only in the fourth process. All the main languages of Western Europe are admitted to be kindred; they are grouped as "Aryan"; and till a few years ago, still following the Biblical lead, we were taught that the primeval Aryans, so-called from the application of the name to the presumptive Sanskrit speakers in early Sanskrit literature, had originated somewhere in Central Asia, and were thence gradually distributed by waves of emigration, some into India and Persia, but the majority into Europe. The Asian hypothesis, which can

[1] Thus we have Professor Max Müller laying it down in his *Lectures on the Science of Language* that there was a time "when the *first ancestors* of the Indians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Slaves, the Celts, and the Germans were living together within the same enclosures, nay, *under the same roof.*" (Cited by Dr Isaac Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 3-4. Compare the passage cited by Dr Taylor from Canon Cook.)

be traced back to the legend of the Garden of Eden, is now abandoned by a majority of the younger specialists in anthropology; the prevailing opinion being that the main European races "originated" in Europe. In nearly every branch of archæological research, in metallurgy, in botany, and in zoology, as well as in mythology and philology, support had been found for the Asiatic assumption; so ready are men to see proofs for what they believe in advance; but in every department, in turn, these evidences have been to some extent discredited or disproved by later research.[1] The Sanskrit language is found to be a late instead of an early system, showing phenomena of vowel degeneration like modern Greek; and the "Aryans" of the Vedas, instead of representing a primeval civilisation and creed, from which all the main European forms are descended, are pronounced to be themselves an offshoot from a presumptive European stock. The earliest European civilisation, on close scrutiny, has every appearance of being indigenous; and the skull-types of all periods, found by excavation in all parts of the continent, seem to be clearly akin to the skull-types of the present day. Yet even in the light of these discoveries, certain assumptions, based solely on the older ways of thought, are still adhered to; and some inquirers, in the very act of upsetting old conventions, are found adhering to others no better founded.

The very nomenclature of ethnology[2] is a record of the abandonment of one false position after another, without any definite change of method. In the first movement away from the merely Biblical position—in the light of the discovered kinship of the European languages with the Sanskrit, which seemed to square so far with the Biblical account of human origins—it was decided that the speakers of all these languages belonged to

[1] See *The Origin of the Aryans*, by Isaac Taylor, and the very able and erudite treatise of M. Reinach, *Le Mirage Oriental*, Paris, 1893; Masson. (Reprinted from the review *Anthropologie*, Nos. 5 and 6, 1893.) M. Reinach frankly avows that he had formerly accepted the view of Oriental origins which he now decisively rejects. I would take leave to suggest, however, that M. Reinach himself rests heavily on very slender evidence when, from the premisses (1) that *Cassiteros*, the Greek name for tin, is in all likelihood Celtic in origin, and (2) that the word is found in Homer, he infers that there was a Phœnician commerce with the British Isles (later identified with the *Cassiterides* because of their tin) in the tenth century B.C. Surely the passage in Homer may easily have been one of the later interpolations.

[2] In the English sense of the term = the science of race divisions. In France, the term is applied somewhat as we apply "anthropology," which again in France covers much of what we include in ethnology.

one "race" or "species" or "variety," which was first called "Caucasian," then "Indo-Germanic," then "Indo-European," as the suppositions of boundary one after another broke down under criticism. In connection with all of these names, there was recognised by the more scientific thinkers the persistence of a certain fallacy—the fallacy that the given group of languages stood for a specific race. "There are Indo-European languages," said Oppert; "but no Indo-European race." And now that "Aryan" has by common consent been substituted for these, the same caveat is more necessary than ever. It is often made,[1] but oftener disregarded. The necessary preliminary to any solid theory of race origins, a careful biological schema of the rise of the *human* race, is left undeveloped, the leap from Darwin's scanty and confused suggestions to Haeckel's brilliant hypothetic schema[2] being too rapid for either scientific conviction or popular acceptance; and it seems to be ordinarily taken for granted that the formation of any one race begins with the formation of its language, though it clearly follows on the Darwinian doctrine that there was an immense period of quasi-human life, during which language was in "infancy." Thus, between the primary assumption that divergence of race begins only at divergence of language,[3] and the secondary assumption that language-forms mark off varieties of race, ordinary ethnological reasoning is comprehensively fallacious.

Apart from fallacies turning on language, again, there is a constant begging-of-the-question in regard to the significance of certain peculiarities of aspect. It is habitually assumed that the characteristics of blond people and dark people, long-headed people and broad-headed people, are matters of heredity deriving from certain primordial, purely blond and dark, long-headed and broad-headed races. In no part of the world to-day

[1] See S. Reinach, *L'Origine des Aryens*, 1892, p. 2. "I consider the Aryans as an invention of the study and not as a primitive people." (R. Hartmann, *Die Negritier*, S. 185). "The typical Aryan, as the theory postulates him, has not yet been discovered" (Virchow, cited by Reinach).

[2] *The Pedigree of Man*, Eng. tr., pp. 75-78. See Haeckel's schema criticised in De Quatrefages' *Human Species*, Eng. tr., ch. xi.

[3] This assumption is of course not always made; and one investigator has expressly pointed out that "race-evolution" must precede the evolution of speech:—"Die verschiedenen Menschenracen reden Sprachen, die unter sich absolut keinen ursprünglichen Zusammenhang haben: daraus folgt aber unwiderleglich, dass die Racenbildung der Sprachbildung voranging" (Th. Poesche, *Die Arier*, S. 104).

do we find such definitely marked-off races; yet it is taken for granted that there were at one time such races. And, while the premiss almost implies that the primitive longs and broads, blonds and darks, derived from pithecoid men so characterised,[1] the pressure of facts forces some of the theorists to decide that there were longs and broads, blonds and darks, among those primeval "Aryans" who are assumed to stand out from the other races of men speaking non-Aryan languages.

Yet this already mongrel family is constantly represented, without any attempt to relate the proposition to the main evolution theory, as "originating" in this or that small part of the planet. The remote abstraction of the race has been cherished by a filial posterity with a singular devotion. A cursory survey of the literature of the subject reveals that it has been provided with at least a dozen "cradles." The "cradle" of the race has been located [2] in

Bokhara,	by Rhode.
Siberia,	,, Pièrtement.
India,	,, Curzon.
Bactriana,	,, Pictet, Max Müller, Kuhn, von Roth, &c.
Plateau of Pamir,	,, Orby, Lenormant, Amélineau, Bourdais, &c.
Armenia,	,, F. Müller, Peschel, Brunnhofer.
Germany,	,, Geiger and Loeher.
South-East Russia,	,, Benfey, Tomaschek, Schrader, Huxley.
West Russia,	,, Poesche.
Gaul,	,, Lenglet-Mortier and Vandamme.
Lower Danube Region,	,, Madame Clemence Royer.
Region between the Atlantic and the Oural, by Cuno.	
Scandinavia,	by Penka, Sayce, de Lapouge, Lombard.
Western Europe,	,, Koeppen.

There is said to be evidence for every one of these locations, the broader and the narrower alike, evidences partly derived from correspondences of language in relation to natural objects, and

[1] This point has been raised by Haeckel. *Cp.* Topinard, *Anthropologie*, Eng. tr., p. 531.

[2] See *L'Origine Européenne des Aryens*, by the Jesuit Father Van den Gheyn, Paris, 1889, p. 5 *sq.*; and Reinach, *L'Origine des Aryens*, 1892, pp. 23, 35, 47, 49, 52, 68, 85, 92.

partly from archæological remains. Yet what is meant by the "origination" of a race, not one of the later theorists seems to have made clear. It may mean (1) "creation" in that spot of a certain type, or (2) evolution in that district, through untold ages, of a special human type from a pre-human, or (3) acquisition there of a primordial "Aryan" language, by an already mongrel variety of mankind which before had no language, or only a scanty store of "roots" in common with species which elsewhere developed non-Aryan languages, or (4) development there of either a blond or a dark type, either a long-headed or a broad-headed type. Thus the very conception of an Aryan cradle collapses on the first analysis, leaving us asking, in consistency, for further "cradles," first, for mankind in the lump, next, for the non-Aryan races, for the blonds, for the dark, for the broad-heads, for the long-heads, for the tall, for the short, and so on *ad infinitum*.

Narrowing our attention to the two points of complexion and skull-shape, we go through the same process of pre-supposition, scepticism, and collapse. So far as I am aware, there has been no properly inductive and decisive inquiry as to how varieties of complexion,[1] height,[2] and skull shape arise, whether through mere interbreeding of primordial variants, or through the normal operation of traceable causes which subsist now as formerly. One of the most independent investigations ever made of the race problem is that of Herr Theodor Poesche,[3] who boldly grapples with the phenomenon of blondness, tracing the facts inductively and seeking for a biological clue. While making some oversights, he shows pretty fully that the ordinary assumptions as to the blondness of certain nations are quite erroneous; that only in Sweden and Norway, and perhaps in Denmark, is there a majority of blonds; that, as there are many blonds among the Eskimos and the Lapps, so there are many dark people in Sweden and Norway, and apparently still more in some of the Danish islands; that even in the "blondest" parts of Germany the dark are in the majority; that the dark

[1] *Cp.* De Quatrefages, *Human Species*, Eng. tr., pp. 265-6, 276, &c.

[2] It would seem that height is at least as important a characteristic as complexion and skull-shape. Yet it is admitted by Broca that "in all races, *even in those which are pure*, and *à fortiori* in those which are mixed, the height presents sufficiently wide individual variations." (*Mémoires Anthropologiques*, i. 387.)

[3] *Die Arier: ein Beitrag zur historischen Anthropologie*, Jena, 1878.

people multiply as we go to the south and west ;[1] that the same thing occurs in France ; and that blond people are found among non-European races in every part of the world, some Asiatic peoples, commonly supposed to be sallow and dark-haired, being in reality predominantly blond. Thus the traveller Vámbéry notes concerning the Turcomans, usually conceived to be the reverse of fair : "As regards colour, the blond prevails : and there are even whole tribes, as, for example, the Kelte race, among the Goergen Yomuts, which are generally half-blond."[2] This consists with much older written testimony ; the ancient Chinese annals mentioning no fewer than five blond peoples in Asia ;[3] while according to Galen and Hippocrates,[4] many of the Scythians were blond. Then there are blond tribes at the present day in Setchuan, in China ; there are many red-haired and blue-eyed types among the Afghans ; there are blonds in Morocco and in nearly every Berber tribe—in fact, they are found in every population in the world,[5] even among negroes there being variations in the blond direction. On this phenomenon of blondness, thus seen to be so widespread, Herr Poesche scientifically enough generalises that blond hair, blue eyes, and white skin are alike to be set down to the physical cause of

[1] Poesche cites the discourse of Virchow before the Anthropological Conference at Jena, in which, *from school-statistics*, the following percentages of blond to dark throughout Germany are arrived at :—

Schleswig-Holstein,	43·35	per cent.
Pomerania,	42·64	,,
Hanover,	41·00	,,
Prussian-Rhineland,	29·64	,,
Bavaria,	20·36	,,

As these figures are taken from a scrutiny of children, they may be held to represent the maximum proportion that can be allowed to the blonds, since it is notorious that many blond children grow dark-haired in later life. See also Karl Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, 1886, S. 97-103, for a series of German testimonies to the dwindling of the blond type outside of Scandinavia.

[2] *Sketches of Central Asia*, p. 296.

[3] Klaproth, *Peuples de Race Blonde*, in *Tableau historique d'Asie*, pp. 161-186. *Cf.* Abel Remusat, *Recherches sur les langues tartares*, avant-propos, p. 44.

[4] Hippocrates, *De Aere et Locis*, x. 90 (c. 48 ed. van der Linden) ; *cp.* Poesche, *Die Arier*, S. 26, citing Uckert.

[5] "Die Blonden finden sich vom Eismeer bis zur Sahara, und vom atlantischen Ocean bis zum Baikalsee und Indus ; die Südküste der Ostsee ist das Centrum ihrer Verbreitung : dort sitzen die meisten und blondesten ; sie nehmen nach allen Richtungen ab, je nach der Entfernung von dieser Küste des baltischen Meeres." Poesche, as cited, S. 32.

defect of pigmentation; and, following a suggestion of Prichard,[1] he connects this phenomenon with the more extreme one known as albinoism.[2] Yet, while thus recognising that albinoism and blondness alike may occur everywhere, and while further recognising that albinoism occurs sporadically among the lower animals, Herr Poesche takes it for granted that all the historic phases of blondness derive by heredity from one stock, which became wholly albino by reason of living in certain physical conditions conducive to non-pigmentation. These conditions he finds in a special degree in Russia, in the region between the Dnieper and the Niemen, where there is a great area of marshy land, and where alike among men, animals, and vegetation there is the most decided approach to general albinoism. There seems to be in the climate there something hostile to the process of pigmentation of hair, eyes, and skin; and it thus happens that albinoism, which in other parts of the earth occurs exceptionally, occurs here generally. Here, accordingly, must have been developed the race of blonds.[3]

Now, it follows from Herr Poesche's own induction that albinoism, which, like blondness, crops up all over the globe, might be developed in many districts in varying degrees, relatively to the stress of the climatic influence. It is suggested by the same induction that the influence in question broadly diminishes westward and southward from the northerly region, where it appears to be strongest. It also suggests that in the course of ages even the reduction of certain territories to a cultivated state may have so modified certain climatic conditions as to counteract the influences making for blondness; nay, that even change in the food and way of life of individuals[4] may affect their pigmen-

[1] It is to be noted that, before Prichard, Blumenbach specified the albino as a variety of the human race occurring in all parts of the world.

[2] "Alle diese charakteristischen Erscheinungen sind auf *eine* Ursache zurückführen, *den Mangel an Pigment in den entsprechenden Theilen. Die Blonden sind Albinos oder, genauer gesprochen, Halbalbinos.*" S. 17.

[3] "Zwischen Niemen und Dniepr, an den obern Zuflüssen, in den ungeheuren Rokitnosümpfen zeigen alle organischen Gebilde, Menschen, Thiere, und Bäume, die ausgesprochenste Neigung zum Albinismus! Es ist also dort etwas in Boden, Wasser, und Luft, das der Bildung des Pigments in Haaren, Augen, und Haut feindlich ist; was an allen Orten der Erde vereinzelt auftritt, der Albinismus organischer Gebilde, ertritt hier massenweise auf und erklärt uns so das Entstehen der grossen, blonden, Menschenrace!" (Poesche, S. 68.)

[4] Since this was written I have found that both of these suggestions were made long ago. In 1645, Conring, noting the difference between the contemporary German type and the ancient descriptions, suggested that not only

tation.[1] But instead of allowing these obvious considerations to have their fair weight in his theory, Herr Poesche takes it for granted that all blondness derives from the initial albinoism of a race which became albino in a certain European region, the blonds being the product of a crossing of the primary albinos with darker races. And for him this primary species of albino is the Aryan race, though by implication he credits its virtues to those with which it has inter-bred. These primary albinos and half-albinos were all alike, "as we still find the wild peoples"[2]—an entirely arbitrary assumption by the way, on a par with the current delusions as to race-complexion which Herr Poesche exposes, the apparent exceptional alikeness of the "wild" races being only the illusion of a superficial observation, such as is apt to arise for us at our first contact with almost any foreign people.[3] And this early albino or half-albino species was not only all blond but all long-headed (dolichocephalic), because it has been found that the great majority of (supposed) ancient Swedish (presumably fair-haired) skulls are long-headed, while the great majority of (supposed) ancient Lapp (presumably dark-haired) skulls are broad-headed (brachycephalic). On these grounds the German ethnologist, Ecker, in his *Crania Germaniae meridionalis occidentalis*, makes the ancient Germans purely dolicho-

race-mixture but changed way of life may have been the cause; and in 1778, Zimmermann repeated a suggestion as to change in the German climate which Conring had rejected. See Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, S. 99.

[1] So little has been done in the way of analysis of the problem that the notorious fact that thousands of persons, blond in childhood, become dark in later life, has been left unnoticed by many of the ethnologists, and unexplained by all.

[2] "In einer fernen Zeit lebte also irgendwo ein Volk, *ganz homogen in sich, wie wir heute noch die wilden Völker treffen*, das folgende charakteristische Merkmale besass; es war hochgewachsen, dolichocephal mit niederer, schlecht entwickelter Stirn, vorspringendem Hinterhaupt, dessen Rand ein Fünfeck bildet, blond, blauäugig, mit weisser Haut und üppigem Haarwuchs." S. 23.

[3] Thus I remember to have read somewhere a confident assertion of the uniformity of features in a Russian regiment as compared with an English one. An average Russian would probably say the same of an English regiment. Unobservant whites say the same thing of negroes in the mass; and most people are quite sure that all sheep, for instance, are alike. Yet the shepherd can distinguish them about as well as the dairymaid can her cows. It is told again, that an European artist, visiting a Japanese studio, politely confessed that one of the things that struck Europeans in Japanese art was its general sameness." "That, was the reply, "is exactly what we say of European art." And Humboldt long ago remarked that while Europeans on first seeing natives of South America found them all alike, they later found that they differed from each other as much as Europeans.

cephalic, because they are historically said to have been blond. The Teuton, in fact, is the typical Aryan, the first dilution or modification of the unmitigated marsh-bred albino, placed in a healthier situation than the Aryanising marsh, and growing to much greater strength and stature accordingly,[1] while the Celt is a further blond developed in the valley of the Danube, leaning more to broad-headedness, because mixing more with non-Aryans.[2]

It is not easy to see what special comfort the modern Teuton can derive from this view of things. In the first place, the type presented is not at all admirable: the "low and badly-developed forehead" with abundant hair suggesting anything but an intellectual race.[3] In the second place, the great majority of Germans are not now dolichocephalic,[4] by Herr Poesche's express ad-

[1] S. 197.

[2] "Das Thal der mittleren Donau ist unstreitig als die alte Heimath anzusehen, in der aus Arien Kelten wurden." S. 168. "Die Kelten waren die Avant-garde der grossen arischen Südwestarmee. . . . Sie hatten als solche besonders schwere arbeit, und ebenfalls grossere Berührung mit den anarischen Urbewohnern Westeuropas als ihre Nachfolger." S. 169.

[3] It is one of the most primitive prehistoric types. See De Quatrefages, *Human Species*, p. 311. M. De Quatrefages, it is true, seeks to rebut disparaging accounts of the ancient dolichocephalic skulls by citing Vogt's testimony to the close similarity between the skull of a gifted contemporary *savant* and that of the Neanderthal man: giving the further parallels of the skulls of a Danish politician of the seventeenth century, a bishop of the fourth, and Robert Bruce (*Human Species*, pp. 309-310). But such instances of real or presumptive superior brain capacity in skulls of quasi-simian shape are quite inconclusive as to the brain development of the prehistoric skulls. M. De Quatrefages makes in this connection no comparative measurements, and says nothing of apparent development of special convolutions. One detail in the description of the ancient supposed-Teutonic skull does offer a foothold for speculation. It projects notably behind, a feature common to the majority of the skulls of monkeys and negroes, and surmised in their case by Gall to be connected with their special philoprogenitiveness. The ancient Teutons do seem to have been very fecund and careful of their offspring. This gave them their main military advantage—that of numbers.

[4] So far is the general aspect from corresponding with the theoretic that we find Mr Meredith (*Adventures of Harry Richmond*, ch. 34) speaking of "the German head, wide, so as seemingly to force out the ears." A short, blond, and broad-headed French friend of the present writer, too, has often been told in England that he "looks very like a German." Yet again, Mr Grant Allen speaks of the early Anglo-Saxons as having "heads of the *round* or brachycephalic type, common to most Aryan races." (*Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 15, *cf.* 156). It seems safe to say with M. De Quatrefages and M. Réinach, here alone at one (See Reinach, *L'Origine des Aryens*, p. 99), that broad and long heads alike are "Aryan."

mission,[1] so that the primary Aryan virtue would seem to be sadly rarefied, while the bulk of it lies with the Swedes, who do not exactly seem to possess the earth. The full half of mankind, too, are neither broad-headed nor long-headed, but medium-headed (mesocephalic).[2] These facts might seem to suggest, like the facts of albinoism and blondness, that the phenomenon in hand, instead of being a matter of mere heredity, may be one of proximate causation—that breadth or length of skull may be set up, in some way as yet untraced, by certain special conditions of life in the parent. If albinoism is admittedly thus set up, and if albino or semi-albino types are found to be dolichocephalic, the very coincidence would seem to suggest that the skull shape too is partly determined by special conditions.[3] There also obtrudes itself on the student, in this connection, the known fact that wilful deformation of the skulls of infants was till recently syste-

[1] "Messen wir aber die Schädel der heutigen Germanen, so finden wir dass nur die Skandinaven noch in ihrer grossen Mehrzeit die alte dolichocephale Form rein zeigen. In Südwestdeutschland glaubt man nur einem Viertel der gegenwärtigen Bevölkerung noch dolichocephale Schädel zuschreiben zu dürfen." (S. 212). See also Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, S. 132; and Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, p. 228.

[2] Poesche, as cited. The received mode of skull-appraisement, it should be noted for the general reader, is to take the length of every skull as "100," and divide that by whatever fraction represents the proportion of the breadth to the length. Thus a head of which the breadth is three-quarters of the length will be rated as having an "index" of 75. As half of mankind are found to range between 74 and 78, all within those figures are pronounced mesocephalic, or medium-headed. Those below 74 are rated as dolichocephalic, or long-headed; those above 78 as brachycephalic, or broad-headed.

[3] Herr Penka, who is more circumspect in these matters, deals carefully (1) with the theory of J. Ranke, that since broad-headedness reaches its maximum in the Upper Tyrol and Switzerland, height of location may have a transforming effect on skull shapes ("dass die *Hohenlage* einen *transformirenden* Einfluss auf die Gestaltung des Schädels ausübe, und einen dolichocephalen Schädel in einen brachycephalen umzuwandeln im Stande sei." Penka, S. 138-9); and (2) with the theory that broad-headedness may be a product of civilisation ("dass der brachycephale Typus das Product der Civilisation sei, also durch den Einfluss eines mehr geistigen Factors entstanden sei." S. 141). Both of these theories, as he justly argues, break down, there being many long-headed skulls in some mountainous countries; while broad-headed skulls are found in very remote times. But alternative theories readily suggest themselves. It may be that *some* of the conditions of life in the Tyrol and Switzerland are peculiar to these regions; and it might be that the broad skull *survived* because better adapted to civilisation. The question is not at all closed.

matically practised in some savage tribes (the North American Indian Flatheads being the best-known instance), and that the practice subsists in an obscure way in civilised Europe,[1] thus strongly suggesting survival from barbarous times. It may be then that in the skulls of some ancient grave-places either the broader or the longer heads may have been artificially made so in infancy. Indeed, in the tables of MM. Broca and Pruner Bey, reproduced by M. De Quatrefages,[2] allowance is made for such deformations. But none of these considerations is weighed by Herr Poesche. For him, dolichocephalism must be a matter of special heredity from one ancient dolichocephalic stock—the Aryan blond or albino, which is specially Teutonic.

And, slight as is the basis for this identification, and small as is the satisfaction which seems to be rationally derivable from it by anybody even if it be true, it is acquiesced-in and commented-on by one French scientific writer in a way which once more makes the anthropological student raise his eyebrows. It is after a very learned examination of the dispute on Aryan origins that M. de Ujfalvy writes :—[3]

"If human superiority consists exclusively in a certain physical energy, in a stirring, enterprising, aggressive temperament; in a word, in a spirit of conquest, then certainly the dolichocephalic blonds are the first race in the world; but if, on the contrary, we examine the psychic faculties, we see that the artistic conception, that supreme genius of the human race, the eternal glory of the Greeks and of the Romans guided by the Greeks, is become the imperishable patrimony of the brown and brachycephalic races of central and southern Europe. We have there a superiority which is otherwise enviable than that claimed by the blond race, and one which may at need console the brown brachycephali for having received from these rivals at a given moment the (*sic*) Aryan language. Which last, by the way, I hasten to add, is anything but proven."

And, on the last head, the reader, with still more haste, coincides. For "*the* Aryan language," for one thing, does not exist. But M. Ujfalvy's unconditional acquiescence in the German conception of the primal dolichocephalic blond is fully as astonishing as would be his acceptance of the theory that that particular

[1] Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie Gauloise*: II^e^ Partie, *Types Gaulois*, 1861, pp. 154-158. Topinard, *Anthropologie*, Ptie. I. ch. 5, Eng. tr., pp. 176-185.

[2] *Human Species*, Eng. tr., pp. 372-373.

[3] *Le Berceau des Aryas*, par. Ch. E. de Ujfalvy, Paris, 1884, pp. 30-31.

type had bestowed the existing European languages on Europe. We have here a patriotic Frenchman (of whatever descent) agreeing to regard the ancient Teutonic invaders of Gaul and the Roman Empire as the most energetic race of the world, and the typical conquering race in history. Both propositions are far astray. The ancient blond Teuton or Gaul, though big and robust, was notoriously a "soft" type to begin with. He had no endurance, and could never hold out against equal numbers of disciplined southerners.[1] He made his conquests by force of numbers, and by reason of selecting for his attack populations which had passed out of the primeval hunting and militarist stage while he remained in it,[2] such as those of Gaul, Spain, and Italy. When he in turn had passed out of the hunting and militarist stage, he was easily enough conquered in turn by new military peoples. The Franks after Charlemagne made a poor resistance to the Danes; the Visigoths in Spain were easily overthrown by the Saracens; the Saxons in England were subdued by the Danes, and went down at one blow before the Normans. As regards enterprise and the abstract spirit of conquest, the Teutonic invaders of the west and south are not to be compared to the Romans, or the Greeks under Alexander. The German movements were the efflux of either hungry and overflowing or of dispossessed populations of hunters, seeking to plunder rich agricultural peoples. In modern times and in our own day, the presumed descendants of these hunters are really not specially given to conquest; and their "physical energy," so far as they exist in Germany, seems to have been at a discount at the recent Olympic games. The actual blond dolichocephali, as Herr Poesche has told us, are the Swedes and Norwegians, who have done little in the military way for some centuries, and a good deal of whose energy at present appears to be happily applied in the direction of literature and the arts. In fine, M. de Ujfalvy, taking the formula about the dolichocephalous blonds as a German vaunt, has given but a weak and erroneous answer, when he might have annihilated the formula altogether. He has given away his case.

All the while, as we have seen, the Teutonists admit that only a minority of the Germans of to-day are dolichocephalous; so

[1] See the ancient testimonies cited by Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie Gauloise*, Partie II.: *Types Gaulois*, 1861, pp. 64-67. In particular, see Livy, v. 44; vii. 12; x. 28.

[2] This historical phase is much and rightly insisted on in the *Traité de Législation* of Charles Comte.

that on their own principles modern Germany has reached her high developments of power and knowledge in virtue of her mainly brachycephalic population, which in terms of the theory is non-Teutonic. On the other hand, the population of France, by the testimony of M. Broca, is no less mixed.[1] In nearly every district we find a miscellany of tall and short, brachycephalic and dolichocephalic, Celtic, Germanic, and Kymric according to the conventional types, but much more often mixtures of these types in single individuals. Thus neither is France brachycephalic nor Germany dolichocephalic; and still the war of speculation and of insinuation goes on.

As for the comparative qualities of the alleged broad-headed and long-headed races in pre-historic antiquity, we find that the latter, identified by Teutonic writers with the Teutons, were relatively much the lower in apparent civilisation at a given time.

[1] "Abstraction faite d'un très-petit nombre de localités très-restreintes, on chercherait en vain dans le reste de la France une grande collection d'individus présentant les caractères d'une race pure. Partout il y a des hommes grands et des hommes petits; partout il y a des blonds et des bruns, des têtes longues et des têtes rondes, des yeux noirs, bleus ou gris, des visages celtiques, kymriques, germaniques et même pelasgiques. On trouve ces diverses variétés de taille de forme ou de couleur dans la plupart des familles, souvent même parmi les enfants du même père et de la même mère; on observe très fréquemment réunis en une seule personne des caractères appartenant manifestement à deux ou plusieurs races: le nombre des individus qui répresentent parfaitement le type des Celtes ou le type des Kymris est extrêmement restreint: et enfin, chose très-remarquable, ces individus qui paraissent de race pure sont souvent issus de parents qu'il serait impossible de rattacher à une race determinée. La population de la France présente donc l'instabilité ethnologique qui est l'indice assuré du mélange des races." (Broca, *Mémoires d'Anthropologie*, Vol. I., 1871, pp. 330-331.)

It must be observed, however, that Broca has not always spoken to the same effect. The above passage, which occurs in his paper *Sur l'ethnologie de la France*, dates from 1859. In a paper on *L'Anthropologie de la France*, read in 1866, he affirms the existence of two fairly well-marked types—one tall, blond, and narrow-headed, the "Kymry," the other shorter, darker, broader-headed, the "Armorican Celts"—in Brittany alone:—"L'anthropologie retrouve, dans la partie de la Bretagne qui a conservé la langue des anciens gaulois, deux races juxtaposées, partout plus ou moins modifiées par leurs mélanges réciproques, mais bien reconnaissables encore dans les districts on chacune d'elles prédomine: l'une grande, blonde, dolichocéphale, aux yeux clairs, au visage allongé—c'est la race des Bretons, la race kymrique; l'autre, de petite taille avec des cheveux plus bruns, des yeux plus foncés, une tête moins dolichocéphale, un visage plus arrondi—c'est la race des Gaulois armoricains, la race celtique" (Vol. cited, p. 419).

"We find that the dolichocephalic people of the Baltic coast were in the lowest grade of savagery, while the brachycephalic races of Central Europe had made no inconsiderable progress in civilisation, and had reached the nomadic pastoral stage. Coming down to a much later period, we find that at the close of the neolithic age the Teutonic race was the more backward, since their culture-words are largely loan-words from the contiguous Slavo-Lettic and Celtic languages. This is the case even with words referring to agricultural and pastoral life."[1] With such facts as these to proceed upon, some French anthropologists naturally take pleasure in the thesis that the real "Aryans," the speakers of the Aryan languages, were the more civilised, broadish-headed, darkish, southerly races, whom the narrow-headed blond barbarians of the Scandinavian regions temporarily overran—that it was short Gauls who "Aryanised" tall Teutons, and not *vice versa*.[2] Some of the Gallic champions even seek to make out that the dark Galli were the conquerors, not the conquered; while Germans, with equal zeal, maintain that the Teutons were not only the conquerors, but as superior in character as in stature. And all this in the name of anthropological science.

It is clear that, if the question of persistent racial gifts and defects is worth discussing at all, it must be discussed on more concrete grounds than those we have just examined. It has, indeed, been discussed on more concrete grounds—on all the grounds supplied by ancient historical documents. To these, then, we must go in our search for a defensible opinion.

§ 5. *The Naming of Celts, Gauls, Germans, and Teutons.*

The name Celt, so often loosely and uncritically applied in literature to a whole series of national groups, sometimes including even the inhabitants of Spain and Italy, sometimes limited to the Gaelic-speaking peoples of Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, is found to be in origin, so far as written history shows, a local name for only a regional group or set of tribes in the south of Central Europe and the south of France, before our era. They may or may not have been inhabitants of a particular district of the modern Narbonne, in what became the Roman Province *Narbonnensis*, and later the province of Languedoc. The tribes of that district were presumably among those of the inhabitants of

[1] Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, p. 233. *Cf.* p. 239.
[2] *Id.*, pp. 226-229.

ancient Gaul with whom the Greek trading colony of Massilia, the ancient Marseilles, had first dealings. For reasons to be shown later, it is somewhat unlikely that any tribe called themselves Keltæ; but tribes close to Marseilles may have so described tribes further off. Whatever were its origin, the Massilians seem to have taken the name, as traders will, as a convenient label for the whole populations north of their colony, turning the local word into the Greek *Keltoi*, and calling all the northern barbarians Celts, somewhat as, then and later, the names "India" and "Indian" were applied to eastern populations in general—a usage of which we have still traces in the names "West Indies" and "North American Indian." It is not known at what period the so-called Celtæ settled in Southern France. Herodotus (B.C. 445), in a confused passage,[1] locates Celtæ in the Danube valley and "beyond the pillars of Hercules" (which may mean in Spain), but not near Massilia. That, however, does not prove that they were not there in his time. In any case, as regards the naming of the people of Gaul, the usage of the Massilian traders came to be the usage of Greek literature before the era of Alexander. But it is to these tribes of the Danube valley and Southern France that the latest investigation comes back as the first clear and certain datum in the discussion on the distribution of the "Celtic race."[2]

From this point onwards, perplexities abound. The Romans gave the name of *Galli* to certain tribes of Northern Italy who were believed to be of the same stock, or to speak the same language, as the population north-west of the Alps, who were also called *Galli*, and whose land, like the Gaul-inhabited part of Italy, was called *Gallia*. The Romans were in closer and more general contact with the people in question than were the Greeks: how, then, came they to call them Galli, and not Kelti? We can make no sure inference, positive or negative, knowing as we do that the people who for the Romans were *Graii* or *Graeci*, Greeks, and whose country was *Graecia*, called themselves

[1] B. ii. 33: *cp.* v. 9.

[2] Compare Strabo, B. iv. c. 1; Diodorus Siculus, v. 32; Bertrand, *Archéologie celtique et gauloise*. 2e édit., 1889, pp. 253-264; D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Celtes et les langues celtiques*, 1882, p. 7. It is generally agreed that Strabo wrote loosely on the location of the Celtae, as he cites Cæsar erroneously. M. D'Arbois de Jubainville (*Introduction à l'étude de la littérature celtique*, 1883, p. 90, *note*) decides that he was wrong in placing the Celtae in the Narbonnaise, and that he had misread Polybius, who locates the Volcae there. We are thus in uncertainty at the very outset.

Hellenes, and their country Hellas. The presumption in that case is that, as was believed in Aristotle's day, a certain Hellenic tribe or set of tribes in earlier times called themselves *Graikoi;* and this name was applied by the Romans in perpetuity, after it had entirely passed out of use among the Hellenes.[1] But in the case of the Galli and Kelti that hypothesis is hardly open to us. The Roman name *Galli* seems to have been as old as the Greek name *Keltoi.* Were the Kelti then only a section or branch of the Galli? There is some ancient evidence that the Greeks before our era recognised Kelti in parts of North Italy, where the Romans noted Galli.[2] But only about the time of Cæsar does the name Celtae come into sight with the Romans.

Help is sought from the languages which to-day we call Celtic. (The name, it need hardly be observed, was pronounced with the hard and not the sibilant sound of *c:* the proper sound is *Kelt;* and the French and English usage of pronouncing the word *Selt* is only one of a hundred corruptions following on the confusion of the Greek and Roman *c.*) It is plausibly argued that *Kelti* or *Celtae* was a "Celtic" word closely connected with that preserved in the Scotch-Gaelic word *Caledon,* whence comes Caledonia. According to the Scotch-Gaelic dictionaries, the word *Ceiltach* (*c* hard) means *dweller in the forest,*[3] and *Caledon* a forest country. The Celts then may have been so named by themselves, or more probably by their immediate neighbours, as forest-dwellers; and Galli close to Massilia may have inadvertently given the Greeks the idea that *all* the other tribes were Kelti. As a matter of fact the Scotch tribes whose territory was formerly called Caledon have immemorially called themselves Gaël,[4] (more correctly Gaedhil or Goidel), with a pronunciation nearer the Latin *Galli* than is suggested by the English spelling, *Gael,* and with a semi-guttural sound of the *g* which is neither that of our *g* nor our *k,* but something between *g* and the Greek χ. It thus appears possible that the Kelti of the Greeks were *Gaèl* or *Gallach* who were also *Ceiltach,* Galli who were forest-dwellers. But on the other hand the word *Gall* or *Gaill* is the Gaelic word for a stranger or foreigner; and in early Irish history

[1] Compare the Saracen usage of calling all Westerns Franks.

[2] Bertrand, as cited.

[3] Or a sequestered people. The verb *ceil* means "to conceal," while *coille* is the modern word for a forest. In Scotch Gaelic *forest-dweller* would be *Coilltich.*

[4] Or perhaps sometimes by the adjective *Gaelach.* Compare the name *Gregarach* = the tribe of Gregors or MacGregors.

we have "The wars of the Gaedhill with the Gaill"[1] so that "Galli" may just have been a local name for tribes of another race or of another dialect, and may have stood for no one race whatever, even as "Welsh" was a German name for foreigners in general. There is no certainty possible here.

And now a new difficulty arises. After a time the Greeks are found to have applied the term *Galatai* where they formerly applied the term Keltoi—an apparent combination of the names Keltoi and Galli. It is argued that they got *Galatai* from Galatia, their later name for Gallia or Gaul. *Gaeltachd*, it is noted, is a general Gaelic name for the Scotch Highlands. Making that into Galatia, the Greeks would get *Galatai* as the name of the Galli or Gallic people, reversing the process by which the Romans made up *Gallia*, their name for the land, from *Galli*, their name for the people.[2] However that may have been, it came about that Greek writers applied not only to the people of Gallia in general, but to other northern Europeans, the name *Galatai*, and this became the source of extreme confusion, the word serving to cover alike those whom the Romans called *Galli*, Gauls, and those whom they called *Germani*, Germans. The Greek-writing historian Dion Cassius, in his compilation made during the first half of the second century of our era, systematically translates the Latin word *Germani* by the Greek Keltoi, while he renders the Latin word *Galli* by Galatai, the relatively new Greek synonym of Keltoi. In the Greek-writing Dionysius Halicarnassus again (shortly B.C.), Celtica, the "Celtic" region, extends from the Atlantic to Scythia and Thrace, Gaul being the part west of the Rhine, and Germania the part east.[3] The Greek-writing historian Diodorus Siculus, too (about 50 B.C.), gives the Greek name *Galatai* to the Germans of the right bank of the Rhine, attacked by Cæsar in the year 55 B.C., while limiting the name Celt to the people near Marseilles. Thus, wherever we have to depend on the later Greek writers for our knowledge of the Keltae or Galatae, it is either difficult or impossible to know whether we are dealing with people kindred in blood or language to the old Gallic-speaking populations of Brittany, Cornwall, Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, or people kindred in blood or

[1] "Danes and Normans, in the eyes of natives [Irish] were alike styled Gaill, or foreigners" (Richey, *Short History of the Irish People*, p. 125).

[2] Amedée Thierry, *Histoire des Gaulois*, P. i. ch. 1.

[3] D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Les Celtes et les langues celtiques*, 1882, p. 8. (Reprinted in *Introduction à l'étude de la littérature celtique*, 1883.) *Cp.* Bertrand, as cited, p. 260.

language to some of the races called Teutonic. The presumption often lies in the latter direction. The Greek-writing historian Polybius (about 150 B.C.), who had access to good Roman and other materials, appears to some to distinguish between Keltoi and Galatai, applying the latter name always to certain bands of mercenary and other warriors figuring elsewhere than in Gaul and Northern Italy, and seemingly deriving from the region between the Upper Danube and Thrace. The captors of Rome about 390 B.C., called by the Romans *Galli*, are by him called *Galatai*. Yet in some places he seems to connect, though not to identify, the Galatae and the Keltae, as if they were united against the Romans. It has thence been inferred that the Celtae may have had the aid of the Galatai as mercenary troops in this particular invasion.[1]

When, then, anti-Irish or anti-Gallic writers, such as Bishop Lightfoot and Mr Goldwin Smith,[2] take for granted that the ancient Galatians were of the same "stock" as the ancient Gauls in general and the modern Irish in general, and were further alien to the so-called "Teutonic" stock, they are merely manipulating verbal knowledge. On the very face of the case, it is historically quite uncertain what was the pedigree of those Galatae who invaded Greece and wrought such havoc in the third century B.C., before settling down in Galatia. Their leaders' titles were Gallic, and they were unquestionably the people whom the Romans called Galli, only a small band of presumable Teutons (Teutobolds = ? Bold Teutons) being associated with them. But no one now can tell whether they were of the "race" of Bismarck or of the "race" of O'Connell, or of both; and if the ancient Galatians, Jewish or Gentile, were "foolish," as Paul called them, it may as well have been with the folly of Germans as with that of Frenchmen and Irishmen, to say nothing of the heritages of folly which Paul seems to have discovered quite as abundantly in the Græco-Roman-Jews of Corinth, the Greek-Galatian-Jews of Galatia, and the hypothetically pure Jews of his own land. For the drift of a great deal of later discussion on the subject is to make out that the ancient Galli and Galatae alike were of a type closely akin to the ancient German.

When, passing from the question of names, we look into the elements of the population of Ancient Gaul, we find it already consisting, about two thousand years ago, and presumably long

[1] Bertrand, as cited, p. 419. I cannot find that Polybius makes the general distinction claimed by M. Bertrand.

[2] See the critique on *Mr Goldwin Smith's Polemic* hereinafter.

before that, of a variety of apparently different stocks. Modern research claims to establish that, despite this variety, the languages spoken by the different stocks were dialects of one tongue,[1] not distinct tongues like the Gallic and Norse or French and Norwegian; and that this one tongue was clearly kindred with the modern Gaelic, Welsh, and Erse. As against that claim, it is worth while to go back to the familiar paragraph with which Cæsar (if indeed the passage be his) begins his Commentaries.

"All Gaul (*Gallia*) is divided into three parts, of which one is inhabited by the Belgae, another by the Aquitani, and the third by those who in their own tongue are called Celtae, in ours Galli. *These all differ among themselves in language, institutions, and laws.* The Galli are divided from the Aquitani by the river Garonne, and from the Belgæ by the Marne and the Seine. The Belgæ are the bravest of all these peoples, because they are far removed from the culture and civilisation [*a cultu atque humanitate*] of the (Roman) Province, and the merchants rarely reach them with those things which lead to effeminacy of spirit. Next to them are the Germani, who inhabit the other side of the Rhine, and with whom they are continually at war; from which cause also the Helvetii excel the other Gauls in courage, because they fight battles with the Germani nearly every day, either driving them back from their frontiers, or themselves carrying war into the territory of the enemy."

It may be noted in passing (1) that Cæsar did not include in "all Gaul" the people of the district of Narbonne, which was already a Roman province; and (2) that he probably got from Greek writers the notion that the Galli as a whole called themselves Celtae. He does not seem to have learned any Gallic tongue. If it be true that the later Greeks made the name Galatia from the general native name for Gallia, it can hardly be true that the mass of the Galli called themselves Celtae. As for the conqueror's assertion that the Aquitani, Galli, and Belgae spoke different languages, it is open to the explanation that they spoke different dialects, which to him would seem different languages; and this is the gloss made by those scholars who are satisfied that Belgae and Galli alike spoke Celtic or Gallic. Even if we make this assumption, however, we only arrive at the conception of a diversified population speaking variants of one language. The differences of customs and of aspect which we know to have existed are the more important in view of the

[1] See the *Ethnogénie Gauloise* of Roget Baron de Belloguet, *Partie I.: Glossaire Gaulois*, 1858. 2e édit., 1872.

presumed general unity of speech. The bulk of the people of the district of Aquitania, and the neighbouring tribes called the Liguri, were by the general consent of the ancient writers much nearer in appearance to the people of Spain than to the more northerly Gauls; and were without dispute classed as Celto-Iberian, that is, connected alike with the Iberians, the people of the Peninsula, and with the people of Gaul. And the conclusion pointed to by the historical evidence is that Celtae so-called, in the era before written history begins, had successfully invaded Spain as other Gauls successfully invaded Italy, mixing more or less with the populations they found there; while on the other hand, either there remained in Gaul a dark stock which had been there previously, or some Iberian peoples had invaded Gaul; with the result that on both sides of the Pyrenees, as on both sides of the Alps, there were recently-mixed stocks.

But this datum only raises further question. The Aquitani and the Liguri appear to have been dark-haired, shortish, dark-skinned, "wiry," as the phrase goes, and nervously alert.[1] The more northern Gauls, sometimes called the "Gauls proper," are on the other hand described by Cæsar as tall, and by later writers as tall, white-skinned, and fair or red-haired. Then had there been an original "Celtic" stock which possessed these characteristics in common with other northern peoples; and had it lost them during centuries of occupation of Southern France, northern Spain, and northern Italy? That is the first hypothesis that suggests itself. But then we find that the modern Celtic-speaking Breton race, presumably descended from the ancient Armoricans of the same district, who were classed as Galli, are much more often short and brown-haired or dark than tall and fair; and that the same characteristics prevail among the stocks of Wales and Cornwall, who are classed with the ancient Bretons as Kymri, a section of the Galli. Then the north-westerly Kymri were more like the south-westerly Celto-Iberians than the rest of the Gauls; while the latter, curiously enough, broadly resembled the Germans, as described by Tacitus. It is one of the perplexities of prejudiced historians, eager to find the Celts at all times a hopeless species, that Cæsar and Tacitus, in their writings on Gaul and Germany, seem to recognise no specific difference of aspect between the peoples.[2] Hence a number of inquirers, taking physical aspect to be the true clue to descent, have come

[1] Compare the old authorities cited by Amedée Thierry in his *Histoire des Gaulois*, Partie II. ch. i.

[2] See the critique on *Hill Burton on the Scotch Celts*, hereinafter.

to the conclusion that throughout Gaul and the "Celtic" regions there were really two races; and that the tall and fair race was really *Germanic*—a view which logically revolutionises the whole line of speculation on the characteristics of the races, though those who take it do not generally seem to see as much.

The Germanic theory, which we have seen[1] to be of old standing, rests substantially on the ancient testimonies that the "Galli" like the "Germani" were tall and fair or red-haired. This testimony, as we have also seen, gives no account of a double element in the population of any one part of Gaul; but the separate accounts of the dark-haired Aquitani and Liguri, the testimony of Cæsar as to the almost enslaved condition of the mass of the people of Gaul as compared with the aristocracy and the Druids, and the recognised prevalence of dark hair and short stature among the decendants of the people of north-west Gaul, have led many to the conclusion that throughout Gaul there was a mixture of two stocks. In this restricted form, without the assertion that either of the stocks was specially "Germanic," and without any process of argument necessarily implying that thesis, it is concisely and dispassionately put by one of our leading Celtic scholars:—

"One language was spoken by two races which gradually fused into one people—a northern, fair-haired, blue-eyed race, of tall stature, lymphatic temperament, and elongated heads; and a southern race, shorter in stature and dry and nervous in temperament, having brown or black hair and eyes and round heads. The free or dominant class of Gauls belonged to the former race, which was evidently an intrusive one. The inhabitants of the British Islands [before Cæsar] seem to have been composed of the same two races, and to have spoken the same language as those of Gaul."[2]

It is as a corollary to this general view that other writers affirm the "Germanic" character of the blond and dominant race. The earlier upholders of that view sought to show that the blond Galli of antiquity spoke a German language, an undertaking which, though not hopeless, has always substantially failed.[3]

[1] Above, pp. 15, 20.

[2] Professor Sullivan; art. *Celtic Literature* in *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

[3] It seems quite clear that the language spoken by the north-eastern Galli in Cæsar's time was not the language of the Germani. Cæsar (B. G. i. 46) tells that Arivoistus, the Germanic King who had crossed the Rhine fourteen years before, had learned Gallic by long residence in Gaul. On the general question, compare Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie Gauloise;* Partie I., *Glos-*

Some of the later adherents of the view are apparently content to suppose that the red-haired Galli were Teutons who abandoned Teutonic speech and acquired that of the people among whom they came. That hypothesis does not appear to be met by the Baron de Belloguet, who, having shown to the satisfaction of most Celtic scholars that one language was spoken all over Gaul at the beginning of our era, and that this language was non-Germanic, appears to hold that these facts prove the Galli to have been non-Germanic—that is, not offshoots of any of the Teutonic-speaking peoples, but simply akin to these. He holds to the conception of a blond race like the Teutonic whose original language was yet Gallic and non-Teutonic;[1] though his general doctrine commits him to the view that these were not the original population of Gaul. The outcome of his polemic seems to be the thesis that a blond northern race imposed Gallic on a dark southern race whose tongue previously was neither Gallic nor Germanic, though on the latter head his position is not clear, as he decides that the conquerors, being in a minority, were absorbed by the conquered, and that their stock has now for the most part disappeared.[2] His conclusions as a whole may be briefly stated thus :—

(1) That the Celts or Gauls, Belgae included, belonged to one blond lymphatic type, little fitted to bear southern heat.
(2) That they were dolichocephalic, or narrow-headed.
(3) That there was a brachycephalic or broad-headed population alongside.
(4) That these last were not truly Galli.
(5) That the Galli were very like the Germani, but certainly not Germani.

saire Gaulois. Holtzmann, who deals very ingeniously with all the difficulties of his thesis that the Galli were Germanic and the Germani Kelts, seeks to show that the passage in Cæsar, of which the MSS. give variant readings, is corrupt, and must be read otherwise, so as to permit of another than the received purport (*Kelten und Germanen*, S. 31-36). But then Holtzmann also argues that Strabo was right in departing from Cæsar's account of the sections of Gaul. The documents have thus to be very freely handled in order to make out the Germanic hypothesis.

[1] "Les langues indo-européennes ayant eu le même berceau, les races qui les créèrent sortait egalement d'une même souche." Partie II. *Types Gaulois et Celto-bretons*, 1861, p. 92.

[2] "Le type gaulois considéré dans son ensemble, tel que les anciens l'ont décrit, est entièrement perdu dans les trois quarts de la France." (*Ethnogénie Gauloise:* Ptie. II., *Types Gaulois, end.*)

(6) That the Galli, already degenerating in Cæsar's time, were always a minority; that they were not the aborigines, but conquerors; and that their stock has been lost in that of the conquered.

(7) That this conquered majority belonged to a dark or brown race, which originally occupied Western Europe.

(8) That they were probably of the stock of the Liguri, found in the south of Spain and of Italy, and were identical with the Lloegriens and the Gaëdhail or Gaël of the traditions of Brittany and Ireland.

(9) That the Liguri were probably of African origin, and of the stock of the present Berber race.[1]

There remains the cognate theory of M. Alexandre Bertrand, who also finds two races in pre-Roman Gaul, but defines them as Celtae and Galli, making the last-comers the Celtae, whom he regards as bringing a higher civilisation than that of the Galli = Galatae, who were formerly in possession. This theory, which is difficult to follow, by reason of M. Bertrand's way of using the race-names, proceeds mainly upon the archæological evidences for the late advent of an iron-using race who came from central and south-eastern Europe. The earlier Galli of Northern Italy (Cisalpine Gaul), he finds to be a much less civilised race than the Galli whom Cæsar identifies with the Celtæ; and he apparently infers an invasion between 150 and 100 B.C. "The portrait of the Galli of Polybius cannot apply to the Celtæ of Cæsar." In his view, the Celtic invaders found the Druids already installed, and made terms with them, they themselves constituting the aristocratic minority with whom Cæsar had to deal.[2]

Between these theories and the Germanic there seems little to choose. None seems capable of proof; and either way the red-haired race figure as conquerors. And as the original existence of two unmixed neighbouring red-haired stocks with widely different languages is a perplexity the more—though Professor Sullivan thinks the divergence of language could take place very speedily[3]—ethnologists continue to hark back to the Germanic theory, modifying it by the surmise that the tall Galli, originally German-speaking, had adopted the language of the population

[1] *Id., ib.*

[2] *Archéologie celtique et Gauloise*, 2e édit. pp. 394-397.

[3] The Irish and the German tongues, he contends, "must have been nearly identical a few centuries before the Christian era" (Introduction to O'Curry's Lectures on the Ancient Irish, p. lxxvi.).

of Gaul, just as did the Franks later, within the historic period. In favour of that surmise may be noted the fact that a number of the names of Gallic aristocrats or leaders given by Cæsar have a Germanic appearance. We have Vercingetorix, Orgetorix, Dumnorix, Ambiorix, and so on,[1]—names which certainly suggest the Teutonic formation we find in Heinrich, Dietrich, Friedrich, and so on; though they never seem actually to coincide with modern Teutonic names. "Rix" is the way in which Cæsar might be expected to write the German sound "rich," his *x* standing for the Greek guttural χ, *chi*. But then on the other hand we find that *righ* is the immemorial Celtic word for *king*, whereas only in remote antiquity does the word *reiks* or *reika* seem to have had that meaning in German; and though the Galli whose names we have cited were not regarded as kings in the modern sense, the suffix may very well have been a title of honour so originating.[2] We have names of the same sort among the chiefs of the Britons in Kent—*e.g.* Cingetorix, Lugotorix; and one of the arguments for the view that the Cimbri who invaded Italy were akin to the Galli is the fact that among the names of their chiefs were Cesorix and Boiorix. When German writers argue that Cesorix is identical with the Teutonic *Geiserich*, = Genseric, they only bring us back once more to the fact that, whatever their descent, the north-eastern Galli of Cæsar's day apparently spoke a very different tongue from that of the German Ariovistus; and there remains such a name as that of the Nervian (Belgo-Germanic) chief Boduognat,[3] which seems to trace clearly to the Gallic *Buadhach* = victorious, as does the name Boadicea or Boudicca. So that similarity of names is somewhat slender evidence (and I know of none better,[4] unless it be the apparently close resemblance of aspect between Gauls and Germans in the old descriptions) on which to decide that Cæsar's Gauls were Teuton conquerors absorbed in a non-Teutonic stock.

In any case, that solution fails to dispose of the questions: (1) Who were the original Gauls? (2) Were they Celts? (3) Did the name Galli belong originally to the tall and fair and

[1] Among the Galatae in Greece, too, we have such names as Synorix and Poredorax. Plutarch, *De Mulierum Virtutibus*, cc. 20, 24.

[2] This seems to have been the historic fact. See Professor Rhys's excellent little book, *Celtic Britain*, 2d ed., pp. 57-65.

[3] *De Bello Gallico*, ii. 23.

[4] Holtzmann's manipulation of Gallic names, such as *vergobretus*, in order to show that they are not Celtic but Teutonic (*Kelten und Germanen*, S. 90-119), is really much less satisfying than the old Celtic etymologies.

dominant northerns or the short and dark and subjugated southerns? (4) Were the stocks of the Aquitani and the Liguri, or stocks closely related to them, distributed all through Gaul, constituting the plebeians? (5) Why were there no ruling blonds over them in Aquitania and Liguria: and why were there none later among the Bretons?

We may decide that the blond invaders had failed to conquer the original inhabitants in Aquitania and Armorica, where, being pressed on the coast, they would make a harder stand; but even then we are only at the beginning of the problem. Assuming the two-race theory to be at bottom true, we must adopt one of two positions: Either those dominant blonds were Germans or Teutons, kindred in speech and blood to the bulk of the then peoples of Germany (who may or may not equally have subjugated a darker aboriginal population), and despite their dominance had accepted the language now known as Celtic or Gaelic, but really belonging to the dark races whom they subjugated (and who in that case, like the Greeks and the Italians, were also "Aryans" by descent); or the Celtic language was originally spoken by a northern race physically resembling the blond Germanic type, who subdued certain dark populations speaking non-Celtic languages, and succeeded in imposing the Celtic language on them. On the latter view the northern Kymry—Bretons, Welsh, and early Irish—may have been of the same stock as the Aquitani and Liguri, and may have originally spoken a language closely akin to that of the early inhabitants of the Spanish Peninsula. But either way, be it observed, the tall blond race are implicated in all those ancient accounts of the Celtic temperament which are drawn upon by modern Celtophobes. If the ruling Gauls were of Germanic stock, the Gaulish characteristics of which we have heard most are Germanic characteristics; and the Galatae of Greece were equally a Germanic stock. Those Gauls whom Cæsar describes as eagerly inquisitive but unstable and fickle were the Gauls whom he describes as very tall compared with his troops, and whom other Roman writers describe as fair- or red-haired. Cæsar says nothing of a dark-haired inferior race who had all the faults of Gallicity, leaving only Germanic virtues to red-haired superiors. He seems indeed to have had no idea that the Germans were in anyway preferable to the Gauls. He was, in fact, no such laborious student of character as some of our Christian Bishops and historians appear to suppose. He was in earlier life an unscrupulous adventurer, capable of displaying towards enemies—as in his treatment of the Tenchtheri and the Usipetes—all the

cool ferocity and duplicity of his mediæval Italian namesake Cæsar Borgia; and in his dealings with Gauls and Germans he had no higher ethical or critical standard than his own interest. Those were in his eyes faithless who, owing him no loyal faith, broke faith with him just as he was ready at need to break faith with them; and those were in his eyes fickle who did not devotedly and stedfastly subordinate all their national aspirations to the cause of the conqueror. He was none the less a man of extraordinary power and sagacity; and he developed into a military ruler of remarkable clemency and self-control. But it is absurd to take his censures of the Gauls, who several times came near destroying him, as definitions of the character of a whole race or set of races; and it is worse than absurd to take his account of the character of a tall white-skinned race of Gauls as applying to a short, dark-haired race of Gauls to whom he does not refer. And if Cæsar's Gauls were a Germanic race, the Galatians were a Germanic race, and the Britons before the Saxon conquest were Germanic as well as Keltic, blond as well as dark. So that whatever bad qualities of "race" are found by prejudiced historians in the character of ancient or modern "Celts" are to be connected just as much with the Teutonic stock as with the Gallic, commonly so-called.

But even this is not all. It is assumed for the purposes of the anti-Celtic school that the typical Teuton is—or was—tall and fair and blue-eyed. But Tacitus, who is the chief ancient authority with the Germans, describes them not as fair but as red-haired,[1] with blue eyes; and he gives almost exactly the same description of the Caledonians of Scotland,[2] remarking that their physique and red hair tell of a German origin. Hence it has been argued that these Caledonians, identified with the Picti, were not Celts but Teutons; though most of the archæological evidence supports the conclusion of Mr Skene, that the Picti

[1] "Truces et cœruli oculi, rutilæ comæ, magna corpora et tantum ad impetum valida; laboris atque operum non eadem patientia." (*De moribus Germanorum*, c. 4). The Baron de Belloguet has also pointed out that Galen (Comm. in Hippocr. *De salubri diaeta*, c. 6) says it was a common error to call the Germans yellow-haired, ξανθοι; whereas they were really πυῤῥοι, red-haired. *Cp.* Dr Beddoe, *Journal of Anthropology*, Oct. 1870, p. 124.

[2] "Namque rutilæ Caledoniam habitantium comæ, magni artus, germanicam originem asseverunt" (*Vita Agricolæ*, c. 11). Yet some writers decide, in respect of the sexual usages of the ancient Britons in general, that the Picts were non-Aryan. See, however, Poesche, *Die Arier*, S. 102, as to the many traces of polygamy among the early Scandinavians. (Citing Grimm, *Geschichte der deutschen Sprachen*, i. 18, 188.)

and the Gaël were closely kindred peoples. However that may be, it is the fact that in a large part of Germany to-day, as in England and Scotland, there are more dark-haired than red- or fair-haired people; while the fair- and red-haired ones seem to be at least as often short as tall, and the dark-haired ones about as often tall as short. Then, if we are to proceed upon the clue by which the Germanic and Celtic types have been differentiated as respectively fair (or red) and dark, or tall and short, are we not driven to assume that in modern Germany and Austria there is a preponderance either of Celts or of some other dark non-German types, the old German types being now completely in a minority? And are we not further led to infer, as some do, that the old Germanic stock is dying out, because lacking in capacity for civilisation? German writers expressly admit its disappearance as regards all the more southerly lands which it once overran[1]; and Herr Karl Penka puts this as the "most salient and most sad" proof of the fact that the blond race has only a small power of resistance to climatic heat.[2] But since the blond race not only dwindles down in the southern countries, but is largely outnumbered even in Germany and England, it would appear that there is more than heat in the matter, and that even where it appears formerly to have long flourished, as in Central Germany, it is lapsing into or being supplanted by the darker types; as if its ancient success were a mere temporary triumph of militarism and numbers over brains and civilisation, which are now turning the tables.

At this stage, though the champions of Teutonism will doubtless adopt new explanations,[3] the candid inquirer will begin to admit that the assumption of certain recognisable and persistent differences of type and character between Teutonic-speaking and Celtic-speaking nations has singularly little foundation in reason or in historic fact. And the further the tests are pushed, the more baseless the assumption appears. In the Highlands of Scotland, where there has subsisted down to our own day, a people known as Gaels or Galls, and presumptively kindred

[1] "Die grossen Schaaren von Germanen, ganze Volksstämme, welche ausgezogen sind, welche zum Theil Jahrhunderte hindurch in fremden Ländern mit erfolg die Herrschaft bewahrt und die unterjochten Eingebornen ihre Gewalt haben fühlen lassen, sie sind endlich nicht bloss von der politischen Bühne, sie sind auch von der physischen Bühne verschwunden. Es sieht aus, als wenn sie hingeschlachtet worden wären." Virchow, cited by Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, 1886, S. 98.

[2] Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, S. 132; *cp.* Poesche, *Die Arier*, S. 212.

[3] See those above suggested, p. 36.

with the Welsh, Bretons, and Erse-speaking Irish, to whose languages theirs is more or less closely akin, we find a preponderance neither of short dark people nor of fair-haired and blue-eyed people but of red-haired and brown-haired and tall dark-haired people. Lowland-Scotch prejudice leans finally to the thesis that everywhere in the Celtic world in historic times the ruling caste was Teutonic;[1] but even this adjustment will not meet the facts of the case. Finally, it is acknowledged that there is an apparent preponderance of Scandinavian (that is, Teutonic) stock in the Hebrides, where the language has for many centuries been Gaelic. But this admission is made, on the sociological side, only after generations of Saxondom had included in the same vituperation all grades and all tribes of the Celts in Scotland as elsewhere; and the discovery of the Scandinavian origin of many of the inhabitants of the Western Islands is an extremely awkward one for Celtophobes who had found the whole explanation of the misery of the Hebridean crofters in the supposed fact of their Celticity.

Repelled thus from Ultima Thule, whither he has followed the track from Gaul, the seeker for the primordial Celt tries next the trail of those Kymry who, as we have them in Brittany and Cornwall and above all in Wales,[2] do not seem to have ever been describable as generically tall and fair, but do seem to fill one part of the traditional programme in respect of having been nationally unfortunate. Who then were the Kymry?[3] In remote antiquity we verbally trace them eastwards to the Kimmerii, mentioned by Herodotus[4] as inhabitants of "Scythia" and of the Kimmerian Bosphorus. The general name of *Scythae* covered a multitude of tribes whose way of life, as related by Herodotus, in many ways corresponded with that ascribed to both Galli and Germani in later times; and we trace among the Scythae in particular, by the name of *Getæ*, the presumable Goths of later history.[5] After the beginning of our era, the *Kimmerioi* are explicitly identified by Greek geographers and historians with the *Kimbroi* or *Cimbri*[6] and the *Galatae*, and are vaguely described as dwelling in the east and in the north of Europe,

[1] See below the critique of Hill Burton's History.

[2] *Cymraig* is the Welsh name for the Welsh people.

[3] For a thorough study, see the posthumous work of Roget, Baron de Belloguet, *Les Cimmériens*, which completes his *Ethnogénie Gauloise*.

[4] IV. 12.

[5] Apparently represented to-day, however, by descendants of strongly "Celtic" type. See below, p. 65.

[6] Strabo, vii. c. ii. § 2. Plutarch, *Marius*, c. 11; Diod. Sic. v. 32.

coming from the shores of an icy northern sea and from the Cimbric Chersonese. About a century before our era they tumultuously invaded Gaul, Spain, and Italy, and seem to have been then vaguely regarded as thus eastern and northern in origin.[1] The question arises, What was their language, their stock? They were associated with the Teutones, a supposed Germanic tribe, whose name has since been made to cover the aggregate of the Germanic peoples. Were the Cimbri then Germani? At once the old difficulties present themselves afresh. For the Romans before our era the Cimbri seem to have been like the Galli. The Cimbri defeated and driven back by Marius, though leagued with Teutones, are in various ways identified by Roman writers with the Galli;[2] and similarly, the Galli or Galatae who invaded Greece in the third century before our era are called *Kimbri* by Appian and by Diodorus Siculus.[3] As regards the ancestors of the Welsh in north-western France, we do not find that they were known to Cæsar or any of the ancients by the name of Kymry, which is the name by which the Welsh call themselves in their literature. Still, knowing how often races are known by one name to their neighbours and by another name to themselves, it seems natural to suppose that the Gael-Kymry were connected with the Cimbri whom the Romans lumped with the Galli. When however we come to Tacitus, the chief source for our knowledge of the early Germans, we find him treating the remaining Cimbri as a *Germanic* tribe, living north of the Elbe, where they are located also by the geographers Strabo and Pomponius Mela.[4] And Tacitus further describes them as "now a small community, but great in fame."[5]

We turn next to those Iberian and Italic stocks which we have seen to be in some way connected with Gallia or "the Celts" before our era; and we do this the more hopefully because philology detects certain points in common between the Latin and the Celtic languages which constitute a closer relation-

[1] Florus, iii. 4. Quintillian, *Declam. pro Milite Mariano*, c. 13.

[2] Cicero, *de Oratore*, ii. 66. tells of some painted representation of a Gaul on the "Cimbric shield" of Marius: "*pictum Gallum in Mariano scuto Cimbrico.*" Comp. his treatise *De Petitione consulatus*, c. ii. 9; his oration *pro Manio Fonteio*, c. 14; and Sallust, *De bello Jugurth.*, c. 114.

[3] Appian, *De bello Illyrico*, c. 4; Diod. Sic. v. 32.

[4] Strabo, vii. c. 2, § 4; Mela, iii. 3.

[5] "*Parva nunc civitas, sed gloria ingens.*" C. 37.

ship than that between either and the Teutonic tongues.[1] The tradition in the time of the later Romans was that the Umbrians of Subalpine Italy were ancient Galli, who had conquered the district at a remote period, driving out of it the Siculi, who later peopled Sicily, and the Veneti. If this happened, the Gauls were presumably in turn conquered after a time by the invading Raseni or Tyrheni, (better known by their Latin name of Etruscans), who came from the north of Greece; and were either enslaved or killed out or driven into the Umbrian mountains. Can an early type of Gaul then be found in Umbria? The old name *Ombri* has been surmised to be the Celtic *Ambra* = the brave, and to have been a general epithet given to themselves by the victorious invaders. Among the Romans, too, "Cisalpine Gaul" was supposed to be peopled by the same stocks as peopled Transalpine Gaul. But then in the time of Polybius, who seems to have been a careful student so far as his knowledge went, the Southern Galli were a semi-savage people[2] with no signs of the civilisation and the organised cult which prevailed in Cæsar's time in Gaul; so that M. Bertrand, as we have seen, decides them to have been of a different race from the Galli-Celtae of Cæsar's description. Others, again, identify them, from their skull remains, with the *Celtæ of craniology*.[3] We are left then to speculate whether they were akin to the other old Italic stocks; whether these, in turn, were a dark race like the Iberians; and whether they originally spoke some of the Italic languages, which are so comparatively near akin to the Celtic; or whether these Italic languages had been imposed on their ancestors by northern "Aryan" invaders, whose type (if tall and blond) disappeared in the course of centuries (as that of the later Germanic conquerors has done since), but leaving the northern language established (which the later invaders failed to do). On any view, we look on an apparently endless vista of race mixtures.

There remains the case of the Belgae, of whom Cæsar learned[4] that most of them had come from Germany (*ab Germanis*), driving out the Galli who had formerly held the district, though they were now allied with the Galli and constantly at war with

[1] D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Celtes et Germains, étude grammaticale*, 1886. This writer considers that the linguistic connection points to a primitive "Italo-Celtic" unity.

[2] Polybius, ii. 17.

[3] Taylor, as cited, pp. 88, 238.

[4] *De Bello Gallico*, ii. 4.

Germani. It is in connection with *Belgae* that he tells how the *Galli*, being generally tall, were wont to jeer at the small stature of the Roman troops. It seems clear that the Belgae in general, whatever their aspect, spoke "Gallic" and not a German language; and they are identified by some inquirers with the Firbolgs of Irish tradition, who also seem by some accounts to have been tall and fair.[1] Once more then, proceeding on the assumption that the blond types belong to one race and the dark to another, we find ourselves confronted by opposed groups of red-haired people speaking different languages, one of the groups apparently using the tongue common to a mixed race of darker people.

The truth evidently is that the words *Germania* and *Germani* have no more definite racial significance than the words *Gallia*, *Celtica*, and *Galli*. One and all were applied loosely in antiquity, and they are applied if possible still more loosely now. For Cæsar, tribes outside the district which his own countrymen chose to call Gallia were in the mass Germani, because they fought the Galli; and the Belgae and Helvetii were Galli because they fought the so-called Germani. Yet the so-called Galli and Germani unquestionably fought among themselves in the territories which the Romans called by their names; and they would as certainly be ready to fight kindred tribes beyond the borders specified by the Romans. Cæsar himself asserts that there were Galli in Germania and Germani in Gallia; and he sets out by acknowledging that Gaul contained three nations, differing in language, customs, and laws.

When we closely scrutinise the testimony of Tacitus, we find ourselves no nearer clearness or certainty. We have seen that he classes as Germanic the Cimbri whose name in later history appears only among the "Celts," and also the Caledonians of Scotland, who are generally reckoned Celts. But this is not the only point at which the data of Tacitus clash with the traditional classification—and indeed with his own preliminary account of

[1] According to Professor Sullivan, the three warring races of Firbolgs, Tuatha Dé Danand, and Milesians or Scoti, were all alike tall and fair. (Introd. to O'Curry's Lectures "*On the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*," 3 vols., London, 1873, p. lxxii.) Indeed in O'Curry's extracts from the old Irish literature there is constant mention of blonds. But Mr Richey (*Short History of the Irish People*, pp. 28-29), cites MacForbis (who lived in the seventeenth century), as calling the Fir-Bolg, in his *Book of Genealogies*, a short race with dark hair and eyes; and Mr Richey thinks the point is thus settled.

the Germans as an unmixed race.[1] That view is clearly irreconcilable, at the very outset, with the premiss that certain Germanic tribes had frontier wars with non-Germanic tribes. Both sides taking captives, there must have been intermixture in that respect.[2] Freedom from recent intermixture could appear to exist only among the tribes near the centre of the Germanic territory; and it was doubtless these that Tacitus had in view in his generalisation. As soon as we pass from that to his details, we have a picture of a variegated population in Germany analogous to that we have been forced to frame for Gaul. The confederation or agglomeration of *gentes* known as the Suevi, occupying the greater part of Germania, so-called by the Romans, are found to be distinguished from other Germans by their habit of tying up their hair; and the free Suevi are thus also distinguished from the slaves.[3] Among the Suevi, then, we have an enslaved and a free class, and the slaves may have included any number of aliens, Galli or others. Tacitus expressly records, as Cæsar had done before, that tribes of Gauls had invaded Germany; and to the Volcae-Tectosages, already specified by Cæsar[4] as having conquered and held Germanic territory, we have to add the Helvetii, the Boii, and the populations of the Decumatian Plains (*Decumates agros*), specified by Tacitus. Further, the latter writer expressly tells us that the Gothini spoke the Gallic language[5]—a circumstance which (unless we take the Gallic tongues to have originated in northern Europe alongside of the Germanic) can only be explained by a Gallic conquest, and which further creates a new difficulty for the thesis that the Galli were a Germanic race—and yet again that the Aestyii, on the right bank of the Suevic sea, had the rites and customs

[1] It is interesting to note that Tacitus partly anticipates the modern view that the Aryans originated in Central Europe. He argues of the Germans:—"Ipsos Germanos indigenas crediderim, minimeque aliarum gentium adventibus et hospitiis mixtos. . . . Quis porro, praeter periculum horridi et ignoti maris, Asia, aut Africa, aut Italia relicta, Germaniam peteret? informem terris, asperam caelo, tristem cultu adspectuque, nisi si patria sit? (*De mor. Germ.* i.).

[2] "In Europe, what population can pretend to purity of blood? The Basques themselves, who apparently ought to be well protected by their country, institutions, and language, against the invasion of foreign blood, show upon certain points, in the heart of their mountains, the evident traces of the juxtaposition and fusion of very different races." (De Quatrefages, *Human Species*, Eng. tr., p. 273. *Cp.* Beddoe, *Journal of Anthropol.*, Oct. 1870, p. 126.)

[3] *Id.*, c. 38.

[4] *B. G.*, vi., 24.

[5] C. 43.

of the Suevi, but a language nearer the Breton or Britannic (*propior britannica*),[1] besides being much more industrious than the Germans in general. Tacitus also tells that this tribe, which practised agriculture to an extent unusual in Germany, worshipped the earth-goddess, and wore as a talisman, and as sole substitute for weapons, an emblem of the boar—the animal sacred to the earth-goddess in many ancient cults. Now, the figure of the boar has been found among Gallic remains, and is confidently held by archæologists to have been a Gallic ensign.[2] So that here again the Galli seem marked off from the Germans, despite their similarity of aspect. Finally, in his account of the inhabitants of Britain,[3] while tracing the red-haired Caledonians directly to the Germanic stock, Tacitus distinguishes sharply between the dark and curly-haired Silures, whom he regards as of Iberian descent, and others whom he declares to be like the Galli, without classing them with the Caledonians. His idea of the Galli then would seem to be that they were not dark, yet not red-haired like the Germans and Caledonians.

Thus then with one section after another of the population of Ancient Gaul, supposed to be either closely akin-to or the source of the populations of Ancient Britain, modern Brittany, Wales, Ireland, and the Scotch Highlands, we find that the boundary lines supposed to mark off the so-called Gallic or Celtic stock from the so-called Germanic disappear or waver on scrutiny. Everywhere the races seem partly to blend, the physical traits to be in part common, the geographical distribution to be inextricable. Such a patient and scholarly process of discrimination of early British and Irish tribes and stocks as is set forth in the *Celtic Britain* of Professor Rhys does but leave us surer that the question of race is insoluble. Between Goidelic and Brythonic Celts and non-Celts, Aryans and non-Aryans, we can never reach any real knowledge of race characters or types, or original racial speech. All that we can discover is a series of masses of barbarians, known to the more civilised peoples of

[1] C. 45.

[2] See the figure in Bertrand's *Archéologie Gauloise et celtique*, 2e édit., near end.

[3] "Habitus corporum varii; atque ex eo argumenta. Namque rutilæ Caledoniam habitantium comæ, magni artus, germanicam originem asseverant. Silurum colorati vultus, et torti plerumque crines, et posita contra Hispania, Iberos veteres trajecisse eosque sedes occupasse fidem faciunt. Proximi Gallis et similes sunt. . . . Eorum sacra deprehendas superstitionum persuasione; sermo haud multum diversus." (*Vita Agricolae*, c. 11.)

their time by loose generic titles, any one of which would serve to cover indefinite tracts of northern Europe, and a multitude of independent tribes and hostile confederations. From this chaos of ancient barbarism there survive certain groups of *languages*, two of which are known to us as Celtic and Teutonic; but so far from these languages giving us a clue to the stock or pedigree of the peoples who now speak them, we find many reasons for believing that in antiquity peoples of apparently the most different stocks, in age after age, entered into the use of the same language, just as has happened in our own era. A race, in any sense known to us, and at any distance of time at which it can be traced, is such a complex of elements that the traditional assumption of special and rooted mental characteristics becomes simply fantastic when compared with the facts. The theory of race pedigree, in fact, crumbles to nullity in the case of Celts and Teutons just as it does in the case of Hebrews, Moabites, Midianites, Ishmaelites, Heraclidæ, and Romans. When, after seeking vainly in the ancient documents for some criterion or clear distinction among race types in terms at once of language and aspect, we attempt to find a meaning in race names themselves, instead of getting any new light we are led to the surmise that the very conception of race is a relatively modern and factitious development. Of the etymological premisses on which—taking the traditional method for what it may be worth—we have above sought to reach rational conclusions, not one escapes suspicion on strict scrutiny. Every name in turn is found susceptible of conflicting explanations. The name Teuton, which in modern times serves to indicate the whole of the peoples speaking the "Germanic" languages, is historically the name of only one Germanic tribe—that which invaded Italy with the Cimbri and was destroyed with them—and was never applied by either the Germani or the Romans to the Germanic peoples collectively. Its modern use appears to be purely fallacious. It connects with the Gothic *thiuda*, the Old Norse *thjoð*, and the Anglo-Saxon *theod*, all signifying "a people." From the same root appears to have come the German word *Diet;* and the modern word *Deutsch* or *Teutsch*, which now stands for "German," simply meant the vernacular language, the language of the people, as distinguished from the Latin of the scholarly class, whose civilisation came through the lore of Rome. But the word is not specially Germanic. The Irish *tuath* signifies "a tribe"; the Breton *tud* = people; and the Welsh *tud*, which now means a country, is at bottom the same

word, since "foreigner" in Welsh was *alltud*, even as *eltheod* is "foreigner" in Anglo-Saxon. Furthermore, the Oscan *tauta*, *touto*, and the Sabine *touta*, *tôta*, also signified "a community"; and it is probable that "the Gaulish word for a people or community was *touta*."[1] Then the old name *Teutones* may as well have been given to a "Celtic" as to a "Germanic" tribe, whether by themselves or by their neighbours. It stands for no traceable pedigree. And if there be any weight whatever in the tests of skull-shape and of prevailing complexion, the giving of the name "Teutonic" to all the "Scandinavian" stocks indiscriminately is a mere perversion of the facts, since there is alike traditional and craniological evidence that the historic Danes differed widely from the Teutonic type; and Scandinavian scholars have held[2] that in that region there was first a broad-headed non-Teutonic race, then a Gothic, then a Celtic, introducing bronze—all preceding the historic Swedes.

Again, we find that *Galli* may have meant, in a "Celtic" speech, either "the blond" or "the strong;" and the question arises whether the early Roman name for the Northern races did not simply mean, like the Latin *Galbi*, "the yellow people." But on the other hand, as before noted, the word *Gall* in the Erse dialect means "a stranger,"[3] whence arises the query whether the name may not first have arisen through the different "Gallic" tribes so specifying each other, with the final result of making the name cover tribes speaking another tongue than theirs. The name Armorica, anciently given to Brittany, whence the name Armoricans for the people, simply meant Sea-side, and may have been given by others to a population who had no such word. We saw that *Ceiltach* or *Coiltach* may mean forest-dweller or secluded dweller, and that *Caledon* may mean forest-land; but the word *Caledon* or *Calyddon* may no more have been the home-name of northern Scotland for the ancient people called Caledonians than the German name *Wälsch* (= Italian) is the Italian name for Italians. The "Welsh" are to-day known to Englishmen by a name which is probably German in origin, meaning simply "foreigners." M. Gaston Paris, followed by M. D'Arbois de Jubainville, derives the word from the *Valah*, the supposed Germanic name for the Celtic or Gallic tribe called by Polybius and Cæsar *Volcae*, and anciently situated north of the

[1] Professor Rhys, Hibbert Lectures on *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 45.

[2] Professor Nilsson, of Lund, in *Report of British Association* for 1847, p. 31.

[3] Gall is the Irish and Scotch-Highland word for a non-Gaël.

Upper Danube and in Germany as well as in south-west France. It is further connected with Bolgae (said by an ancient poet to be the original form of the name), and so with the Belgae and the Irish Fir-Bolgs. Here we have one of the slightest identifications that have met us in our inquiry; yet for all we know it may be true. There is no weight of evidence either way. *Volcae* looks more like the German *Volk* (=folk) than anything else; and *Volcae-Tectosages* always suggests a compound name given by German-speakers to describe a particular "folk," but the resemblance settles nothing. A natural surmise is that if *Valah* be identical with *Welsh*, it is also identical with *Wallach*; and when we learn that the Wallachians are mostly shortish, dark-eyed, black-haired, and unlike Magyars, Germans, or Slaves, we begin to presume them certainly Celtic and non-Teutonic. Prichard and others, however, have seen reason to identify them with the ancient Getae or Dacians, and to hold them "the only living representatives of the ancient Thracian race"[1]—which may or may not have been Celtic.

The word *Germani*, in turn, has no more of sure basis. For Strabo, it meant simply "kindred," and he thought the Germans were so called as being "germane" in appearance to the Galli.[2] Tacitus, in an apparently corrupt passage, says that the name was given "through fear," but leaves its meaning an enigma.[3] The theory that "German" meant *guerre*-man, *warrior*, is no better and no worse; as is the etymological theory that *gallus*=cock comes from a form *garlus*, "akin to the Sanskrit root *gar*" =to make a sound, whence the Latin verb *garrio*, to chatter. On the other hand it has been suggested that *German* was a Gallic epithet, from *garm* or *gairm*, meaning clamour; and yet again that it came from *gair* or *ger*, meaning neighbouring or neighbour, the *man* in Celtic signifying small! For Carlyle, finally, the name German suggests an original *Gar*man, the man who compels or *gars* (*Scottice*); etymology thus lending itself to every man's fancy or prejudice in turn. There is really no good reason to suppose that in antiquity the multitude of separately-named tribes whom the Romans called *Germani* had any general name for themselves. The later named *Allemanni* (=All men) has been supposed to be a title invented to indicate

[1] Dr J. A. Meigs, in Nott and Gliddon's *Indigenous Races of the Earth*, 1857, p. 308.

[2] Strabo, vii., c. i. § 2.

[3] *De mor. Germ.* c. 2. See Holtzmann (*Kelten und Germanen*, S. 42 *sq.*) for an elaborate discussion of the passage. He takes Strabo's view of the word.

that certain hordes invading Italy were made up of a great many stocks; but as to this also there is no certainty; and as the word *gar* in German still has in a sense the force of "all," there arises the further hypothesis that Germani and Allemanni were two dialect-names with the same meaning.[1]

In all directions the race-names offer similar perplexities. The tribe-name Briton, whence we have Britannia, Britain, and Brittany, is traced by Professor Rhys, in the form of Brython, to a word meaning clothed or cloth-clad; and he surmises that the tribe in question used the name to mark themselves off from the non-Aryan aborigines whom they found wearing skins. This seems at first sight unlikely enough, but it is perhaps as likely as any other view. In any case, the name was that of only one section of supposed Celts, and "no Goidels, in the linguistic sense of the word, are found to have been called Brittones either by themselves or by the other Celts within historical times."[2] Add to this that *Iberi* possibly meant just the *Further* people; and that the Germanic *Ingaevones*, *Istaevones*, and *Hermiones* of Tacitus were presumably just the *Inwohner*, *Westwohner*, and *Herumwohner*, the Inland-dwellers, West-dwellers, and Hither-dwellers; and the racial significance of racial names can be broadly estimated.

Nor can the perplexities of the verbalist method be cleared up by any resort to archæological clues. Great hopes have been founded on the evidence of the shapes of skulls found in different regions; and something like general views have been reached on a basis of the comparison of graves, tombs and other structures. But on neither line can we reach any certainty of historical discrimination in the present connection. It has been again and again shown that no large group of European skulls of any period is definitely marked off from the others, there being round, broad, and long heads in nearly all collections;[3] while in regard to dolmens, tumuli, and other

[1] According to Adelung (*Aelteste Geschichte der Deutschen*, Sect. viii., par. 1) there were in the different German dialects at one time as many as 111 distinct names for a horse, of which only five remain. Another light on the imaginary "Aryan" unity of the Teutonic-speaking race.

[2] *Celtic Britain*, pp. 205-211.

[3] See Roget de Belloguet, *Ethnogénie Gauloise:* IIe Partie, *Types Gaulois*, p. 182. Dr Taylor (*Origin of the Aryans*, p. 79) alleges a partial division. But as his own data constantly show (see, for instance, p. 86), the so-called broad skulls often vary towards the long type, and *vice versa*. The mean or average measurements thus tend to set up a wrong impression, as do

evidences of modes of burial there is the baffling difficulty that we can never be sure which race, by historical nomenclature, introduced any one fashion.[1] Dolmens raised on tumuli point to the superposition of one cult or custom on another; but the dolmen-builders in that case may have been descendants of the mound-heapers who had adopted the use of dolmens on contact with another people, conquering or conquered by them.

Seeking for general principles, we may frame the hypothesis that the practice of burning the dead, like that of embalmment, would naturally originate in warm climates, where the dangers of burial would soon force themselves on notice, and compel resort to some means of preventing the process of putrefaction. But when we go into historic detail we find that certain peoples refused to practise cremation where their neighbours used it, while others seem to have adopted cremation after the example of their neighbours. There is evidence that certain of the Celtae in Spain held it impious to burn their dead, and left them to be devoured by birds of prey, who were supposed to carry the souls to heaven.[2] This corresponds almostly exactly with the persistent practice of the Parsees, who, like the Celtae, may be supposed to have stuck to the usages of ancestors inhabiting a cold country. But other peoples of presumably northern descent are found to have gradually accepted the practice of cremation—*e.g.* in ancient India and ancient Rome—in imitation of the southern races

the graphic presentments of the extreme case as "types" (*e.g.* p. 71). The variations ought to raise afresh the question whether (to say nothing of the barbaric practice of skull deformation in infancy) differences in skull shape do not result from traceable causes. On the other hand, those who, with Dr Taylor, hold skull shape to be fixed and hereditary (despite the variations from the mean) ought surely to regard *all* dolichocephalic and *all* brachycephalic races as respectively akin. Yet Dr Taylor does not seem to infer any kinship between the dolichocephalic Iberians and the dolichocephalic Teutons, though he inclines (pp. 70, 92) to see kinship between the brachycephalic "Celts" and "Turanians," and though, further, it might reasonably be argued that the short Iberians and the tall Teutons had merely been differentiated by widely different life conditions during long periods.

[1] Thus Professor Rhys (*Celtic Britain*, pp. 258-259) surmises that the Brythonic Celts of Britain buried in barrows, while the Goidelic Celts dug graves, yet in some instances adopted the Brythonic fashion of mounds. And this leaves open the question of the practice of the pre-Celtic population, which "profoundly modified" the Goidelic (*Id.*, *ib.*).

[2] Silius Italicus, iii. 340-342. The Celto-Scythae, again, are recorded to have embalmed the heads of their dead (Pomponius Mela, ii. 1); while the Galatae in their invasion of Greece scandalised the Greeks by leaving their slain unburied (Pansanias, x. 21).

among whom their ancestors had entered; while on the other hand dark races, presumed to be of southern descent, are found to revert in northern countries to the practice of burial. Thus mortuary remains, like the other clues, fail to apprise us of any primordial and persistent distinctions of race.[1]

Supposing we agree to mark off as distinct races the inhabitants at a given time of lands where we find skulls tending in the main either to the long or the broad type, making a further distinction between tall and short long-headed races, we are still without any proof as to any hereditary moral characteristics in the various species; and we are further entirely precluded from identifying any one type with any nation in historic times. If the "Celts" be the tall broad-headed race of the "round barrows" of Britain, then the Celtic skull is identical with typical Latin and Umbrian skulls,[2] also with typical Helvetic skulls, also with a typical Danish skull of the neolithic period.[3] And this "race" is "now represented by the Danes, the Slaves, and some of the Irish."[4] That is to say, a people commonly described as Teutonic, the Danish, is typically "Celtic"; as is also the ancient Roman and the modern Russian; and the modern Irish have certain affinities in all these directions. If again the Celts be the short and dark and long-headed race loosely alluded to as the "Iberians," whose skulls are found in the "long barrows" of Britain, and who are supposed to have been overrun by the tall broad-headed people above considered as the possible Celts, then the Celtic race to-day is "represented by *some of* the Welsh and Irish, by the Corsicans, and by the Spanish Basques."[5] On that view, Napoleon may have been a Celt; as Cæsar may have been on the former view. But if, yet again, the Celts be really the *short broad-headed* race, whose skulls are found in Switzerland and Central France, and who are loosely described as "Ligurians," (or sometimes "Lappanoids") then the Celtic race is "now represented by the Auvergnats, the Savoyards, and *the Swiss*."[6]

[1] Compare for instance the maps in M. Bertrand's *Archéologie celtique et gauloise* with those in Dr Sopie Bryant's *Celtic Ireland*. M. Bertrand draws a line showing a broad separation between dolmens and tumuli-with-iron. It goes nearly due north from Marseilles to Rheims, then north-eastwards, parallel with the coast-line. He puts *Galatae*, using iron, east and south of that line and "nameless populations," with Celts and Hyperboreans, using bronze, mostly west and north of it. Dr Bryant seeks to get ethnological guidance from the tumuli and dolmens, but her race-maps do not at all coincide with those of M. Bertrand.

[2] Taylor, as cited, pp. 88-89.

[3] *Id.*, p. 82.

[4] *Id.*, p. 214.

[5] *Id.*, p. 214.

[6] *Id.*, p. 214.

If that confusion is not sufficiently confounded, the reader may add to it by collating the further theory, above considered, that the tall Galli and Caledonians were Teutonic. Dr Taylor, who presents to us so many perplexities, puts aside this, deciding with surprising confidence that

"There is a superficial resemblance between the Teutons and the Celts, but they are radically distinguished by the form of the skull. No anthropologist would admit that the Row Grave skulls and the round barrow skulls could belong to the same race. Both races, however, were tall, large-limbed, and fair-haired. But the pink and white complexion of the Teuton is different from the more florid complexion of the Celt, who is inclined to freckle. The eyes of the pure Teutons are blue, those of the Celts green, grey, or greyish-blue. The hair of the Teutons is golden; that of the Celts is often fiery red. In the Roman period the Gauls are described as resembling the Germans, but not so tall, so fair, or so savage."[1]

Dr Taylor here accepts as decisive a few ancient testimonies which are contradicted by others;[2] yet he had just before cited, without comment, the statement of Tacitus, that the Germans had red (*rutilæ*) hair. And as he cannot prove that the ruling Galli or Celtae of Cæsar were either freckled or broad-headed, since he cannot identify their skulls; and as he points out that there are dark and red-haired types[3] among the Scottish Highlanders,[4] and short dark dolichocephali and tall red-haired brachycephali in Ireland,[5] he supplies no solution of the sociological imbroglio set up by the traditional characterisations of Celts and Teutons. Indeed he expressly complains that the name "Celt," though fixed in anthropology, is a source of great confusion.

[1] Taylor, as cited, p. 109. On this general view the Danes (=Dr Taylor's Celts) should be mostly green or grey-eyed, red-haired, and freckled, as compared with the yellow-haired, blue-eyed pink and white Swedes (=his Teutons). Yet he tells us (p. 84) that "the hair of the Danes, according to Dr Beddoe, is either pale yellow or light-brown, and their eyes are . . . usually either blue or bluish-grey." On the other hand, the Danes of British tradition were dark; and the Highland name Dougal, often taken as typically Celtic, is held to have been applied by Celts to Danes, meaning as it does *dark stranger*.

[2] See Dr Beddoe, *Journal of Anthropology*, Oct. 1870, pp. 123-124; and *cp.* Galen, as cited above, p. 55, *note*.

[3] He instances the MacGregors and Camerons as red-haired *clans*. Yet I have known dark Highlanders of both names. The very name Rob *Roy* (=red) shows that red hair was not general among the MacGregors of last century.

[4] P. 78. [5] P. 110.

We end by noting, with Broca, that ancient Celticity can be viewed under four aspects,[1] there being :—

1. The "Celts of history"—the peoples of the confederations of Central Gaul.
2. The "Celts of linguistics"—spreading from Ireland to Galatia.
3. The "Celts of archæology"—the beginners of the bronze age, who were broad-headed.
4. The "Celts of craniology," (found in Scandinavia as well as further south) who were either broad- or narrow-headed.[2]

And these four certainly cannot be proved to be one.

The only course for reasonable students seems to be to abandon once for all the theory of primordial and persistent type-differences in the speakers of different languages. But the ancient presupposition of race-tendencies, capacities, proclivities, is so tenacious, so conformable to a psychological bias which is common to all races and nearly all men, that after the old formulas have been discredited there is still the tendency to put equivalent formulas in their places. Thus we find some sociologists restating the case thus. They surrender the old definitions of "Celt" and "Teuton," and propose to make the name "Celtic" apply loosely, for mere purposes of convenience, not to the Celts and Galli "proper" but to the prehistoric "Iberian" or "Ligurian" or "Silurian" or "Lappanoid" inhabitants of Gallia and the early inhabitants of Britain and Ireland, without attempting to make out in what degree these populations were "non-Germanic" at the beginning of our era, and without noting that the so-called Germanic peoples of Scandinavia and Germany in turn included large Celtic elements. Having thus conveniently got rid of the old difficulties and put the case in the most suitable form for a new vindication, they affirm that the history of the two stocks (both later inextricably mixed, on their own showing) within the historic period is sufficient to show a fundamental difference in political capacity, which difference, they once more argue, is to be ascribed to some special characteristics, acquired it may be in long prehistoric ages, in the stocks which *predominate* in the so-called Celtic and Germanic countries—in France as contrasted with Germany; in Ireland as contrasted with England. All the while they ignore (*a*) the modern demonstration that the "Teutonic" race-type of antiquity is dying

[1] *Mémoires Anthropologiques*, i. 375.

[2] For Retzius and many others, the Celts were dolichocephalic. *Cp.* Taylor, as cited, p. 226; and Beddoe, as cited, p. 118.

out, and that modern Germany, for instance, approximates in the main, as regards type-aspects, to modern France. They further abstain from anything like a scientific calculation of (*b*) the proportion of non-Teutonic blood in the population of early England, which is now generally admitted to have conserved a great deal of the ancient British[1] (already much mixed) with that of the invading Anglo-Saxons and (Celtic?) Danes; which was further much mixed under the Norman and Angevin kings; but which is yet habitually spoken of as a "Teutonic" people. Equally they waive all pretence of (*c*) an estimate of the amount of "Celtic" population in English-speaking Scotland, of Scotch-Celtic and Irish population in modern England, and of "Teutonic" stock in Ireland. As a matter of fact the clue of modern *names*, the only available one in this case, proves that there are in England and Scotland millions of nominally non-Teutonic people—the Welsh name Jones, for instance, being one of the very commonest in England, while in Scotland the clan names beginning with "Mac" are extremely numerous in the Lowlands—and that in Ireland, though Mr Huxley and Mr Lecky and Mr Gladstone are probably wrong in supposing the bulk of the population to be of "Anglo-Saxon" descent, there are myriads whose ancestors entered the island within the last three hundred years.[2] All these considerations are got over by even the most scientifically disposed of the racial school, who are content to take for granted a probable majority of a given descent, and to assume that such a majority must needs determine a country's history in respect of their racial tendencies. They thus reaffirm, while disclaiming all race-prejudice, the old doctrine visibly formulated by race-prejudice, only offering new arguments and abandoning most of the old.

And as the new doctrine, though put forward by far more circumspect reasoners than the old school of Celtophobes, is in the opinion of some of us just as erroneous and just as ill-founded as the old, it remains to deal with it on its merits as we have dealt with that.

[1] See below, sec. v. *Cp.* Mr Grant Allen, *Anglo-Saxon Britain*, ch. 7; the Rev. H. M. Scarth, *Roman Britain*, p. 227; and the criticism of Mr Freeman's Teutonist assumptions in the *Anthropological Review*, Jan. 1870.

[2] The two leaders who virtually constituted the present Irish National movement, and whose animosity to England was certainly as strong as that of any of their followers, bore respectively English and Scotch names. The name of Parnell is English, and that of Biggar Lowland-Scotch.

§ 6. "*Celtic*" *and* "*Teutonic*" *History.*

Apart from the much more primitive life-conditions of the peoples beyond the Rhine, who were mostly hunters and brigands, with little agriculture and no towns, holding land by nomadic tenures, only one marked difference is noted by Julius Cæsar between the social structures of the Galli and of the Germani. That is, the Gallic institution of the Druidic priesthood.[1] Whereas the Druids in Gaul were a numerous and powerful order, which many of the aristocracy were glad to join, the Germans beyond the Rhine seem to have had no organised priesthood whatever. Tacitus so far corroborates Cæsar.

Druidism is certainly a notable sociological phenomenon. We know little about it; but that little is enough to constitute a quite definite problem. Unless Cæsar has grossly exaggerated the facts, the Druids were one of the most influential priesthoods of antiquity; and before Cæsar their name and prestige seem to have reached Greece.[2] Such an institution, which it must have taken a long time to evolve, seems to some students to mark off the Galli as moved by tendencies different from those prevalent among the Germani—tendencies to the erection of a priestly tyranny, subversive of intellectual and personal freedom. When, however, we seek for the historic origins, we find reason to surmise that Druidism belongs neither to the Galli or Celtae so-called nor to the presumed older population. We may indeed surmise that the older population had a priesthood. The ancient stock called Iberians in Asia Minor[3] are recorded by Strabo to have had four social grades: (1) that of the "old and wise"; (2) that of the priests; (3) that of the soldiers and agriculturists; (4) that of the common people, who were the serfs of the kings.[4] The holders of property, too, were not individuals but families. Here we have a state of society in which the priesthood is visibly very powerful; and if we suppose the ancient Iberians of Spain and Aquitaine and the kindred Liguri to be akin to the Iberians of Armenia, and to have constituted the lower orders in Gallia after the conquest by the Celtae-Galli, we may further suppose

[1] *De bello Gallico*, vi. 21-24. Cæsar attributes to greater luxuriousness of life a relative inferiority of valour among the Galli.

[2] Though some of the supposed ancient allusions will not bear investigation. See D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Introduction à l'étude de la littérature celtique.*

[3] In the north of Armenia.

[4] Strabo, B. xi., c. 3, par. 6. *Cp.* c. 4, par. 7-8, as to the priests and rites of the Asiatic Albani, who also revered old age.

them to have had a priesthood which was the nucleus of the Druid order, and which retained its power under the conquerors as did the Christian priesthood later. But a special feature in the description of ancient Druidism is that Cæsar declares its headquarters to have been the British Islands, whence it was imported into Gallia.[1] This at once suggests a connection with the Phoenicians, who had for centuries traded with Britain for tin, and who constituted the one foreign culture-influence that the pre-Roman Britons could undergo. And as the sacrificial usages of the Druids—especially the burning of victims in great osier-cages shaped like men[2]—closely resemble those of the Moloch-worshipping Carthaginians, we are much better entitled to look to early Phoenician influence for the development of Druidism (on a basis, it may be, of a primitive "Iberian" priesthood which had already sacrificial usages) than to suppose that in remote primeval Britain there had been independently evolved an elaborate esoteric doctrine of immortality and planetary influences and cosmic origins such as Cæsar describes.[3] The evolution of

[1] *De bello Gallico*, vi. 13.

[2] *Id.*, vi. 16. The Druids also seem to have worn black robes like the priests of Saturn. See Strabo, B. iii.

[3] *Cp.* Pliny, B. xvi. c. 95. I find the Phoenician hypothesis well worked out by Moke, *Histoire des Francs*, 1835, pp. 422-441. For another theory of Druidism, which must be admitted to be weighty, see Professor Rhys's *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., pp. 69-73. Professor Rhys surmises Druidism to have been pre-Celtic, and to have been accepted by the "Goidelic" Celts but not by the "Brythonic" Celts. The cosmogonic element in Druidism he supposes to have been derived from the Mediterranean civilisation by way of Marseilles; and the resort of Gaulish students to Britain, he suggests, may have been by way of getting back to the more "rugged and horrible" but more sacrosanct lore of the early non-Aryan cult. This theory coincides with that above offered to the extent of assuming a primitive priesthood on which a later influence worked. I may point out however that Professor Rhys—in saying that beyond the passage in Festus Avienus, of which he makes light, "there is not a scrap of evidence, linguistic or other, of the presence of Phoenicians in Britain at any time"—makes too little of the testimony of Strabo (iii. 5, *end*) that the Phoenicians were anciently the sole traders with the Cassiterides. It is true that the identity of these islands is in doubt (see Elton's *Origins of English History*, 2nd ed., 1890, pp. 10-23), but it is really not proved that they were not, as was long held, the Scilly Isles; and in the very nature of the case, as put by Strabo, the Carthaginians were moved to keep the sources of their tin supply as far as possible secret. In this connection I may further venture to suggest that Professor Rhys might consider the virtual correspondence of such a goddess-name as the Gaulish *Belesama* (see his *Celtic Heathendom*, p. 46, &c.) with the Phoenician Bel-Sama, to say nothing of the coincidence of the doctrine of triads.

Druidism among the "Celts," then, (though our explanation is only a tentative one), was probably a process closely corresponding to the growth of the Christian priesthood everywhere in modern Europe—an imposition of a systematised and sophisticated cult on simple-minded barbarians to begin with. In any case, nothing can rationally be inferred from it as to any bias towards sacerdotalism among the "Celtic race." It is the modern representatives of the Galli, the French, who of all European nations have most completely subordinated their priesthood; so that it is unnecessary to rest upon any hypothesis of origins by way of clearing the racial issue. And it is the more surprising to find that issue raised in this connection by a student who in other cases sets aside the assumption of backward tendencies among the Celts. Dr Taylor indeed puts his proposition as impartially as may be[1]:—

"The Christianity of the New Testament, with its peacefulness, its submissiveness, and its resignation, in which it agrees with Islam (!) and other Oriental faiths, was contrary to the inner genius of the Teutonic race, with its independence, its self-will, its free life, and its contentiousness. Hence the Teutonic races, in which these Aryan characteristics are the most strongly developed, were the last to submit to the yoke of the Gospel. It was only when the Goths had settled within the bounds of the Roman empire that they were converted; and when they were converted it was to a rationalistic form of Christianity; it was Arianism and not Catholicism which they were willing to accept."[2]

I shall deal later with the modern application of Dr Taylor's thesis; but in the meantime it will suffice to point out the complete arbitrariness, scientifically speaking, of the foregoing generalisation, which the writer illustrates by citing Cæsar's picture of the Druidism of France and of the lack of an organised priesthood in Germany. Let us put a few test questions.

1. If the elements of "peacefulness" and "resignation" be common to Christianity and Islam, why should not Christianity from the first have served the Teutonic purposes as easily as did Islam those of the militarist Saracens?

2. Were the Gauls then so comparatively peace-loving and so submissive as the argument implies? Were they not on the

[1] He explains in a footnote that his statement of the case is "little more than a summary of the *somewhat speculative* remarks of Poesche and Penka." But if he thinks the speculations fallacious, he should have rebutted them as he does others.

[2] *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 246-247.

contrary anciently reputed more turbulent and insubordinate than the Germans?

3. Is not "self-will" as favourable to Athanasianism as to Arianism? If not, why did not the self-willed Gauls become Arians?

4. If Christianity be contrary to the "inner genius" of the Teutonic race, how came it that the Anglo-Saxons accepted it as thoroughly as did the Gauls?

It is plain that the theory is forced on the facts. The Teutonic races were later converted to Christianity, as they came later under *all the other influences of southern civilisation:* that is all. No more for them than for any other race did the quietist prescriptions of the Christian books prevent the adoption or profession of the Christian creed. That their early bias to Arianism turned on proximate grounds, and had nothing to do with "inner genius of race," is shown by the fact that in the countries most strictly Teutonic according to the theory—Sweden and Norway, for instance,—there has been in modern times no more Unitarianism or Deism than anywhere else, less indeed than in England and France. The whole line of the explanation is wrong.

Apart from that phenomenon of an organised priesthood, which we have thus left with only a tentative explanation, there will be found on comparison nothing in the so-called Gallic or Celtic and Germanic communities of antiquity which indicates anything like a fundamental difference in political capacity. The Roman commonplace in regard to the Galli and Britanni was that they lacked the capacity for union; that they were always divided among themselves; and that by reason of these divisions they fell a prey to the Roman invader. It was further said of them that they were inconstant both in war and in diplomacy, making a bold front but readily giving way on a check. On reflection, it is a little surprising, but on further reflection it is less surprising, that such a charge, coming from such a people,[1] should ever have had any weight with civilised readers. It belongs

[1] It is true that Polybius (ii. 32; iii. 70) though a Greek, uses the customary Roman language as to the Galli; and it is not to be disputed (see below, sect. vii.) that all barbaric races in warfare are apt to give way when their first onset fails. But Polybius was a thorough partisan of the Roman power; and as regards warfare, it is easy to see in his own narrative that the Gauls had given way only when they found their weapons hopelessly bad as against the Roman—a contingency in which Roman armies themselves always broke down in the same fashion.

to the most primitively superficial order of political criticism. The Romans themselves, to begin with, had been as much divided against each other as any nation in history. From time immemorial, according to tradition, the *plebs* had been chronically at daggers drawn with the aristocracy; and in the age of Julius Cæsar the old elements of discord, complicated by the element of the Italian population not living in the city itself, led to a series of civil wars of the most desperate kind. Had a barbarian enemy seized the opportunity of those social civil strifes to fall upon Rome, the Romans might or might not have instantly united for the common cause. As it happened, no barbarian enemy was at hand, the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Marius having left his party and Sylla's free to fight in Rome till they were weary. But it is safe to say that, apart from the special military genius of Marius, Sylla, Cæsar, and Augustus, any enemy who was relatively as strong against the Romans as was Cæsar or Agricola against the Gauls or Britons, might much more easily have overthrown Rome than Rome did the Galli and the Britanni. We are apt to forget, first, that Rome was pre-eminently the militarist state of the ancient European world—as much specialised for militarism as is modern England for the application of coal to industry; and, second, that the numerous Roman aristocracy, a body of military and administrative experts, naturally yielded a larger crop of great generals, from generation to generation, than any other community could. That such generals, in such a community, utilising all its military resources, should have conquered the combinations of the barbarians of the north, was almost a matter of course.

Yet with all these advantages, we know from the Roman historians themselves, Roman armies often gave way in panic in the field; and the rivalries of Roman generals often endangered campaigns. Cæsar's enemies at Rome, he tells us, sent messages to Ariovistus promising him great rewards if he should destroy Cæsar. And Cæsar's own legions were again and again withheld from panic and defeat only by Cæsar's own intense determination. It was the triumph of genius, of a highly evolved brain, over inferior forms of will and intelligence. Pitted against the barbarian Vercingetorix, he was once all but outgeneralled; and the relative primitiveness of the barbarian—Celt or Teuton, whichever he were—does not altogether disadvantage him in our eyes in comparison with his cooler antagonist when we read how he at last galloped out of his despairing garrison to give himself up to the enemy, seeking so to help his

beaten followers. Cæsar, if defeated at Pharsalia, might have faced the worst in a colder fashion, but he could not in any more heroical. On the other hand, when we remember what the Gallic and Britannic populations were, the marvel is not that they did not unite better but that they ever united at all. The Romans expressed themselves on this subject under the influence of a commonplace hallucination. They knew that the peoples of Gaul and Britian were not two homogeneous nations but groups of hostile nations, of different stocks, often at war with each other. Yet they confusedly described them as divided peoples —divided because of a passion for division. That Gauls and Britons should combine against Rome was really not much more natural than that the Greeks should have combined with the Romans against Carthage. Their failure to combine was certainly not more complete, in a general way, than the failure of the Greek States to combine against Philip, or later against Rome. And their action, finally, will bear comparison from any point of view with that of the Anglo-Saxons who could combine neither against Danes nor against Normans, and of those German States which in our own century joined the first Napoleon in fighting against Prussia. To charge the ancient Celt with incapacity for union while citing the modern Teuton as the type of the capacity, really seems quite gratuitously unreasonable.

When we turn from the comparison with civilised States to a comparison of ancient "Celtic" disunion with that of ancient Teutonism, the anti-Celtic generalisation seems still more vain. Everything that can be said of the Gauls or Britons on that head can be at least as truly said of all the northern populations whatsoever. We have just seen it avowed by Teutonic writers that "contentiousness" is a special Teutonic characteristic. And there is more evidence than that. Aristotle, whose wisdom in this matter was pretty much as the foolishness of ordinary Greeks, laid it down[1] that the northern European peoples, though very brave, were "apolitical" or incapable of political organisation, and that it was for this reason they never succeeded in subjecting each other—a singular proposition on the part of a member of a Greek City State. Some moderns, on the other hand, decide that the Greeks themselves were signally and fatally deficient in the capacity for political organisation. These formulas are still (as we have seen) as plentiful as blackberries, in virtue of the ancient and apparently immortal fallacy of explaining phenomena in terms of themselves. In physics,

[1] *Politics*, iv. (vii.), c. 6.

the practice of ascribing the soporific effects of opium to a "dormitive virtue" is no longer viewed with respect; and the pleasing formula that "nature abhors a vacuum" is not in our day generally regarded as a useful truth; but in politics these methods still pass very well. So we have the success of Rome set down by professed experts to an "innate capacity" in the "Latin race" for so succeeding, and the contrasted disunity of the Greek States to an "innate defect." The reader will perhaps not be loth to follow a more slow-footed method of explanation.

Taking the condition of the ancient peoples as Aristotle saw it, we are led to infer, surely, that degree of organisation in any population is determined by antecedent conditions, which may be reduced to three general kinds:—

(1) Number and force of *outside* civilising influences—as in Greece compared with Gaul or Egypt.

(2) Geographical conditions, as in Greece with its multitude of valleys and general *physical* dividedness compared with Egypt.

(3) Balance of military strength in relation to neighbours or enemies, as in mediæval Ireland relatively to England or in the sections of Gaul relatively to each other.

In terms of these conditions, it is easy to reach a rational view of our problem. The different groups or stocks in Gaul, before Cæsar, were normally in somewhat the same relation to each other as the groups of Germany. Rome at the height of its organised energy sent against them one of the greatest generals of all history; yet in the few years of the struggle with him, they effected a series of combinations, and came very near crushing him. So in Britain. It was as if Alexander the Great had suddenly invaded Italy, and overrun it before the mutually warring Italian peoples had time to develop a combination against him. In civil as distinguished from military organisation, the Galli exhibited just the kind and degree of development that normally goes with the standard of civilisation they had reached. Their society was flawed by slavery, but not more so than the Greek and the Roman. It exhibited already the diseases invariably set up, thus far, in societies in which wealth is accumulated and appropriated.

Among the Germani, on the other hand, we find exactly corresponding defects. They were less civilised than the Galli, more primitive, therefore less affected by the social vices accruing to the accumulation of wealth; but it was solely a question of

culture-stage. They were not better, wiser, more honourable. The great virtue usually attributed to them, on the authority of Cæsar and Tacitus, is chastity: Tacitus laid stress on that because it was lacking in the Rome of his day.[1] But Rome had once claimed for itself the same characteristic — when, like the Germania of Tacitus, it was poor, primitive, warlike without having attained extensive conquest. And it is abundantly certain that as soon as the Germanic races came into changed culture-conditions, in contact with the wealth and luxury of the south, they developed the very grossest sensuality.[2] As regards power of military organisation, again, we find them not a whit before the Galli. Tacitus expressly singles out the Catti—a tribe with a very Gaelic-looking name[3]—as being unusually well-disciplined and intelligent for Germans, obeying their leaders, attending to rules, calculating occasions, trusting to valour rather than to luck, and more given to putting faith in their leader than in their multitude. Whether these were Germans or not, they seemed to Tacitus exceptional among the Germani, who, he notes, usually lost days in the business of assembling for a war, by reason of their straggling ways. As regards mode of life, they were, like the ordinary run of barbarians, uncleanly[4]

[1] Later, we find Julian, in the *Misopogon*, praising the Gallic reverence for chastity. See also Spartian, *Niger*, c. 6. The simple fact seems to be that the early Germans laid stress on a late puberty, which was a climatic tendency. Their general monogamy, it is suggested by Poesche, may have been a result of the difficulty of feeding families in the north, after the period of primeval promiscuity. *Die Arier*, S. 103. This theory is not inconsistent with the fact that, once become monogamous, they multiplied rapidly. But *cp.* Hippocrates, *De Aeribus*, c. 48, as to the Scythians, who were chaste and infecund.

[2] Even in Anglo-Saxondom, "polygamy was not unknown, and it was usual for men to marry their father's widows." (Allen, *Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 74.)

[3] They were dwellers in the Hercynian forest, where they had been driven by the Germanic Batavi. They wore beards, which was rare among the Germani; and in other ways they were different from the bulk of the Germanic tribes. "Duriora genti corpora, stricti artus, minax vultus, et major animi vigor. Multum (ut inter Germanos) rationis ac sollertiae: praeponere electos, audire praepositos, nosse ordines, intelligere occasiones, differe impetus, disponere diem, vallare noctem, fortunam inter dubia, virtutem inter certa numerare; quodque rarissimum, nec nisi ratione disciplinae concessum, plus reponere in duce quam in exercitu." (*De mor. Germ.* c. 30.)

[4] Tacitus, *De mor. Germ.* c. 20. The historian, however, makes the curious statement (c. 22) that in the cold weather, which in Germany lasted a long time, they rose late and began the day with a warm bath. This clearly cannot have been true of the common people: it can have been true only of part of the aristocracy, such as it was. It therefore appears that much

and drunken, their passion for strong drink being such that anyone could overcome them through it.[1] Then in war, instead of being, as our Teutonistic sentimentalists suppose, remarkably frank and chivalrous, they usually figure as gaining advantages by craft and stratagem. Thus Ariovistus conquered the Belgae of his region by taking them at unawares:[2] the Tenchtheri and the Usipetes had similarly overpowered the Gallic tribes who at first beat them off, by returning unexpectedly.[3] One Roman historian, who had been among them, went so far as to call them a race of born liars.[4] Withal, the Germani seemed to have been, like the traditional Galli, much given to boasting.[4] The Tenchtheri and Usipetes, who had been driven from their own land by the Germanic Suevi, intimated to Cæsar that though they had been beaten by the Suevi, against whom the Gods themselves could not stand, they were capable of beating anybody else in the world.[5] Cæsar however destroyed them as utterly as he did Ariovistus.

These qualities, be it observed, are not to be reckoned as specially Germanic, any more than the shortcomings of the Galli or Britons are to be counted specially Gallic. We are not to invert the fallacy of the Celtophobes, but simply to decide that the Germani exhibited the characteristics of barbarians at a given culture-stage. Trickery and boasting are absolutely normal characteristics of savage tribes in warfare in all ages. Only it is necessary to show, as against the Teutophiles, that the ancient German was a barbarian like another. If there is

of what Tacitus tells of the Germani, like what Cæsar tells of the Galli, represents only what would be communicated by the upper classes.

[1] C. 23.

[2] Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, i. 40.

[3] "Natum mendacio genus" (Velleius Paterculus, ii. 118). *Cp.* Cæsar, *B.G.* iv. 13. Mr Kingsley in his unlucky lectures on *The Roman and the Teuton* (ed. 1889, p. 11) makes the extraordinary statement that "the Teuton thought it mean to use surprises and stratagems." The familiar narrative of Cæsar might have withheld him from such extremity of error. It is clear from Velleius Paterculus that the destruction of Varus was entirely a work of stratagem and surprise, the Roman meeting his doom because he would not believe that the people he was ruling justly and considerately would plot against him. Of the later Goths, Mr Bradley notes (*The Goths*, p. 11) that "the one great reproach which the Roman writers bring against them is that of faithlessness to their treaties."

[4] "Ariovistus ad postulata Cæsaris pauca respondit: de suis virtutibus multa prædicavit" (*De Bello Gallico*, i. 44).

[5] *Id.*, iv. 7.

any political difference between him and the Gaul, in the period before the Frankish invasion, it is that he submitted with greater docility to the Roman rule when once conquered. As against the modern German lucubrations on the subject of the early defeat of Varus by Arminius, we have the record in the Augustan history that poor Alexander Severus, setting out to deal with a German attack on Gaul, was troubled by this insubordination in a race which had usually been submissive even to the weakest emperors.[1] The Gauls, on the other hand, are described in the same connection as "dour" and fractious.[2] The Gaul, it appears, having a clearer national memory and a more developed political consciousness, was sensitive where the Teuton, in his earlier culture-stage, was passive. Yet it has been pretended that the Teuton had the greater resisting power because of a greater gift for organisation and union. As a matter of fact, troops of Teutons long served in the Roman army, enabling it to keep the others in subjection.

There remain to be considered two phenomena which some students have singled out as marking an important difference of individuality between the ancient Teuton and the ancient Celt, commonly so-called. They are: (1) the phenomenon of the influence of women in the German affairs, and (2) the phenomenon of the voluntary adhesion of German warriors, as sworn companions, to a chief on the strength of his character or fame, without regard to family connection. The latter circumstance has been cited by students who hold that the clan, the primitive organisation on the basis of the family, real and theoretical, is a low form of society, and that any voluntary combination is a higher form. Now, it so happens that this very species of organisation existed in full force among the Iberian-looking Aquitanians, who are held by some to have been the pre-Celtic stock of France, who were certainly dark and southern-looking, and whose type is supposed, by those who disparage the "Celtic" faculty of organisation, to predominate in France to-day. Not only did the Aquitanians of Cæsar's day often elect their generals,[3] but their chiefs were followed by bands of sworn

[1] "Natio . . . . quae semper etiam minusculis imperatoribus subjecta videbatur." (Lampridius, *Vit. Alex. Severi*, c. 59.)

[2] "Gallicanæ mentes, ut sese habent, duræ ac retorridæ et saepe imperatoribus graves." Tacitus, again, notes that the Britons would pay tribute quietly if no violence were done them, but that against violence they always revolted (*Vita Agricolae*, 13, 19).

[3] See Cæsar, *B.G.*, iii. 8; vii. 4, as to choice of leaders generally.

companions,[1] who shared all his fortunes and died with him to the last man when the fortune of war destroyed him. Here then was the institution supposed to distinguish the Teutons, and to show their superiority to the primitive instinct of clandom, found in high development in the stock to which, with that of the Liguri, we must look for the non-Teutonic basis of the Gallic population if we decide that the blond Galli were Teutons. And the blond Galli, be it observed, lacked the institution; not that they were limited to the primitive organisation of the clan, for they clearly were not; but that they do not seem to have had *soldures* on the Iberian system. On the other hand, it is very evident that the life of the Germani was very largely based on the primitive clan principle. Tacitus records that it was held among them a duty to espouse alike the amities and the enmities of the group or the community,[2] though these vendettas were not implacable; and he even holds that their successes in war were largely due to the fact that they fought in groups of kindred;[3] going on to say that the voices of their women and children near them roused them to their best efforts—a statement which reads strangely beside the story of Cæsar's rout of the Tenchtheri and Usipetes, when the cruel attack on the camp of the women and children struck the men with panic and put them to flight. However that might be, we know that many of the Teutons who invaded England after the decay of the Roman empire settled in groups of one family name—that is to say, in clans. The place-name-types of Nottingham, Billingham, Birmingham, Harlington, Darlington, Uppington, and so on, so abundant in the midland counties point to this: these towns were the "home of the Nottings," "home of the Billings," "town of the Harlings," and so forth. And that the very simple faculty of combining on a larger scale on the clan basis was not at all lacking in any of the so-called Celtic peoples is shown by the organisation of the Irish in the tenth century. The fact that the Highlanders of Scotland (including the "Germanic" Caledonians of Tacitus and the Norse immigrant element of the Middle Ages) remained under a pretty strict clan system down till last century, is for thoughtful readers only one more proof of

[1] "Devoti quos illi *soldurios* appellant." Cæsar, *B.G.*, iii. 22.

[2] "Suscipere tam inimicitias seu patris seu propinqui quam amicitias necesse est: nec implacabilis durant." *De mor. Germ.* c. 21.

[3] "Quodque præcipuum fortitudinis incitamentum est, non casus, nec fortuita conglobatio turmam aut cuneum facit, sed familiæ et propinquitates." *Id.*, c. 7.

the divisive influence of a physically divided territory when the means of communication remain primitive. The Highlanders remained clannish as the civilised Greeks remained clannish. But even the Highlanders were well unified under the Celtic kings at the date of the Conquest; and the Highland and Lowland populations seem to have been well unified at the time of the intervention of the English king, Edward I., whereafter the Lowland element, represented by the Norman Bruce and his Stewart descendants, predominated, and the progress of the Highlanders in civilisation was disastrously arrested.

On the other point of the influence of the women in the counsels of the community, the claim for the Teutons is found to be no less completely quashed by the facts. It is one of the queerest ironies of the doctrine we are examining that the respect alleged to be anciently paid by the Teutons to their women is cited as a proof of their peculiar merit and sociability, when in point of fact there is to-day no country in civilised Europe where women's opinions are less respected.[1] This is too notorious to need proving; yet, while the average German loudly applauds Prince Bismarck's furious opposition to the intervention of women in politics, the ancient privileges of the women of his race in that direction are counted to it for a merit. Turning once more dispassionately to the documents, we find that just as the dark Aquitanians possessed the institution of the *devoti*, supposed to be so specially Teutonic, so did the dark Liguri—who, as we said, seem with the Aquitani to be among the oldest and the most persistent elements in the Gallic compound—treat their women with that consideration which is supposed to have been peculiar to the ancient Germani. Plutarch tells us that, the Ligurian women having once intervened in a civil war so successfully as to restore peace not only in the cities but in the families, there arose the custom of calling them into consultation in all questions of peace and war, and of submitting to their notice all disputes with allies.[2] Whatever that story may be historically worth, the testimony is of equal validity with that of Tacitus concerning the status of the German women. Tacitus tells that in memory of an

[1] Dr Bodichon (*Études sur l'Algérie*) specified a "political influence accorded to women" as common to the Celtic *and* Teutonic peoples of his blond group, along with "predominance of the aristocratic element." This just before the era of Bismarck, and within a generation of the Commune.

[2] Plutarch, *De mulierum virtutibus*, c. 6. Plutarch speaks only of *Keltoi*, but as he connects those in question with the campaign of Hannibal, they were presumably the Ligurians.

occasion on which ranks giving way in battle were restored by the exhortations of the women, the sex was held in a sort of sanctity, was admitted into the counsels, and was listened to as having oracular power.[1] There is no other evidence on the subject; and even this compares curiously with another passage found in the same treatise, where a Teutonic or Scandinavian tribe is described as being peculiarly degraded, in that it is governed by a woman.[2] In any case, there was clearly nothing specially Teutonic in the matter.

When we finally contrast broadly the histories of the countries in which Teutons are held to predominate with those of the countries in which Celts are held to predominate, pre-Norman England with early Ireland, Roman and pre-Roman Gaul with Frankish Gaul, later Germany with post-Carlovingian France, any remaining superstition we may cherish as to a unique Teutonic faculty for order must be cast away. The strict truth is that wherever, between the decline of Rome and the Middle Ages, the Germani by force of numbers and in virtue of their barbaric militarism overran the more civilised peoples, they exhibited during whole ages an utter incapacity for coherence and peaceful order. "Show me," says Zeller, discussing five hundred years of their history, "Show me anything, up to the eighth century, save crude beginnings of government, as soon overthrown as raised."[3] And there is no answering the challenge. The anarchism of the Goths who invaded Italy was the despair of their leaders. Athaulf, the successor of Alaric, avowed that whereas his first ambition had been to destroy the Roman name, and to make of the Roman empire a Gothic one, in which he should rule as did Augustus, he at length realised that the Goths were too inveterately barbarous to submit to laws, and decided rather to use their energies to re-establish and extend the Roman power, reforming the old empire rather than seeking to found another.[4] Whatever efforts at organisation were made by the Teutonic leaders were inspired by the memory of the Roman example, and were made with the help of Italians trained in the Roman tradition. Theodoric, the greatest of them all, wrought

[1] *De mor. Germ.* c. 8.

[2] It is of the Sitones, who "continue" the Suiones, that he writes:—"Cetera similes, uno differunt, quod femina dominatur: in tantum non modo a libertate sed etiam a servitute degenerant" (c. 45). The concluding words, "Hic Sueviae finis," give an air of interpolation to this part of the book.

[3] *Histoire d'Allemagne*, ii., avant-propos, p. x.

[4] Paulus Orosius, *Hist.* vii. 43.

thus; and yet he failed in his ultimate aims, because he had to deal with populations barbarically averse to organisation. The very movement of the Teutonic peoples into Gaul and Italy, indeed, was itself largely produced by their terror of the Huns, against whom they could not stand, and before whom they fled. And they transiently succeeded rather through the military weakness of the western populations than through any political or military genius of their own. Their descendants were easily overthrown in their turn by new invaders, more freshly barbaric. Suevi fell before Visigoths, Visigoths before Ostrogoths, Ostrogoths before Lombards, Lombards and Burgundians before Gallicised Franks, Ripuarian Franks before miscellaneous Teutons, Visigoths and Vandals before Saracens. Wherever they took on civilisation, it was at best a partial adoption of that set up by Rome: in no case did they carry it further: in most cases they lowered it. The Merovingian rule in France exhibits every evil feature that has ever been charged against either Gauls or Latins in the mass,—brutish vice, revolting ferocity, habitual duplicity, pitiable weakness of character.[1] With characteristic logic, the Teutophile commentators charge the corruption of the Franks to the Gallic civilisation in which they grow corrupt, as if there were any merit in having been barbarically simple where nothing but barbaric simplicity existed, and as if to become worse than the Galli were not to give a proof of mental inferiority to the Galli. However that might be, their history is one of chronic strife down to Charlemagne, and of speedy relapse into similar strife after Charlemagne. There is no people in European history which for a longer period exhibited a more inveterate spirit of dissension than the German.

If we simply take the history of Anglo-Saxon England, as the best counter-picture to that of Celtic Ireland, we have a record of just such internecine war and anarchy as English politicians are wont to point-to, in the case of Ireland, as a proof of the innate unruliness of the Celt. In the pages of a historian not at all disposed to darken his colours on that theme, the story of Saxon England becomes a miserable record of the ups and downs of battling semi-savages, falling out afresh in every generation, and apparently as incapable of political cohesion as their ancestors of the days of Aristotle. Landing

[1] St Boniface (Anglo-Saxon) who was the great missionary among the Germans in the 8th century, before Charlemagne subdued the Saxons, speaks of them in general as dull and fleshly: "carnales homines et idiotæ Allemanni, Bajuvarii, vel Franci." (Othlon, *Vita S. Bonifacii*, ii. § 1, cited by Mignet).

in the middle of the fifth century, the first historic invaders conquered but a part of the island; being resisted by the Britons with a stubborn endurance which the later Saxons never showed against their own invaders. Not for two hundred years was England substantially Anglicised; and this because, facing tenacious enemies, the invaders could not attain to political unity. They were at war among themselves immediately; and every page bears record of fresh strife through the vast space of six hundred years—a lapse of time, be it observed, much greater than has been held to prove certain modern barbarians incapable of civilisation. The record becomes drearily monotonous. "Revolt and slaughter had fatally broken the power of the West-Saxons when the Northumbrians attacked them." "Penda allied himself with the Welsh king, Cadwallan, in an attack on Eadwine." Pagan Penda conquers Christian East-Anglia, also Northumbria. "Even while Caedmon was singing, the Christian Church of Northumberland was torn in two by strife." "London fell into Mercian hands. The West-Saxons, who had been long ago stripped of their conquests along the Severn by Penda, were driven across the Thames by Wulfhere." "But the vigorous and warlike Ecgfrith was a different foe from the West-Saxon or the Jute," and Mercia is again overthrown by Northumbria. In turn "the supremacy of Northumbria fell for ever with the death of Ecgfrith and the defeat of Nechtansmere" at the hands of the Scottish Celts, Mercia making war afresh. In the south-west, "able as Ini was to hold Mercia at bay, he was unable to hush the civil strife that was the curse of Wessex. . . . In 726 Ini laid down his crown and sought peace and death in a pilgrimage to Rome." "The anarchy which had driven Ini from the throne broke out on his departure in civil strife which left Wessex an easy prey to the successor of Ceolred." Aethelbald aims at the headship of Britain, "but the arm of Aethelbald was destined to the same failure as that of his predecessors." "England north of the Humber was saved from his grasp." "Southern England was wrested from Mercia." "From the death of Bæda the history of Northumbria is in fact only a wild story of lawlessness and bloodshed. King after king was swept away by treason and revolt . . . the very fields lay waste. . . . An anarchy almost as complete had fallen on Wessex after the repulse of Aethelbald's invasion. Only in Mercia was there any sign of order and settled rule." Later, "Mercia was torn by a civil war which broke out on Cenwulf's death." "All England south of the Thames at once submitted to Ecgberht of Essex;

and East Anglia rose in a desperate revolt which proved fatal to its Mercian rulers." "Mercia bowed to the West-Saxon overlordship." And so on till the Danes came and "struck down the short-lived greatness of Wessex." At their landing "civil strife, as usual, distracted the energies of Northumbria." For a hundred and fifty more years the fresh Teutonic element swells the old imbroglio, till in the eleventh century the Danish Cnut crushes the whole chaos into submission. And thus it comes that, six hundred years after the first Saxon invasion, after Cnut has been followed by Edward the Confessor, we find England under Harold still chronically in civil war, ready for the Norman Conquest, still uncivilised, unprogressive, undistinguished. Sparks of culture had gleamed at intervals, only to die out. "Literature, which on the Continent was kindling into a new activity, died down in England into a few psalters and homilies. . . . National history there was none. . . . The Church sank into lethargy. . . . Abroad, Europe was waking to a new revival of literature, but England was all but severed from the Continent."[1] After this, who shall speak to us of the Teutonic gift for civilisation and orderly progress? The historian whom we have just been following avows that it was the two hundred years of Danish, Norman, and Angevin domination that made "not merely English wealth and English freedom, but England itself."[2] The Saxons, who never could comprehensively dominate the British, and never could unite against the invader[3] were themselves swiftly subjected in mass by Dane and Norman in succession. Again we seem thrown on speculation as to race qualities for a formula; but by this time we are perhaps capable of turning our backs on that method, and finding our formula in the principle that organisation and civilisation are products not of "race" but of the conditions in which races live. The Danish dominion could not have brought permanent order, much less civilisation. Cnut held the land in virtue of energy of will and military power; Duke William in turn held it by the same qualities, and unwittingly brought with him the seeds of a real civilisation in virtue of his contact with France, which in turn

[1] Green's *Short History of England*, p. 66.

[2] *Id.*, p. 60.

[3] "Even yet [after the battle of Hastings] the English could not agree among themselves. In this crisis of the national fate, the local jealousies burnt up as fiercely as ever. While William was marching upon London, the witan were quarrelling and intriguing in the city over the succession" (Allen, *Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 171).

was in contact with Southern Europe. All modern European civilisation is but the rebirth and development of germs left by the civilisations of the past, which in turn had been gradually developed from crude germs that took gradual life in peculiar physical and social conditions. The new civilisations are greater than the old, as wheat grown in certain new soils bears more richly than it does in old; but the new civilisation could no more have been developed by the mere hereditary character of the races who carry it on than the wheat could be spontaneously generated by the soil. We must reject alike all theories which set down to any race whatever, *qua* race, the faculty of making civilisation. Some French historians, writing in exactly the style of the Teutophiles, ascribe to the Celticity of the Celt the survival of civilisation in Gaul. The Teutonic invasion, says one, "could not enfeeble the genius of the Celtic race. It was that which absorbed the barbarians as it had appropriated the Roman civilisation; it converted them; it infused into them its ideas and made of them, for the salvation of Europe, the apostles of the Gospel and the champions of civilisation."[1] Thus does rhetoric meet rhetoric. It would indeed be reasonable to say that if the new Frankish empire, under Charlemagne, was able in part to achieve the civilisation and organisation of Middle Europe, it was in virtue of the elements of civilisation and order persisting in Roman Gaul. The difference in civilisation and intelligence between the Gallicised Franks and the Saxons was a difference due to the Gallic blending and the Gallic environment. It is also true that the stand made in England by Alfred against the Danes, one of the first bright points in "English" history, represents the result of a union of the Celtic and the Saxon population of Wessex.[2] But it is as idle to ascribe that difference to the "genius of the Celtic race" as it is to credit later German civilisation to the genius of the Teutonic race, or as it would be to credit the special results of ploughing and draining a field to the "genius of the soil." The Galli were further advanced in the way of civilisation than the Germani: that is all. They had a richer territory—a soil richer alike in mines and in agricultural products, and so they had reached in parts a commercial and capitalistic civilisation before the coming of Cæsar, who was on that account able the more easily to organise his conquest. The Teutons who later entered Gaul and Italy seem to have morally degenerated instead of progressing, simply because they were in

[1] *Histoire de l'Europe, de* 395 *à* 1270, par H. Chevallier, 1880, p. 15.
[2] Grant Allen, *Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 140.

the main heavy-witted barbarians suddenly plunged in material well-being without having undergone any due psychological and intellectual preparation. Something of the same kind goes on even to-day in the United States, among the much more quick-witted and civilised Irish. For civilisation is no sudden angel of change, no tropic rain falling on a germ-filled soil to cover it in a day with a wealth of beauty and joy, but a slow and precarious transmutation of mind and life by a play of direct and indirect forces, which at times visibly frustrate each other, and seem to turn all energy to an evil end.

So it was in the building-up of the civilisation of England. The mere political unification of the country by brute force at the Conquest meant no conscious harmonisation of life. Brute force always incurs brute penalties. The mailed Norman no more than the mailed Dane brought with him a talisman of "genius of race" wherewith to charm the warring egoisms of men into synergy and peace. The sympathetic historian whom we have followed above, with his passion for telescoping periods, tells us[1] in one place that it was in her "years of slavery" under "foreign masters" that England "really became the England that we know," as if self-governing industrial England dated from the thirteenth or fourteenth century. He tells us that between the Conquest and Edward the First, through contact with the Continent, "the old mental stagnation was at once broken up, and art and literature covered England with great buildings and busy schools." But, to say nothing of the twenty years of bloody anarchy under Stephen, there was civil war under John, civil war under Henry the Third, gain and loss of Scotland under the first two Edwards, civil war under Edward II., and, after the palmy days of Edward III., a long decadence and retrogression :—

"The hundred years which follow the brief sunshine of Cressy and the 'Canterbury Tales' are years of the deepest gloom : no age of our history is so sad and sombre as the age which we traverse from the third Edward to Joan of Arc. The throb of hope and glory which pulsed at its outset through every class of English society died into inaction and despair. Material life lingered-on indeed, commerce still widened, but its progress was dissociated from all the nobler elements of national well-being. The towns sank again into close oligarchies, the bondsmen struggling forward to freedom fell back into a serfage which still leaves its trace on the soil. Literature reached its lowest ebb. The religious revival of the Lollard was

[1] *Short History*, p. 60.

trodden out in blood, while the Church shrivelled into a self-seeking secular priesthood. In the clash of civil strife political freedom was all but extinguished, and the age which began with the Good Parliament ended with the despotism of the Tudors."[1]

In the previous period of expansion, be it observed, every determining element of advance was foreign. The "Teutonic" genius is nowhere to be seen. The Anglo-Norman civilisation began with the influx of French craftsmen, clerks, and artists. The first stirring of the new society by the spirit of imaginative literature, under Henry the First, came from the inspiration of the Welsh Arthurian legend; the first secular-minded and critical men of letters are the "Celtic" Walter de Map and Gerald de Barri, both of Welsh blood, both educated at Paris, both writing in Latin.[2] The very winning of the Charter depended on the situation abroad, the defeat of John's forces (Flemish, German, and English) at Bouvines by the French under Philip[3] being the means of enabling the English barons to hold out; and they had finally to seek aid from the French king against the French mercenaries with whom John would have overwhelmed them. And the historic creation of the English Parliament, still later, is credited to the Frenchman, Simon de Montfort, against whose marriage with the sister of Henry the Third the English baronage at first revolted. As for literature, the fructification of Chaucer's gift by foreign contact is as certain as the felicity of the developed gift itself. The whole course of English history as of every other, in fact, in so far as it is a history of progress at all, is but a record of gain from changed conditions and from the cross-fertilisation of cultures, of civilisations. The rise of modern English literature under Elizabeth is emphatically such a process. Even that side of the literature which might be supposed most strictly derived from the Saxon stock, the Folk Lore, as set forth for instance in the plays of Shakspere, is found to have been very largely if not predominantly Celtic in character.[4] Thus many of the "household

[1] *Short History*, pp. 216-217.

[2] *Id.*, pp. 115-117. "Gerald is the father of our popular literature," says Green, who makes him a mixture of "the restless Celtic fire" and "Norman daring;" while Walter de Map, the poet, is credited with "Celtic vivacity" only.

[3] "It is to the victory of Bouvines that England owes her Great Charter" (Green, as cited, p. 122).

[4] See Thom's *Three Notelets on Shakspere*, pp. 27-39, 73-74, 105-108. Mr Thom notes the peculiar wealth of fairy-lore in Shakspere and Drayton,

words" of English fancy are due to non-English survivals. And still, with literature and Christian theology in full play, the "race" exhibits no innate genius for political harmony: civil war breaks out anew on new pretexts; a new polity is forcibly founded only to fall again; and ever since, English political progress has been made by way of the strife of parties. There is indeed no other way.

Nor does the later history of Germany exhibit any better fortune, any greater gift of union and peaceful organisation among the nominal descendants of the older Teutonic stock. Whatever progress took place among the German-speaking populations was, as has been said, a progress imposed from the outside. The Teutons of Central Europe emerge in modern history without a literature,[1] at a time when the cooped-up Welsh seem to have had a whole library of poetry and legend, and when even remote Iceland (where also perchance, despite assumptions to the contrary, there had been a blending of races) has a poetico-historic lore; and their literary beginnings are for the most part simple imitations from the more civilised neighbouring peoples. In their political development, from the tenth century onwards, after the separation of the German and Frankish sections of the Carlovingian empire, we see only the struggle of forces characteristic of all feudalism, emperors fighting with dukes, sparring with the Pope, balancing fief against fief, pitting bishops against nobles. The organisation of imperial Rome was set up, *plus* feudalism and Christian ecclesiasticism, without even the measure of peace normally enforced by Rome; the new chicane of churchman and lawyer being but a new fountain of strife. Towns, castles, palaces, abbeys, churches, were one and all fortified places, ready for war at any moment; and every new reign seems to have been a pretext for anarchy, till it should appear whether or not the new emperor could maintain his power. The better the emperors established themselves in Italy, the greater the scope for anarchy at home; and the chief significance of the Teutonic rule for mediæval Italy was to make the German cries of Guelf and Ghibeline the symbols of never-ending ferocious strife and an infinity of crime. Pope and anti-pope, Kaiser and anti-Kaiser,

both of Warwickshire, near Wales. I may here note my dissent from the judgment of Mr Grant Allen, that English remains "essentially identical in grammar and idiom with the language of the first Teutonic settlers" (as cited, p. 230). The alteration of English syntax is as marked as the alteration of vocabulary, and for every language-learner it is nearer French than German.

[1] The supposititious ancient mythic poetry having been lost.

recall the worst days of declining Rome. And when after three hundred years of chronic battle we reach the outstanding reign of Frederick the Second, it is to find him employing an army of Saracens against Italian free cities and the Pope, battling all his life long with the church and with his nominal subjects; and dying beaten, to leave Germany once more to anarchy.

All this while the spirit of self-government, in the fuller sense of the term, had been manifesting itself, not in the German-speaking peoples, but in the cities of France, northern and southern alike, in respect of the new phenomenon of communes, claiming and holding defined rights as against the nobles who formerly ruled the towns as their domains. Whether or not this development in the north had any derivation from older Teutonic *guilds*, and in the south from the Roman *curia*,[1] the institution radiated from France in the twelfth century to England, Germany and Italy alike. In France it was, too, that the spirit of culture became organised in the same period in the University of Paris. From the same centre, it may be, spread influences of a less civilising kind, as the institution of chivalry so-called; and indeed France may be said to have organised tyranny earlier than her northern rivals. We are not concerned here, however, to make out any thesis for any one people as a civilising force; but simply to maintain that every people in turn counts for civilisation in the measure in which its conditions make for progress of any kind; and that neither in the moral nor in the æsthetic arts is there any racial bias or disability, though there is precedence and sequence.

We have already glanced at the Teutonic theory, as developed by Dr Taylor, that there is something in the "inner genius" of the Teutonic race which has drawn it to Protestantism and anti-sacerdotalism, while the Celts, or the "brachycephalic race" in general, take as naturally to Catholicism and priestly rule. In one breath accused of incapacity for organisation, the "Celt" is described in the next as unduly prone to religious organisation

[1] This theory, set forth by Augustin Thierry, is now rejected. See in the *Histoire Générale* edited by MM. Rambaud and Lavisse (Vol. II.) the chapter (viii.) by MM. Giry and A. Reville, § 2, *La Révolution communale*, p. 418. *Cp.* Seignobos, *Hist. de la Civ. au Moyen Age*, p. 81, and Chevallier, as cited, p. 484. But compare the view of Dr Brentano as to the origin of the early English guilds in family groups holding trade secrets, and the suggestion of Mr Grant Allen that the first families of craftsmen in England may have been Romanised Welsh inhabitants of the cities—whose municipal life seems to have been carried on without interruption from Roman times. (*Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 161. *Cp.* Scarth, *Roman Britain*, pp. 227-230.)

and subordination—to being in religion exactly what modern Germans are in politics. It may be well to deal at some little length with that phase of the discussion; and again Dr Taylor's summary will conveniently serve as a statement of the theory to be dealt with.

"Now that Christianity has spread over Europe, it is divided into two opposed camps—the Catholic and the Protestant, the Church of Authority and the Church of Reason (!), the line of division coinciding very closely with the line which separates the two great races of Aryan speech. The dolichocephalic Teutonic race is Protestant; the brachycephalic Celto-Slavic race is either Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox. In the first, individualism, wilfulness, self-reliance, independence, are strongly developed: the second is submissive to authority and conservative in instincts. To the Teutonic races Latin Christianity was never congenial, and they have now converted it into something very different from what it was at first, or from what it became in the hands of Latin and Greek doctors. The Teutonic peoples are averse to sacerdotalism, and have shaken off priestly guidance and developed individualism. Protestantism was a revolt against a religion imposed by the South upon the North, but which had never been congenial to the Northern mind. The German princes, who were of purer Teutonic blood than their subjects, were the leaders of the ecclesiastical revolt. Scandinavia is more purely Teutonic than Germany; and Scandinavia is Protestant to the backbone. The Lowland Scotch, who are more purely Teutonic than the English, have given the freest development to the genius of Protestantism. Those Scotch clans which have clung to the old faith have the smallest admixture of Teutonic blood. Ulster, the most Teutonic province of Ireland, is the most firmly Protestant. The case of the Belgians and the Dutch is very striking. The line of religious division became the line of political separation, and is co-terminous with the two racial provinces. The mean cephalic index of the Dutch is 75·3, which is nearly that of the Swedes and the North Germans; the mean index of the Belgians is 79, which is that of the Parisians. The Burgundian Cantons of Switzerland, which possess the largest proportion of Teutonic blood, are Protestant, while the brachycephalic Cantons in the East and South are the stronghold of Catholicism. South Germany, which is brachycephalic, is Catholic; North Germany, which is dolichocephalic, is Protestant. Hanover, which is Protestant, has a considerably lower index than Cologne, which is Catholic. The Thirty Years' War was a war of race as well as of religion; and the peace of Westphalia drew the line of religious demarcation with tolerable precision along the ethnic frontier.

"Wherever the Teutonic blood is purest—in North Germany,

Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Ulster, the Orkneys, the Lothians, Yorkshire,[1] East Anglia — Protestantism found easy entrance, and has retained its hold, often in some exaggerated form. In Bohemia, France, Belgium, Alsace, it has been trodden out. In Galway and Kerry it has no footing. The Welsh and the Cornishmen, *who became Protestants by political accident, have transformed Protestantism into an emotional religion, which has inner affinities with the emotional faith of Ireland and Italy.* Even now Protestantism gains no converts in the South of Europe, or Catholicism in the North. Roman Catholicism, or the cognate creed of the Greek and Russian orthodox churches, is dominant in all those lands where the brachycephalic race prevails; Protestantism is confined to the dolichocephalic Teutonic region. The neighbourhood of Toulouse, which was the headquarters of the Albigenses, is more dolichocephalic than any other part of Southern France, and Toulouse was the Visigothic capital. In no city of France were the Huguenots so numerous as at Nîmes, another stronghold of the Visigoths; and Nîmes is still largely Protestant in creed. England, which is orthocephalic, is neither Catholic nor Protestant, but Anglican. It is not to be supposed, however, the religious belief is a function of the shape of the skull, but that the shape of the skull is one of the surest indications of race."[2]

Why the last sentence should be added to such an exposition it is not easy to understand, for if the preceding extract means anything it means that form of skull in general determines form of ecclesiastical preference and of religious belief. We can only deal with the exposition on its merits. It will be noted that where the "broad-headed" peoples are found to be Protestant, as in Wales and Cornwall, the Teutonic theorists assert "political accident" and impute mysticity or "emotion," without asking for a moment whether "political accident" so-called may not have determined equally the Catholicism of Ireland and the Protestantism of North Germany, Scotland, England, and Scandinavia. Such a question, and a further question as to the alleged religious affinity between Welsh Methodism and Irish Catholicism, will be found to be fatal to the whole thesis.

1. It was emphatically "political accident" that set up Protestantism in England and Scotland while Ireland was forced further into Catholicism. The Reformation was made in England by a king *of French and Welsh descent*, acting in concurrence

[1] [One of the parts of England where there certainly survived a large part of the pre-Saxon population. J. M. R.]

[2] *Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 247-249.

with a large body of the lower aristocracy, who went with him because they were offered a large share of the spoils; and in Scotland the greed of the landowners wrought the same result in opposition to the throne. It was for the same reason, and not through any special narrow-headedness, that the German princes promoted the Reformation.[1] For the rest, the sphere of the Reformation was largely fixed in respect of simple remoteness from Roman influence; and it was much more a political (and financial) resentment of Italian interference than any theory of anti-sacerdotalism that spread Protestantism in the northern countries.

2. The Catholic religion had been as "congenial to the North" as to the South for some eight hundred years; and one of the elements of the Reformation movement was the conviction in the North *that the Italian priesthood was in large part unbelieving.*

3. *Luther, as Dr Taylor elsewhere notes, was of the brachycephalic race.*

4. *Calvin was a French Swiss; and Calvinism, the religion of Presbyterian Scotland, is a more rigid system of dogma than Catholicism itself.*

5. To decide that the Lowland Scotch are "averse to sacerdotalism and have shaken off priestly guidance" is to fall into an extraordinary misconception. Scotch Presbyterianism is one of the most marked developments of sacerdotalism in history; and Buckle was right in saying that the Presbyterian Scotch have been more priestridden than any other European people save the Spanish.

6. To call Protestantism the religion of Reason is to fly in the face of all relevant history. Luther was as anti-rationalistic as any Catholic, and more anti-scientific than many Italian cardinals. The aim of Lutherans and Calvinists alike was not in the least to leave the reason free but to formulate all belief on the basis of the Sacred Books.

7. Instead of being specially given to Reason, the hyper-Teutonic peoples of Scandinavia have been among the last to contribute to the rationalist movement.

8. The rationalistic movement which began in Germany last

[1] Poesche and Penka would doubtless set down to brachycephaly, at a hazard, the fact that of old, in the strife of Guelph and Ghibeline, the common people of Germany were often on the side of the Pope and against the Emperor. But the diplomacy of the priesthood would secure that end with peasant heads of any type.

century is obviously traceable to beginnings made in England and France, which again derived partly from Italy.

9. While Dutch scholars have done much for Biblical criticism, there is more of popular rationalism in Belgium than in Holland.

10. In Paris, so far from the mass of the people being submissive Catholics, they are Voltairean. The Municipal Council, which supplies a fair test, is notoriously freethinking. And the great majority of the more educated classes are agnostics.

11. The same holds true of educated men in Italy, and in Russia.

12. *If* the Methodism of the Welsh is "emotional," it is not more so than the Methodism of the English in general.

13. The Highlanders of Scotland, "Celtic" and other, are to-day in the main as rigidly Presbyterian as the Lowlanders were two centuries ago; and now that the Lowland clergy are growing incoherently heterodox, the Highlands are the stronghold of orthodox Calvinism.

14. It is quite true that Protestantism makes no converts in Southern Europe—or in Northern either. But Catholicism *does* make converts in the North, notably in England. It is not at all a matter of racial boundary. What is happening is a gradual movement of the more emotional or ritual-loving types of religionist to Catholicism; and of the more rational types to agnosticism.

15. To single out the neighbourhood of Toulouse as hereditarily Teutonic and therefore inclined to Protestantism is an extraordinary stroke of argument. Toulouse was one of the most bigoted of Catholic cities and one of the most active centres of the Inquisition!

16. To single out Nîmes, again, as a "stronghold of the Visigoths," is to adjust the evidence to the theory. There were many other old-Teutonic "strongholds" in France. Why did not they also yield multitudes of Huguenots? And how comes it that La Rochelle, the Huguenot capital, cannot be described as a centre of ancient Teutonism? As a matter of fact, the Huguenots were stronger in La Rochelle than in Nîmes, which latter city, as it happened, had been largely settled from Spain in the reign of Charlemagne, and to this day shows some Spanish affinities. The Protestantism of the people of Nîmes, as of many other places, was fundamentally a matter of revolt against the governmental religion rather than a matter of any theological predilection.

17. On Dr Taylor's own showing, "the Swiss" in general are brachycephalic. This applies to Geneva, a centre of Protestantism from its outset.

18. To say that England is "orthocephalic" is again to obscure the case. In England there are multitudes of brachycephalous people. But it cannot be pretended that they are mostly Catholic, though there is as much sacerdotalism in the High Church party as anywhere.

The thesis, in fine, breaks down at every point. The straits to which the framers are driven can be seen in the resort to the proposition that the Celtic peoples are "submissive to authority and conservative in instincts"—the exact negative of the common charges with which we have dealt above. It is certainly true that the social and political sequel of the Reformation in Germany was an unparalleled period of moral and physical anarchy and ferocious war, a long riot of evil beside which the French Revolution seems but a brief tempest, clearing the air. All this is conveniently forgotten by those who desire to convict "the Celt," in the person of the French, of an excessive disorderliness. But while Germany as a whole has endured more internecine war than any other European country, it remains the historic fact that the modern Germans, like the ancient, are more and not less "submissive to authority" and "conservative in instinct" than their French neighbours. All the same, it is in Germany, the alleged home of "individualism," that there has arisen the most systematic organisation for the spread of Socialism. If only sociologists, amateur and other, would but look at all the facts of a case before generalising on it, we should have been spared much of the present discussion. One after another, every theory of "innate tendency," the positive and the negative, the most flatly contradictory propositions, all in turn are overthrown; and the nations successively show every sort of faculty except the master bias which is said to sum them.

If we were to estimate the "innate capacity" in terms of the date of development, we should be led to put the Teutonic-speaking peoples not among the first but among the last. The great political and intellectual development of Germany, above all the organisation of Germany, it cannot be too emphatically said, is a late modern development; and this precisely because the German peoples, late as they were in undergoing civilisation from the outside, had no special bias to union and harmony, but on the contrary as strong a bias to intestine strife as any people in history. In the sixteenth century, Ulrich von

Hutten could declare that absolute disunion was the special characteristic of Germans; and after the Thirty Years' War, the German people seemed the most decisively divided, as they had become in many ways the most backward of the civilised peoples of Europe. The practice of private war between citizens and cities, long abolished in the other civilised States, still subsisted among them down till the sixteenth century, guilds and cities being even then known to challenge each other to combat.[1]

The development of the very idea of a German unity belongs to the present century, the beginning of which saw the German States unable to combine against Napoleon, Saxony and Wirtemberg fighting on his side against Prussia. And after Prussia had built up her organisation and her power, in virtue not of any gift of race but of the science acquired by her educated administrators, a war between her and the Germanic State of Austria was the first proof of her strength. Finally, it was only on the enormous impulse given to nationalist sentiment by the triumphs of 1870 that the so-called unification of Germany has been achieved. But for that chance, the result of the folly of the French Emperor, whose accession to his throne had represented the rise of new elements of civil disunion in France—elements of disunion which have since grown apace in Germany itself—there would to-day have been no German Empire. The voluntary or federal union of German States revived in the first half of the century was by the mass of Germans themselves reckoned a despicable failure, for which they had only terms of the coarsest contempt.[2] It was only on a monarchic and militarist footing that they could combine.[3]

[1] Pütter, *Hist. of Pol. Const. of German Empire*, Eng. tr., 1790, i. 378, &c. It is a German publicist who speaks of "that singular German disposition to seek combat *solely for the pleasure of fighting*." (Eberweck, *L'Allemagne et les Allemands*, trad. fran. 1851, p. 186.)

[2] Compare the old rhymes:

Der deutsche Bund
Ein tolles Hund,

and

Der deutsche Bund,
Ist Gift und Schund.

"The German Union—a mad dog": "The German Union is poison and filth."

[3] Dr Eberweck, writing his hopeful forecast of German development in 1851, declared that "it will assuredly not be the German princes to whom the German people will confide the task of centralising the Fatherland. The German *people* will centralise Germany." (*L'Allemagne*, p. 8.) The sequel

What remains to be said of the course of Teutonic civilisation? This, that within a hundred and fifty years the scattered States of Germany have passed from separateness to political (albeit monarchic) unity, and from a backward and dependent intellectual condition to the status of the most systematically intellectual of the European peoples. It is but a hundred years since the ideal of a German literature was grasped by the German people, previously possessed only of learned specialists, and looking to France, England, and Italy, for light and leading in art and letters.[1] What inference then shall a rational inquirer draw? That it was "race" that worked the change, after centuries of impotence; or that what one race has done other races may do, given but the favouring conditions, and relief from the burdens and barriers of the past?

A generation ago, a great sociological historian laid it down that, by reason not of race but of antecedents, the French people for a long time to come would be incapable of constitutional self-government. It was in one of his rash moments that Buckle wrote:—

"The consequence of all this [long supremacy of the protective spirit] has been that the French, though a great and splendid people —a people full of mettle, high-spirited, abounding in knowledge, and perhaps less oppressed by superstition than any other in Europe—

has not borne him out. The Eberwecks of that day are to be looked for in the United States.

[1] The old question of the foreign influence on German literature (discussed by the author in *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 160-174) is thus characteristically dealt with by the too patriotic Herr von Treitschke:—"Poetry remains always the specially national art. Even as its speech is entirely understood only by those of the inner national stock (*Volksgenossen*), so does the poet shape the ideal of his conscious striving directly out of the life of his own people: all great Christian nations, however much they may owe to foreign thought-contacts, have made their classical poetry essentially out of their own force. . . . The spirit (*das Gemüth*) is national. Ear and eye are cosmopolitan." (*Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 5ter Theil, 1894, S. 395.) If this merely means that every people brings its own modifying influence to the culture it absorbs, it is a truism: if it means that there is anything superlatively national in the poetry of Germany, it is a vain saying. There has been no more cosmopolitan culture and no more cosmopolitan poetry than that of Goethe, to whom we owe the maxim that "national literature to-day has no longer much significance: the time of universal literature has come; and every one now ought to strive to hasten it on."—And Teutology must be in somewhat sore straits if it is to take to claiming Teutonic credit for the Semitic and Parisian Heine.

have always been found unfit to exercise political power. Even when they have possessed it, they have never been able to combine permanence with liberty. One of these two elements has always been wanting. They have had free governments, which have not been stable. They have had stable governments, which have not been free. Owing to their fearless temperament they have rebelled, and no doubt will continue to rebel, against so evil a condition. But it does not need the tongue of a prophet to tell that, for at least some generations, all such efforts must be unsuccessful. For men can never be free unless they are educated to freedom."[1]

It is worth while to note how, in this attempt to limit, even on quasi-scientific grounds, and in no spirit of prejudice, the possibilities of development in a nation, even a rationalistic writer falls into fallacy after fallacy. If French history has latterly been, as Buckle here says, an alternation of free and unfree governments, then the unfree governments of recent times (to which the proposition must be held to apply) were *not* stable. The rebellions to which he alludes had latterly been successful in overthrowing the governments rebelled against—those of Louis XVI., Charles X., and Louis Philippe. Then these governments were no more stable than the others. Again, the proposition that men "can never be free unless they are educated to freedom" is a plain counter-sense. Men can only be "educated to freedom" *in* relative freedom. There must be a beginning somewhere. In England, says the too patriotic sociologist, "self-discipline, self-reliance, and self-government . . . are matters of *hereditary descent*, traditional matters which we imbibe in our youth, and which regulate us in the conduct of life. The old associations of the French all point in another direction." The last sentence was true; but the "hereditary descent" is a sad misnomer. The phrase should have been "matters of long custom"—not so very long custom either. And whereas the non-prophet confidently prophesied that the French could not "for at least some generations" set up a free and stable government, they did as a matter of fact, thirteen years later, set up a republic which has lasted ever since, and now seems tolerably stable, despite the misleading show of instability set up by their adoption of the inconsistent English system of cabinets. He who now looks back on French history, from the Revolution onwards, can see that the frequent subversions of French Government come in the main from the facts (1) that the French industrial system is always closer to the

[1] *Introd. to Hist. of Civilisation in England*, 3-vol. ed., ii. 126.

exploding point by reason of its definiteness and lack of room for expansion, and (2) that the upper classes, knowing this, are ready to anticipate the democratic action of the workers, and to make revolutions in turn. The revolution of 1848, like that of 1830, was semi-democratic. The *coup d'état* of 1852 was supported by the monied classes. It is a question of special conditions. All the while, France is a Republic, while England and Germany alike seem still far removed from that consummation.

While delimiting as above the capacity of the French people for self-government, Buckle still more straitly limited the capacity of the Germans. "The German people," he decided, "are . . . more unfit to guide themselves than are the inhabitants either of France or of England."[1] Here, without attempting to measure the degrees of unfitness in question, we have simply to note that United Germany, though certainly tyrannised by its Kaiser about as outrageously as was France under either Napoleon, or England under the third and fourth Georges, shows an ever-growing capacity for self-government, especially in the organisation and maintenance of the Socialist movement—which, however, constitutes a risk of future "instability." In short, all propositions denying to any nation the capacity for self-government, whether they be founded on the presuppositions of prejudice or on a simple inference from negative evidence in the past, are to be regarded with utter distrust.

Apart from the grounds above dealt with, there is only one on which propositions as to racial tendencies can be quasi-scientifically founded, and that is the fact that individuals do undoubtedly differ in capacities and proclivities. If individuals thus differ, it is asked, why not nations? The answer is that, precisely because individuals thus vary, there is no collective "national character." The surprising thing is that men who, like Mill, have expressly rejected the notion of racial character in particular cases,[2] and who even, like him, have unreasonably disputed the existence of innate peculiarities in the individual,[3] have yet maintained the abstract thesis that nations have collective characters.[4] Apparently the confusion turns partly on the habit of identifying temperament with character, and aspect with temperament. We have seen above how several writers

[1] Vol. I. p. 238.

[2] See the *Political Economy*, B. II. ch. ix., § 3.

[3] See Professor Bain's biography, *J. S. Mill*, p. 146.

[4] See the *Logic*, B. vi., c. ix., § 4.

make out the "blond race" to have been in the mass "lymphatic."[1] Yet we have all known blonds who were very vivacious and dark people who were sluggish and dreamy. It may be true that, setting aside points of complexion, there is more vivacity of temperament in some nations than in others—in Frenchmen and Irishmen than in Englishmen, in Italians than in Germans. Such difference of temperament might in some cases plausibly be assumed to result from climate. But here again there is perplexity, for the Spanish are traditionally regarded by many as a grave and dignified people, and the Italian as in comparison undignified and volatile; while as against the "blind hysterics of the Celt" of France we have the vaunted "furor Teutonicus" and the Berserker-rage of the ancient Norseman. It is extremely difficult to say how much of the outward manner of any nation is a result of recent reactions. Gravity and reserve have come to be fashionable at the conventually-controlled English universities; and stiffness of manner is said to be peculiarly English; but though Froissart considered the English of his day to "take their pleasures sadly" it does not appear that before the Puritan period they were more sombre than other peoples. And latterly the Germans have been as loud as the French in their strictures on English stiffness. Certainly a German dinner-party makes more noise than any; but it is hard to see here what becomes of the factor of "race."

When we look at any nation through the eyes of its own satirists, writing in oblivion of race antagonisms, we seem to find a singular identity of weakness in all. Ibsen, studying Teutonic Scandinavia from within, seems to find in it every species of vice, moral and intellectual, that has been diagnosed in other lands, whether by natives or by enemies; and he is said to have drawn his *Peer Gynt*—a type of anything but

[1] The Baron de Belloguet, who as we have seen takes this view, while insisting that the Galli were not Germani, yet contrives to make them the worse of the two main elements in the French amalgam. He then allots the characteristics of the tall blond and the short dark types:—"To the Gaul *pur sang*, a fierce and headlong nature, animal irreflexion and impulse, intemperance, the passion for dress, excessive pride in his race and his exploits, frankness, credulity, magnificent hospitality, simplicity and sluggishness of mind. To the conquered race, vivacity and intelligence, natural eloquence, a jesting humour (which we call to-day *l'esprit gauloise*), unquiet curiosity, acuteness, and the faculties of invention and imitation, whence that remarkable aptitude of the transalpine cities for a rapid civilisation." (*Le Génie Gaulois*, p. 47.) Needless to say, this estimate has no more value to-day than those which give all the virtues to the Teutons.

stedfastness of character—as a kind of emblem of his nation. However that may be, his personages show none of that monopoly of merit which legend ascribes to Teutondom at large. If, again, we could suppose the apparition in a "Celtic" country of two such monarchs as the present German Kaiser and his granduncle, who was king of Prussia in 1848, we can imagine how confidently two such "types" would have been cited as being possible only in the Celtic races. If "types" there be, they are singularly hard to isolate on racial lines.

Nothing is commoner, as we have seen, than the drawing of contrasts between Germans and French, Teutons and non-Teutons, the Teuton being usually conceived by himself and his worshippers, in these latter days, as a fine compound of profundity and practicality, sagacity and strength. Yet it is only some half-a-century since Freiligrath's phrase, "Germany is Hamlet," passed current among Teutophiles as a true generalisation; and when we go behind the outworks of German patriotism we find that there is no special consciousness of unity of type in the Fatherland when its children forget to be patriotic. They of the north have a more or less genial contempt for those of the south, somewhat as happens in "united" Italy. And a cosmopolitan-minded German has made out type-portraits for northern and southern Germany which play a good deal of havoc with other pictures of Teuton *versus* Celt. "In the south, you find naïveté, spontaneity: in the north reflection, ratiocinative meditation. Yet it is not practical good sense that is lacking among the southerns; the cunning of the Wirtembergers and the Swiss, in matters of self-interest, is proverbial. . . . The northern German distinguishes himself from his southern compatriot by a brilliant and cutting intelligence, cold and pitiless,"[1] and so on. And it is this same northerner who for Taine and a dozen other generalisers is the typical "dreamy," introspective, mystical Teuton. It only needs to compare the formulas of any score of type-drawers to see that no outline whatever holds good for the judgment of any group concerned, the pretended unity always dissolving in a multitude of differences.[2]

[1] Eberweck, as cited, pp. 603-610.

[2] The good Eberweck, while giving professed proofs that Germans differ greatly among themselves by latitude and longitude, pauses to protest that all the same they are at bottom homogeneous: "In each nationality there exist opposed qualities: each is composed, so to speak, of living contradictions; but the contradictions are at bottom only the diverse sides of the same fundamental force" (Work cited, p. 608). We seem to be reading a paraphrase

But whether or not there be preponderating types of temperament in nations, it is quite clear that temperaments do not determine political history any more than they do the processes of logic. There are mathematicians and chemists, poets and artists, soldiers and thinkers, rationalists and pietists, in one nation as in another; and the clash of class interests, which is the fundamental factor in politics, goes on alike in all. England was the scene of a long civil war, ending in a regicide, and of a second revolution, ending in a king's exile, when France was thoroughly monarchic. When France in turn effected a revolution and a regicide, aristocratic England, being now unitedly monarchic, saw the explanation in vices of French character. Sociology might by this time be a little more intelligent. The destinies of nations are the outcome not of any special heredity but of special conditions. The people of the United States, with an inheritance of self-government, underwent a dreadful civil war by reason of the peculiar difficulty of one of their problems. If any other nation suffers specially from civil strife or disunion the cause is to be looked for in its case, in the same way, in conditions, and not in any imaginary tendency of "character." If we found any nation predominantly given to murder, or to theft, or to fallacy, we might begin to surmise some total heredity of characteristics; but when we find that whatever measurable differences exist — as in matters of sobriety and religiosity — are perfectly explicable in terms of climate and institutions, it is mere primitive empiricism to assume a heredity of political or industrial character.[1] Even supposing that French revolutionary heat or Irish industrial discouragement were inheritable, and not rather matters likely to set up reaction and a contrary

of the Athanasian creed. All the while, Eberweck, as we have seen, was pleading for international fraternity, and repudiating the spirit of race-antagonism.

[1] It has been argued, by an ethnologist who maintained the permanence of differences of skull types, that "the consequent permanence of moral and intellectual peculiarities of types cannot be denied" by naturalists. (J. C. Nott, in Nott and Gliddon's *Types of Mankind*, 1854, p. 50.) But even if it were true that *general types* of skull persisted as this writer claims, it does not in the least follow that minor modifications of skull shape were not visible in the very specimens under his eyes. Such modifications could perfectly permit of modifications of brain development, both as to form and as to convolution, sufficient to carry profound modifications of mental and temperamental tendency. Indeed, the occurrence of the latter modifications lies on the face of all history.

bias in posterity, it would not in the least follow that they would be inherited. If special characteristics of individuals are found in multitudes of cases *not* to be inherited, all heredity depending on certain combinations in the parents, on what ground can we suppose that any predominant intellectual or moral characteristic in a nation—supposing one to exist at a given moment—will persist under changed conditions? Cromwell's sons were un-Puritanical. Then, on the very principle under dispute, a nation may change its characteristics in a generation. In fact, a large part of the proof currently offered for the assertion that certain races have a persistent collective character turns out to be proof, on the contrary, that the alleged national bias changes. French characteristics, we are told, for example, remain the same. But Frenchmen have changed their form of government in essentials nine or ten times since the Revolution. Then it is a French characteristic to be changeable. But for a hundred and fifty years before the Revolution their government had been stable. Then it is characteristic of Frenchmen to be submissive to despotism.

In the same way we have all been accustomed to hear the French people described, even by some of themselves, as ill-fitted for colonisation, partly by reason of infecundity, partly by reason of special devotion to their motherland. From these premisses we reach the conclusion that the Anglo-Saxon "race" is in comparison innately fruitful, and hereditarily given to colonising. We have only to turn to Canada to get a clear proof to the contrary. In sheer fecundity, the French settlers there have excelled all others, and, other things being equal, they are just as effective citizens. Their case suffices to show once for all that it was simply the special political conditions of French and English development in the seventeenth century that determined the advance of one race and the check of the other in colonisation and conquest. France was in a period of political anchylosis and artificially paralysed powers, while England, as a result of certain political accidents,[1] was in a period of free energy and unhampered expansion.

[1] I use this term, which is sometimes loosely employed and sometimes unintelligently condemned, to signify, in politics, such turns of affairs as a change of dynasty vitally affecting the practice of government. Such a turn occurred when James II. turned Catholic; when the many children of Anne predeceased her; when the succession of the House of Hanover brought to the English throne kings who could not speak English, and so on. The advent to power of an administrator of genius like Chatham may also be termed an accident.

Even as regards the supposed insurmountable lothness of Frenchmen to leave their native land—a lothness which, so far as it exists, is reasonably to be attributed to the special brightness of French life—we meet with emphatic testimony which, so far as it goes, reverses the current doctrine. It is a typical Englishman who thus contrasts English and French colonisation in the East:—

"You cannot convince an English settler that he will be abroad for an indefinite number of years, the idea would be equivalent to transportation: he consoles himself with the hope that something will turn up to alter the apparent certainty of his exile; and in this hope, with his mind ever fixed upon his return, he does little for posterity in the colony. He rarely even plants a fruit-tree, hoping that his stay will not allow him to gather from it. This accounts for the poverty of the gardens and enclosures around the houses of the English inhabitants, and the general dearth of any fruits worth eating.

"How different is the appearance of French colonies, and how different are the feelings of the settler! The word 'Adieu' once spoken, he sighs an eternal farewell to the shores of 'La belle France,' and with the natural light-heartedness of the nation, he settles cheerfully in a colony as his adopted country. He lays out his grounds with taste, and plants groves of exquisite fruit-trees, whose produce will, he hopes, be tasted by his children and grandchildren. Accordingly, in a French colony there is a tropical beauty in the cultivated trees and flowers which is seldom seen in our own possessions. . . . A Frenchman is necessarily a better settler: everything is arranged for permanency, from the building of a house to the cultivation of an estate. He does not distress his land for immediate profit, but from the very commencement he adopts a system of the highest cultivation."[1]

When one after another of the most confidently vended generalisations as to national gifts and defects are found thus astray, it is surely time to abandon such principles of interpretation in political science. They do but cumber the ground of rational political construction, and obscure the problems of international ethics. In the least provincial form, as in the attribution of certain civilising qualities to "Aryans," they are as vicious and as pernicious as in the narrow forms in which the people of the provinces of one State, and of the villages of one province, express their unreasoned sense of superiority to each other. Even on the current hypothesis, the "Aryan race"

[1] Sir Samuel W. Baker, *Eight Years in Ceylon*, ed. 1890, pp. 88-89.

was later civilised than the "Semitic" or "Hamitic"; and there is no reason to believe that it would ever have been civilised at all but for its contacts with previous civilisations. Herr Poesche, after working out his hypothesis of albinoism, cannot forbear to throw in a peroration on the adorable Aryanity of the Aryans, for which he can offer no true scientific justification. First he exults over the primitive chastity of the red-haired Germani,[1] as described by Tacitus:—"What a noble picture of a simple, chaste, brave people! No wonder that in this wedlock were born the conquerors of the world."[2] The same trait of constitutional chastity, be it observed, has been attributed to some tribes of North American Indians,[3] who like the Germani were proud of making wastes round their villages, and of plundering other tribes, and who were equally disdainful of agriculture. On the other hand, the ethnologist says nothing of the drunkenness of his chaste barbarians; nothing of the fact that the world they overran was a decaying one; nothing of their own rapid vitiation and decay, nothing of their admitted disappearance from the scene of their ancient conquests. Taken together, the facts suggest, if anything at all, that the Teutonic race in the days of its greatest real diffusion (that is, in the period 400-1200 of our era) was a mere vehicle of brute force, counting against rather than for civilisation. It seems to have had the combined military advantages of numbers (drawn however from a very wide area), of good physical development (though not of endurance of heat and toil), and of constant practice in hunting,[4] as against races who for various reasons multiplied less freely and lived more industrial lives. This holds true of the success of the so-called "Celts," whom we have seen to resemble the Teutons, against the so-called "Iberians" or the "Ligurians" or "Silurians." A writer who is scientifically impartial as between so-called Celt and Teuton, is found weighting the

[1] Despite his principle of pan-Aryanism, Herr Poesche must needs make the usual remark (S. 176) on the similarity between the modern (dark) French and the ancient (blond) Galli, of whom Cato said that they chiefly cared for war and rhetoric (*rem militarem et argute loqui*). If modern Germans have not attained the *argute loqui*, it is surely not for want of trying. As regards the *rem militarem*, they may surely claim to have out-Galled the Galli.

[2] *Die Arier*, S. 209.

[3] Kingsley, while accusing the Redskins of universal licentiousness, acknowledges the combination of chastity and ferocity among the Caribs. *Roman and Teuton*, p. 8.

[4] Compare the preparation of the Macedonians of Alexander, as discussed by Professor Mahaffy in his *Alexander's Empire*.

scales for both against the "Iberian," apparently because the Iberian was defeated. Contrasting an abnormally narrow Iberian skull with an abnormally broad Celtic skull, Dr Taylor decides[1] that in the latter "the broad, capacious forehead and the short square chin indicate mental power and determination of character," while he judges that the former is "weak" because the upper lip and the chin are long. Now, the forehead of the broad skull is not at all "capacious" *relatively to the mass of bony structure;* the Iberian forehead, which he calls "narrow," is relatively much more capacious; and the face need no more have been weak, even in appearance, than that of Sir Walter Scott, whose upper lip was long, and whose head was narrow. There is really nothing to tell us whether or not the Iberian character was weaker or less tenacious than the Celtic, even in the solitary and extreme instances here contrasted.[2] There is not even valid evidence for the assertion[3] that the more powerful race at the time of contact "possessed a higher civilisation." The only proof offered is that "in the long barrows [of the smaller or "Iberian" race] metal is absent and pottery is rare, while the presence of pottery is a distinctive feature of the [Celtic] round barrows, and bronze is not unknown." But it may have been the practice of one race to put pottery in its graves, while the other might possess pottery without so depositing it; and the possession of bronze, even if peculiar to the former race, may have been attained only at a late period. For all we know, the so-called Iberian race, with its delicate osseous structures, may have been much the more civilised of the two; as the conquering Anglo-Saxons of a later period seem, on Dr Taylor's own testimony, to have had absolutely smaller brains, despite their much greater stature, than the much earlier "Iberians" of Britain.

"The skulls from the Anglo-Saxon graves, although dolichocephalic, like those from the long barrows, are unmistakably dissimilar. The forehead is more retreating, the cranial vault lower, *and the mean cranial capacity much less*, in the one case amounting to 1524 cubic centimetres, or 93 cubic inches, in the other only to 1412 cubic centi-

[1] As cited, p. 73.

[2] It is odd that while phrenology is commonly tabooed in the name of exact science, the loosest guesses from physiognomy pass current among scientific men, and the relatively exact tests of phrenology are ignored in these matters.

[3] *Id.*, p. 78.

metres, or 86 cubic inches. . . . Moreover, one [the Anglo-Saxon] race was tall, often over six feet, the other exceptionally short."[1]

So that the conquest by the Celts may but have been the physical triumph of the less-evolved and more numerous race over the higher, and the conquest of the mixed race by the Saxons a further triumph of a lower race still. In which case the modern dwindling of the old Teutonic type would represent, not any victory of race over race, but the final victory of civilisation over forces which threw it back ages ago.

Yet the Teutophile persists in crediting modern civilisation itself to the virtue of his small-brained ancestors. It is after noting with other inquirers how generally the blond type, which

[1] *Id.*, p. 102. In the tables of skull capacity given by Topinard (*Anthropology*, Eng. tr., p. 230) the skull capacity of the Merovingians is similarly placed very low—between that of the Chinese and the New Caledonians. If all these measurements be accurate, they go far to quash one of the premisses of some writers of the school of Weismann. Professor Haycraft, for instance (*Darwinism and Race Progress*, p. 115), argues concerning the Anglo-Saxon skulls in question that "when we look at them we feel that there is no reason to assume that they are of a lower type than our own, or that the men and women of whom they are the remains would not, were they possessed of our advantages of education, &c., take an equal status in society with us." If such problems are to be settled by what "we feel when we look," this may hold good; but one would expect a professed biologist to look for a more scientific test. Nobody doubts that some of the skulls "from the Vikings' graves must have belonged to magnificent specimens of humanity"—in respect of stature and strength—but there is really no reason whatever for, and many against, the assumption that the Vikings in question, if educated in our day, would constitute normal civilised types. Of course there are still many people of extremely small intelligence and strong combative passions in all classes, from the "upper" to the lowest; many of our aristocrats, for instance, being but well-bred microcephali, or "grooms in the wrong place." But if by "us" is understood the average of our non-criminal class, including the more as well as the less intellectual people, then Professor Haycraft's thesis cannot stand. It is one of those assumptions which exhibit Weismannism as in part a process of finding pretexts for a presupposition. If we are to frame any hypothesis in the matter at all we are bound first of all to make comparative measurements of skull capacities, with especial regard to the frontal convolutions, and if we are scrupulous we shall further recognise the probability that development of convolutions within a given cranial space may vary with osseous characteristics. (*Cp.* De Quatrefages, *Human Species*, Eng. tr., p. 382.) But here again, while the relatively scientific and inductive method of phrenology is set aside in the schools as charlatanism, we find professed and trained biologists reaching conclusions as to brain capacity by the merest guess-work.

for him is the Aryan, is being superseded by others up to the very verge of Scandinavia, that Herr Poesche exclaims :—"They have been for thousands of years the active part of mankind, to whom all the initiative in history belongs, the inheritors of all previous historic periods and cultures, the creators of all the coming ones"; going on to picture the "Aryan spirit ruling and ordering everywhere." "The Aryans possess force and might"—they and they alone.[1]

It is wholesome to turn from such rhetoric to historic retrospect, and to remember how twelve hundred years ago the Saracens overran the Aryan kingdoms of northern Africa and Spain; how five hundred years ago the Turks captured still-Aryan Constantinople; and how much of modern Aryan science derives originally from Saracen contact in the Middle Ages. The Saracen civilisation, after wonderful developments, was arrested, the elements of progress within it being strangled by the elements of conservatism, represented by the cult of the Sacred Book; and the political framework being overthrown by the revived militarism of the Christian foe. But it was no special heredity of race that wrought the failure, any more than it was any gift of race which saved Western Christendom from a similar strangling of the spirit of science by the spirit of superstition. What saved Christian Europe was its miscellaneity and the interaction of its component parts, somewhat as the interaction of the city-states of Greece so long sustained and stimulated Greek civilisation. The distribution of the intellectual forces of Europe through so many independent States made impossible their simultaneous suppression; and if the Saracen civilisation had been in anything like free and friendly contact with the Christian polities it too might have gained enough from the stimulus to overcome the malady of creed. But Christian malice, concurring with Mohammedan, kept Islamic civilisation isolated; and the faculties which, even thus, had done so much to develop science in Europe, were lost to the common cause of intelligence. How little "race" has to do with the matter may be realised by any one who will estimate the extent to which intelligence in Christian Spain has been eliminated or paralysed during the three hundred years since the religious factor obtained in her polity the same fatal predominance that had ruined the previous civilisation of the Moors.

Rationally considered, every one of the races under notice is capable of an intellectual renascence, given the fitting sociological conditions. Even the civilisation of Turkey, the history of which

[1] As cited, S. 238.

Buckle declared he could write on the back of his hand, is no dead trunk, but one capable of blossoming into fruitfulness if fed with the sap of a freshly-stirred soil.[1] The due conditions may or may not occur: as to that we can make no prediction: but we can confidently say that there is nothing in "race" to exclude the possibility, though an era of inertia is not easily to be countervailed. Inertia may supervene in any race under certain conditions. We have heard much of the theoretic superiority of the stock of the Pilgrim Fathers, to whose original virtues, real and imaginary, some people attribute most of the progress made in modern times in the United States, putting down to Irish immigration all the blemishes of modern American politics. As a matter of fact, the Pilgrims promptly proved themselves to be quite average people in respect of their incapacity for coöperative industry;[2] and their fanaticism was a profoundly anti-social influence throughout the whole of the really Puritan period. The Revolution itself was clearly made by the combination of such new forces as the idealistic political devotion of Washington, not at all a Puritanic type, and the intellectual stimulation given by Paine, who was still less so. Finally it would appear that in our own day the old Puritan stock, where living as nearly as possible in the original conditions, is as distinctly marked by moral and intellectual atrophy as any civilised population of which we have knowledge. The stories, for instance, of Miss Mary Wilkins, pronounced by her most competent compatriots an excellent observer, reveal in New England life a kind of anchylosis of character, a running down of all elements into a kind of imbecile passive malignity,[3] that seems far further away from healthy civilisation than any of the faults of the Irish peasantry.

Here we have a bad case of stagnation, if not of decadence, in a stock which was probably much over-praised at its best, but which in any case passes as a crack "Teutonic" type. The stagnation is seen to be like all other phenomena a matter of conditions; and to conditions, accordingly, we are to trace similar phenomena in other races, the more readily because all alike can claim positive achievements in favourable circum-

[1] As to the case of China, see the author's *Introduction to Modern English Politics* in the *Free Review*, Nov. 1894, pp. 175, 182.

[2] See Mr Goldwin Smith's *History of the United States*, p. 23, and compare his earlier language concerning the Pilgrim Fathers in *Three English Statesmen*, 1867, People's ed., p. 74.

[3] See in particular Miss Wilkins' novel, *Pembroke*.

stances. It lies on the face of Herr Poesche's own thesis that the progress of modern Europe, which he says is due to the Aryan race, is rather due to non-Aryans — the "pigmented" brachycephalic breeds who have so nearly crowded-out the blonds.[1] If one or more non-Aryan stocks can thus successfully compete with the Aryan, so may any of the rest, given the necessary culture-conditions. The "Aryan" creed in sociology is finally no better founded than the Athanasian creed in theology. When all is said it is found that the "Semites" alone, though declared by some to show constant signs of degeneration, are the toughest of all the competing races of the world. The Jews, — scourged, as the physicians tell us, by neurosis and diabetes — are yet the most generally indestructible.[2] And while the self-styled Aryan prates of the predominance of his species, the lands in which his tongue is spoken are chronically convulsed by wild outcry against the domination of the Semite, who wields the all-compelling power of the purse; yet at the same time, as if to show at a glance the nullity of the theory which in turn makes him merely a manipulator of money, contributes to "the general deed of man" the most opposing influences, producing at once Lassalle and Rothschild, Marx and Hirsch, Ricardo and Disraeli, Jew and Philistine. The spontaneous variation of the stock defies alike the ideal of the Rabbin, the pressure of Christian animus, and the sentimental exhortations of the neo-separatists, who found their mouthpiece in George Eliot, in the years of her declining powers and dissolving principles. The Jew, despite all such appeals, verily will not go back to Jerusalem. "Except for the comparative infrequency of the more bestial types of men and women," says a brilliant observer of that race, "Judæa [= modern Jewry] has always been a cosmos in little; and its prize-fighters and scientists, its philosophers and 'fences,' its gymnasts and money-lenders, its scholars and stock-brokers, its musicians, its chess-

[1] Compare Dr Taylor: "The genius of Germany comes from the other [the brachycephalic] race, to which Luther and Goethe both belonged. . . . The intellect and genius of Europe, the great writers, and more especially the men of science, belong rather to the brachycephalic race which has so profoundly modified the physical type in Germany, France, Italy, and England" (*Origin of the Aryans*, pp. 245-246). I do not say these assertions are proved, but *they follow from the Teutonist premisses.*

[2] "Nur die Juden acclimatisiren und erhalten sich in allen Ländern." Penka, *Die Herkunft der Arier*, S. 95, citing Boudin, *Du non-cosmopolitisme des races humaines* (Mém. de la Soc. d'anthrop. de Paris, i. 93-123).

players, poets, comic-singers, lunatics, saints, publicans, politicians, warriors, poltroons, mathematicians, actors, foreign correspondents, have always been in the front rank."[1] And in the sections of this "race," which, though in antiquity it was certainly an amalgam like all others, has probably been the least mixed of all for some two thousand years,[2]—even within this we find in full play the very spirit of irrational discrimination which has branded the whole race, (on its own invitation) as "peculiar." "Spanish Jews," says our Jewish observer, "earliest arrivals [in England] by way of Holland, after the restoration, are a class apart, and look down on the later imported Ashkenazim, embracing both Poles and Dutchmen in their impartial contempt. But this does not prevent the Pole and the Dutchman from despising each other. To a Dutch or Russian Jew, the 'Pullack' or Polish Jew is a poor creature; and scarce anything can exceed the complacency with which the 'Pullack' looks down on the 'Litvok' or Lithuanian, the degraded being whose 'Shibboleth' is literally 'Sibboleth,' and who says 'ee' where rightly-constituted persons say 'oo.' To mimic the mincing pronunciation of the 'Litvok' affords the 'Pullack' a sense of superiority almost equalling that possessed by the English Jew, whose mispronunciation of the Holy Tongue is his title to rank far above all foreign varieties."[3] The humorist goes on to assure that "yet a vein of brotherhood runs beneath all these feelings of mutual superiority; like the cliqueism which draws together 'old clo' dealers, though each gives fifty per cent more than any other dealer in the trade." It is even so. Such are in reality the brotherhoods of races, a mirage of sentiment beyond the desert of self-seeking, a mood that comes and goes.

There might be found, one thinks, in the history of the Jewish race in particular, the most overwhelming demonstration of the deadliness of the spirit of racial separateness when erected into a cult, though it has been possible to quasi-scientific minds even in our own day to read the lesson backwards. Among all the nations of antiquity it stood out by reason of the enormous arrogance of its pretence of superiority, resting as it did its whole culture on a doctrine of racial monopoly in religion. To that

[1] I. Zangwill, *Children of the Ghetto*, proem.

[2] Yet Mr Zangwill seems to take it for granted that the Jews of the different countries not only assimilate the moral characteristics of their neighbours (*e.g.*, p. 45) but approximate to their facial type (*e.g.*, p. 252). And indeed the difference between the Peninsular type of Jew and some others is often so great as to suggest a considerable interfusion of Moorish blood.

[3] *Id.*, pp. 16-17 (1-vol. ed.). *Cf.* p. 328.

insane claim the world has given its brutal answer[1] during two thousand years, till in our own day there rises here and there the hope that the claim and the retort will together pass out of the problem of civilisation, so hard to solve even apart from such insensate complications. Surely we may cherish so circumspect a hope. It is a Jewish scholar, I believe, who undertakes most diligently to dispel "the oriental mirage." Surely we may hope ere long to do more, and to dissipate for Jew and Gentile that still more ancient mirage which is distilled from the primordial prejudice of race.

§ 7. *The Ethic of the Race Instinct.*

There is, however, a final aspect of the race question which it may be well to consider before we turn from it to study the Irish problem on lines of inductive science. I mean the philosophic aspect. Racial antipathy or prejudice, with which we have thus been dealing, is obviously correlative with racial enthusiasm, such as confronts us in the Irish nationalist movement. Men belittle what they suppose to be an alien race because they esteem their own. And I may be accused of accepting and justifying the instinct of race on the positive side,

[1] If we may judge from Mr Zangwill's pages, it does not seem to be often realised, even by the most intelligent Jews, that in the matter of exclusiveness and arrogance it was the Jews who began, and that it is they—the orthodox among them—who most zealously keep up the note. The best among them continue dutifully the prayer: "Pour out Thy wrath on the heathen who acknowledge thee not, and upon the kingdoms which invoke not Thy name. . . . Pursue them in wrath, and destroy them from under the heavens of the Lord" (Work cited, p. 237). Compare the racial self-glorifications put in the mouths of some of the best characters in the book. And even the half-free-thinking Esther is made to sob: "Surely the people of Christ have been the Christ of peoples"—using the expression in the Christian connotation. The whole of Mr Zangwill's book is thus instructive as to the psychology of the racial fallacy. The brilliant author himself, even while picturing the most mindless formalism among the orthodox of his race, credits them with "omnipresent ability," and claims at the outset that the faults of the Ghetto "are bred of its hovering miasma of persecution"—as if there would be no faults but for that. And after all this, we find Mr Zangwill making violent fun of the so-called "Celtic Renaissance," as if it were not philosophically on all fours with much of the Jewish sentiment which he sets forth so sympathetically. George Eliot professed to revere the race instinct all round, while preaching it to the Jews; but some of her auditors seem to wish to keep it as an exclusively Judaic possession, like the Jehovah of the past and the roast-Leviathan of the future state.

the side of the claim of a population to separate political institutions on grounds of race, while discrediting it on the negative side, in respect of all pretences that certain races, as such, lack any capacity essential to self-government. If it is absurd for Englishmen to disparage the Celt, I may be told, it is equally absurd for Irishmen to stand on their Celticity. There is here a possibility of confusion which may as well be guarded against.

All racial self-glorification, it is clear, is an irrational play of instinct. It is habitually indulged-in, tolerated, and applauded in civilised countries, where individual self-praise is regarded as a clear sign of fatuity when not resorted to in self-vindication against blame. Yet praise of one's nation is certainly a product of self-regarding vanity, and is at the same time, in the eye of strict reason, more absurd. Self-praise, though unpleasing to others, may be just—may be such as another could justly bestow. But to take personal pride in vaunting one's nation is, rationally speaking, the merest inconsequence. If our nation has in any way distinguished itself, we are individually no more entitled to plume ourselves on the fact than is a single undistinguished person to plume himself on being descended from a famous man. Aristocratic pride of birth has long been laughed out of discussion; and it is not found that descendants of great writers or artists seek on that score to claim any social deference. But we are here on that borderland of rational ethics which is sooner or later reached in the analysis of all problems of conduct, and we must go warily. Pride in one's nation, like pride in friends, is after all a spontaneous emotion, like joy in another's beauty, or in one's own success. There is but one test. Emotion is the ultimate fact in well-being, as indeed in consciousness; and, there being no thought as there is no fear of stamping out all emotion that is joyous, the business of ethical criticism is found to consist in settling what forms of joy are anti-social.[1] Once recognised as such, they are more or less nearly destroyed; the loss, however, bringing its compensation in the higher and broader if less violent satisfaction of a substituted good-will.[2]

Now, it is obvious at a glance that though racial ill-will

[1] This point is dealt with at some length in the author's lecture on *The Pleasures of Malignity* (South Place Institute, London).

[2] "It is not, as Spinoza has shown, by arguing away our emotions, but by confronting them with still stronger emotions, that they are, if necessary, to be overcome." (Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, 1882, ii. 94, citing Spinoza, *Ethica*, Pars. iv., Prop. 7.)

depends upon a primary instinct of patriotism, that primary instinct does not necessarily involve a correlative ill-will to the point of ill-doing. When Mr Green writes that "no spot in Britain can be so sacred to Englishmen as that which first felt the tread of English feet," irrational as the sentiment is, it can hardly be said to promote anything worse than similar sentiment. It does not set up any tendency to applaud the deeds of the brutal crews of Hengist and Horsa, slayers of women and babes. And so when Mr Freeman, writing for Englishmen who are descended alike from Saxons and Normans, gravely tells how "our fathers" cried "Out" to the Normans in the stockade at Hastings, he is not likely to move an adult reader to anything more than a smile. In other directions, of course, a similar primitiveness of feeling easily takes on a sinister colour and works unqualified harm. Thus there is downright maleficence where race-prejudice confirms Englishmen in a policy of oppression towards Ireland, and in a less degree where it moves Frenchmen and Germans to a chronic reciprocity of insolence. But where on the other hand the sentiment of race moves a misgoverned and unhappy population to demand its freedom, its choice of its system of government, as in the case of the Italian majority resisting Austria, or the Irish majority demanding Home Rule, the ethical situation is profoundly different. The emotion here is substantially self-regarding; it is malevolent only in so far as it resents maleficence; it is a demand to stand on that footing of equality which is the necessary condition of any true moral relation. If the Italian is content to be free, planning no further conflict; if the Irishman is content with federal Home Rule (we shall consider later what are the just conditions), there is a clear gain to human well-being, in that a whole population is put on the plane of responsible self-government where formerly it was below that plane. That an Englishman, then, should cease to contemn and vilify his Irish neighbours, by way of ceasing to over-esteem his own race, is a step forward in morals. He has the gain of substituting a higher for a lower emotion: and he loses no motive-power for good. But that an Irishman should over-esteem his own race in his resentment of English oppression is not in turn an evil, so long as it is part of his motive-power to strive for a political reform. That he should in many cases bear ill-will to the Englishman as Englishman, and deny *his* capacity for certain kinds of well-doing—such as justice, mercy, and truth—is a deplorable concomitant of the state of bitter political strife;

but there is only one possible way to the cure of the evil, and that is, not that the Irishman's should rise to the supernormal height of loving his enemy while the enemy remains unchanged, but that the enemy should consent to cease from provocation. After that, both alike may purify themselves of the animal instinct of patriotism, and rise to that higher form of feeling which, desiring good for our own community, and striving of necessity first for that, equally desires good to all others and contemns none. In short, as the normal man cannot rise to the highest forms of goodness so long as he is enslaved, so a nation cannot rise above the pride or passion of race till after it has known of itself what the successful self-assertion of race means. It must stand on the ordinary plane of nations before it can be expected to cast out a form of primitive emotion which, in the terms of the case, nations already on that plane still cherish. And it cannot be too emphatically said that any man who calls on a dependent people to be satisfied to remain dependent, and to put the sentiment of race equality out of its thoughts, is rather ethically obtuse than ethically superior. We may be quite sure that the Englishman who in the present posture of affairs affects to despise the Irish sentiment of nationality, would, had he been born an Irishman, have been a hater of England—unless he be altogether incapable of a social sympathy. Any one so far from normal altruism must be either a pure egotist or a pure tribalist.

Once a nation has attained freedom from alien coercion, however, once it stands on a footing either of federation or of independence, there is little or nothing to be said for its cultivation of the sentiment of race, from the point of view of ethical reason.[1] Nearly everything that has been said for it in

[1] It is very doubtful whether the Welsh Eisteddfod, though involving no malevolent emotion, does not do more to retard than to promote Welsh culture. It has indeed the advantage claimed for it of enabling all Welsh people to meet on a common ground of feeling; and in this way it probably counteracts to some extent the bad effects of religion. But on the other hand it tends to maintain complacency over a low standard of achievement. Educated Welshmen have often pointed out (what might almost have been assumed *a priori*) that the poetry of the prize odes has no literary value; and a careful musical critic of the last Eisteddfod protests that even on the musical side—that which most interests the great majority of the audience,—there are small signs of progressive culture, the prize cantatas being "musical drivel," though the Welsh voices are often good. It is true that Professor Rhys has noted, as a remarkable advance on previous years, that out of five competition

modern times is either a display of mental confusion or a brazen pursuit of declamation. Mr Ruskin has protested that all good art, whether of colour or speech, is redolent of its birthplace. If so, there can be no fear of hurting it by teaching the artist to recognise that all birthplaces are in the terms of the case of equal virtue for those born in them. And if it be good to think of oneself as one of a small group of brothers, there can be nothing but good in feeling brotherhood for all civilised men. It is a childish fallacy to identify cosmopolitanism with egotism. There are egotists in every tribe, in every community: it is they and they only who are egotists abroad.

In its commonest form, patriotism so-called is so far from being a substantially beneficent emotion that it flourishes most rankly alongside of malignant emotion towards even fellow-citizens. The Englishman who is most vaporous of enmity towards foreign races is commonly he who is most ready to break English heads on a point of domestic strife. And the way in which national aggregates of mankind, themselves divided by a hundred enmities of interest and bias, are yet chronically unified for the most part in temper, and sometimes in action, by the breath of a common fury towards some other aggregate—this is one of the most sombre aspects of civilised life. In every great State in the world, there are marked divisions of class jealousy and party animosity, over and above the infinity of individual hostilities which constitute the physical and moral struggle for existence. And yet in each State there are multitudes who, either sinking for the moment the smaller passions in the greater or caring only to gratify each as it is aroused, will at a word shout insult and furious menace at some other State whose official head commits an indiscretion, or whose official underlings commit an offence. Within a year we have seen the press of the four or five most civilised countries in the world braying hoarse hatred from each against some of the others. The psychological process is absurdly primitive. For perhaps the bulk of political Frenchmen, Germans, and Americans, there is an imaginary entity, "England," which is guilty of all the misdeeds of all Englishmen in international life, and which is always plotting treasons, stratagems, and spoils. And while in England we are normally aware of being divided into parties bent determinedly on frustrat-

essays on the Welsh language, three were sanely scientific. This, however, is a development that has very little to do with the Eisteddfod as an institution. Good may be done by the prizes for products of artistic handicraft; but that kind of influence need not be provincial.

ing each other's policy and ideals, we in turn are capable of setting up for ourselves an imaginary entity, "England," which is but an abstraction of the military power of the community, exercised with the presumed approval of the majority. Both abstractions are about as far from the reality as is an average Chinaman's notion of European character. At the same time we preposterously conceive of an entity "France" and of an entity "Germany," each actuated by a single or corporate volition, presenting no trace of the conflict of parties which we normally know to go on in France and Germany. It is the same with each of the other nations in turn. Most Americans individually answer proudly for the other sixty millions as "we," though "we" are honeycombed like the other "we's" with clashing interests and political animosities; the farmers of the West protesting that they are ruined by the East, and the clamourers for war with England being told by fellow-countrymen that they are ignorant blunderers. France, full of intense partisan hatreds, becomes *la patrie* in a flash of hysteria at the thought of the German; and the average Frenchman cherishes a besotted vision of an entity "Russia" which is France's friend, because the average Russian also hates Germany; when all the while the populations of both Germany and England have a hundredfold more of the realities of ethical life in common with the people of France than has the bureaucratic world which is the main political actuality behind "Russia." It seems as if, throughout the ages, men must needs grow inebriate of one lying formula after another; and that when religious superstitions cease to be pretexts for systematic war, political superstitions suffice to play the same part.

Some of the manifestations of the sentiment of race by bodies of grown men are so absolutely on a level with the doings of schoolboys, and some are so absolutely on a level with the doings of barbarians, that they almost seem to negate the notion of political evolution. When, some years ago, an American horse won in an English horse-race, the entire New York Stock Exchange was reported to have burst into long-continued transports of cheering. One hesitates to think what greeting would meet any man asking the assembly in question to perform collectively any act for the good of the community—beyond perhaps subscribing towards the relief of some flagrant public distress. Most of the members, probably, would not have a twinge of conscience about an operation in shares which would beggar thousands of their countrymen, and take the bread from the mouths of their colleagues' children. But they were unfeignedly ecstatic over the

superior speed of a horse that happened to have been foaled in the North American continent; and if frog-jumping happened to be the modish sport rather than horse-racing they would doubtless be as ecstatic in the case of an American success in that line.

In England more recently we have had an exhibition of cognate feeling of which the model is to be looked for rather in a palaver of redskins than in the school-playground. The Minister for the Colonies, speaking at a Conservative reunion shortly after the Teutonic Kaiser had with characteristic judgment interposed in the trouble set up by local English aggression on the Transvaal —always so-called Teutons embroiling themselves with Teutons— the English Minister at this juncture thought fit, instead of seeking to allay foolish irritation with words of common sense, to declaim to his after-dinner audience the assurance that under no circumstances should "we" permit foreign interference—in respect of our interference with foreigners. Whereupon the entire audience, the reports say, spontaneously rose to their feet, shouting their applause, waving their handkerchiefs, and emptying their glasses. And these sober-sided gentlemen, with their spokesman, are of those who inform us that the Celtic race, lacking self-control, is incapable of self-government, and likely to do ill by the strangers within its gates. The critics in question have since exhibited themselves to the world as the brazen defenders of the act of brigandage which gave rise to the whole outbreak of ill-will between the nominal head-centres of Teutonia—London shouting Billingsgate at Berlin, and Berlin bellowing insult back. The defenders of the piratical raid on the Transvaal, be it observed, prosers and poets alike, are those who asperse as "rebels" the Irishmen who constitutionally demand Home Rule for Ireland; and if the clash of German with English braggadocio had led to a pan-Teutonic war, the Teuton-hating Teutons of England would have expected the Celtic "rebels" to fight by their side— or, to put it more exactly, would have expected Irishmen to go and fight for them. Such are the consistencies of race-sentiment.

When one remembers the internecine conflict that in every case is proceeding behind the parade of national flags, the cries which pass between the aggregates seem to yield a ring of hideous irony, as of the mirth of madmen behind their bars. Everywhere there is the mining war of classes, the inner corrosion of penury and the rage of despair, the clamorous appeal from the sufferers for permanent succour, the futile paltering of a few in the attempt to give it, the hard refusal of the rest; and over all sound the cries of protested national unity, the roar of animal

pride and hate which outpeals the cry of pain. Everywhere distress and social disease, everywhere the mutual exasperation of factions, everywhere reciprocal disbelief, everywhere "a paste-board portico without, and a deliquium of deadly weakness within."

It would be inconceivable that all this should long subsist, were it not that it has so long subsisted. We are all so constantly criticising each other within our own frontiers, demonstrating the imbecility of some and the baseness of others, one half of the electorate crying shame on the other half as a medley of knaves and fools, that it seems psychologically impossible that we should ever get into the attitude of putting our race collectively in the right and another race collectively in the wrong. We realise on one day that many Germans are wiser than many English, and on another day that many French are more civilised than many Australians or Americans: certain movements, certain ideals draw sections of all races into fraternity; and there is hardly a citizen, however little-travelled, who has not met some member of an alien race whom he likes and esteems. Yet all the aggregates alike seem capable of drowning all such reminiscence in a flood of such instinct as hurled at each other's throats the "dragons of the earlier prime."

As regards the disputes of man and man, there are outsiders who can sit in judgment: even recrimination may at times have the effect of reminding a disputant that he has not done as he demands to be done by. But in the hatreds and strifes of nations, each side seems to forget all its sins and think only of its wrongs—each side's combatants, that is, for in every war there are some who condemn their own nation. Much has been made, and is still made, in the United States, of the amount of sympathy shown by many of the upper classes in England with the South during the Civil War, and of the lack of any sort of sympathy with either side, or with the people of the States as a whole, on the part of many other Englishmen. Yet any consultation of current American literature before the war will reveal that, whatever might be the weight of English opinion and English models in some spheres of American life, there was in others an enormous amount of crude vituperation of all things English. Such vituperation, which was often far more virulent than the inconsiderate criticism of American life by English travellers, naturally set up ill-will among many of those abused; but when the war came, many American patriots were unfeignedly indignant that "England" for a time showed so little fellow-

feeling. We are all so ready to forget our past blows in the thrill of our tingling perception of our present hurts. The new nations seem in this respect no wiser than the old. The late Mr Lowell, in his early and angry essay "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners," exhibited the latter form of sensation with much energy; but it will not be found that Mr Lowell in any of his works, early or late, ever forbore a good opportunity to treat other nationalities with the simple-minded condescension of race which so exasperated him when flaunted by obtuse Englishmen. Be it over German clumsiness, or French flashiness, or Scotch unattractiveness, the good gentleman's humour and good humour are one when he can make play against another community as others had made play against his. And his example is freely followed among his countrymen. That some of them have sold Remington rifles to Turks wherewith to repel Russians, and military stores to Cuban insurrectionists wherewith to baffle Spain,—all this is not felt to be a reason for regarding the outfitting of the Alabama in England as a similar commercial transaction. Despite the compensation which followed, the original offence, with many another, is still scored by many to the general account of the entity "England." As a matter of fact, there were many sympathisers with the South in the Northern States, as there were "loyalists" in the Southern;[1] but these things are forgotten in the ethical convenience of settling all accounts by imputing wrong-doing in the lump to another nation in the lump. Thus Mr Howells, privately one of the most amiable of men, seems quite serious at times—as serious as Mr Marion Crawford—in representing Englishmen in general and in particular as without exception detestable.[2] Some offence personally received, or some offensive English action or utterance concerning Americans, has apparently sufficed these amateur sociologists as ground for furious indictments of a whole nation.

When men who, albeit of the irritable genus, are vowed to peaceful pursuits, thus lend themselves to the spirit of national malice, it is a matter of course that nations in the lump, or the bellicose sections of nations, should hold themselves as always

[1] Compare Walt Whitman's *Specimen Days and Collect*, Glasgow ed., 1883, pp. 258-261, and an article *England and America in* 1863, in *Harper's Magazine*, May 1896, p. 847.

[2] Readers of Mr Howells' novel, *A Fearful Responsibility*, and of Mr Crawford's romance, *Mr Isaacs*, will remember the passages in point.

the wronged and never the wrongers in war, every citizen being primed in such views by the lamentable compositions employed everywhere as manuals of history in the common schools. The German people have been taught for eighty years to exult over their old War of Liberation—liberation from the French invader —with no thought of the fact that wanton German invasion of France had been the beginning of that particular strife, and indeed one of the determining circumstances which led to the rise of Napoleon. In the same way the French people in the mass[1] are taught to hold their nation wronged by England and by Germany, even as the English schoolboy is taught to regard France as the aggressive enemy of England in the modern period, yet at the same time to take satisfaction in the wanton invasions of France by the older kings of England. Everywhere reflection is made to subserve one of the worst instinctive lusts of the animal man.

With such an infinite heritage of strife in all our veins, it would indeed be visionary to preach an ideal of absolute strifelessness, of all-embracing goodwill. The religion which specially claims to expound the principle of mutual love has been in practice but a new pretext for enmity. I have seen a programme of a "Young People's Society of Christian Endeavour" where, under the device of Christian solidarity, the members of groups are counselled among other things to develop the instinct of "loyalty" to their own particular church. A text for the theme is duly supplied.[2] The average man can come no nearer than that to a general philanthropism. Even the political movement which can claim to be creating a new hope for the ending of the reign of militarism by founding itself on the community of interest between the workers of all nations—even scientific Socialism is the organisation of world-wide strife between the working-class and its exploiters; while the Socialism of the streets is too often a grim gospel of hate. But at least we can hope for the continuous transformation of strife from an animal

[1] The present opportunity may be taken to note with satisfaction and with praise the efforts of M. Robin, so long director of the Prevost Orphanage at Cempuis, to substitute a sane and civilised teaching in these matters for what is normally given. M. Robin has had his reward in being deprived of his post and vilified alike by pietists and pagans in the French press, but his record will not be forgotten nor his example let pass into oblivion.

[2] Psalm lxxxiv. 1-12. "A review of the history of your own denomination" is the suggested exercise.

energy, so to speak, to an energy of the reason; a continuous shifting of the grounds of hostility from primary passions to purified ideals, from the plane of barbarism to the plane of intelligence. And it is because the prejudice of race, with all its cargo of historical fallacy and political iniquity, is just an energy of mere animal passion, surviving unpurified from the stage of sheer barbarism, that it is here impugned.

II.

THE LESSON OF IRISH HISTORY.

§ 1. *The Causation of the Past.*

We have already seen enough to satisfy us that at the dawn of history there was no "Irish race" in the special sense, no specific type of human being, whether "Celtic" or "Iberian" or "Ligurian" or "Silurian" or "Lappanoid," or "Teutonic," constituting a main part of the Irish population. In Ireland, as nearly everywhere else in the scope of our survey, there had been wave on wave of immigration, whether of "pure" or of "mixed" races; and in the earliest literature we find abundant record of golden-haired as well as of dark-haired people. And though these data are not proofs of difference of stock, there are other reasons[1] for believing that among the groups in question there were tribes of "Teutonic" kinship as well as tribes of "Celts." We may at least be sure that in prehistoric Ireland there had occurred a mixture of inhabitants very much like what has occurred in historic Ireland, where we note the successive addition of Danes, Anglo-Normans, Elizabethan English, Cromwellian English, and Lowland Scotch to the previous blend. If then we are ever to explain the course of Irish history, and any broad peculiarities which may exist in modern Irish character, it must be *a posteriori* and not *a priori*—from conditions and not from first causes. It is sufficiently idle to set up race character in any case as an explanation of national facts; but it is worse than idle to do so when the race is admittedly a medley of many stocks. At this day, though one or two types of face are generally recognised among us as Irish, because apparently much less common outside of Ireland, there is no general Irish type[2] whether as regards skull, hair, skin,

[1] Penka (*Herkunft der Arier*, S. 174) sees evidence in Irish tradition for the view that the Gaël came from Scandinavia.

[2] "The 'macrognathism' [largeness of jaw] . . . popularly supposed to be characteristic of the Irish face, and always appearing in the Irishmen of

eyes, or stature, save in so far as we find there, as in England and Scotland, a majority of dark or brown-*haired* people. The common notion that Irishmen are mostly dark-*eyed* is an error. "It is a curious and suggestive fact," says Dr Beddoe, "—suggestive of the worthlessness of unsystematic observation and hasty generalisation—that the Irish are very frequently spoken of as a dark-eyed race; whereas the preponderance of light eyes (grey, blue, or bluish grey, often with a narrow dark rim round the iris), is very decided, and obtains without a single exception in all the forty or fifty localities where I have made observations. Sir W. Wilde, dealing with people from all parts of Ireland, but in larger proportion from Dublin and its neighbourhood, found in 1130 the following proportions:—blue eyes, 34·1 per cent.; grey eyes, 54·6; hazel eyes, 2·4; and brown eyes, 8·8 per cent."[1] And this is further confirmed by a German anthropologist already cited. "We constantly meet," says Herr Poesche, "the notion that the Irish in general have dark eyes. In reality there are among them relatively fewer dark-eyed people than among the English and the German. Probably 90 per cent. of the Irish have blue-grey eyes. On the other hand they are in general less blond than the Germans and the English, as one can readily see by the children."[2] Further, the average stature of Irishmen is greater than that of Englishmen.[3] We can thus find in Ireland no general type answering either to the Celtic or the Ligurian or

English caricature, is really not common in the Irish, although very common in the lower type of Scotch face" (Richey, *Short History of the Irish People*, p. 27, *notes*).

[1] Art. *The Kelts of Ireland*, in *Journal of Anthropology*, Oct. 1870, p. 119. *Cp.* Dr Beddoe's article in the *Memoirs of the Anthropological Society*, vol. ii., 1866, p. 43, where he notes the dark eyes of the Welsh as distinguishing them from the Irish.

[2] *Die Arier*, S. 24. Herr Poesche falls into an error, or at least a laxity of terms, when he asserts that "Holland, England, and Scotland are predominantly blond." This is not true as regards England and Scotland unless we reckon as "blond" many brown-haired people. Blonds proper are certainly in a minority in England and Scotland; and Herr Poesche in another part of his book cites a letter from a Scotchman pointing this out. On the other hand, I have observed in Celtic-speaking Wales a great predominance of semi-blonds and dun-haired people over the black-haired. At an Eisteddfod one sees four or five of the medium type for one distinctly dark, and about as many blonds or red-haired as black-haired. The latter are said to preponderate in Denbighshire. (Taylor, *Origin of the Aryans*, p. 68.) Personally, I have not noticed there any such preponderance.

[3] In the far west of Kerry, commonly held to be peopled by an "Iberian" type, Dr Beddoe found the stature high (as first cited, p. 121).

the Iberian or the Scandinavian, as described by the anthropologists.[1] And while there seems to have been one "Celtic" language spoken throughout Ireland at the beginning of the historic period, it is quite impossible to decide whether this language "originated" with dark or fair or tall or short or broad-headed or narrow-headed people, or with very early inhabitants or with later.

What we do seem to find, about a thousand years ago, is the *débris* of a measure of civilisation which on some sides compares rather remarkably with those of contemporary northern Europe, apart from Wales. The Irish, like the Welsh, seem to have cultivated the intelligence, or more strictly the imagination, on the side of literature and song, much more extensively than had been done by the then inhabitants of England or of Germany.[2] If we proceeded on assumptions of inherent racial tendencies, we should be led to decide, accordingly, that the peoples speaking the Celtic languages have an innate or racial æsthetic bent[3] which is lacking in some of the peoples speaking the Teutonic languages. It seems to be among the races who existed in northern and southern France at the beginning of our era—among them or their presumed kindred—that there arose in modern Europe the faculty for and the practice of imaginative literature on the plane of the adult intelligence. Northern and Southern French poets—trouvères and troubadours—and Welsh and Irish bards, were practically the first representatives, in the modern period, of the force which did more than any other to lift semi-civilised life above the mortal monotony that in times of semi-civilisation, as of barbarism, is one of the main provocatives to war. If gifts of "races" to civilisation are to be

[1] *Cp.* Dr Beddoe as first cited, pp. 127-131.

[2] "It may be said that the two oldest collections of secular Irish literature which Dublin possesses, the *Leabar nah hUidhre* and the Book of Leinster, (end of 11th and middle of 12th century) are 'collections of the débris of a rich manuscript literature which has been destroyed with the monasteries by the invasions of the Northmen, in the ninth and tenth centuries.' The two collections contain many pieces composed before these invasions; and even in MSS. of the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries, literary works antedating the 9th century are found in abundance. One cannot otherwise explain the persistence with which these MSS. conserve, in a multitude of words, letters which had ceased to be pronounced at the time of last writing." (D'Arbois de Jubainville, *Introduction à l'étude de la littérature celtique*, 1883, pp. 382-383, citing Zimmer, *Keltische Studien*, Heft I. pp. 26, 28.)

[3] Mr Elton (*Origins of English History*, 2nd ed. p. iii.) cites ancient testimonies going to show that the ancient Gauls had tartans.

posited, this is a gift of which it would not be easy to speak too highly.

To attribute, however, a special faculty to a race because its members were forward in showing that faculty, is only to repeat the fallacy of race prejudice on the positive side. If the so-called Celtic peoples developed humanist poetry and secular fiction before some of the so-called Teutonic peoples, it must have been in virtue of certain institutions, which may or may not have been set up with the conscious purpose of promoting the ends which they finally served. When the Romans created annual consuls, it was not with the knowledge that that was the best available plan to evoke the maximum of the military faculty in the State, and to breed a caste of captains. These results were secured incidentally, the design being simply to check the engrossing of power. So, among the peoples of France and Wales and Ireland, it cannot be supposed that there was any early determination to promote poetry. What seems to have happened in France and Wales is, first, the development of the Druid order (above considered), and later the gradual transformation of that order, especially after the coming of Christianity, into an order of bards.[1] The Germans were no more racially incapable of such a development than the Norsemen, who to some extent paralleled it: they simply did not come so early under the conditions essential to such a development. We know from Tacitus that they had a habit of singing a chant before battle—a chant which he says they called the *barditus*. There was there the germ of a bardic system; perhaps a form of the very word. Only there lacked the conditions and influences which could readily fecundate the germ—among the first of these being the use of letters, which reached Gallia and Britain through Marseilles, and possibly through Carthaginian commerce, while Germany was still untraversed by civilised men.

As a matter of fact, however, there has been among us much less of anti-Teutonic than of anti-Celtic apriorism, even in this connection; and the sociological truth in the matter may be brought out by following up the anti-Celtic view as it is indicated by the late Mr Russell Lowell in his *Letters*. Mr Lowell, being of opinion that M. Littré had in some of his writings[2] allowed

[1] Diodorus Siculus (v. 31) mentions "bards" in addition to priests among the Galli.

[2] I cannot recall any passage in Littré which seems to me to give occasion for such a criticism. It is true that he combated the view, which Mr Lowell seems to have adopted, that early French represents the contact of the

too much credit to the Celtic element in early French literature, protested that "As for the Kelts, there is no early French literature of any value in which the Teutonic blood did not supply the *fond*. The history of the language proves it, if nothing else did." Now, the history of a language simply *cannot* prove such a proposition as is here laid down. Nothing could prove it save an amount and a kind of biographical evidence which in the nature of the case does not exist. The *fond* of Mr Lowell's doctrine is visibly his own raw race-prejudice, which reveals itself crudely enough in his further self-confounding confession: "I like Man better than I do any special variety of man—*and I think the Keltic variety one of the poorest.*"[1] Mr Lowell indeed put his case in the weakest way he well could when he staked it on the ground of linguistics. A Teutonic basis for the early French literature could be much more plausibly argued on the score of the Teutonic *matter* of the Chanson de Roland, for instance, than on the score of any Teutonic elements in its language. The fact of the language being so definitely Romance must surely tell in favour of the Gallic culture force. As regards the Teutonic matter in the epos, however, the answer is that, inasmuch as the "Teutonic blood" had in its original environment produced nothing even remotely approaching the Chanson de Roland, whatever share it had in the new literary growth was absolutely conditioned by the new environment, which must receive an equal credit, if the apportioning of racial credit is to be the business of either literary or sociological criticism. The true and scientific conclusion, surely, here as elsewhere, is that the crossing of stocks, of temperaments, of cultures, yielded a result far superior to what was possible for either side without it. Without the "Teutonic blood," probably, the new literary growth had not arisen; but it is quite clear that it could not have arisen in a purely Teutonic sphere.

Germanic invaders with the Latin language (*Histoire de la langue française*, édit. 1863, i. 102-104). Littré showed that there is no evidence of any preponderating Germanic influence, and insisted further on the numerical smallness of the invading element. But on the other hand he noted as distinctly (ii. 104) that the old Celtic counted for as little in determining the new speech. In his essay on the *Nouvelle Exégèse de Shakspere*, again (a review of the English book so entitled), he sets his face against a number of the pro-Celtic assumptions of his author (*Littérature et Histoire*, 1875, pp. 96-98, &c.); and he is equally judicial in his estimate of the elements which went to the building up of modern European civilisation (for instance, in the *Études sur les barbares et le moyen age*, 3e édit., pp. 84-92, 124-136).

[1] *Letters of James Russell Lowell*, i. 442-443.

It used to be assumed that in the earlier Scandinavian literature the "Teutonic genius" had exhibited its innate and independent literary bent, though the mere fact that the gift had been exhibited only in the northern branch of the supposed homogeneous stock, leaving the southern to develop it much later by imitation, might be supposed to discredit the racial thesis in advance. But we now know that the Eddas, like other parts of the old Scandinavian literature, have been antedated alike as regards form[1] and matter. Much of the Scandinavian mythology is now held to have had a post-Christian origin; and the Eddas in particular are found to show a marked foreign influence. And that influence, notably enough, appears to be "Celtic." The Eddas are now dated between 800 and 1100; and their latest expositors hold them to have been composed, albeit by Norsemen, within the culture-sphere of Ireland.

"Where . . . shall we find a place to which the conditions of life depicted in the poem shall apply—a temperate country, with Kelts in or near it, with a certain amount of civilisation and refinement and foreign trade, with Christian influences, with woods and deer and forest trees, with a fine coast and islands, where there were fortified places, where there was plenty of rich embroidered tapestry; where hunting, hawking, bird-clubbing went on as common pastimes, where slavery was widely prevalent (the slaves being often of a different racial type to their masters), where harping and carping went on in the hall to the merry clink of cup and can kept filled with beer and wine, where there was plenty of 'Welsh' cloth, 'Welsh' gold and 'Welsh' steel, where the Scandinavians led a roving life, fighting and sailing, and riding and feasting, by turns? Where but in the Western Isles?

"Again, where could those curious mythologic fancies, which created Walhall, and made of Woden a heavenly Charlemagne, which dreamed, like Caedmon, of the Rood as a tree that spread through the worlds, which pictured the final doom as near, and nursed visions of an everlasting peace, holier even than Cynewulf's Phœnix figures—where could such ideas as these, alien as they are to the old Teutonic religion and ritual and thought, have been better fostered than in the British Isles, at a time when the Irish Church, with her fervent faith

[1] "Down to the present century, and far into it, the most extravagant views were held with regard to the 'Eddic poems.' . . . Even Grimm placed them long before Charles the Great. These opinions, however, a careful examination of the poems will show to be untenable, and the positive evidence of language proves them to be absolutely mistaken." (Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, 1883, Introd., Vol. i., p. lvii.)

. . . and curious half-Eastern legends, was impressing the poetic mind on one side, while the rich and splendid court of Eadgar or Canute would stimulate it on the other?"[1]

If then even the early Scandinavian poetry itself owes its generation in part to Celtic contacts, it is an act of the merest partisanship to credit in mass the early literature of France, in a non-Teutonic tongue, to the "Teutonic blood" of the Frankish invaders who had so speedily adopted the tongue of the native majority. When the dogmas of blondness and dolichocephalism have collapsed, the dogma of "blood" must share their fate. We may certainly decide that any one stock may profitably be crossed with any other in the same or a similar culture-stage; but it would be folly to credit to one stock, on no substantive evidence, an innate literary endowment which we finally do not allow even to a race which earlier gave proof of literary faculty. To this attitude we return. What we have to do with regard to the early literature of Ireland, bardic and legalist, is just to accept the phenomenon for what it is. There is a danger of over-estimating the importance of the proto-civilisation of Ireland in itself, as apart from the developments which we have above assumed to have followed on such beginnings. Primeval bardism was certainly not a force that could constitute a civilisation even remotely comparable to those of the Mediterranean world. It was simply an intellectual nucleus,[2] which new culture forces could advantageously fructify. And when Christianity arrived, though of course it was a culture force of no lasting value, the efficacy of the nucleus was at once seen in the extraordinary development of Christian propaganda which followed. The facts of the zealous cultivation of Christian letters in Ireland in the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries, and of the spread of Christian teaching thence by Irish missionaries and pupils of Irish schools, are indisputable and undisputed. What is urged by the critics of Irish claims is that this phase of civilisation was not progressive or permanent; that, apart from any interference by England, the proto-civilisation of Ireland either stagnated or succumbed to the shock of the Danish irruption of the ninth century; and that if it so succumbed it cannot be held to have had any great inherent vigour. To which we answer, Exactly so. The mediæval civilisation of

[1] Vigfusson and Powell, *Corpus Poeticum Boreale*, Vol. i., Introd., pp. lxii.-lxiii.

[2] I say nothing here on the disputed question of early Irish decorative art, on which I have reached no decided opinions.

Ireland, like the civilisation of Anglo-Saxon England, was incapable of progress beyond a certain point in the absence of certain political conditions and certain fresh outside influences. The course of things proved clearly enough how weak a civilising force is mere "Christianity."[1] Indeed, save in so far as the conflicting ethics of ancient Syria may be higher than that of an uncivilised race to which it is communicated, mere Christian doctrine is not a civilising agent at all; and it is quite conceivable that but for outside influences the early Irish and the Anglo-Saxons might have remained absolutely unprogressive at the intellectual and artistic level of the ninth century. Christianity can subsist fixedly at the level of semi-barbarism, just as it can at the level of a negro camp-meeting. The determining forces of Christian civilisation, so-called, have really been quite apart from the Christian religion, consisting as they did (1) among the early Irish and English in the study of language and the practice of letters which the use of the Christian literature involved, and (2) since then in the successive acquisition of non-Christian literary and scientific ideas, by way of fresh contact with ancient literature and Saracen science, and of the cumulative process of thought and discovery following on these impulses.

Christian Ireland then might well stagnate as did Christian England, in the absence of fresh contact with the progressive life of the Continent. The fatality of the Christian influence, in a primitive community where the Christian doctrines are really believed in, is that in time it positively unfits the people for self-defence against barbarian enemies. Thus the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks and the Irish alike seem to have grown collectively timorous as they grew Christian, the later Teutons being glad to buy off menacing Danes and Norsemen with tribute, while the Irish, though never overrun by the Danes as were the Saxons, were long incapable of making headway against them. Christianity, of course, did nothing to unite the tribes—less, apparently, than Druidism had done in Gaul; and there was enough in-

[1] The Duke of Argyll, while insisting on the "utter sterility of the Celtic Church as regards any good influence on the economic condition, or on the social state, or on the political organisation of the people," sets down the failure to Celticity. "The Celtic Church carried in its hands, indeed, the precious seed of Christian belief. But it carried that seed in the most earthy of all earthen vessels" (*Irish Nationalism*, pp. 16, 17). The metaphor here is obscure, but the passage at least plainly implies that it is not in the "seed" but in the "hands" or the "vessel" that the civilising force lies. That is to say, the creed in itself is impotent.

ternecine war to arrest civilisation had the Danes never appeared. On the other hand, the Danish civilisation being higher on its commercial side than the Irish, the Danish contact, but for its disastrous effect on literature, might even have been a civilising agency. In so far, then, as the case of "Ireland *versus* England" takes the shape of a claim on the Irish side that England destroyed a pre-existent Irish civilisation, it must be disallowed. The Irish tribes in the eleventh century had at last worsted the Danes, without showing any gain from the Danish influence; while on the other hand the Danes had almost destroyed the old germs of culture. It was not England that wrought the havoc.[1] The valid statement of the case is something very different. What Ireland needed for development was peaceful contact with European civilisation. What occurred instead was mere oppressive and maleficent interference on the part of England, whose rulers were at once unable so to conquer Ireland as to assimilate its polity to theirs; unfit so to administer law as to exert a moral

[1] The Duke of Argyll, rebutting the claims made for the early Christian civilisation of Ireland, has insisted that the heathen Danes were much more civilised than the Christian Irish. Coming from a Christian polemist, the proposition has weight; but it is nevertheless probably overcharged. Says the Duke:—"It is literally true that the heathen Danes, who began their invasions of Ireland in the year A.D. 795, and were finally defeated in 1014, did more, during these two hundred and nineteen years, to establish the beginnings of commerce, of wealth, and of the civilisation which depends on these, than the Celtic Church or people did during all the centuries of their previous, or of their subsequent and separate existence" (*Irish Nationalism*, pp. 17-18). Granted that the Christian Church did little, it cannot be made out that the Danes did much more. The Duke carefully cites Professor Richey as to the superior building of the Danish cities, which were fortified places; but he entirely ignores the following verdicts by the same authority:—"Little plunder could be obtained from the Celtic inhabitants, and the efforts of the [Danish] invaders were, therefore, directed against the ecclesiastical establishments. *The monastery of Armagh was rebuilt ten times, and as often destroyed.* It was sacked three times in a month. The result of these constant invasions was the extinction of the feeble sparks of civilisation which had been kindled among the monks—the schools of learning were dispersed, and the Celtic nation more disorganised than before" (*Short History of the Irish People*, p. 108). "Their [the Danes'] civilisation was not conspicuously superior to that of the natives. . . . All the circumstances which enabled the colony of Marseilles to exercise so beneficial an influence in southern Gaul were utterly wanting to the Danish trading towns" (*Id.*, p. 110). "No civil wars could have produced the ruin and national and moral deterioration which were the result of the first invasion and continued presence of the Danes" (*Id.*, p. 112).

influence without a military; and incapable of the wisdom or generosity of leaving the Irish populations to their own devices. It is not necessary to put the argument in the form of a charge of premeditated wickedness against the successive rulers of England, though it is important to remember that their doings were very much on a par with those which many Englishmen characterise as wicked in the case of foreign powers in modern times. The Turkish Porte never misused opportunities more grossly, or maintained its authority with more heartless egoism, than did the rulers of England in their dealings with Ireland during five hundred years. But if we want simply to understand the matter, instead of dealing out denunciation, which in such a case can now have little corrective value for anybody, it may suffice to say that the relation set up between England and Ireland was from the first an immense fatality, such as would have been ruinous—and this is the great point to be enforced here—such as would have been ruinous to the development of *any civilisation and any race whatever*, placed as Ireland was. The business of a rational historian to-day is not to convict dead Englishmen of evil-doing, but to show living Englishmen how things worked together for evil in Ireland under their ancestors, and how impossible it is that things in Ireland should ever go well unless they absolutely rise above their ancestors' point of view.

What would conceivably have happened in Ireland but for inconclusive English interference, was the normal process of subjugation of warring septs by a ruler of military capacity.[1] There seems no other way by which a primitive pastoral and hunting people, divided into hostile groups, can reach a progressive state of peaceful agriculture and industry. Certainly the Irish population had taken a long time to approach the solution. But the Anglo-Saxons had not reached it at the time of the Norman Conquest, after five or six hundred years of miserable experiment. In either case it could probably have been reached only by way of conscious imitation of the doings of more civilised rulers, and by employment of some of their means, as the Teutonic leaders and kings were led to the idea of empire by the spectacle of that of Rome. That the Irish should not have spontaneously attained to the Roman solution was clearly due to no special incapacity for it, but rather to the fact of the natural difficulties in the way[2]—difficulties which

[1] Compare Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, 10th ed., iii. 348, 365; Lecky, *History of Ireland*, i. 3, and Maine, *Early History of Institutions*, p. 54.

[2] "Although compact in form, and not intersected by mountain ranges of

cannot be said to have existed to anything like the same extent in Anglo-Saxon England. To this day Ireland is a country not easy to traverse, and in the days of enormous bogs and enormous forests it was much worse. Even in the sixteenth century, the English armies found it extremely hard to overrun. That a native ruler or series of rulers, with no precedents to guide them, should have kept such a land in steady subjection would have been miraculous. But even as the much more physically-divided Greece could at length be brought into subject unity, after ages of division, by the advance of military and administrative skill, so might Ireland have been, especially after the famous precedent created by Brian.

In that way the mere example of the Norman Conquest of England might very well have served to set up a definite unifying movement in Ireland. If even the Norman Conquest had effectively extended to Ireland, the fusion there could have been at least as complete as in England. But what happened, as everybody knows, was a process of merely partial interference, which left Ireland always chained to England as it were by one foot, unable to scramble to even such measure of equilibrium as was attained in England and Scotland. Every possible adjustment was sure to be tripped up by a jerk of English intervention. For the English ruler, living out of touch with the Irish population, never came to regard them as his fathers had soon learned to regard the Saxon population of England —as subjects and neighbours to be arranged with and to be assimilated. This belonged to the physical circumstances. To understand the relation between England and Ireland, it is important to remember at all times the simple fact, that in respect of difficulty of intercourse *Ireland is much further away from England than France, and Dublin much further away from London than Paris.* The "estranging sea," by rupturing the tissue of contacts which means unity in a State as in an organism, made it predestinately impossible that one pulse of regular life should ever run from England to Ireland, even as the same factor made it impossible that England should maintain her later conquests in France. Even to-day the mere geographical aloofness of Ireland and England counts for a great deal in limiting acquaintanceship; and in days of scanty

unusual elevation, it [Ireland] is broken up into several distinct districts without means of easy communication; and its political divisions, and the fortune of each of them, are clearly referable to physical conditions" (Richey, as cited, p. 11).

navigation it must have counted for much more. Added to difference of language, it set the politics of the two countries, under their single nominal king, fatally at variance; and despite some isolated steps towards statesman-like courses, the relation settled down into one of cat and dog. This was recognised by one of the English writers who began to consider the case reasonably three hundred years ago. "It was manifest," says Sir John Davies, the Attorney-General of James I. for Ireland, in his *Discovery of the True Causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued* (1612)—"It was manifest that such as had the government of Ireland under the crown of England did intend to make a perpetual separation and enmity between the English and Irish, pretending, no doubt, that the English should in the end root out the Irish." But as the sentiment of race hostility is essentially unintelligent, it needs not, to feed upon, any real difference of heredity—not even, as later history shows, the real distinction set up by difference of language. It was doubly impossible to "root out the Irish," because the simple factors of remoteness and separateness at once began to raise up new "Irish" in the persons of the English settled in Ireland. Indeed we may say with perfect confidence that *if in the twelfth century all the native Irish had been utterly exterminated, the "Irish trouble" would in great measure have afterwards gone on just as it has done.* That the English conquerors, once settled in Ireland, became "more Irish than the Irish themselves," is one of the commonplaces of British history. In virtue of being a commonplace it has of course never availed to check the habit of generalising on "the Irish character" and "the Celt;" though it at once convicts all such generalisations of nonsense.

It is indeed a great lesson on the real forces of universal politics, to realise how the blind egoism of the Norman conquerors to begin with, and of the English governments in later ages, turned to naught the very aspirations that moved them. In England there was gradually wrought an immense compromise—the adoption by the conquerors of the language of the conquered, the common people, who did nearly all the work. In Ireland the same thing inevitably took place, since the handful of mailed conquerors were dependent on the natives for all manner of service, while the natives had nothing to gain from learning the speech of their masters. Every Norman baron's child would learn Irish from his nurses and his grooms, as his cousins learned English in England. But where in England the result was a fairly homogeneous population, divided only by status, in Ireland

it meant, by reason of the chronic influx of new English, the maintenance of the sharp line set up by difference of speech, involving difference of tradition, law, literature, sympathy, ideals.

The native population, clearly, had plenty of reproductive animal vigour. Before the Norman Conquest (1014), it had overthrown the Danes. In the following centuries the natural assimilation of the English minority would gradually have made Ireland wholly "Irish." The English Pale, the line within which English law was administered, and Irishmen were treated as worse than outlaws, always tended to recede towards Dublin, and would inevitably have disappeared but for the chronic reintervention of the English kings, using their power to "keep open the wound." And, to worsen matters, there was the added evil that the English garrison, new and old, was largely made up of an anti-social type. Immeasurably more real than distinctions of race are the differences set up in communities by certain processes of social selection. In such enterprises as the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, and the invasion of Ireland by Strongbow, there come to the front certain semi-criminal types, the types of the restless adventurer and the outlaw, men blood-stained and ostracised, men eager for wealth without toil, bent on ruling others but little given to ruling themselves. And in every fresh infusion of English blood in Ireland, down till the seventeenth century, there was a large share of that type of character. It is easy, of course, to exaggerate its effect in a community. Leaders of nominally unspotted character have frequently been guilty, in Ireland as elsewhere, of atrocities which no Pizarro could outdo; and experience seems to show that the posterity of the unstable and criminal types, when duly mixed with other stocks, tends to become normal. It is clear, however, that at the time of first contact the interlopers would always be prone to violence and all manner of unconscientiousness, and would thus help to keep up in Ireland that atmosphere of distrust and animosity, uncertainty and passion, which belonged to the old state of tribal strife to start with, and which the institution of the Pale had malignly conserved.[1] On scanning

[1] As against hostile English accounts of Irish character, it is interesting to note an old Irish proverbial opinion of the English with whom they came in contact:

> "With one of English race no friendship make:
> Shouldst thou, destruction will thee overtake;
> He'll lie in wait to ruin thee when he can:
> Such is the friendship of an English man."

Hardiman, *History of Galway*, 1820, p. 68, translating from the Erse.

Irish history down to the Parliamentary period, we shall find that scarcely a generation passed without England's doing something to recreate the evil.

The advantage of a strong monarchy in the Middle Ages was that it checked feudal anarchy. But the English monarchy in Ireland never attained this end. Its own fiefs were at chronic strife among themselves, the Norman barons having from the first reproduced the state of things formerly on foot among the natives; and the king was in the nature of the case rather pleased than otherwise. Strife among the barons prevented the growth of a common interest, which would naturally tend to be Irish, and to alienate Ireland from English rule. It was not to the king's interest even to check the tyrannies of his Anglo-Irish vassals over their native retainers: the real danger in his eyes was that the barons should assimilate too closely to the natives, and so cease to be English. This state of mind was exhibited by Henry II., at the very moment of the conquest; and it seems never to have passed away. The English crown appears to have been constantly in a state of jealous suspicion even of its own official representatives at Dublin; for it stands on record that in the thirteenth century Ireland had forty-six lord-lieutenants, in the fourteenth century ninety-five, and in the fifteenth century eighty-five.[1] Such a statistic tells volumes of the system of government. To develop Irish civilisation, to hold the balances between the races and between the barons, to put law on a sound footing and promote the spirit of peace, was a task for the most patient statesmanship. But whether a lord-deputy of Ireland were competent or not it was all the same; he could effect nothing of importance before he was recalled; and the tendency in England would be to recall him the sooner, the more desirous he seemed to be of doing any good.

The first thought of any intelligent viceroy in Ireland, we might suppose, would be to equalise the laws and make intercourse between the races easy and peaceful. This was doubtless proposed by some; though it is hard to trace in the history of the English administration before the end of the fifteenth century a gleam of intelligent statesmanship. So far from revealing any "innate" English political faculty, that history reveals an almost inconceivable destitution of such faculty. After the failure of the first attempts to rule Ireland on English lines, with no machinery of legal adaptation and conciliation, it became a first principle with the English government to prevent the extension

[1] Lappenberg, cited by Hassencamp, *History of Ireland*, Eng. tr., p. 4.

of English law to the natives, much more to avoid any working compromise between the two systems. It cannot indeed be said that the English government even at the outset really sought to bring its laws to bear on the native Irish. By the latter, we are told, the early laws "were not taken notice of," but "the English Government made no attempt to enforce them."[1] It is thus peculiarly absurd to blame the Irish race in mass for remaining so long under their own primitive laws. Many of them seem to have been at one time very willing to come under the English laws, and permission was refused,[2] save by way of special charters to individuals, which, though numerous, emphasised the general exclusion. One of the landmarks in the record is the "Statute of Kilkenny," passed in 1367, in the reign of Edward III. By this amazing edict it was enacted that any Englishman in Ireland who should (1) connect himself with the Irish either by marriage or sponsorship, or (2) sell a horse or armour to an Irishman, or (3) present a Church living to an Irishman, or (4) receive an Irishman into a monastery, or (5) give hospitality to an Irish

[1] *Historical Review of the Legislative Systems Operative in Ireland*, by the Rt. Hon. J. T. Ball, ed. 1889, p. 6.

[2] Despite the abundant rewriting of Irish history in modern times, this point remains obscure. Beaumont (*L'Irlande*, 7e édit., i. 40) puts it that the natives had "no disposition to accept the new law of the victor," but his sole authority is the statement of Leland (*History of Ireland*, 1773, i. 225) that they "neither *claimed* nor enjoyed the benefits of the English constitution." Hassencamp (p. 5) expressly asserts that "the benefit of English laws was denied to the Irish, although they specially requested that it might be extended to them;" but he only gives a general reference to Davies. The truth seemingly lies about midway between these statements. Leland somewhat confusedly states (i. 225-226, text and note) that "a few of the most peaceable" of the Irish in the reign of Henry III. sued for "a royal patent by which they might enjoy the rights of English subjects," and were "admitted by the king to a participation of these rights, *notwithstanding they were denied to their countrymen in general;*" going on to say: "*There are innumerable records of these grants made to individuals of Irish race.*" And he cites some of the documents. From all this it is clear that a general amalgamation might have been effected if the English authorities had had the requisite patience and capacity, and if they had been prepared to begin by using the native language, as their descendants do to-day in India, trusting to natural interest to secure the later acceptance of the tongue of the more civilised nation. It does not appear that the native Irish chiefs were ever, save in very rare instances, invited to attend the Irish Parliaments; and if they showed disinclination for such attendance, the Norman barons did exactly the same thing. In the case of the latter, fines for non-attendance were imposed from an early period. (Ball, *Legislative Systems*, as cited, pp. 10, 263.)

bard, should be held guilty of high treason and be put to death accordingly; while (6) an Englishman who should take an Irish name, or (7) wear the moustache (then an Irish peculiarity), or (8) wear the Irish costume, was to be punishable by imprisonment and confiscation of property. Such legislation obviously excluded all notion of assimilation between the peoples; and it was not a new departure, for already it had been enacted (1) that no Irishman should hold any ecclesiastical preferment, or (2) be admissible as a witness in a court of law.[1] It has been claimed for these statutes that they aimed rather at maintaining English law among an English population which tended to lapse rapidly into barbarism[2] than at injuring the natives, who remained under their own laws; and no doubt the object was rather to sustain English civilisation than to depress Irish. But it is obvious that a system which admitted of no legal arrangement between the two portions of the Irish population could only serve to drive the minority still more in the direction of the majority; and this was what actually happened, the Statute turning out to be a total failure from the point of view of its framers. The English area steadily shrank, as measured by the range of English speech and institutions. There was all the difference in the world between this half-inert clinging of a feudal power, itself but half-civilised, to a territory which it could not administer, and the all-assimilating sway of Rome, which sent the fibres of its puissant organisation to the furthest corners of its empire, imposing its speech and its laws, its arts and its method, on all races alike. The contact of the half-impotent intruder and the unsubdued native seems to have been purely mischievous to both alike,[3] the intruder always tending to lapse to the culture level of the old population, while the latter, instead of gaining from the culture-contact, learned only to associate outside civilisation with antagonism. It was a mere deadlock.

The worst of the case was that the normal decadence of the English element was never allowed to reach the stage of dissolution, as it would have done had the elements in Ireland been left to themselves. From the moment of disillusion after the Conquest, the English population tended to drift back; but the

[1] Hassencamp, citing Theiner's *Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum historiam illustrantia* (Rome, 1864), p. 16.

[2] See the subject very judicially discussed by Professor Richey, *Short History*, pp. 207-214.

[3] "The English Government during this period was a source of unmixed evil to the country" (Richey, p. 218).

English Government would not, could not let the problem so solve itself. When disgusted holders of land grants, large and small, anticipating thus early the fatal absenteeism of later times, came back to England, leaving their lands to be managed or captured as might be,[1] they were met with menaces of fine and confiscation. The king could not consent to let English fief lands be quietly retaken by the natives, and already in 1353 we find laws passed to punish and prevent withdrawals.[2] Even these would have failed to fasten an unwilling English population to the soil, were it not that the king had always the resource of instating new adventurers,[3] there being at all times plenty of men of broken fortunes ready to clutch at any means of restoring them. Thus the incessant decay of the English garrison was chronically repaired, bad material tending to be replaced by worse, all for the sake of maintaining, in accordance with feudal ideals, the phantom dignity of the overlord, while the mass of the Irish people, neither forced under nor attracted to the rule of feudal civilisation, but rather held at the spear's length and taught to see in the intruder the worst of enemies, remained absolutely unprogressive.

This is substantially the history of the Anglo-Irish connection for over three hundred years. During the greater part of that time, indeed, civilisation had made but small advance in England. On the side of literature, it had gone back from the rich accomplishment of Chaucer to a state of almost abortion under the long storms of chronic civil war; and only in respect of a slow extension of commerce and the arts of life had there been any growth. Thus when, under Henry VII., there was set at work in Ireland the forcible rule which had begun to work stability and to shelter progress in England, it might have been held that the possibilities of the dependency were not so very far behind those of the main State. Sir Edward Poynings' Act of 1495, framed by that Lord Deputy with a retrospective eye to the various attempts of Anglo-Irish to renew the Wars of the Roses, in which they had shared, had the effect of making the Irish Parliament entirely subordinate to that of England, decreeing as it did that an Irish Parliament should not even be convoked until all the proposed bills had been seen and sanctioned by the English Privy Council, and that

[1] Richey, pp. 182-184.

[2] *Id.*, p. 206. Hassencamp (p. 4) asserts that "no effort was made to retain the landlords on their estates." On the next page he shows that an effort *was* made.

[3] Richey, p. 186.

the bills so authorised must be either passed or rejected without alteration. At the same time, all the recent English statutes were decreed to be applicable in Ireland.[1] Here of course there was small prospect of self-development for Ireland; but in the circumstances of the time the gain from the restriction of the oppressive powers of the Anglo-Irish nobility, who were now forced like the English to limit their feudal following, was probably greater than any harm arising from the checking of their schemes of legislation. The mass of the people were apparently no worse off, if not actually better. And in the next reign, the regal conscientiousness which is at times as notable in the rule of Henry VIII. as his lawless egoism, gave rise to some vigorous efforts towards good government in Ireland. The state of the country was in many respects very like that of Germany at the same period, private war being chronic;[2] and a strong government was the likeliest civilising force conceivable in the circumstances. Henry was nearly as remarkable, in his day, for his lenity towards the common people as for his ferocities towards his dignitaries and his wives; and as he was in England, so he was in Ireland. "As regards his Irish policy," Dr Richey decides, "his State papers disclose a moderation, a conciliating spirit, a respect for the feelings of the Celtic population, a

[1] This had already been done by an Act of Edward IV.; and the principle had long been held to apply in a general way. See Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, 10th ed., iii. 362, *note*.

[2] The Duke of Argyll, after citing from Professor Richey, with other details, the crowning item that in 1524 "the cities of Cork and Limerick carried on a war against each other by sea and land, sent ambassadors, and concluded a treaty of peace," goes on: "*In short, civilised society did not exist in Ireland*" (*Irish Nationalism*, p. 147). The idea thus conveyed will probably be considerably modified when it is remembered that a similar state of things existed in the Germany of Luther, where, despite repeated imperial enactments against private war, the practice was still common in the first half of the sixteenth century, having been normal in the fifteenth. Thus Goetz von Berlichingen, who flourished 1480-1562, declared war in 1513 against the city of Nürnberg, and took many merchants prisoners; and in the previous year the Diet complained of innumerable similar acts among individuals, private citizens attacking, kidnapping, imprisoning, blinding, selling, and assassinating their enemies. In 1519, again, Ulrich of Würtemberg made war on the free town of Reutlingen, captured it, and held it till dispossessed by the Swabian League. (Cp. Pütter, *Historical Development of the Germanic Empire*, Eng. tr., 1790, 1, 91, 378-379; Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*, 3te Aufl., Cap. 364, *Städtische Unruhen;* Kohlrausch, *Hist. of Germany*, Cap. xv., xvi., Eng. tr., 1844, pp. 339, 343, 354; Hallam, *Europe during the Middle Ages*, ch. v., one-vol. ed., pp. 368-375.)

sympathy with the poor, which no subsequent English ruler has ever displayed."[1] But whatever were the normal possibilities of a well-meaning despotism in Ireland—and the clear failure in England to solve the pressing economic problems of the time leaves the case very doubtful—Henry had already sown the seed of a new growth of evil which was destined to turn all good hopes for Ireland to despair.

Of all the elements of strife with which civilisation has been cursed, the most inveterate and the most malignant is that of religious hate; and this new curse it was that Henry unchained for Ireland when he effected what is called the Reformation in England. That act, so far as his reign was concerned, was simply the expression of his determination to be ecclesiastically as well as politically the master in his own realm. In creed and ritual he was an orthodox Roman Catholic to the last, having no more sympathy with the new Protestant doctrines than he had felt when he called on Ludwig of Bavaria to burn together Luther and his works.[2] And inasmuch as his determining motive was simply his need to control the marriage law to his domestic exigencies, he had at first no concern to attempt any such measures of ecclesiastical change in Ireland as he carried out in England. At home, the readiness of his personal adherents to enrich themselves with Church property gave him the motive power he needed: in Ireland, there was little of the kind to do; and what was done followed on the suppression of the Geraldine rebellion. And whereas there gradually grew up in England in his despite, and afterwards in despite of his daughters, a Protestantism of creed and ritual, there was in the Ireland of that age no possibility of a similar growth. It was not at all a question of race, as we are so often told: it was a question simply of economic conditions and of culture-stage.

When we turn from the racial and other formulas commonly offered to explain the course of the Reformation, and seek instead an explanation in terms of real social forces, we find that the problem broadly resolves itself into one of a varying balance of interests. In Italy and Spain, as elsewhere, there were outbreaks of the critical spirit which underlay the Reformation; but in these countries, roughly speaking, the ecclesiastical interest was far too powerful in point of wealth and numbers to be over-

[1] *Short History*, p. 268.

[2] Letter of 20th May, 1521, cited from Gerdes by Tytler, *Life of Henry VIII.*, p. 134.

thrown. In France, where it was less strong, though still mighty,[1] it made head against the enemy in a series of desperate civil wars. In Germany, as in Scandinavia, it was markedly weaker, and there the interests of predatory nobles and frugal laymen sufficed to realise the ideal of anti-Papalism which had been forced on the real Reformers by the Papal policy of resistance to all criticism. In England, where the ecclesiastical interest was probably stronger than in Germany, it perhaps needed the personal equation of the king—employing the avarice of burgesses and nobles, and drawing on the irritation of the common people against the Pope's delays over the divorce as well as against the greed and licence of the priesthood—to break through the Roman bond; for in England the mere spirit of moral criticism had visibly failed to overpower the general bias to Catholicism. In Scotland, again, the land-hunger of the nobles (who to begin with were no more Lutheran than Henry) sufficed to overthrow a wealthy Church which had lost the respect of the common people, and which the crown, its enricher and normal ally, was too weak to sustain. But in Ireland the conditions were wholly different. The Church had little wealth wherewith to tempt the baronage or alienate the peasantry; there was almost no town population among whom any form of critical doctrine could take root; and there was no occasion to complain of the Pope any more than of sacerdotal exactions. Chieftains were indeed found ready enough to grab the monastery lands that were offered them; and it is on record[2] that the king's renunciation of the supremacy of the Pope was acquiesced in with something like absolute indifference by nobility and clergy alike. But such indifference only proved that in Ireland there was no ecclesiastical question whatever, and that the churchmen themselves had no idea of what the new proceedings involved, having had no experience of hostility from their parishioners. There was in short, comparatively speaking, nothing to "reform" in ecclesiastical polity; and where partially educated England had not yet attained to any heresy of thought, uneducated Ireland could still less have done so.

[1] It seems to be forgotten by the theorists of race that King Francis himself was long inclined to effect some measure of Reformation, but that, as Herbert puts it, "he feared it might cause a division in his realm, as he saw it had done in the empire" (*History of England under Henry VIII.*, Murray's reprint, p. 528).

[2] So Green, *Short History of the English People*, p. 438; but the point is not clear, on the face of his own narrative.

And when, in the following generations, the new Hebraizing Bible-readers of England began to frame for themselves, with the help of Luther and Calvin, a new system of dogma wherewith to organise intellectually their schism, it lay as plainly in the nature of the case that Ireland should remain outside of the Protestant movement. The Puritanism of Elizabethan and Caroline England was above all things a matter of the ferment of the critical spirit in sedentary town populations, living industrially and at peace; just as Dissent has been in later times, and Secularism in later times still. The Bible being the sole culture-force for those of the commonalty who turned away from the theatre, it became their one social and moral standard, supplying them with a set of sanctions on which they could stand against the Popery which had been politically repudiated by their Government. But in Ireland there was no sedentary and introspective industrial population, no ecclesiastical grievance, and therefore no critical ferment.[1] The country was still almost wholly pastoral. To be thus behind England, however, in order of social development, and so in order of preparation for intellectual change, meant for Ireland the being definitely bound up with the Catholic cause as against the Protestant. Where in normal course there would have been gradual change, there was a sudden and violent check to adaptation. A series of fatalities drove the Irish population more and more into the arms of the Papacy and the Catholic States. Gerald, Earl of Kildare, the Lord Deputy at the date (1531) of Henry's assumption of the headship of the Church, does not seem to have had the slightest thought of taking pro-Papal action; and his former imprisonment and narrow escape from death for offending Wolsey were not likely to have left him so disposed. But when, called to England to answer unspecified charges, arising out of family feuds,[2] he was cast into the Tower (1534), the rumour of his execution set his son, whom he had appointed to hold his place, upon a wild course of insurrection, involving an appeal to Charles V. and the Pope for aid. Eleven years before, Kildare's rebellious kinsman Desmond had con-

[1] From the later proceedings in the matters of translating the Prayer Book and Catechism, it would appear that even within the English Pale the common people mostly spoke Irish. As there were no Irish books, they can have read nothing. Cp. *The Early History of Trinity College, Dublin*, by Rev. W. Urwick, 1892, pp. 30, 33, 48. In any case, only the counties of Dublin, Meath, and Louth were English in 1530. See Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, 10th ed., iii. 360, *note*.

[2] Cp. Herbert's *History of England under Henry VIII.*, as cited, p. 537, and Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, iii. 363.

certed an alliance with King Francis, and more recently he had been in treaty with the emperor; but what had formerly been recognised as futile plots now began to wear the air of possible international complications, Fitzgerald having offered the Pope, should the crown of Ireland be given him, to make a crusade against Henry. On Fitzgerald's execution, with his five uncles, trapped at a banquet by his successor, Lord Gray, the Irish Parliament was duly made to go through the forms of renouncing the Pope, suppressing monasteries, and making over tithes to the king. All this affected only the Pale, yet even there there was soon felt tacit resistance and priestly plotting, followed by fresh revolt, all duly crushed by Lord Gray, who proved his sufficiently anti-Catholic temper by destroying many monuments to St. Patrick and burning the cathedral of Down. When he after all shared the common fate of Henry's servants, being beheaded on the charge of having connived at the escape of the youngest Fitzgerald, the Irish people were well on the way to determined Catholicism, though the later revolts failed like the earlier. The English king's assumption of the title of king of Ireland, and the bestowal of church lands on those nobles who acquiesced, left the country only more definitely Catholic, the forms of worship being left all the while unchanged.

It is needless to follow in detail the strifes of the following reigns. The Protestantising measures of the English Government under Edward VI. were naturally resisted. Henry VIII. had sought to enforce the English language on the people through the clergy, and the Council of his son sought to enforce an English Prayer-Book. To this day the Presbyterians of Scotland take pride in the refusal of their ancestors, with less cause, to accept an English Service-Book; and what is held patriotic in Scotland cannot be reckoned otherwise in Ireland. The revolts were suppressed, and the leaders executed in breach of faith; but the people clave to their old priests, exactly as did the Presbyterians of Scotland in the next century. Only gradually, indeed, did the sense of utter religious severance grow up in Ireland, since it was only by degrees that Protestant fanaticism developed itself in England, after Henry's death. That was the fountain of the evil. Lord St. Leger, as Lord Deputy, seems to have worked zealously enough for the promotion of the Protestant interest; but inasmuch as he tempered his zeal with a little local discretion, he was recalled, and a more uncompromising zealot put in his place. Then came the rising of Shane O'Neill, civil war being only averted by the accession of Mary.

But so far was Ireland still from being fanatically Catholic, that despite the ascendancy given by Mary to the Catholic interest, under a Catholic Lord-Lieutenant, there were no reprisals against individuals; only those ecclesiastical endowments being restored which had remained in the hands of the Crown, while not only were there no martyrdoms, but the Protestants had perfect freedom to worship in their own way in Dublin itself,[1] a height of tolerance of which the Protestants of the next generation showed themselves everywhere incapable. Catholic Ireland, in fact, was absolutely a refuge for terrorised English Protestants. On the other hand, the normal English incapacity to treat fairly a dependent people came out in atrocious tyrannies even under a Catholic rule. The chiefs O'Moore and O'Connor having rebelled on a political grievance, their estates were confiscated and bestowed on English colonists; and when the native tenants refused to give way, insisting that under Irish law the land belonged not to the chief but to the entire clan, they were massacred wholesale, and the English settlers duly installed. Thus were constituted the new shires, King's County and Queen's County, in name of Philip and Mary.

With Elizabeth, driven into political Protestantism by the tactics of the Catholic States, there came the religious reversal, with still worse measures of social policy. The Earl of Sussex, who as a Catholic Lord-Lieutenant had massacred the tribesmen under Mary, returned to enforce Protestantism under Elizabeth, and year by year the people become more devoted to their proscribed faith. The Bishops, mostly ready to change creeds with a change of crowns, represented for them only English tyranny and avarice; the curates, mostly Irish-speaking,[2] clung the more warmly to the old religion; and the Government of Elizabeth was utterly unable to carry out its aspirations in the way of providing a Protestant clergy. Protestant rule accordingly meant for the mass of the people only futile oppression, rousing semi-savage chiefs to blind insurrections, repressed by horrible massacres. There is nothing in modern history to compare with the story of the suppression of the Munster rebellion by "the good Lord Graye,"[3] (the second Lord Deputy of that name)

[1] Hassencamp, p. 18.

[2] Even in the diocese of Meath, "one of the best regulated districts in the country," there were in the year 1576 only 18 English-speaking curates; and of 244 parish churches, only 144 had a resident clergyman. See Hassencamp, pp. 21-22.

[3] Spenser's *View of the Present State of Ireland*, Globe ed. of Spenser's Works, p. 654.

unless it be the stories of later abominations committed in the same land by later English leaders. It outwent most contemporary horrors. As Mr Froude has put it, in a moment of relapse from patriotic sentiment,

"The English nation was shuddering over the atrocities of the Duke of Alva. The children in the nurseries were being inflamed to patriotic rage and madness by tales of Spanish tyranny. Yet Alva's bloody sword never touched the young, the defenceless, or those whose sex even dogs can recognise and respect."[1]

It was left to the Protestant commanders of Elizabeth, of James, and of Charles, to slay "not the armed kernes only, but the aged and infirm, the nursing mother, and the baby at the breast." Sir Nicholas Malby, President of Connaught, being commissioned to ravage the Burkes' country, avowed in writing that he spared "neither old nor young;"[2] others have told how in Desmond's country, after all resistance had ceased, the soldiers would drive men and women into barns and burn them there; how they would toss and twirl infants on the points of their spears; how the bands of Pelham and Ormond "killed blind and feeble men, women, boys and girls, sick persons, idiots, and old people." And after the massacres came the direr deaths of the computed 30,000 men, women, and children, who died of famine, and who were found in the ditches "with their mouths all coloured green by eating nettles, docks, and all things they could rend above ground," yea, and who in their extremity "did eate the dead carrions, happy where they could find them, yea, and one another soone after, insomuch as the very carcasses they spared not to scrape from their graves." Englishmen looked-on, it seems, giving no succour; the policy of destroying all food having been deliberately adopted.[3] It is worth the while of present-day English Christians, when thrilling with anger at the atrocities of Turks, to remember that their Protestant ancestors of but three centuries ago wrought bloodier deeds than those of the Moslem Sultan and his Khurds, on the same sort of inspiration. For nothing but a concurrence of the two malignities of race and of creed, surely, could have led men so wont to denounce the cruelties of others thus to surpass their worst foes in systematic

[1] *History of England*, ed. 1875, x. 508.

[2] *Id.*, xi. 197. Cp. x. 500, 507, 512.

[3] Spenser, *View*, as cited, p. 654; Lecky, *History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, new ed., i. 8. See p. 9 for mention of worse horrors still; also the collection of testimonies made by Mr Fox, *Key to the Irish Question*, ch. xxix.

ferocity. Gray was Spenser's patron, the Arthegal of the *Faerie Queene*,[1] the representative of ideal justice in the poem; and the poet declares that all who knew him "knewe him to be most gentell, affable, loving, and temperate; but that the necessitye of that present state of thinges enforced him to that violence, and almost chaunged his very naturall disposition."[2] He was either a weak man turned into a savage, as weak men may be, or a zealot beside himself. And even in England there was so much of recoil from his deeds that he was recalled; so that, as Spenser (his former secretary) complains, Gray's settlement was

"all suddaynly turned topsy-turvy; the noble Lord eft-sones was blamed: the wretched people pittyed, and new counsells plotted, in which it was concluded that a general pardon should be sent over to all that would accept of it, uppon which all former purposes were blaunked, the Governour at a baye, and not only all that greate and long charge which [the Queen] had before bene at, quite lost and cancelled, but also that hope of good which was even at the doore putt backe, and clean frustrated."[3]

Such were at that juncture the feelings of the English idealist poet, who with others received an estate out of the 574,628 acres confiscated in Munster, well manured with slaughtered men, women, and children. Yet he was saner and more humane than the English rulers, who, whether before or after the recall of Gray, had parcelled out the land to English bidders on the condition that they should not sublet any of it to natives.[4] The idea was to exterminate the race. Spenser, though he preached the policy of starvation for the crushing of insurrections, proposed on the other hand that when peace was restored the Irish should be placed as tenants under English landlords;[5] and he planned the systematic extension of agriculture, as being more favourable than mere pasturage to civilisation.[6]

[1] Hallam, iii. 371, *note*. [2] *View*, p. 655. [3] *Id.*, *ib.*

[4] Leland, *History of Ireland*, 3rd ed., ii. 301. Lecky and Hassencamp follow Leland in describing the arrangement as absolute, without considering whether Gray's recall did not cancel it, as the above-cited words of Spenser, and his complaint against Perrot, would seem to imply.

[5] *View*, p. 663.

[6] *Id.*, p. 678. Mr Lecky does Spenser a serious injustice by stating (*History of Ireland*, as cited, i. 19) that "after the lapse of ten years from the commencement of the Settlement, Spenser *complained* that the new proprietors, 'instead of keeping out the Irish, doe not only make the Irish their tenants in

To some extent the spirit of humane statesmanship was actually brought to bear after Gray's recall. Sir John Perrot, his successor, gave out the general pardon; and he effected in Connaught a land settlement which, by providing for the natives, kept that province tranquil for a generation.[1] Among the better-placed survivors from the massacres, too, there was a certain readiness to accept the English speech and English ways;[2] and the towns, though they were almost wholly Catholic, had remained all along politically loyal to the Crown. As early as 1573, Speaker Stanihurst, a Catholic, speaking at the prorogation of the Irish Parliament, on the proposal to establish grammar schools and a university, gave the testimony:—

"In mine experience who have not yet seen much more than forty years, I am able to say that our Realme is at this day an halfe deale more civil than it was, since noblemen and worshipfull, with others of ability, have used to send their sonnes into England, to the Law, to Universities, or to Schooles. Now when the same Schooles shall be brought home to their doors this addition discreetly made will foster a young frye likely to prove themselves good members of the Commonwealth. . . ."[3]

Some such gains may have to some extent gone on in the towns, or at least in the capital, from this time forward, gradually leading up to the degree of intellectual development which we find in the Dublin of Molyneux and Swift. But for the peasantry, making nine-tenths of the whole population, there was to be no possibility of peaceful and prosperous evolution for centuries yet to come. The conciliatory Perrot was in his turn recalled, and executed on a charge of treason; and his successor, Fitzwilliam, wrought

those lands and thrust out the English, but also some of them become mere Irish.'" The passage here quoted (*View*, as cited, p. 675) is in express reference to "*the great men which had such grauntes* [of land] *made them at first by the Kinges of England*," and does not at all refer to the recent settlers. Spenser was really pointing to the past conduct of the Anglo-Irish lords as a reason for disregarding their present vexatious claims. The last clause cited by Mr Lecky might have served to guard him against such a misconception as he has fallen into. He cannot have read the rest of the *View* with proper attention. Spenser has had enough of odium for his part in Irish affairs without this added injustice. Certainly his devotion to Gray made him obstinately hostile to Perrot (p. 656); but his own proposals are specific.

[1] Lecky, i. 17, citing Sigerson, Leland, and Strafford's Letters. See Froude, *History of England*, ed. 1875, xi. 265, as to Perrot's ideals.

[2] See the passage from Robert Payne, cited below, p. 158, and cp. Gardiner, *History of England*, 1603-1642, ed. 1893, i. 380, 406.

[3] Cited by Urwick, *Early History of Trinity College*, p. 2.

against the chiefs with a shameless treachery which left their primitive cunning far in the rear. The see-saw of conciliation and coercion was resumed. In the last years of Elizabeth, and of the century, came the rising of Hugh O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, whose English training had left him as hotly bent as any of his ancestors on maintaining his barbaric status and barbaric powers, and whose grievances against the English Government do not seem to have been worse than the grievances of his vassals against him. As usual, the clan suffered for the chief, and the sagacious Lord Mountjoy mowed them down by sword and famine in Ulster as the "good" Lord Gray had done in Munster. The quarrel was emphatically between the chief and the Government; and if the Government had but followed up the chief and shown favour to his vassals and clansmen, they might have rapidly loosened the old ties of clan devotion, so tyrannous in general were the chieftains towards their own people. But the Government must needs seek to destroy the tribe as well as its ruler; and a common memory of misery kept chief and people still at one. The end was that after the face of the land was covered as of old with ashes and corpses, O'Neill was allowed to make his peace, and live to plot another day.

Then it was that, under King James, the English Government had its great opportunity to root its rule in justice and wisdom. Once more the people of Ulster were separable from their chief, who had kept his earldom on the footing of an English landlord, but treated his vassals as lawlessly as of old.[1] Mountjoy, in overrunning Ulster, had anticipated the step that was to be taken two centuries later in the Scotch Highlands: wherever he went he made his hold sure by well-placed forts. The military problem was thus simple; and Sir Arthur Chichester, the Deputy under whom was effected the settlement of Ulster, had the will and many of the faculties for a good solution. Yet his Protestant bigotry set him astray at the outset. To him the Catholic religion was "wicked,"[2] and, not content with gratifying the wish of the English ruling class to banish Catholic priests and discountenance Catholicism, he set about dragooning the recusants, high and low, till he brought upon himself from the English Privy Council itself a request to justify his action in issuing "precepts under the Great Seal to compel men to come to church."[3] Fear of such oppression had caused insurrection among the southern towns in the last days of Elizabeth; and

[1] See Gardiner, *History of England*, 1603-1642, ed. 1893, i. 381.

[2] *Id.*, p. 394.

[3] *Id.*, p. 396.

only the memory of the late war, and the arrest of Chichester's persecution, prevented a general insurrection in the north. He saw as much,[1] and reluctantly set himself to other courses, counting on educating the young. But nothing could henceforth avert the fatal and ever-intensifying war of the two creeds. An excellent historian tells us that the English ruling class "had a strong feeling of the benefits which would result if the Irish could be induced to accept the religion under which England had grown in moral stature," and that Chichester persecuted "not from any persecuting spirit, but because he had believed that the religion of the Catholics made them enemies to order and government."[2] Yet the same historian shows repeatedly that one of the worst obstacles to good rule and Protestant progress in Ireland was the utter unconscientiousness of the Protestant clergy;[3] and that another was the inveterate chicanery of the Protestant lawyers;[4] and a historian of another stamp, a eulogist of the Reformation, gravely suggests that one of the causes that broke down the mind of Elizabeth was the sense of the decay of character in Protestant England in her day.[5] We had better just describe fanaticism by its name, and recognise it henceforth as the force for evil it has been.

It varied, of course, from time to time. When, after the collapse of minor risings, the English had it all their own way in Ulster, Chichester aimed at something like fairness in the redistribution of the land. But by this time the councillors at London[6] who had recoiled from bullying Catholics into Protestant Churches, had no scruple about taking away from the bulk of the people of Ulster their old sept-rights in the land, and giving the greater part of it out of hand to English and Scottish colonists, who seem mostly to have been of the evil old "adventurer" class, and were thus much less worth cultivating as inhabitants than the natives.[7] The Government

[1] Cp. Vol. ii., p. 284, *note*.

[2] Gardiner, vol. i., pp. 389, 399.

[3] *Id.*, pp. 401, 419. Cp. Froude, *History of England*, ed. 1875, x. 534.

[4] *E.g.*, pp. 422, 439.

[5] Froude, *History of England*, i. 61. Yet in another passage (xi. 201) Mr Froude goes far beyond Mr Gardiner in enlarging on the moral blessings that "England" wanted to bestow on "her wayward sister."

[6] They included Bacon. See Gardiner, i. 435, as to his attitude.

[7] Cp. Gardiner, i. 440, as to the rapid improvement of the natives, and Lecky, i. 22, for contemporary testimony as to the colonists from England and Scotland being generally "the scum of both nations."

had now "lost all sense of feeling for the natives,"[1] and hoped to thin them down either by "venting them out of the land" or by driving them into its wildernesses. In large part the intended cruelty was not accomplished. The colonists wanted labourers, and they hired natives perforce. "The mass of the inhabitants remained in their own homes. They made themselves too useful to be removed."[2] But they remained on the footing of a disliked and inferior race, held down by the ill-conditioned aliens who had robbed them of the land, clinging all the while determinedly to their old faith, which the intruders insulted and would fain have destroyed. Thus there grew up a double heritage of hate, determining the destinies of the generations to come.

As time went on the character of the intruding Protestant element revealed itself mainly in the working of further iniquity under the name of law. What small provision of land had been made for the natives was in all directions frustrated by the machinery of English law, which, vaunted as an instrument of progress and security as against the native system, in reality lent itself to systematic wickedness in a way that no barbaric code ever did or could. Titles were everywhere broken down by the professional creation and exposure of technical flaws, so that it was actually a profitable trade to cause confiscations. At length, seeing the profits made by private persons in the business, James and his advisers deliberately planned to undo the whole of the titles set up by Perrot in Connaught in the previous generation, on the score that, though £3000 had been paid for the enrolment of the patents, the officials had omitted to register them; and at James's death his ministers were about to take £10,000 as a fine from the holders collectively, with a doubled annual composition. Finally, Charles I. in 1628 actually received £120,000 from the Irish landlords all round, as payment for an enactment that all titles undisputed for sixty years should stand good, that the people of Connaught should be registered as lawful proprietors, and that Catholic disabilities should be withdrawn. Yet, after the payment of the money, under pressure of the English Parliament, the Lord Deputy Lord Falkland in 1629 prohibited afresh the Catholic worship; and a few years later the Lord Deputy Wentworth, not yet known as Strafford, actually cancelled the legalisation of the Connaught titles, and the sixty years' prescription. While these infamies were fully endorsed by Charles, the English Parliament

[1] Gardiner, i. 438. [2] *Id.*, p. 441.

on its part pressed on to the utmost of its power the expulsion of Catholic priests and the suppression of the Catholic worship, the Puritan party loudly proclaiming its intention to make an end of toleration.

After all this, we are asked to regard the Irish rebellion and massacre of 1641 as a monstrous crime on the part of the Irish people; and such a moralist as Carlyle has solemnly adjured the Irishmen of to-day, in view of that event, to say nothing more about "the hoof of the Saxon." The adjuration is to be met with the derision due to all the English heroics on the subject. The English nation had simply reaped as it had sown, devilry for devilry. Modern research has gone to show that the element of massacre, to begin with, has been grossly exaggerated, as it was sure to be by a nation which had let pass the wanton slaughter by sword and famine of myriads of Irish, at the hands of its own rulers, with barely a protest, while heaping habitual execration on the cruelties of Spaniards in another hemisphere. It is quite certain that there was no fore-planned massacre, and that nothing of the kind occurred at the beginning of the rebellion. As it went on, many savage murders were committed. What else was to be expected? The marvel is that instead of random ferocities there was not "a murder grim and great" as that of the Niblungs' song. There had been exasperation enough, wrong enough, to have moved a half-civilised people to plot the utter extermination of the aliens who had for generations figured for them more and more as a race of brigands, destitute alike of mercy, justice, and truth, and who were avowedly seeking to compass the destruction of the religion of the mass of the subject race. Even a nominally civilised nation gives abundant play to the passions of the primary human beast when its masses are lashed up to revolt; and we have seen that the Protestant aristocrats of the court of Elizabeth wrought wholesale horrors which to-day would mark them for infamy in Turkey itself. They had slain women and babes, old men and idiots; and they had gleefully schemed the extinction of the people of half a province by slow starvation. In all the massacres of 1641-43, it would seem, there may have perished, by murder or by exposure, from 4000 to 12,000 persons.[1] The "good" Elizabethan commanders had caused the death of as many women. What then was to be looked for at the hands of rude men driven mad by perpetual wrong? For most of the deaths in the later strife,

[1] See the investigation of Mr Lecky, vol. i., pp. 41-104, and his summing-up at p. 79. Cp. Gardiner, x. 69; and Hassencamp's notes, pp. 59-61.

indeed, the blame lies with the English Parliament, which, instead of meeting the rebellion as such, proceeded at once to vote that no toleration should henceforth be permitted in Ireland. Such an insensate enactment was simply a signal for extremities of savagery on both sides; and they were duly reached. The savageries of the Irish could not possibly exceed those on the other side. "In one day eighty women and children in Scotland were flung over a high bridge into the water, solely because they were the wives and children of Irish soldiers."[1] The Protestant beast could hold his own with the Catholic. Writers who, in full view of all that went before, have still no other verdict to give in the matter than one against Popery and Irishry, are only surviving illustrations of the insane unrighteousness which brought about the whole hideous history.

For the rest, Cromwell's ending of the war is the end of all pretence that the savagery in it was special to the Irish. For our modern Cromwellian school, his conduct in this as in other relations is exemplary, the manifestation at once of perfect religious sincerity and of a genius for action. It may here suffice to say that many generals might similarly have shortened many wars by resorting to demoniac methods with a sufficient force at command. Napoleon might have destroyed for many years the resisting power of the countries he overran if he had massacred all who resisted him, and all their priests. But Napoleon, though he is never cited as a moral model, did not, after Egypt, do these things. Tamerlane seems to have achieved great effects by such methods, but he does not usually rank as a great moral force. The simple truth is that Cromwell, a civilised soldier in home warfare, sank several degrees nearer the savage when he passed to Ireland, his racial hate and his religious hate combining to make him furnish very fair justification for a sufficiency of Catholic atrocities on the Continent. He, who put the garrisons and inhabitants of whole towns to the sword because they would not surrender without a blow, and caused friars to be slaughtered like dogs,[2] could wax indignant over the

[1] Lecky, i. 83, citing Carte's *Life of Ormond*, i. 481. Cp. Prendergast's *Cromwellian Settlement*, pp. 67, 68.

[2] This was by Cromwell's express order. His men, so primed, slew women and children, and were vile enough, when following the enemy up to the towers and galleries of churches, to take up children and use them as shields, thus preventing their antagonists from striking in self-defence. Nothing more atrocious is recorded in the history of the time. See the testimony of Anthony à Wood, got from his brother, in his autobiography, ed. Oxford, 1848, pp. 51-52.

slaughtering of foreign "saints" nearer his own way of thinking; and Milton, who could wildly falsify the facts as to the Irish rebellion, produced fervid prose and poetry on behalf of the Waldenses. It would be easy to misjudge the psychological problem which such men thus present: but we might at least be spared some declamation over their ethical excellence.

When Cromwell had done his work, it was estimated that out of a population of 1,466,000, some 616,000 "had in eleven years perished by the sword, by plague, or by famine artificially produced;" 504,000 being reckoned Irish, and 112,000 English.[1] Then there were the thousands sold into slavery in the West Indies by authority of Cromwell or his Government, and the tens of thousands allowed to enlist in foreign service—all going to make such a depopulation that "in some districts the traveller rode twenty or thirty miles without seeing one trace of human life." And now once more the English Government was free to "settle" the greater part of the land with inhabitants of its own stocks; and a Puritan colonisation was duly effected, the remaining Irish being either driven into Connaught or left to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for the English colonists. It is on record that a period of prosperity followed, as might well be in a country which had lost nearly half its population in ten years. There can at least have been no surplus labour. But there had been sown afresh all the requisite seeds of strife, and misery, and frustration. At the Restoration, some hundreds of Catholic landlords were reinstated in whole or in part, in the teeth of a furious Protestant outcry, which prevailed against any further readjustments; and whereas two-thirds of the best land had been formerly owned by Catholics, it was now fast in the grip of their enemies. Naturally, a vigorous attempt to right the wrong was made when James II. set about restoring Catholicism. The proceedings of the Catholic Parliament of 1689, as cleared up by the research of Thomas Davis, were certainly on the whole "more moderate and honest, and essentially fairer,"[2] than those of the English Parliaments of that age, and of the Protestant Parliament which followed it. But Protestantism definitely triumphed in England in 1688 for the main reasons for which Catholicism

[1] Lecky, i. 104, citing Petty.

[2] Sir C. Gavan Duffy, in editorial introd. to new ed. of Davis' *Patriot Parliament of* 1689, p. 7. "I invite the reader to note," says the same editor, "that the identical offences charged on James's Catholic Parliament by partisan writers (and here disproved) were committed without shame or reserve by the Protestant Parliaments of the same era in both countries."

had triumphed in Italy and Spain: it had come to represent a great preponderance of vested interests: and it was accordingly the fate of Ireland to feel for the next hundred years all that Protestant malice could inflict on the adherents of the Pope, and all of iniquity that the English commercial interest, supported by the religious motive, could plan by way of destroying Irish trade.

§ 2. *The Modern Problem.*

Thus were laid the bases of the Ireland of modern times; and it is well that at this point, where mediæval Ireland is virtually done with, and when not only had the English Government acquired complete hold of all Irish political institutions but the very population had been in large part transformed, to sum up the general facts arrived at, as regards the influence of race qualities on the destinies of the people.

It has thus far sufficiently appeared, then, that nothing in the course of things up to the utter embitterment of the religious schism is rationally to be set down to any special qualities of "race" in the Irish people. The political developments, be it repeated, were such as would have been set up in the same conditions in any race, and actually were set up in groups of English birth. As we have seen, the Irish people like the English were a blend of many stocks; and as a matter of fact the "English" blood introduced into Ireland from the twelfth century onwards was notoriously one of the main sources of disaffection. Spenser testified[1] of the descendants of earlier English settlers that

"They are much more stubborne and disobedient to lawe and government then the Irish be, and *more malicious to the English that daylye are sent over*. . . . They say that the lande is theyrs onely by right, being first conquered by theyr auncestours, and that they are wronged by the new English mens intruding therunto, whom they call Alloonagh with as greate reproche as they would rate a dogge."

As regards the mass of the people, it is clear from Spenser's testimony that they were as good raw material as any.

"I have heard some greate warriours say," he writes,[2] "that in all the services which they had seene abroade in forrayne countreys, they

[1] *View of the Present State of Ireland*, Globe ed. of Works, p. 675.

[2] *View*, as cited, pp. 639, 640.

never saw a more comely horseman than the Irish man, nor that cometh on more bravely in his charge. . . . Sure they are very valiaunte and hardy, for the most part great endurours of cold, labour, hunger, and all hardiness, very active and stronge of hand, very swift of foote, very vigilaunte and circumspect in theyr enterprises, very present in perrills, very great scorners of death. . . . The Irishman . . . when he cometh to experience of service abroade, and is putt to a peece or a pyke, he makyth as woorthy a souldiour as any nation he meeteth with."

Nor did they show any moral unfitness for a reign of law. Robert Payne, an English settler, author of *A Brief Description of Ireland* published in 1589, gives as good a character as could be wished to the more fortunate survivors of the Munster mas sacres :—

"The better sorte are very civill and honestly given; the most of them greatly inclined to husbandrie, although as yet unskillful, notwithstanding through their great travell many of them are rich in cattle. Most of them speak good English and bring up their children to learning. I saw in a grammar-school at Limbrick one hundred and threescore schollers, most of them speaking good and perfect English, for that they have used to construe the Latin into English. They keep their promise faithfully, and are more desirous of peace than our Englishmen, for that in time of warres they are more charged. . . . They are quick-witted, and of good constitution of bodie: they reform themselves daylie more and more after the English manners. Nothing is more pleasing unto them than to hear of good justices placed amongst them. . . . They are obedient to the laws, so that you may travel through all the land without any danger or injurie offered of the very worst Irish, and be greatly releaved of the best. . . . I myself divers times have seen in severall places within their jurisdictions well near twenty causes decided at one sitting, with such indifferencie that for the most part both plaintiff and defendant hath departed contented."[1]

So too Sir John Davies, who on his own part helped to show the Irish how much more immoral civilised law could be than barbaric custom, avowed what has been noted ever since, that private crime in Ireland was remarkably rare.

"For the truth is that in time of peace the Irish are more fearful to offend the law than the English or any other nation whatsoever. . . . There is no nation or people under the sun that doth love equal or

[1] Cited by Lecky, i. 20, from the Irish Archæological Society's *Tracts relating to Ireland*, vol. i.

indifferent justice better than the Irish, or will rest better satisfied with the execution thereof, although it be against themselves."[1]

On the other hand it has appeared that, while the main insurrections before 1641 were led by Irish chiefs of septs, sometimes of Norman descent, Catholicism was clung to by the whole population, English and Irish alike, there being no sign whatever of any innate Protestant bias in the "Teutonic" element any more than in the Celtic. The English-speaking and English-descended middle class of the towns were as determined in their recusancy as the Erse-speaking peasantry: indeed they resisted the more direct pressure. There is then not a jot of evidence for the theory of a Celtic proclivity to Popery.[2]

The resistance offered in Ireland to English ecclesiastical coercion was much less recklessly violent than that offered in Lowland Scotland;[3] but the temper which refused dictation in such matters was primordial in the two cases alike.

As regards real faults of character, again, the history of the next century reveals in the case of the descendants of the Cromwellian settlers exactly what the history of the previous centuries had done in the case of the descendants of "Norman" settlers. Assuming the Commonwealth settlers to have been average or "good" English types (and many of them must have been, though

[1] Cited by Lecky, i., 25. Compare the narrative of Gardiner, i. 380, 406, &c.

[2] Mr Gardiner, recognising the causation of Irish Catholicism, yet thinks (i. 389) "it may well be doubted whether the impressionable Irish Celt would ever have been brought to content himself with the sober religious forms which have proved too sober for considerable bodies of Englishmen." I venture to suggest that this remark proceeds on a misconception. It is possible to make any service humdrum, and for many Catholics the Catholic service has been and is so. At the same time it is possible to make any service fervid, and the "Celts" of Wales and the Scotch Highlands seem to get out of Methodism and Presbyterianism whatever religious excitation they require, remaining averse to the Anglican service, which attracts the more cultured of the "non-Celtic" populations, so called, much more than it does the unsophisticated "Celts."

[3] Dr Hassencamp so far countenances the conventional notion of Irish character as to pronounce the riot in a Catholic Church in Dublin in 1629 a "truly Irish excess." Yet his own page narrates that it was caused by the Anglican Archbishop attempting to break up a congregation at worship; and the people involved on both sides were mainly of English descent. Perhaps Dr Hassencamp will balance his doctrine by pronouncing that the riot in an Edinburgh church in 1637 was a "truly *Scottish* excess"; and similar riots in Germany "truly German,"—this "in spite of all temptations to belong to other nations."

we have seen that many of their predecessors were black sheep) the descendants mostly degenerated into idle, drinking, brawling squireens of the type which discredited Ireland in the eighteenth century. Puritan stock and Puritan creed, then, availed nothing to maintain or promote civilisation under the conditions created in Ireland by England. What is more, we find that two generations had not elapsed after the Cromwellian settlement before the English rule had set up in the new Anglo-Irish population as bitter an anti-English feeling as had ever subsisted before, many of the Protestants being even more embittered than the Catholics. The new "constitutional" England was if possible more methodically iniquitous to her dependency, when its whole political machinery had been Protestantised, than the old monarchic England had been. The injustices of the past had for the most part been wreaked on native clans and small landowners, all identified with the Catholic interest: the new policy was to cripple or destroy the trade of Ireland in general, wherever it might seem to compete with that of England. In matters of trade, Trojan and Tyrian were much the same in the eyes of the traders of England. Hume has laid it down[1] as a general principle that free states always treat their dependencies worse than do monarchies, pointing to the rule of the Carthaginians in antiquity, and to that of England over Ireland as compared with that of France over her conquered provinces in modern times. Though the principle soon breaks down on scrutiny—in the case of Turkey, for instance—it is so far true that "free" states, when half moralised, give the freer play to the selfishness of their ruling and trading classes as against dependencies, caring for freedom only within their own borders. And in England for a century after 1688, even during Tory interludes, the trading classes were so far able to shape the policy of the Government, which owed so much to their support, that they could subordinate all the other trading interests of the empire to theirs. There was now no thought whatever of good government in Irish interests, such as had been cherished now and then by former deputies. Ireland was to exist only for the sake of England. Already in the reign of Henry VIII. a law had been framed forbidding the importation of Irish wool into England; and later, under Charles I., Strafford had deliberately sought to crush the Irish woollen trade because it competed with the English, though he strove at the same time to improve agriculture and

[1] Essay *That Politics may be reduced to a science.*

to promote[1] the linen manufacture. After the Restoration, the repressive principle was carried to incredible lengths.

Irish commerce had prospered, despite the evil handling of the land question, in the peace of the first four decades of the seventeenth century, under James and Charles I.;[2] and under Charles II., despite execrable laws for the repression of Irish commerce, there was a measure of prosperity, the natural but temporary result of peace and partial freedom in a country whose population had been in large part destroyed and then partly replaced by new colonists, bent on making their fortunes. None of it is to be credited to the English rule. Whereas Cromwell's Navigation Act had left Ireland, as a matter of course, on the same footing with England, the amended Act of 1663 excluded her, thus depriving her of her whole colonial carrying trade[3] and stopping once for all the development of her shipping[4] that would naturally have taken place with the

[1] Strafford is sometimes credited with "founding" this manufacture (so Lecky, i. 32, perhaps following the editor of Hutchinson's *Commercial Restraints of Ireland*, ed. 1882, p. 13); but there was an Irish linen trade long before his time. Mr Lecky himself notes this, p. 178. Strafford's stimulus came to nothing, and the trade, after being almost destroyed by English hindrance after the Revolution, was re-created only by means of systematic bounties in the next century from 1743 to 1773. In our day its existence is often credited to "Protestant energy and enterprise."

[2] Not, however, to the extent alleged in Provost Hely Hutchinson's work (1779) on the *Commercial Restraints of Ireland*—an untrustworthy performance, which has been unduly praised. It asserts (ed. 1882, p. 9) that the customs were farmed at the beginning of Charles's reign for only £500, and before his death for £54,000,—citing Cox's *History of Ireland*, ii. 91. I can find no such statement in Cox, who on the contrary shows that the Irish customs were farmed in the twelfth year of James I. for £9700, and in the seventh year of Charles I. for £31,050 (*Hibernia Anglicana*, ii. (1690), p. 68). In 1639 they were farmed for £23,500 to Strafford and his partners, who drew from them £55,582.

[3] See details in Lecky, i. 174.

[4] One of the minor absurdities of the anti-Celtic theory is the dogma that "Celts" are in virtue of their race bad sailors. As against this, it may be fitting to cite the anti-Celtic Mommsen:—"Not only were the Celts, to all appearance, the nation that first regularly navigated the Atlantic Ocean; but we find that the art of building and managing vessels had attained among them a remarkable development" (*History of Rome*, B. v., ch. 7, Eng. tr., ed. 1894, v. 15). The seafaring capacity of the Bretons will hardly be explicitly denied even by Celtophobes. As regards Ireland, it is to be noted, firstly, that the square shape of the land, making land communication as a rule the preferable one, would not originally develop sea-going habits as would the

growth of the American colonies. Soon came another blow. Ireland being pre-eminently a pastoral country, her natural exports were cattle, meat, and dairy produce; and the new settlers started a vigorous trade. England was practically the only accessible foreign market. But English landowners after the Restoration were suffering from a fall of rents, which they attributed to the Irish cattle trade; and in 1663 the English Parliament enacted that no Irish fat cattle should be imported after July in each year. The Irish farmers accordingly sent lean cattle, and dead meat; and the English landlords in 1665 enacted that neither dead nor living, fat nor lean cattle, should be imported from Ireland at all. Thus was one of the primary industries of the land wellnigh destroyed, as regarded foreign trade; and the English squires followed up the main blow by prohibiting the import of sheep, swine, pork, bacon, mutton, butter, and cheese.[1] Already the exportation of raw wool to foreign countries had been prohibited both in Ireland and in England, by way of encouraging English manufactures; and the export of Irish wool to England had been stopped by prohibitive duties in the interest of the landlords. Accordingly, as the Irish woollen *manufacture* had not been stamped out by Strafford, it was now revived, the landowners taking to sheep-raising, and the traders to wool-spinning and weaving. The Duke of Ormond, then Lord Lieutenant, secured that the importation of *Scotch* linens and woollens into Ireland should be forbidden; and he contrived to bring over 500 families from Brabant, as well as a number of refugees from Rochelle, to practise the linen trade; and 500 Walloons to work in woollen-weaving.[2] Artificial hindrance was

shape of England and the coast conformation of Norway. (Cp. Richey, *Short History of Ireland*, p. 11.) But when it became commercially profitable for the inhabitants of Ireland to do so, they took to the sea as readily as the Dutch and Portuguese. As to their service in the British navy, see Fox's *Key to the Irish Question*, pp. 310-313. As regards Irish merchant shipping, the text shows the causes of limitation. It had been rapidly increasing before England intervened. Long before the Navigation Act, indeed, the English Government had hampered the export trade by enacting that all ships leaving Irish ports, no matter which, should call either at Cork or at Drogheda, these being the only places where customs duties could be levied. Hardiman, *History of Galway*, 1820, p. 58. Galway had a "staple" for wool and leather conferred on it in 1375, but this was soon withdrawn, and customs had to be paid as before at Cork. *Id.*, p. 59.

[1] Lecky, i. 173, citing the Acts 18 Charles II., c. 2, and 32 Charles II., c. 2.

[2] Hassencamp, p. 101.

thus, so far, successfully met[1] by artificial promotion. After the Revolution, accordingly, the English Government proceeded to destroy the woollen manufacture as it had done the trade in raw wool. There may have been a reinforcement of commercial egoism at this point by Protestant malice; for we know that the previous English dealings with the land had so forced Irish Catholics into Irish trade that a great deal of it was in their hands.[2] And this may have been a reason why, when the Irish Parliament was called upon in 1698 to pass a law imposing prohibitive export duties on Irish woollens, in the interest of England, it shamefully acquiesced. That Parliament would represent the Protestant landed interest, and the rotten boroughs set up by James I. and his successors. In any case, its action was followed up next year by an Act of the English Parliament, absolutely prohibiting the export of manufactured wool from Ireland to any country whatever. Thus the natural Irish manufacture was deliberately destroyed in the interests of the English manufacturers, as the natural Irish export trade had been destroyed in the interest of the English landlords. It was considerately suggested that the Irish should develop their linen and hemp trade—that is, that the more factitious industry should be pushed, when that had been destroyed for which the country had special advantages. And after all, the English Parliament imposed such prohibitive duties on Irish hemps and linens (in addition to excluding certain kinds from the colonial markets) that the hemp manufacture ceased and the linen trade was paralysed.

Thus did Protestant and constitutional England deal by Protestantised Ireland—the most deliberately wicked process of injury ever inflicted on a dependency by any civilised power in history. By this means were the people of Ireland, "Celtic" and "Teutonic," Catholic and Protestant alike, once more struck down into an inferno of misery, when they had been

[1] Thomas Sheridan, writing in 1677, notes that the Acts designed to injure the Irish cattle trade, navigation, and colonial trade, had caused a vast increase in the woollen and linen manufacture, and in the shipping trade with the Continent; the export of beef, tallow, hides, butter, and wool having alone yielded more profit latterly than they and the cattle trade formerly did together. *Discourse on the Rise and Power of Parliaments*, in vol. entitled *Some Revelations in Irish History*, edited by Saxe Bannister, London, 1870, p. 142.

[2] Petty, *Essays in Political Arithmetic*, ed. 1699, p. 186. Petty ingeniously argues that everywhere throughout the world, the heterodox and boycotted religionists tend to do the bulk of the trading.

making rapid progress in wealth and civilisation. Compared with the chronic famine of the eighteenth century, the massacres of the old time begin to seem inconsiderable episodes. The penal laws against the Catholics did whatever else was necessary to make the mass of the people the most ignorant and degraded population in northern Europe. The stronger spirits had fled to other lands, where they developed political gifts not excelled in the nation which had exiled them from their own, taking a brilliant part in the higher civilisation of Europe while their supplanters lived in bigoted ignorance.[1] Instead, however, of spending any fresh indignation on a procedure which beggars all invective, let us now simply state in a concise and schematic way what had been done, sociologically speaking, to Irish life, institutions, and habits, and how what was actually done contrasts with what could and would have been done by a fairly benevolent and fairly intelligent government.

1. Ireland being pre-eminently pastoral, it was necessary for its progress in civilisation that agriculture and other forms of industry should be developed.[2] A woollen manufacture would develop industry on the most advantageous lines; and an industrial population would stimulate agriculture by making a new market for produce. On the contrary the woollen trade was as far as possible suppressed; as was the linen trade, for which there was less primary advantage; and the population were thus thrown back on pasturage, yet at the same time refused the natural market for their cattle and pastoral produce.

2. The land being thus made the one sphere of industry for the people, it was highly expedient that that at least should be put under a wise system of law, promotive of industry and amity. Cultivation being backward, the peasantry should have been put in a position encouraging to industry. On the contrary, there had been forced on the land an alien landlord class, hostile in religion and prejudice to the common people; and the acquisition of land by men of their own religion was zealously prevented.

[1] Cp. Macaulay, *History of England*, ch. xvii., end.

[2] It is worth noting that Spenser, a hundred years before, had insisted on the social need for an addition of agriculture to pasturage in Ireland. "This keeping of cowes," says the Irenæus of his dialogue, "is of itselfe a verye idle life, and a fitt nurserye of a theefe. . . . To say truth, though Ireland be by nature counted a great soyle of pasture, yet had I rather have fewer cowes kept, and men better mannered, than to have such huge encrease of cattell, and noe encrease of good conditions" (*View*, in Globe ed., p. 678). This gives the gist of the sociological corrective to the economic doctrine of absolute *laissez-faire*.

There were thus a deep gulf between the landlords and the labourers, the former being thus developed as a matter of course into one of the most insolent and worthless aristocracies in the modern world,[1] while the people, made indolent by the hopelessness of their case, had artificial abasement added to their disadvantages.

3. For a peasantry so placed, the one moral antidote would be some measure of education. But the penal law expressly prevented Catholic education. That law was, as Burke decided in his Conservative period, "a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man."[2]

4. The mass of the Irish people having been made hostile in religion to that prevailing in England, the interest of the latter, when once the period of anti-Papal panic was past, would have been to conciliate them by toleration, and so do something to attract them to Protestantism and win them away from the influence of their priests. At the same time, whatever measures would maintain the Protestant population should have been taken as a matter of course. But on the one hand the penal laws were maintained in the full knowledge that they rooted the people more and more firmly in their Catholicism and in their devotion to their priests; and on the other hand the trade laws were maintained in the full knowledge that by multiplying poverty they forced thousands of the Protestant descendants of the English and Scotch settlers to emigrate, the native stocks being better able to live on beggarly sustenance.

5. A people thus situated, with no outlet save difficult emigration, with its trade of every description artificially repressed, tended to suffer in a peculiar degree from over-population; and extra misery on this score could only be averted by their learning in some way the lesson of family limitation. But no modern nation had as yet learned the lesson; and the Irish peasantry, instead of being in any way helped in the right direction, were specially pushed in the wrong. On the one hand, the land system, putting them as it did at the absolute mercy of their landlords, created shiftlessness as a morass breeds miasma; on the other hand, the anti-Catholic laws had the peculiar effect of

[1] Cp. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, B. v., ch. 3, near end.

[2] *Letter to Langrishe*, Works, Bohn ed., iii. 343. Cp. other verdicts cited by Lecky, i. 170.

making the priesthood wholly dependent on the ecclesiastical fees paid at births, marriages, and confessions; and the priests accordingly encouraged early marriages and large families as a matter of course.[1] Further, the introduction of the potato supplied the people with the cheapest and most rapidly multipliable food that can be grown in northern Europe; and the utter lack of industry and of scientific agriculture left them to be attracted by such food to an extent seen in no other European country. Thus population increased at the highest European rate and at the lowest conceivable standard of comfort and culture. Finally, as if these stimuli were not sufficient, there came yet another. As soon as the creation of a small freehold franchise in 1793 made it possible for landowners to drive a trade in votes, they commenced multiplying small holdings, thus encouraging young people to marry at an earlier age than ever. So that the most rapid and fatal increase of population—that occurring between 1793 and the famine, was specially the result of the promotive action of the landlords, who afterwards charged the sin of over-population on the people themselves, as a matter of "race."

In fine, there was such a perfect coherence of evil in the conditions of Irish life for a hundred years that the marvel is, not that the people were backward, but that they yet made the progress they did in the towns. It was said by Sir John Davies of the old system of coyne and livery that it would "ruin hell, if set up in the kingdom of Beelzebub." It might be said of the far more comprehensive machinery of demoralisation under notice that it would ruin heaven, with a population of saints. That any species of civilisation at all survived under such conditions would seem to prove that the "race" was in itself superior and not inferior to others. For, as we have noted, one result of the chronic famine and wretchedness of the eighteenth century was that the Protestant and "non-Celtic" inhabitants were in large part starved out.[2] This turning of Irish misfortune to the visible

[1] This factor in Irish sociology, ignored by most historians, is well set forth by Newenham in his *Statistical and Historical Inquiry into the Progress and Magnitude of the Population of Ireland*, 1805, a work written independently of that of Malthus. See pp. 18-28. Compare the later testimony of the work *Ireland as a Kingdom and a Colony*, by "Brian Borohme," 1843, p. 100.

[2] This fact, which is fully set forth by Mr Lecky (i. 245-248) goes far to countervail the conclusion to which he and others have come, that in half of Ireland the "Saxon and Scotch" elements of race preponderate. As against the chronic influx of English into Ireland, there has to be set the constant efflux, from the "conquest" onwards. The statement of Sir John Davies (*Discovery*, p. 2) that in his day (1612) there were more people of English

disadvantage of England was doubtless one of the considerations that at length caused a slackening of the English effort to make Ireland wretched. The thousands who emigrated from Ireland to the American colonies were found to be ready promoters of the Rebellion there;[1] and the growing signs of revived disaffection in Ireland,[2] especially among the Protestant population, forced the concession of octennial elections in 1768. Even the ruin of the Irish woollen trade had partly injured the trade of England, for the Irish had been driven to smuggling their wool to the Continent, and necessarily took goods in return, ceasing to buy from England to that extent; so that there had been already a lightening of the laws against Irish trade. And when in 1782 the Volunteers were visibly masters of the situation, and the Irish Parliament claimed independence, it obtained with that the withdrawal of all the principal trade restraints. But the general lesson was yet far too imperfectly learned to permit of the improved disposition of England standing the test of the panic after the French Revolution, heightened by that of a French invasion; and when in 1798 the Catholic population sought to secure their liberties as the Protestants had secured theirs, the undying religious enmity soon sufficed to embroil the masses in an abominable struggle, undoing all that had been wrought by rational philosophy towards the ending of intolerance among the more educated. As of old, the Catholics did bloody deeds, and the Protestants did bloodier, the suppression of rebellion being more lawless than rebellion itself. Not from ignorant Catholics and rabid Protestants could the political solution come; neither

than of native race, cannot well be accepted; neither can the similar statement in the Remonstrance against Strafford in 1640. The assertors of these things had no means of accurate knowing; they seem to have counted immigration without deducting remigration; and they seem to have assumed further that all clansmen of the name of Burke must be descended from the Norman De Burghs, and so on. Thus Spenser assumes (*View*, as cited, p. 637) that the MacMahons are all of the Norman family of the Fitz-Ursulas, of whose name MacMahon was the translation. But tribesmen would constantly take the name of their chief without being of his family. On the other hand it is abundantly clear that whatever elements of suceptibility to bad conditions existed in the pre-Norman stocks of the island were at least equally great in the immigrant English stocks, from first to last. Cp. Lecky, i. 400-401.

[1] Cp. Bouverie-Pusey, *Past History of Ireland*, 1894, p. 85.

[2] Mr Bouverie-Pusey (p. 82) has summed-up that four movements begin about 1760: one by the upper-class Protestants, against English oppression; one by the Protestant masses against the classes; one by the upper-class Catholics, for freedom; and one by the Catholic masses for betterment of life.

could the form of a Union, carried out by men without the spirit of union on either side, produce the unifying results that its promoters had promised. Another generation had to pass before the fear of fresh revolt could wring from the English ruling class the concession of Catholic Emancipation; and the lapse of a whole century was to leave Ireland still wretched, still disaffected, still misgoverned, still backward in civilisation.

In our own century, however, the essentials of the Irish problem have gradually forced themselves so far on the conscience and intelligence of the British public that the friends of democracy may at last take hope to see the way opened for a real rectification. The disappointment of hopes too lightly formed becomes at length a force of enlightenment. Those who had counted on curing the Irish trouble by Catholic Emancipation had to learn that there existed conditions of economic evil as well as of moral. New distress bred new disorder, always met by the old remedy of the bludgeon; till we sicken of the endless story of Coercion Acts. At length there fell the overwhelming blow of the potato famine, a deadly demonstration that with religious freedom a miseducated and misdeveloped people could still live on the verge of an abyss, and could be well-nigh engulfed therein. After the very stress of famine had seemingly relieved the remaining population, there came a further disillusioning. The new sedition of Fenianism arose to show well-intentioned Englishmen that the mere leaving of things alone could not cancel the heritage of injustice left in Ireland by their fathers.

"An appalling famine, followed by an unexampled and continuous emigration, had, by thinning the labour market, alleviated that extreme indigence which, by making the people desperate, might embitter them, we thought, even against a mild and just Government. Ireland was now not only well governed, but prosperous and improving. Surely the troubles of the British nation about Ireland were now at an end."[1]

But all of a sudden came the explosion of Fenianism, "unlooked for and unintelligible," startling the people of England into panic. "That disaffection which they flattered themselves had been cured, suddenly grows more intense, more violent, more unscrupulous, and more universal than ever." The prompt concessions of Mr Gladstone's Government, the Disestablishment of the Irish Church and the partial improvement of the land laws, did but serve to make further concessions inevitable. The case

[1] J. S. Mill, *England and Ireland*, p. 5.

had been only superficially diagnosed. As Mill said: "The difficulty of governing Ireland lies entirely in our own minds; it is an incapability of understanding."[1] And yet there had latterly been an effort to understand, as Mill avowed.

"If there is anything sadder than the calamity itself, it is the unmistakeable sincerity and good faith with which numbers of Englishmen confess themselves incapable of comprehending it. They know not that the disaffection which neither has nor needs any other motive than aversion to her rulers, is the climax to a long growth of disaffection arising from causes that might have been removed. What seems to them the causelessness of the Irish repugnance to our rule, is the proof that they have almost let pass the last opportunity they are ever likely to have of setting it right. They have allowed what once was indignation against particular wrongs, to harden into a passionate determination to be no longer ruled by those to whom they ascribe all their evils."[2]

This was and is substantially true; and the present Irish problem may be definitively stated under two aspects. There is first of all the clear need for certain great political innovations in Ireland, to the end of rectifying evils of old standing; and there is further the no less clear necessity that the Irish people be now left to work out the solution for themselves, since the English governing class has not only failed utterly to achieve it in the past but is unable, in virtue of its own relation to social problems, to catch up with the developments of the Irish situation as they arise. For the economic situation changes from time to time, with the changes which go on so rapidly in the economic adjustments of the modern world; and a new Land Bill has hardly had time to be tried before it needs to be supplemented. It is not difficult, in view of past and recent history, to constate the main elements in the constructive problem; and they may be thus summarised.

1. Ireland is still in very large measure a pastoral country, the climate being less advantageous for the growth of cereals than those of the countries which chiefly produce these for the world's markets. But,

2. As of old, Ireland needs agriculture and industry to broaden the bases of her civilisation; and in order to develop these there must (*a*) be withdrawn the hindrance of perpetual friction between the idle rent-drawing class and the cultivators, and there must (*b*) be supplied some encouragements to industrial production.

3. The landlord system still remains economically irrational

[1] *England and Ireland*, p. 41. [2] *Id.*, p. 6.

and morally outrageous; and the country cannot conceivably prosper while it subsists. Irish agriculture needs the application of a great deal of capital to bring it abreast of that of other countries, which had gone on developing while everything Irish was kept in forced stagnation. A high authority has calculated that to put Irish soil, area for area, on an equality with that of other countries, there was needed, a generation ago, the enormous outlay of £320,000,000.[1] The third part of that sum will never be applied in a sufficiently short period under the present system. There is needed a new arrangement, under which labour shall be applied zealously and abundantly, and capital on the strength of the labour.

4. The country further needs the industrial development which it was wilfully prevented from making at the beginning of last century. Englishmen, among other vain judgments on the Irish question, sometimes set down to "Celtic indolence" that lack of manufactures which their own ancestors strove to bring about. The simple facts that English capitalism had so completely got the start, in the matter of the woollen manufacture for instance, and that Irish shipping had been so utterly destroyed by the Navigation Acts while that of England was multiplying, would alone constitute a tremendous hindrance to fresh Irish development, even if Ireland stood nearly equal with England in the matter of coal supply, which unhappily she does not. The denudation of her coal measures in the geologic past was another of her predestinate misfortunes; and to enable her to live industrially alongside of English competition there will be needed either the employment of a new fuel, or another motive power than steam, or a stimulation of trade by which she can profitably import fuel.

5. One of the most obvious natural advantages of Ireland, in modern times, is her situation as between England and the United States. Had this advantage been permitted development, there would have existed ere this an extensive trade and passenger service between the States and the Irish Atlantic coast; but to develop it now there would be needed special outlay, English capitalistic competition being able to crush or check any private enterprise of the kind.

6. Unless the habit of rapid family multiplication be checked,[2]

[1] Lavergne, *Economie rurale de l'Angleterre*, etc., édit. 1882, p. 370.

[2] Mr Bonar has pointed (*Malthus and his Work*, p. 205) to the fact that "even in 1875 the Registrar-General's Report showed that there were then fewer marriages in Ireland than in England, in proportion to population, *and*

the Irish peasantry must needs remain poor under any system. Perpetual forced emigration and perpetual decline of population mean perpetual failure to solve the problem of good government and right living. But there is little prospect of the Irish people learning the lesson of family prudence while the priesthood retains its present social philosophy and its present influence; and this it will certainly do while Ireland remains subject to English coercion. Even the later schemes of tenant-purchase offer no prospect of such a bestowal of land on the people as might modify their habits in the direction of those of the peasantry of France.

This, in short, is the formula of the case under every aspect: there will be no solution under English rule. The English people have not spare power of attention enough to master the changing Irish problem; and the English upper classes will always resist measures which point to the transformation of that social order under which they hold their wealth and status. The Conservative course is to go on offering a few palliatives in alternation with measures of coercion, letting the productive power of the country steadily dwindle. It is a noteworthy fact that the only two periods in modern Irish history when Irish industry and wealth went forward were (1) that after the Restoration, before the worst of the trade laws, when new capital and new blood developed the natural resources and trade of the land, and (2) that of the independent Parliament of the end of last century, when Irish agriculture and trade were artificially promoted, as was absolutely necessary after a century of artificial depression. That Parliament by its bounties on the exports of grain instantly created employment for idle capital and labour in all directions,

that they came later." He also points to the 1882 report, pp. 18, 19. The same statement holds good for more recent years, there being in 1890, for instance, only 20,990 marriages in a population of 4,681,173, while in England in 1891 there were 226,025 marriages in a population of 29,081,147. With a little over six times the Irish population, England had nearly eleven times the number of marriages. But this disparity is clearly to be explained by the *emigration* of so many young Irish people to the United States, to Scotland, to England and the colonies, where the people of Irish descent multiply, while the population of Ireland has steadily decreased since the potato famine, till it is now little more than that of Scotland. Between 1853 and 1891 there emigrated to the States alone 2,395,283 Irish, as against 2,107,324 English. This degree of relief cannot go on forever; and in any case, though the Irish decrease represents to a certain extent a raised standard of comfort in the remaining population, it also represents the perpetual pressure of poverty, and an absolute decline in the wealth-production of the country.

and employment of a kind which tended directly to raise the people. In comparison with this service to civilisation, the financial vices of its membership are really of small account, especially when we remember that the Castle administration had been one long process of shameless jobbery, the poor Irish revenues being charged not only with a multitude of sinecures but with endless pensions to men who had served not the Irish but the English Government. If even a corrupt Home Rule Parliament, giving but an imperfect representation of the mass of the people, could thus effectively aid them, in comparison with the worse than impotence of the rule of the English Ministry, there is at least a preliminary presumption in favour of a resumption of the method. Mr Lecky, after showing consciously and unconsciously that every form of sedition and discontent in previous centuries was a natural and substantially justified protest against bad government, breaks out, in his capacity of contemporary partisan, into hoarse vituperation against the agitators of to-day as a new and inexcusable species of malcontents. It is, he declares,[1]

"grotesquely absurd to suppose that the merits or demerits, the failure or success of the old Irish Parliament, has any real bearing on modern schemes for reconstructing the government of Ireland on a revolutionary and Jacobin basis ; entrusting the protection of property and the maintenance of law to some democratic assembly consisting mainly of Fenians and Land Leaguers, of paid agitators and of penniless adventurers."

The tone here tells its own tale of passion and unreason, with which it is useless to argue. The logical implication of the passage is that the Irish people, when given a hold on their own land, will deliberately elect a legislative body of quite lawless and untrustworthy representatives, penniless or pennied, for the sheer love of ructions. When elderly gentlemen talk in this apoplectic way about "democratic assemblies" in England, their antecedents do not secure for them more than the tolerance of compassion ; and even Mr Lecky's historical services cannot win him a respectful hearing when he thus passes from history to vaticination. As has been said above,[2] he is in a fair way to be driven by partisan bias, after all his rationalism concerning race, to the good old creed that race qualities are the source of all Irish evil. We have seen more than enough in the foregoing

[1] *History of Ireland in the 18th Century*, ii. 501.
[2] *Preamble*.

survey to deliver us, if we be capable of scientific thought, from the worship of that idol of the tribe. If the average of Irishmen were at any period in any way behind the average of their neighbours, we can see that it was their conditions that had made them so. If they were or are more superstitious, it is because they had been longer kept ignorant. If in last century their educated class was corrupt and unstable and riotous, and their lower class alternately abject and brutal, it is because the perpetual uncertainty of life and government, the denial of all the natural opportunities of self-development, and the imposition of every possible demoralising bond and demoralising bribe, had unhinged all moral conditions; because the strongest types had been driven forth; and because under English rule duplicity and servility were means to fortune. If in a later age the mass of the peasantry were indolent or even untruthful, it was because the systematic filching away of the fruits of their best labour by the idle landowner had made industry seem the vanity of vanities, and because there was no social and intellectual atmosphere in which the virtue of veracity could grow.[1] If Irishmen are still in the mass somewhat more excitable than Englishmen in the mass, it is because their country has never during three hundred years passed two generations without either civil strife or murderous famine, shaking the nerves and wringing the hearts of the mothers and fathers, and stamping the heritage on their children, whose very cradles were rocked to sobs and dirges.[2] Never within historic times has a generation of Irish been free to grow up prosperously and placidly, and to transmit stability of habit to the next.

But wherever Irish people in any number, of whatever presumed descent or ethnic affinity, have been free to profit by their industry, they have proved themselves in mass as industrious as the best; and wherever they have had free access to culture, unchecked either by Catholic priest or Protestant pastor

[1] It should be noted, in this connection, that Tourguénief has deliberately pronounced the peasantry of Russia to be habitually untruthful; and that Mill no less deliberately passed the same judgment on the English working-class. It would be worth while, instead of vending afresh the old fatuities about race qualities, to make a close comparison as between the upper and lower classes of all countries, and to seek for the causal factors.

[2] I leave this proposition standing, in the knowledge that it will be disputed by the school of Weismann. The record that in times of revolution in Paris the number of premature births and of neurotic cases has always been found to increase, must be held to outweigh thus far a doctrine mainly founded on the observation of the heredities of butterflies and rabbits.

and master, they have shown themselves at least as quick of intellect and as sound of judgment as the average of civilised mankind. Between Protestant and Catholic fanaticism, they are still relatively under-educated; and even as regards their own history, on which they are supposed to brood unprofitably, they are still in the main unstudious. Not a generation ago, one of their best historians wrote:—

"In every system of national education on the Continent the history of their native country is considered a necessary subject of instruction for the young. . . . The case is otherwise in Ireland. The young of this country are left in absolute ignorance of the history of their forefathers. There do not even exist books suitable for instruction in this department. The indifference of the middle classes upon this subject is so great, that no author with a reasonable prospect of success attempts to publish an Irish history. Two reasons are alleged for this anomaly. We are told that a knowledge of Irish history is *dangerous;* and further that the history itself is *useless and uninteresting*."[1]

This was said after there had been plenty of the signs and fruits of national renascence. If it needed a generation of Home Rule agitation to create a more intellectual frame of mind, that agitation will have been only the more wholesome. But the fact thus set forth might alone serve to show that the Irish demand is not a product of sentimentalism and of the outcry of "paid agitators," but an outcome of the constant and grinding pressure of a vital practical need. The people demand Home Rule because they feel their affairs will never go well without it; and we have lately seen a Unionist Government forced rather to offend its landowning adherents than the tenantry of Ulster, who stand for land reform as emphatically as those of the rest of Ireland. Said a Unionist observer in Ulster ten years ago:

"*If the sectarian element were eliminated*, there would scarcely be less discontent in the North than in the other portions of Ireland. The land question is just as pressing here as it is elsewhere; and there is not very much to choose between the city of Donegal and the city of Cork."[2]

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[1] Richey, *Lectures on the History of Ireland*, 1869, p. 1. It was doubtless because of the conviction here expressed that these *Lectures*, and the posthumous *Short History of Ireland* in which they are re-embodied, were printed in such small number that both are now long out of print, and procurable second-hand only at exorbitant prices—a most unfortunate thing for the Irish cause.

[2] *Notes on Ireland*, by J. B. Greene, 1886, p. 54.

And the same onlooker has preserved the remark of an Orangeman "*that he was ready to walk as many miles in a day as any man to shoot a Papist, but all the same he wanted his land cheap.*"[1] The "cheap" does not suggest the strongest of moral positions, but it points to the root of the matter. At the same time, the rest of the utterance, so characteristic, so edifying, points to the great drawback of the Irish cause. To-day as of old, religion is the great sunderer, the great poisoner of hearts and thwarter of hopes. The Protestant clergy of Ulster are free to take credit to themselves for having cherished and fostered the worst growth of religious malignity that can now be seen in all Christendom; for having kept alive a brutalising hatred between two sections of the Irish people, and for having produced one of the most odious types of citizen in the three kingdoms. The spectacle presented to-day by Christian Belfast, where Protestants and Catholics live in separate streets, and where one of either sect venturing to try to live among the other is promptly "fired out," supplies a precious testimony to the civilising virtue of Christianity. It will certainly not be easy for reason and science to countervail all that.

But if the opponents of Irish Home Rule hope, as so many unworthily do, in virtue of this element of sheer evil, to thwart for ever the demand of the majority; or if they hope, as others more worthily do, that some compromise in the matter of the land laws will secure the same end, they have probably miscalculated, for the following reasons.

Firstly, even peasant proprietorship is now a belated solution of the Irish agrarian problem: the scientific solution must go further; and the English ruling class are still far in the rear of even the solution of peasant proprietorship. Only an Irish Parliament can be looked-to to come abreast of the case.

Secondly, prolonged religious strife tends ultimately, in despite of all priesthoods, to generate a recoil from zealotry and to discredit the theme. It did so in France, in respect of the Wars of the League; it did so in Germany in respect of the Thirty Years War; it did so in England in respect of the Civil War. The same tendency holds good of non-military antagonism. Orangeism, then, cannot forever sunder the Irish population.

Thirdly, all clear-headed Englishmen must ere long have begun to see that the priest-rule which they apprehend as dangerous to a self-governed Ireland can only be averted by the very operation of self-government — that so long as Irishmen are collectively

[1] *Notes on Ireland*, p. 55.

pitted against English rule they will in the main be at one with their priesthood, and that their way to undermine priestly power is just to leave the people to their own natural divisions of interest and character.

Fourthly, it is becoming clear even to English and Irish capitalists, as it has long been clear to American, that there is no chance of fruitful application of capital to Irish concerns under the present system of false-union, which keeps up chronic uncertainty and diffidence. Under a Home Rule Parliament, plenty of Irish-American capital, to name no other, would be ready to flow into Ireland, for the development of her resources and her advantages, to the gain of the English as well as her own people.

Against these considerations, prejudice and hallucination can hardly hold out forever. All reasonable hopes are on the side of the new plan as against the old, under which Irish life has for ages been a mere history of failure and downfall. And what Mill said a generation ago may now be said with a more obvious truth and a firmer confidence:

"*Rebellions are never really unconquerable until they have become rebellions for an idea.* Revolt against practical ill-usage may be quelled by concessions; but wait till all practical grievances have merged in the demand for independence, and there is no knowing that any concession, short of independence, will appease the quarrel."[1]

With no less truth we may say again, with the same humane and sagacious politician:

"Let our statesmen be assured that now, when the long-deferred day of Fenianism has come, nothing which is not accepted by the Irish tenantry as a permanent solution of the land difficulty will prevent Fenianism, *or something equivalent to it*, from being the standing torment of the English Government and people. If without removing this difficulty we attempt to hold Ireland by force, it will be at the expense of all the character we possess as lovers and maintainers of free government, or respecters of any rights except our own; it will most dangerously aggravate all our chances of misunderstandings with any of the great powers of the world, culminating in war; we shall be in a state of open revolt against the universal conscience of Europe and Christendom, and more and more against our own."[2]

It only remains to consider at a little further length the last of these propositions.

[1] *England and Ireland*, p. 7. [2] *Id.*, p. 44.

§ 3. *The Verdict of Europe.*

While the English view of the Irish problem was obscured as we have seen, generation after generation, by the fumes of one English passion after another—now commercial greed, now religious hate; now selfish enmity, now rancorous fear—foreign onlookers, whether or not they hated England, could easily see the case for what it was, absolutely about the worst, and relatively the very worst spectacle of misgovernment in Europe. Nothing could avail more surely to undo the prestige of England, as the land of free institutions, than the picture of their perversion to the constant oppression of Ireland. Foreign critics took it as giving the force of an axiom to the loose generalisation of Montesquieu's school, that the dependencies of free States are always worse governed than those of autocracies. And the few Englishmen who could rise above the vulgar self-satisfaction of their fellows, realising this, vainly sought long ago to open their fellows' eyes. "There is not," said Earl Grey in the House of Lords fifty years ago,[1] "there is not a foreigner, no matter whence he comes, be it from France, Russia, Germany, or America,—there is no native of any foreign country, different as their forms of government may be, who visits Ireland, and who on his return does not congratulate himself that he sees nothing comparable with the condition of that country at home."

That testimony holds perfectly good to-day. If the people of England, or a majority of them, fail to realise the part their ancestors and themselves have played towards Ireland, the peoples of Europe realise it very fully. When Mr Gladstone said that the voice of civilised Europe declared for Home Rule, even his own party hardly realised the force of the phrase. It passed for a rhetorical generalisation, resting on the hearsay of newspaper correspondents and the civilities of travellers. But it can be justified by a long series of grave and well-studied treatises, representing all shades of European opinion.

In the middle fifty years of this century no French name stood higher in English opinion than that of de Tocqueville,[2] the author of *Democracy in America*. It stood for a sagacious blend of Liberalism and Conservatism, for cool judgment, for thoughtful

[1] Speech of 23rd March, 1846, cited by Mr Fox, *Key to the Irish Question*, p. 322.

[2] Still cited by Mr A. V. Dicey as a "profound observer" (*A Leap in the Dark*, 1893, p. 112).

scrutiny, for honourable action. And it was the friend and comrade of de Tocqueville, Gustave de Beaumont, his companion and colleague in the United States, whither they went to report officially on the penitentiary system there in force,—it was de Beaumont who, fifty-seven years ago, drew up one of the solidest works theretofore written on the Irish problem, a work in which the English mismanagement of that problem is dispassionately and unanswerably set forth. That work represented the opinion of de Tocqueville's school in Europe. But at the same period an onlooker from another nation, of another school of thought, the Conservative Prussian von Raumer, came substantially to Beaumont's conclusions. De Beaumont criticised von Raumer's doctrine as revolutionary; but the two writers, as Mill later noted, offered practically the same prescription. He might have added that M. de Sismondi, a Liberal French economist of another school than his own, put the prescription still more emphatically. And while French Liberalism and Prussian Toryism were thus practically at one, French Catholicism chimed in. The more liberal side of that Catholicism was well represented by the Comte de Montalembert, the friend of Lacordaire; and the Comte de Montalembert, after actually seeing O'Connell at work in Ireland in his youth, could in his old age write of Lacordaire as "this liberal who has been among us the descendant and the continuator of Saint Dominic, of Bossuet, and *of O'Connell*."[1] I do not say that this estimate is a wise or judicial one, but it shows how the school of Lacordaire and Montalembert felt. Later, we have from Father Adolphe Perraud[2] two large volumes of *Études sur l'Irlande Contemporaine* (1862), a work published with a preface by the then Bishop of Orléans, and appealing to the orthodox Catholicism of France. Here we have a really industrious research, drawing on English official documents and all manner of English and Irish testimonies. The book is of course zealously Catholic, but it does not rely on mere clerical allocution to carry its point. On the contrary, it supplies to all classes of French readers an amount of exact insight into modern English discussion over and mismanagement of Ireland that they could have obtained in no other way. Such a book, following on de Beaumont's, must have convinced nine out of every ten Frenchmen who read it, be they Catholic or freethinking, that whatever may have been the truth as to Irish grievances in previous centuries, in this century they were the result of English

[1] *Un Moine au XIX^e Siècle*, éd. 1881, p. 3.

[2] Afterwards Bishop of Autun, and member of the Académie Française (1882).

tyranny, English selfishness, and English unintelligence. Montalembert might seem to many an extravagant zealot, but Father Perraud could not be so set aside; and he had de Beaumont's treatise behind him. Nor did he lack other French corroboration. Besides the documented treatises of de Beaumont and himself there had appeared a series of works on Ireland by French observers, such as the *Lettres sur l'Irlande* of M. Duvergier de Hauranne, and *L'Irlande*, by MM. Chavanne de la Girandière and Huillard-Bréholles, all bringing home to the intelligence of Europe the immense failure and wrong of English rule in Ireland. After the work of Monseigneur Perraud there appeared, in 1863, the revised and extended edition of that of de Beaumont, with a new *Notice sur l'état présent de l'Irlande*, still summing up against England, though without a scintilla of anti-English prejudice.

And still the play of criticism goes on. The Irish problem, alas! has survived the efforts of the English Liberalism of the last generation to solve it—efforts partly stimulated by foreign criticism, but never rising to the task in the fashion of the foreign reformers whose work had been held up to them as an example. Von Raumer, the Prussian Conservative, insisted that the woes of Ireland could never be cured save by turning the tenants into peasant proprietors. That was in effect what had been accomplished in Prussia in the previous generation by the measures of von Stein and Hardenberg—or, as von Raumer always puts it, of the King, Frederick William III. Here is his whole prescription:—

1. Provision for the schools and churches of the Protestants and Catholics equally, out of existing church property or new endowments.

2. Abolition of tithes.

3. Poor laws (though opposed by O'Connell), but free of the blemishes of the English.

4. Special taxation of absentees by poor-rates.

5. "The complete abolition of the system of tenants at will, and the conversion of all these tenants at will into proprietors."

"On reading this," says von Raumer, "the Tories will throw my book into the fire; and even the Whigs will be mute with astonishment. The whole battery, of 'pillage,' 'jacobinism,' 'dissolution of civil society,' is discharged at me. . . . Even the Radicals ask, with astonishment, how I would work this miracle. There is a 'Sibylline' book, a patent and yet hidden mystery, how this is to be effected; and there is a magician who has

accomplished it—the Prussian municipal law, and King Frederick William III. of Prussia."[1]

De Beaumont, while pronouncing von Raumer's proposal—apparently under a misconception of von Raumer's meaning—"purely revolutionary, proper to engender the most dangerous covetings and the most fatal passions,"[2] was equally emphatic for peasant proprietorship, and for radical reform. Specifying first the desirable remedies of new industry, emigration, and poor relief, he prescribed the "abolition of the civil, political and religious privileges of the aristocracy," to be accomplished in abolishing the feudal system of tenures in Ireland (1) by way of prohibiting sub-tenancies and (2) by abolishing the right of primogeniture; and further (3) the disestablishment of the State Church, and (4) the payment of stipends to the Catholic clergy.

The second and third of von Raumer's proposals were realised in that generation; but it was thirty years before the third of de Beaumont's was given effect to, and some years more before even a beginning was made in the direction of von Raumer's fifth; while his first, which concurs with de Beaumont's last, is still not even within sight of being adopted. And meantime the problem itself has developed. Had a system of peasant proprietary been established by the middle of the century, it would undoubtedly have worked great things for Ireland. Had it been established simultaneously with the reforms in Prussia, it might even have limited in some measure the fatality of the famine of 1848, for it would probably have had a restraining effect on population, or at least upon sub-division of holdings. Had it been established before 1860, it would have prevented the Fenian movement; and it would have fitted the peasantry to meet the bad years after 1870 much better than did Mr Gladstone's Act of that year. But with no further land reforms than the Land Acts of 1870 and 1880, the merely modified situation of the Irish peasantry left them unable to meet another series of bad seasons, and the old story of evictions and emigration is told afresh year by year. Thus it comes about that the English Government figures to the eyes of Europe very much as of old, the record of evictions and of emigration being for foreigners the most easily noted phase of the history of things Irish. The attempts of the Liberal party to undo the wrongs of the past seem trivial beside the amount of misery that

[1] *England in* 1835, Eng. tr., iii. 198.

[2] *L'Irlande, sociale politique et réligieuse*, 7e edit., I. lxxxiii.

subsists; and the foreigner shrugs his shoulders as of old over English misgovernment. This is the effect conveyed even by the careful work of M. Fournier, Professor in the Faculty of Law at Grenoble, who was sent to Ireland in 1880-81 by the French Ministry of Public Instruction, on the proposal of the Paris Faculty of Law, to report on the agrarian question. It may be said of the work of M. Fournier that while he has done the historical and technical part of his work with much industry and substantial success, he has failed to realise that the Irish agrarian problem is a changing one, and has consequently erred in attributing all the existing trouble directly to the wrong-doing of past time. It is quite true that but for that wrong-doing the Irish people would be much more able to meet new difficulties: but M. Fournier does not seem to recognise that new difficulties develop, setting all down to the legacy of the ages.

"Parliament has bettered the situation of the rural classes," he writes; "it was out of its power to clear away the prejudices, the rancours, the hatreds which the past has bequeathed to the present, and which, exploited by agitators, magnified by the popular imagination, will retard for yet a long time the re-establishment of public peace in Ireland. The legislator may well seek to organise for the future a more equitable rule: there is no magic ring by which he can make *tabula rasa* of the past. History does not recommence: we may truly say with the Roman juriconsults that no written law can efface things done: *Facti causae infectae nulla constitutione fieri possunt.*"[1]

Here, doubtless, there is a touch of national prejudice; for on such a view all history, French no less than English, would be but a record of inherited curses. That is not the final lesson to be learned. But it is important to realise how, the old misdeeds of England being thus represented as the actual causes of all present troubles, and the misdeeds themselves being freshly set forth with abundant learning, European public opinion regards the refusal of the English majority to let the Irish people grapple with their own problem. It is not too much to say that the retention of our grip over Ireland, with its eternal sequence of penury and hate, causes every display of English sympathy for oppressed aliens to figure in European eyes as a grotesque hypocrisy. When English meetings protest against the mishandling of Armenians by Turks, French and Germans ask whether the difference between direct massacre and the chronic "sentence of death" by eviction in Ireland justifies the English

[1] *La Question Agraire en Irlande*, 1882, *préface*.

attitude of disinterested philanthropy. They will not stop to ask whether the sympathisers with the Armenians do not also sympathise with homeless Irish; though indeed if they did they would find leading Unionists taking up the cause of the Armenians. It suffices that it is "England" that employs the crowbar brigade in Catholic Ireland and denounces the rule of the Turk over Eastern Christians.

On the question of the Irish demand for autonomy, finally, we have the work of M. Francis de Pressensé,—the son of the well-known French Protestant scholar, a trained diplomatist with an English experience, editor of one of the weightiest Parisian journals—declaring decisively for Home Rule.

"This book," he says of his treatise, "is an essay in political history. I have sought in the past the causes of the apparently irremediable division which arms against each other the two parts of the British empire. *I undertook this study with a prejudice favourable to the English supremacy and an unfavourable prepossession towards Irish autonomy: I conclude it, fully possessed by the principle of limited independence or of 'Home Rule,' as it has been defined by Mr Gladstone and accepted by Mr Parnell.*"[1]

It may be answered that there is an old tendency in France to take the Irish side; indeed M. de Pressensé admits as much, but it is without weakening his case:

"Ireland is tied to us by bonds of race, by common memories, by shared sympathies. And I may avow without circumlocution that I have been glad to establish the accordance of the result of impartial research with the instinct of French hearts. This book has been conceived and written in an entirely historic spirit. None the less I trust that it may present, in a fashion not too unworthy of the cause, the just claims of Ireland. The whole past of that country, especially since the iniquitous suppression of its independence, seems to me to testify in its favour. There are, if I do not deceive myself, reasons for believing that this great suit, already gained before the tribunal of history, is on the eve of being gained also before the tribunal of British democracy."

Nor is this tone special to France. The Prussian von Raumer, a specialist in history, who prescribed peasant proprietary for Ireland sixty years ago, and who had a distinct touch of Prussian ill-will to France, exhibited no Teutonic disesteem for the Irish people. His verdict was that

[1] *L'Irlande et l'Angleterre depuis l'acte d'union jusqu'à nos jours*, 1889, *préface*.

"Ireland is the most deplorable instance in modern history that a great and noble people may for centuries together be involved in the same injustice and infatuation, and all the highly-praised forms of the constitution be after paralysed by the forces of passion and prejudice. Kings, lords, and commons have alternately and simultaneously wronged Ireland; how should humanity, mildness, and obedience to the laws proceed from such education? What all the forms of the constitution denied, what even now the boldest minds in England conceive to be impossible, our kings have accomplished, for schools, churches, cities, towns, peasants, landed property, trade, tolls, military institutions, &c., and laid the basis of a freedom of which Ireland, if no quicker progress is made, will be destitute for centuries to come."[1]

"*There is no essential difference between the English and Irish in regard to their intellectual qualities;* and the defects which appear occasionally will be most easily remedied, and even wholly removed, by employment, education, mutual influence, and equal treatment."[2]

And one of the best of recent histories of Ireland, that by Dr Hassencamp, head master of the royal gymnasium of Ostrowo, gives another weighty German summing up against England's treatment of Ireland. It is after pronouncing in favour of the Union that, noting the breach of faith which followed it, in the withholding of Catholic emancipation, the historian writes:—

"Thus England at that period played the part of the legendary Roman king, who at first refused to purchase the sacred books for a small price, but who was afterwards compelled to offer a much higher sum for only a portion of them. In like manner England might in the year 1800 have procured peace and tranquillity for Ireland by the comparatively inconsiderable concession of Catholic emancipation; but the favourable opportunity was allowed to pass away; and now all concessions and all offers appear to be insufficient to purchase that priceless blessing."[3]

This may be taken as the prevailing attitude of continental opinion at any time for sixty years back.

As for opinion in America, despite the frequent outcrop in the States of a spirit of native dislike to the immigrant Irish, who unhappily but naturally figure pretty largely in the corrupt politics of their new environment,—or perhaps just because of resentment of this complication of American problems—there is an overwhelming agreement as to the perversity of the refusal of Home

[1] *England in* 1835, as cited, iii. 201.

[2] *England in* 1841, by the same. Eng. tr., i. 182.

[3] *The History of Ireland from the Reformation to the Union*, by Dr R. Hassencamp. Eng. tr., 1888, *end*.

Rule by the English majority. The only serious American objection to Home Rule, I believe, is that of my esteemed friend Mr Moncure Conway, who, seeing how the element of State rights in the American constitution was so long the support of slavery, and was finally the source of the Civil War—a fact too little appreciated by writers on the constitution, here and in the States—insists on the dangers that might arise under a similar constitution for Ireland. The infamous negro-lynchings in the Southern States in our own day Mr Conway traces to the same cause, the judicial authority of the Central Executive being powerless against the hatreds of race. But that is, I think, not at bottom an argument against Home Rule, but simply a consideration proving the need for care in forming the British Federal Constitution of the future. It would be a simple matter to make provision for the prompt repression by the Central executive of all transgressions on the part of the people of any component section of a federal State against any of the others; indeed such a State as ours would not be at all likely to leave that matter so ill arranged as it is in the constitution of the Republic.

In any case, a question about form of constitution is one thing and a question about the success or failure of a paramount State in governing a dependency is another; and in this respect there is only one voice throughout the non-English world as to the Anglo-Irish relation. Indeed it must needs be so. It must be obvious to any Englishmen capable of intelligently putting to himself the question, that if Ireland had attained her present state under the auspices of any other nation, the voice of England would unanimously declare that nation unfit to exercise its power. When misery and revolt are reported in Christian populations under the rule of the Turk, the average Englishman never dreams of suggesting mere perversity among the revolters: he at once ascribes the trouble to the misgovernment of the Porte. And if any other territory of northern Europe were seen to be capable of successful tillage, but forever a prey to destitution, he would take for granted not the incapacity of the inhabitants but some insanity in the laws with which they were always at strife. What the Englishman would thus do in any case similar to that of Ireland, foreigners do in the Irish case. Educated men in Europe are not to be persuaded that an intelligent people living on a fruitful soil remains in desperate poverty and burning disaffection age after age by reason purely of its own perversity. They are not be talked by unreasoning British Protestants into the belief that mere "Catholicism" is the cause of the misery of the

Irish peasantry, when Catholicism goes with fair comfort in France and Germany. They say with absolute confidence that the Irish results are results of misrule. They point to the vast change made in the condition of the peasantry of France, once so wretched, now on the whole so progressive, by the French Revolution. They point to the no less notable change made in the life of the peasantry of Prussia by land legislation at the beginning of the century—a change which went for much in enabling Prussia in a few years to rise from political ruin to energetic success. They say that Irish peasants are amenable to change of conditions like any other, and that the Englishman who denies it is a sample of the perversity which he imputes.

If argument and pressure of opinion throughout the civilised world could carry the point, Ireland would have had autonomy long ere this. Unfortunately, as Unionist comments on foreign opinion show, the majority of Englishmen pay too little heed to such opinion to be soon led by it to any course save one of mere defiance. There is, however, a consideration which may appeal to them in the matter, and that is, that should England ever be really embroiled in a war through some such complication as those which so rapidly accumulated on our hands a little while ago, the element of Irish hostility to England throughout the English-speaking world might be a very serious matter. When President Cleveland received thousands of telegrams congratulating him on his unhappy outbreak of bluster in the Venezuela dispute, we could be sure that most of them would come from American Irishmen. To Englishmen of the militarist school, who form the bulk of the Unionist party, and who confessedly cannot feel safe unless their navy be twice as strong as any two (or is it now three?) others, it can hardly be a comfortable reflection that their policy thus multiplies an eager enmity to them in one of the largest populations of the civilised world.

And it is not merely in foreign States that this enmity subsists. There is a chronic talk of Imperial Federation—a Federation between the mother country (a group of provinces *not* federated) and the colonies. But the colonies contain hundreds of thousands of Irishmen; and who shall say how many of them have been made determined haters of England by their experience of her rule? Why should *they* consent to federate with the so-called mother country, the unseemly group in which *their* mother land is chained to the wheels of the others, and insolently denied the right which the colonies are encouraged to claim? We have seen that the Irish immigrant element in the North American

colonies counted for much in their revolt against England. Who shall say that the larger and perhaps more embittered Irish element in the Australasian colonies, already greater by far than were the North American at the date of their independence, may not in our own time work the utter alienation of these? Surely the English majority would do well to make the Irish race a friend before it grows too dangerous an enemy. There is a possible Nemesis growing out of all the generations of Irish misery, out of the evictions, out of the over-population, out of the endless emigration. The Irish race, the breed with Irish memories, multiplies; and the so-called Anglo-Saxon race, outside of England, nay, even in England, is becoming more and more a race with Irish names, looking askance on the English race though speaking the English tongue. "Ten years ago," said an English politician twenty-eight years ago,

"Ten years ago the third and fourth cities of the world, New York and Philadelphia, were as English as our London; the one is Irish now, the other all but German. Not that the Quaker city will remain Teutonic; the Germans too are going out upon the land; the Irish alone pour in unceasingly. All great American towns will soon be Celtic, while the country continues English; a fierce and easily-roused people will throng the cities, while the law-abiding Saxons who till the land will cease to rule it. Our relations with America are of small moment by the side of the one great question, Who are the Americans to be?"[1]

These are the words of a Home Ruler, albeit one with anti-Celtic notions. But it was a Unionist, it was Mr Bright, who in his pre-Unionist days said this:—

"In America you have another Ireland, an Ireland which does not fear the government in Ireland, an Ireland full of passion with regard to what they believe to be the sufferings of the country they have left. . . . If the government of England and the government of the United Kingdom, as it is called, had been a government of statesmen, does any man in the world believe they would have allowed things to come to such a pass as this? . . . See what a position we are in. The whole civilised world points to our condition. The newspapers of France, of Germany, and even of Italy, and the newspapers of the United States . . . do not now write about Poland, or Hungary, or Venice, but they write about Ireland. . . . And if it were not a delicate subject to treat upon, which I now think it better to avoid, it would be easy to show how greatly we have lost in national power and moral influence

[1] Sir Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain*, 4th ed., p. 11.

with other nations, and especially with regard to our fears of defence. . . . If it were not for the moral sense of the people of the United States, and the good faith and honour of their government, there is no doubt but the great trouble—far greater than any we have yet seen—would have arisen on the Canadian frontier between the Irishmen in the United States and the subjects of the British Crown in Canada."[1]

To such testimonies as these, many Englishmen, themselves foolhardy to the point of bluster, return the answer that it is only the ignorant and noisy part of the Irish-American population that causes the American feeling to seem so largely anti-British. The charge of wrongdoing against themselves they meet by charging rowdyism and folly on the Irish-American population in the mass. Such charges dispose of themselves, on the old principle that he who indicts a whole nation does but indict himself. The Irish have their full share of blatancy, as have the Germans, the French, the English, and every other people in the world. But it is only the most blatant of Englishmen who can suppose that in the exiled Irish world there are not multitudes of men who judge the weaknesses of their fellows as sharply as do English anti-democrats the weaknesses of theirs, and who yet bear an enduring ill-will to England. "I have met," wrote an honest though effusive Irish observer during the Fenian period,

"I have met in many parts of the Union grave, quiet men-of-business Irishmen who, though holding their opinions with the resolute firmness common to their temperament and tone of thought, rarely take part in public matters, and yet are interested in what is passing around them, especially in whatever concerns the honour of their race and country. *From men of this class I heard the most strongly expressed opposition to the Fenian movement, and occasionally the bitterest contempt of its leaders.* Jealous of the reputation of their countrymen and . . . sensitive to ridicule, they were ashamed of the miserable squabbles and dissensions so common among the various branches or sections into which the Irish organisation is, or was then, divided; and they experienced the keenest humiliation as some new disaster rendered the previous boasting more glaring, or more painfully absurd. Yet among these grave, quiet men of business, these men of model lives, these men in whose personal integrity any bank in the country would place unlimited trust—amongst these men England has enemies, not friends. They are opposed to Fenianism not because it menaces England but because it compromises Ireland. So much alike do

[1] Speech of 23rd December, 1867, cited by Mr Fox, *Key to the Irish Question*, p. 323.

these men think and express themselves, though perhaps a thousand miles apart, that one would be inclined to suppose them in constant communication and intercourse with each other. Not to say in substance, but almost literally, this is the manner in which I have heard a number of these grave, quiet, steady business men refer to the Fenian movement :—'I strongly object to this Fenian organisation, for many reasons. In the first place, it keeps up a distinct nationality in the midst of the American population, and it is our interest to be merged in this nation as quickly as may be. In the second place, I have no confidence in the men at its head : how can I ? Which of them am I to believe? If I believe one, I can't the other. Then what they propose is absurd. They talk nonsense about going to war with England, and England at peace with the world ; and every additional disaster only rivets Ireland's chains more strongly. If indeed this country were at war with England, that would be quite another thing ; and after all, of what good would that be for Ireland? Would it better her condition? Would it be worth the risk? . . . But at the same time, I must say this for myself, if I could see my way clearly, if I thought that a fair chance offered of serving Ireland and making her happy, I would willingly sacrifice half of what I have in the world in the attempt.' . . ." [1]

If the English Unionist journals, in their way of imbecile self-glorification, make light of the enduring ill-will of such men as these, at least the mass of the English people is sane enough to feel that the policy is wrong which provokes it. And as the unconditional refusal of Home Rule to the orderly and constitutional demand of the great Irish majority, won to goodwill by the effort to meet them, has justified tenfold the resentment of the best and sanest of the Irish race against the apparent English majority, it is not to be believed that that majority can much longer remain Unionist, even in appearance. The faults and disasters which weaken the Irish parliamentary party cannot alter, for alien and impartial eyes, the merits of the issue. The *orbis terrarum* will not alter its estimate of the Anglo-Irish relation because Parnell, chancing to clash with the ethical superstitions of English Protestants and Irish Catholics alike, lost first his hold, and then his judgment, and then his life ; or because the scratch regiment which he despotically ruled has broken up as did Cromwell's host in vain dissension. That Parnell at his best was an imperfect man, or that his followers are imperfect in weaker ways, is, I repeat, a childishly irrelevant comment on the Irish problem, coming as it does from men who are only imperfect

[1] J. F. Maguire, M.P., *The Irish in America*, 1868, pp. 607-609.

with a difference, and that a difference for the worse, seeing that their aim is wholly negative and repressive, and in nowise constructive.

Either the lately awakened forces of political intelligence and social aspiration are doomed to end in all-round frustration, or the cause of the Irish people, as against English enmity, is destined to be gained. Either the English nation is to sink ever deeper in social corruption and political torpor, growing more and more a populace of gross toils and gross joys, passing further and further from the very dream of equality and of elevation of life, or the fabric of the State is to be new made and its life blood purified by the righting of the ancient wrong which so fatally flaws both. By the beginning of the twentieth century we ought to have some clear notion of how the tide of things is turning.

III.

MOMMSEN AND RICHEY ON GAULS AND IRISH.

I.

THE typical voice in the propaganda of Teuton against Celt is that of Theodor Mommsen, the German archæologist and historian of Rome. He is a very learned man in his special walk; and there has been a natural tendency to assume that a scholar who has all Latin archæology at his fingers' ends must be a first-rate historian, not only in the sense of knowing and telling all the facts, but as a judge of men and events, and a commentator on the course of things. Certainly he ranks highest among the modern historians of Rome, there being no such competition for the front rank there as is seen in the historiography of Greece, in which Englishmen, Germans, and Frenchmen have vied with each other throughout the century, proceeding one weighty history after another with zealous industry. In Roman history, though he is already felt by students to belong to a past generation, he may still be said to have it all his own way. I have indeed heard portions of his work discussed among specialists with scant respect, some describing portions of it as simply stupid, the work of a scholar who had the ambition to make a name as a writer, though lacking some of the qualities of mind most essential to the historian's task. And of some of the parts of his work which I have seen specialists praise, I am prepared to affirm the superficiality. But our business here is to consider in particular the character and weight of the verdict he has volunteered on what he regards as the "Celtic" race.

It is after telling the story of the conquest of Gaul by Cæsar that he thinks fit to bestow on his readers his Germanic opinion of not only the Gauls of antiquity but the modern Irish, whose "kinship" with the former he takes for granted, without a moment's scholarly reflection on the ethnological questions involved. Here is the passage, a little condensed:—

"This was no accidental destruction, such as destiny sometimes pre-

pares even for peoples capable of development, but a self-incurred and in some measure historically necessary catastrophe. . . . In the mighty vortex of the world's history, which inexorably crushes all peoples that are not as hard and as flexible as steel, such a nation could not permanently maintain itself: with reason the Celts of the continent suffered the same fate at the hands of the Romans, as their kinsmen in Ireland suffer down to our own day at the hands of the Saxons—the fate of becoming merged as a leaven of future development in a politically superior nationality. . . . In the accounts of the ancients as to the Celts on the Loire and Seine we find almost every one of the characteristic traits which we are accustomed to recognise as marking the Irish. Every feature reappears: the laziness in the culture of the fields; the delight in tippling and brawling; the ostentation . . .; the language full of comparisons and hyperboles, of allusions and quaint turns; the droll humour . . .; the curiosity . . .; and the extravagant credulity . . .; the childlike piety, which sees in the priest a father . . .; the unsurpassed fervour of national feeling . . .; the inclination to rise in revolt under the first chance-leader . . . but at the same time the utter incapacity . . . to attain or even barely to tolerate any organisation, any sort of fixed military or political discipline. It is, and remains, at all times and all places, the same indolent and poetical, irresolute and fervid, inquisitive, credulous, amiable, clever, but—in a political point of view—thoroughly useless nation; and therefore its fate has been always and everywhere the same."[1]

Let us first take the series of propositions on its merits, as a pretended differentiation of the Celtic race from others, before considering the value of the identification of ancient Gauls with modern Irish.

1. *Laziness in agriculture.* As a special description of the Gauls of antiquity, this, as every student knows, is untrue. The Gauls were indeed behind the Romans in agriculture, but they were ahead of the Germani. Slothfulness in agriculture is one of the characteristics specially given to the Germani by Tacitus.[2]

2. *Delight in tippling and brawling.* This too is one of the features noted in ancient German life by all observers. It is no less noted in mediæval German life. Some say it is sufficiently notable in the German life of to-day, to say nothing of the English.

[1] Mommsen, *History of Rome*, B. v., ch. 7, Eng. tr., ed. 1894, vol. v., pp. 98-100.

[2] *De moribus Germanorum*, cc. 26, 45.

3. *Ostentation.* A feature of the life of a score of peoples in the same culture stage; and one abundantly seen in the history of the German aristocracy, who answer to the upper-class Gauls of whom Cæsar wrote.

4. *Figurative language.* The special characteristic of the Teutonic Eddas and Sagas.

5. *Droll humour.* Without definitely answering in the affirmative the old question of Bouhours, "Whether a German can have wit," we may impartially note that Germans in modern times have made rather more pretensions to "droll humour" than any other European nation; and that such mediæval works as *Till Eulenspiegel*, *Reynard the Fox*, (albeit borrowed from the French), and the productions of Hans Sachs, and such works as some of Richter's in modern times, give some basis for the claim. It is not to be denied that a modern collection of German jokes, as Mr Lowell put it, makes life seem more serious, and has a tendency to make it more precarious; but still the habit of joking seems as common in Germany as anywhere else.

6. *Curiosity.* As against the special testimony of Cæsar regarding the Gauls I do not recall any concerning the ancient Germani. But every student knows that an eager interest in the advent of any stranger with news is one of the commonest as it is one of the most natural features of the life shown in Anglo-Saxon literature. And I may add my personal testimony—which can be borne out by that of many others—that when travelling in Germany I have been questioned by chance fellow-passengers with a zest of primitive inquisitiveness which I have never seen equalled in any "Celtic" country.

7. *Extravagant Credulity.* If Herr Mommsen refers to superstition, he may be accommodated with many proofs that in Germany in all ages, down to that in which a German journalist is imprisoned for jesting at the Holy Coat of Trèves, there has been as much religious credulity as anywhere else. Buckle and others in his day held the German people to be more superstitious than either the French or the English. In regard to other sorts of credulity, the land of Baron Munchausen surely ought not to waive its just claims.

8. *Childlike Piety.* Wherein Celtic piety is more childlike than any other at the same culture stage, it is impossible to discover without some assistance from the historian's suppressed knowledge.

9. *Subservience to the priest.* No Catholic people was ever

more subservient to its priesthood than the "Teutonic" Lowland Scotch have been since the Reformation. The filial attitude towards the priest is visibly common to the Italian, the Spanish, and the Russian peoples; and in no Catholic country is Catholicism more effectively organised than in Catholic Germany and Austria.

10. *Fervour of National feeling.* Obviously a quality of non-Celtic stocks in at least as high a degree.

11. *Inclination to revolt under any chance leader.* Does this mean that Vercingetorix was a "chance leader"? Was he any more so than Arminius? And under how many "chance leaders" have the Irish people revolted? Is the expression any more than a piece of chance verbiage?

12. *Incapacity to attain any organization or fixed discipline.* Exactly the account given by Tacitus of the Germani, who never did "attain any sort of fixed military or political discipline" till modern times, and who remained for centuries disorganised while France was highly organised. If France is to reckon as a Celtic country, Dr Mommsen's proposition is a farce.

13. Apply the closing sentence, finally, to the divided Germany of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, down to the era of Bismarck, and compare the effect. This was a Germany which could not unite on any ground between 1790 and 1866, could not effectively resist Louis XIV. without the help of England, could not unite against the first Napoleon, could not unite at all save in resistance to the foolish attack of Napoleon III. All the epithets of Dr Mommsen could plausibly have been applied, and were applied, to Germans, often by Germans themselves, with the exception of the last, which is a kind of blatant aspersion that no judicious writer would cast on any nation in any stage,—not to Spain or Turkey in their lowest hours.

So much for the items of the differentiation. Every one turns out to be worse than worthless as a distinguishing mark of the race aspersed. The passage is a string of journalistic phrases, strung together with as little science and as little sincerity as go to the work of any Chauvinist leader-writer in Berlin. What then is to be said of the bearing of the whole passage on the case of Ireland, and what of the political sanity of the doctrine laid down? What is the scientific content of the formula on "historically necessary catastrophes"? Does it amount to anything more than the empty deliverance that when a nation

is beaten it is beaten? If anything else, it is as good for one case as for another; and we are led to the instructive conclusions that the assassination of Cæsar himself, the fall of the Roman Empire, the later rotting-down of Teutondom in Italy, the conquest of Anglo-Saxondom by Danes and by Normans, and of Teutondom in Spain by Saracens, the fall of Germany into anarchy after the Reformation, the agony of the Thirty Years' War, the age of impotence which followed, and the beating down of the insolence of Prussia into the dust by Napoleon at Jena, "were all in some measure historically necessary catastrophes." So with the fustian about the vortex which crushes all people not as hard and as flexible as steel. Since Spain and Italy and Turkey and Morocco and China and Persia have all continued to subsist as nations, century after century, despite periods of impotence and stagnation, they are all, on Dr Mommsen's principles, as hard and as flexible as steel in comparison with the Gauls, who were "necessarily" conquered by Cæsar, and in comparison with the Germans, whom Cæsar did not attempt to overrun, though whenever he met an army of them he annihilated it in an hour, as Marius did the Cimbri and Teutones. Dr Mommsen, in fine, is childish enough to assume that the Gaulish people was "destroyed" because it was definitely absorbed in the Roman civilisation, and that the Irish people is destroyed because it still remains at the mercy of English misgovernment. On the same principle, Alsace and Lorraine were destroyed when France annexed them, and were destroyed afresh when Germany got them back.

When we rationally consider the past history and present position of Ireland, the Teutonic declamation of Dr Mommsen on the subject falls away from our thoughts like the quotidian brawling of the hired newspapers of his Fatherland. The Irish land, the Irish people, have stood for seven hundred years at a relative disadvantage such as the so-called Germanic peoples never underwent—a disadvantage long ago fully recognised by intelligent writers of his own nationality who took the trouble to study the case. If the Irish people in modern times have ever on a large scale been indolent, it was visibly because the fruits of their industry were systematically wrested from them under the worst land laws in Europe. That they are signally industrious, whether at home or abroad, under fair conditions, is admitted even by enemies, the fact having been established by the testimony of a series of observers who had in this matter the decisive advantage over Dr Mommsen of knowing that whereof

they speak. And since he penned his paragraph, the Irish people has shown that it can organise for political purposes so efficiently as to paralyse the English Parliament and force the two main English parties in turn to come to terms. For the rest, if the Irish Nationalist political organisation disrupted at the fall and death of Parnell, it did no more than the German Socialist organisation did at the death of Lassalle,—and may do again.

One makes these comparisons specially between Celtica and Germany because it is so plain that Dr Mommsen's handling of the character of the Celtic race is an expression of mere vulgar racial vanity on his part. He has not made the most ordinary study of the ethnological problem: he does not seem to be aware that one exists. He speaks of the Irish as the Celtic kindred of the Gauls in apparently complete ignorance of the presumption that the blood of the Irish people was largely "Teutonic" in the period before trustworthy history begins, and of the fact that it was certainly much mixed with Scandinavian and English elements in the historic period. In the same way he takes as unquestioned an absolute racial distinction between Cæsar's Gauls and Germani, when many writers of his own nation have maintained that the Gauls were Germanic. Dr Mommsen was not analysing a scientific problem. He was delivering himself of catchpenny patriotic rhetoric in the name of historical science.

And this fact itself, which must be perfectly well recognised by many sensible students in Germany, is instructive to those who really study the conditions under which nations advance and retrogress in true civilisation. From the critical sagacity of Von Raumer before 1850 to the uncritical Chauvinism of Mommsen after 1850, the process is not one of advance in political wisdom. And it may not be out of place to say here that the mere pre-eminent documentary specialism which is the main product of the German scheme of culture is a different thing from eminence in judgment on any subject whatever. Dr Mommsen is a prominent illustration of the success with which men may accumulate historical information without reaching historical understanding; but it is not in his sphere alone that Germany presents the spectacle of knowledge without insight, and of oracular emphasis without wisdom. Into the writing of a multitude of his zealous fellow-scholars of all departments there enters the same egoism, the same disregard of critical scruple, the same headlong affirmation of presuppositions, the same law-

less wresting of evidence to the support of an obstinately maintained theory. In philosophy, in mythology, in theology, in Shaksperology, in economics, in history, in æsthetics, the same forms of egoism and industrious incapacity yield cognate results, so that in no country is laborious and learned literature as a rule less durable than in the country which produces most of it. Men like F. C. Baur and K. O. Müller, men who to knowledge unite the genius for using it, are as rare in Germany, proportionally speaking, as anywhere else. And under the regimen of military unity, Chauvinism, and "success," it does not appear that they are relatively multiplying. For the services constantly rendered to the world by mere German industry, every student must be grateful; but if we discriminate between accumulation of material and advance in philosophic comprehension (as distinguished from arbitrary system-spinning and mere verbal profundity) we shall not find, I think, that the alleged superiority of the Teutonic character is evidenced by the average of results. We find such products of special organisation as special organisation may anywhere yield in a given culture-stage. We find no evidence of a special racial genius, in any sense of the term, save perhaps in so far as the uncured cumbrousness of the German speech seems to impart a cumbrousness to the general run of German utterance.

II.

That the foregoing remarks on German specialism are not, as some may suspect, mere irrelevant recrimination, will appear when we follow up the analysis of Dr Mommsen's anti-Celtic oracle with an analysis of the very different utterance of the late Professor Richey in reply to it. It was in the first of his *Lectures on Irish History* that, after citing Mommsen's deliverance by way of letting an Irish audience hear foreign criticism, Professor Richey met the German's attack with a species of defence which is in large part a surrender. To judge from his critical handling of such fallacies as the view that "the Celt" is innately unfit for seafaring, and the old falsism that Celts are innately prone to dissension, Mr Richey would have seemed to be the last man to admit innate racial defects of any other sort. He was not, I believe, of Irish paternity; but whatever his own race, he seems in the greater part of his work to stand aloof from all forms of race prejudice. Yet here, where he has to deal explicitly with the doctrine of fixed racial characteristics, he proffers admissions which not only yield to the Celtophobists much of what they assert

but seem to take the ground from under his own most rational explanations of Irish history. I transcribe the passage :—

"It may be fairly contended that the failure of the Celtic race is not so much attributable to the inferiority of their organization to other races, as to the fact of their possessing, to a certain degree, a higher organization. . . . As contrasted with the Teuton, the Celt possesses a peculiar susceptibility of emotion, and a peculiar rapidity of perception, so much that it may be almost said that an idea has passed away from the mind of a Celt before a Saxon begins to understand it at all. But this has an unfortunate result in practice, because it too often amounts to an incapacity of holding an idea for a long period. . . . The Celt conceives ideas rapidly and clearly, but forgets them as easily. He is brilliant, but not persevering ; his thoughts are vivid but not enduring. This is marked in the whole history of the Gallic race, and particularly in the want of tenacity exhibited by them in their struggles with Rome, and in modern history by the half-Celtic French in many of their wars. . . . At the end of the fifteenth century, the French swept all resistance before them in Italy. The Italians dreaded the astonishing *furia Francesca;* but after a few months every French conquest collapsed, from the want of a steady perseverance. The same characteristics appear in Celtic art and literature. Irish poetry consists of exquisite lyric outbursts ; but, alone of all nations of Europe, the Celts do not possess an epic poem which takes an acknowledged place in universal literature. As to Celtic music, the separate airs handed down from remote antiquity are unequalled in variety, tenderness, and expression ; but Irish music has never risen beyond an air ; operas, oratorios, and concerted pieces have been produced by people of inferior sympathies, but greater industry. . . . The toil of now nigh six centuries expended on Cologne Cathedral testifies the faith and perseverance of the German people. The fierce impulse of Celtic art expended itself in the carving of a doorway, or the illumination of a manuscript. The chief political characteristic of Celtic nations is a want of perseverance in exertion to attain a given end, and inability permanently to unite for any definite object ; but want of active perseverance must be distinguished from what we may call the passive resistance in old ideas. Though the Celts do not exert a continued effort to accomplish a given object, yet they will cherish a fixed desire to attain that which they have failed to accomplish. Ancient traditions and national longings form the staple of their political ideas to such an extent that they do not appreciate existing circumstances, and fail to adapt themselves to an altered state of things."[1]

[1] Richey's *Lectures on the History of Ireland*, 1st Series, 1869, pp. 8-11.

Coming from a writer who, though more impartial than any other Irish historian, yet treated Irish concerns with obvious sympathy, this judgment may seem to buttress Mommsen's to such a degree as to overbear all criticism. If authority is to settle the question, it may seem already settled by such a measure of agreement. But the present inquiry has recognised no authority save that of established fact and logical reasoning, and we shall accordingly proceed to analyse Professor Richey's deliverance as we have analysed Professor Mommsen's, taking it first point by point.

1. *Failure.* This word is used with a startling laxity. It is applied to the ancient Gauls in respect of their having been conquered by the Romans, as well as to the Irish in respect of their not having yet secured political equality with the rest of the United Kingdom. But on that line of interpretation nearly every race has "failed." The non-Roman Italians failed to begin with, in that they were conquered by the Romans. The Greeks failed in the same way. The amalgamated Romans in turn, after being successful when largely composed of populations who in the terms of the case had failed, failed collectively in that the empire fell before the Germanic barbarians; who again in turn failed, in that one wave was always overrun by another. The Eastern Teutons later failed when they were subdued by the Westerns under Charlemagne. The German Emperors failed when they lost hold of Italy. The Franks failed in that they lost their language, and were absorbed in the mass of the population they had conquered. The Anglo-Saxons utterly failed in that they were subjugated by the Normans; and the later English failed grievously in that after having overrun France they were ignominiously driven out. The Jews failed conspicuously. And so on throughout all history. The expression, in fine, is indefensible.

2. *Difference of Organisation.* It has been hereinbefore suggested that some of the presumptive early races may have been overpowered by others who were inferior to them in the sense of being more animal, more brutal, more habitually pugnacious. But to attribute this or any other delicacy of organisation to the "Celtic" race so-called is quite unwarrantable. They had themselves been conquerors of other races. The Gauls of Cæsar's day, further, really do not seem to have been notable for superiority of perception. And it will be found that at the close of his allocution Mr Richey absolutely contradicts the dictum with which he sets out.

3. *Discontinuity of Thought.* Mr Richey was here, doubtless,

contrasting the Irish peasant class, as he knew it, with either the English peasant class or the English educated classes. He seems to have confused vivacity and mobility of temperament with disconnectedness of thought. The latter defect is common to the majority of mankind, and *goes as often with temperamental slowness as with temperamental quickness.* It is probably true that the people of Ireland and of France are as a rule more vivacious than the people of England. The cause for such differences is to be looked for in (1) influences of climate and beverages, and (2) influences of political events, including massacres and rebellions, on the nervous system of a race; such effects being probably heritable, Weismann notwithstanding, But, given the difference in average of temperaments, it does not at all follow that there is a similar difference in continuity of thought or continuity of political action. The Great Rebellion in England and the French Revolution are alike easily to be explained in terms of political causation, without reference to temperaments. And it is simply not true that the "Celtic" nations in the mass show less continuity of feeling and opinion than the others. Professor Richey, as already noted, contradicts himself on this very point. His concluding proposition absolutely destroys that under notice. Both cannot be true. And if we contrast the culture histories of the two races of the definition, we find that neither is true. On the one hand, the "Teutonic" countries which accepted the Reformation proved themselves so far more and not less unstable than those which rejected or suppressed it. The sudden transition from Mary-worship and the reverence for the Mass in England and Germany to ribald rejection of them, proves, if anything at all, that the English and Germans were people with little depth or sincerity of religious conviction. No "Celtic" race, again, ever passed from one extreme to another of temper and social habit, and back again, as "Teutonic" England did in passing from the regimen of James I. and Charles I. to that of the Commonwealth, and then again to that of the Restoration. And no Celtic race has ever passed through such a prolonged series of changes of fashions of thought and feeling as have been passed through in Germany since the rise of Frederick the Great last century. It is specially in "Teutonic" countries, once more, that we meet with the phenomena of religious "revivals," which as such imply a sequel of apathy. The Wesleyan and Salvation Army movements are products of English and not of Irish or French life. And if we contrast the perpetual see-saw of politics in England, the perpetual oscillation between Liberal and Tory

Governments, with the steady preponderance of one principle in Irish politics, we shall at least find no reason to credit the Teutonic people with more fixity of character than the supposed "Celtic."

4. *Lack of Military Tenacity.* This is a strange misreading of history. *The Galli made a far more tenacious resistance to Rome than did the Germani.* The Germani, in the nature of the case, drew one signal advantage from the rising under Arminius, which was a piece of successful treachery, not a display of "tenacity" at all. But when the Roman conquest was resumed, the Germani showed no such tenacity as did the Galli. When subdued, they were far more passive.[1] In fact, it is quite clear that had Germania lain in such a close geographical relation to Rome as did Gallia; had it been as easily penetrable, and commercially as well worth subduing, it would have been more and not less easily and quickly conquered than Gallia. When Professor Richey proceeds to deal with later Gallic history he becomes astonishingly fallacious. It is an obvious historical fact that the French kingdom was being built up with continuous foresight and patience during centuries in which Germany was a chaos of dissentient States. The case of the conquest of Italy in the fifteenth century is quite misleading when stated as it is by Professor Richey. It was not "lack of perseverance" that made the conquest impermanent, but the nature of the political conditions. The French could not *stay* in Italy; and they could not govern it from France. The earlier Teutonic conquerors stayed on the soil they conquered; yet even they were upset by each other in rapid succession; and they finally could not subdue the Italian cities. On Professor Richey's principles, the English had proved *their* complete lack of perseverance by their repeated failure to hold their conquests in France and in Scotland, where they were free to keep foot in the country if they could. The proposition really will not stand a moment's criticism.

5. *Art and literature.* Here one is almost moved to pronounce Professor Richey's criticism quite incompetent. To what set of "epics" does he refer? What is the Danish epic that has taken a place in universal literature; what the Swedish; what the Russian; what the Spanish; what the Turkish; what the Hungarian? He was doubtless thinking (1) of the Scandinavian Sagas and Eddas; but on the one hand it is now pretty well agreed-on that the Eddas are a product of a Celtic environment and influence; and on the other hand it is surely impos-

[1] See above, p. 81.

sible to pretend that they have a higher place in universal literature than the Arthurian cycle, which is a "Celtic" product. Professor Richey presumably credited to Germany, as an epic of universal acceptance (2) the *Nibelungen Lied*. But how then could he possibly deny similar status to the *Chanson de Roland* on the side of the "Celts"? It is idle to reply that the *Chanson de Roland* shows Germanic influence, for the early German literature was unquestionably inspired by Romance influence. As regards later epics, it seems hardly worth while to continue the discussion. *Faust* is not an epic; but if it were it proves nothing, for in Germany as elsewhere the epic is now dead. *Don Quixote* is not an epic; but if it were, it would be the last of Spanish production. It is surely time that such matters were looked at in the light of social science rather than of primitive hypotheses about race qualities. The relative development of music is plainly a matter of social conditions. It was most developed where most effort was made to develope it. In Elizabethan England it stood high. Puritanism threw it out of the line of advance; and with us it is still backward. What Professor Richey said of Irish music was just as true of Scotch music till the other day; and the beginning of higher music in Scotland is simply a matter of spread of culture-influence from elsewhere. When Ireland achieves a reasonable measure of political peace, and is thus free to develop its culture, it will develop in music as readily as in other matters, if not more so. The "artistic temperament" is at least as common in the Irish people as in others. Mozart and Schubert, "Teutons" both, were certainly not specially "industrious" types, but they framed, the one great operas and the other the torso of a great symphony. Oliver Goldsmith, the "Celt," was certainly not a specially industrious type; but he compiled histories of Greece and Rome, and a bulky work on Natural History, besides producing among his more original works a story, a play, and two poems, which for their day represented something like artistic perfection. He had certainly fine sympathies; but these are no more the appanage of "Celtic" races than the faculty of composition and construction is the appanage of "Teutonic." There is no lack of sympathy behind the Folk Songs of Germany; and it happens that *Gemüthlichkeit* is customarily claimed for themselves by Germans as a prevailing racial characteristic.

6. *Cathedral-building.* It would be hard to find a more perverse expression of the racial theory than Professor Richey's suggestion that Cologne Cathedral proves the Germans to

possess a faith and perseverance which the Celts lack. Cologne Cathedral simply represents a series of political conditions, some delaying, some determining the final completion. About fifty years ago, Heine made the very incompletion of the Cathedral a ground for exactly the opposite kind of reflection to Professor Richey's. Such are the harmonies of the *a priori* method. If Professor Richey had turned his thought to the cathedrals of France in general and of Brittany in particular, he could hardly have penned his preposterous sentence. To take the case of Ireland, never politically united since the Renaissance, and forcibly withheld from cathedral-building with public funds for over three centuries,—to take her case and contrast it with the case of the German people and Cologne Cathedral, is to pass out of sight of sane science, not to say of common-sense. In the United States, all creeds and stocks are alike free to raise cathedrals; but it is found that the Irish, who mostly went thither in extreme poverty, have built the finest. And some of us could wish that it were not so. The enemy, again, points to the new cathedral as a proof of the power of the Irish priest; while Cologne Cathedral as we have seen, is to be for even the friendly sentimentalist a proof of the "faith and perseverance of the German people." Thus does the farce of pseudo-science go on.

7. *Impermanence and permanence.* Here, at the close, Professor Richey's account of things Celtic collapses in helpless self-contradiction. The Celts are credited with a special want of perseverance to attain a given end, as if they had latterly shown a relatively lower average of political faith than the American Colonies in the War of Independence, the American States in the War of 1812, the Germans under Napoleon, the Greeks under the Turks, or the Italians under Austria. They are reproached for an "inability permanently to unite for any definite object," as if the English or any other people were ever "permanently united," or as if a "definite object" were a thing for which any people *could* permanently unite. Then all at once the whole argument is overturned, and we have the lamentable proposition that "though the Celts do not exert a continued effort to accomplish a *given object*, yet they will cherish a fixed desire to attain *that which they have failed to accomplish*." It seems unnecessary to prove at any length that this is nonsense; or that the final proposition as to the traditional fixity and unadaptableness of the Celt is the exact negation of what was previously said as to his changeableness and receptivity.

I do not think there is much left of Professor Richey's racial disquisition, whether as regards his facts or as regards his reasonings. Sooth to say, it is as poor a performance in the way of sociological reasoning as Mommsen's; seeing that no more than Mommsen does Professor Richey examine the ethnological question as to the constituents of the so-called Celtic races. He calls the French half-Gallic. On the same principle he should call the Scotch half-Gallic, the English largely Celtic, and the Irish largely Teutonic. But there is neither basis to his doctrine nor coherence in the statement of it.

If any one still hesitates to dismiss Professor Richey's theory of Celticity, let him at will carry the examination further, to the consideration of further passages in the *History*—also simple reprints from the original *Lectures*—in which the same assumptions are freshly set forth. Let him take, for example, the self-stultifying passage in which the historian makes out in one breath that the Normans in France had altered their character by intermarriage, and in the next breath that after all they kept it substantially unchanged:—

"By intermarriage with French they [the Normans] had lost the tinge of northern melancholy, the deep sympathy with nature, and that love of their lonely homes which their fathers had entertained. In place thereof they had acquired a light and superficial gaiety, a love of pomp and pleasure, and a true sympathy for art; they were no longer worshippers of Odin, but among the most zealous patrons of the churches they had wasted. . . . But one quality the Normans inherited from their ancestors unimpaired—their boundless self-confidence and love of adventure."[1]

We have above seen that the Gallic stock, with which the Normans intermarried, happened to have shown the same qualities of self-confidence and love of adventure; so that the assumption of heredity in that one case seems rather gratuitous. On the other hand, if intermarriage is to be held to involve an extensive change of character for the Normans, it must no less involve it for the Germans, the Austrians, the Saxons, and the Irish. Once more the argument is in chaos.

So, finally, with Professor Richey's comment on "the great German Reformation which Dean Milman truly styles 'the Teutonic development of Christianity'—an event wholly repugnant to the Celtic mind."[2] . . . I have already shown that

[1] *Short History*, pp. 129-130. [2] *Id.*, p. 132.

this line of assertion is utterly inconsistent with the facts.[1] The Celts of Scotland have for the most part become fanatical Protestants. The Celts of Wales have done the same. There were no more zealous Protestants in Europe than the Huguenots of France, who were finally driven in great numbers into the "Teutonic" countries. According to one line of ethnological doctrine, Calvin was a Celt. According to another, Luther was a Celt, being brachycephalic. A theory which thus falls into one absurdity of self-contradiction after another may surely be held finally to have discredited itself. In Professor Richey's hands it has certainly done so.

If I am asked how such a criticism is to be reconciled with the judgment that Professor Richey is in other respects an excellent and an impartial historian, I can only answer that he seems to me to represent the effects of the survival of a sub-rational sentiment in a man otherwise rationalistic. He seems indeed to have passed through various stages of thought; and it is doubtful whether, had he lived to write out his *Short History* as he had planned, he would have held to what he said in 1869 on the subject of race qualities. It is, as I have said, radically inconsistent with his remarks on the natural *formation* of race character, in the later lecture which is reprinted as the first chapter of the posthumous work.[2] Perhaps he had already abandoned the race fallacy all along the line. In any case, his early adhesion to it only shows how much power a widely current and time-honoured fallacy may have over even a critical intelligence; and our business is to argue out the issue on its merits. When we find Newton alternating between true physics and mythical history, we do not for a moment accept the latter on the credit of the former. Nay, when we find that even the physics is fallaciously formulated by reason of theological prepossessions, we recast the formula in terms of accurate philosophy. The rational course with Newton, then, is the rational course with lesser men.

[1] Above, pp. 93-97.

[2] See above, pp. 134-135, *note*, 161-162, *note*.

IV.

HILL BURTON ON THE SCOTTISH CELTS.

§ 1.

That Hill Burton's *History of Scotland* takes a high place among complete histories of modern nations, is commonly allowed among the small percentage of his countrymen who have read it, as well as by the larger and perhaps more respectable class who compromise matters by having it on their shelves. These latter patriots, naturally, are not wont to countenance the suggestion that the work might advantageously have been made a trifle shorter by the relegation of some matter, as for instance the history of the legal and other proceedings against Mary, to separate treatises. It would be an unwarrantable slur on their candour, however, to anticipate from them anything but a fair hearing of a plea for the reversal of one series of Burton's judgments, concerning which his readers are probably well nigh unanimous in protest.

What has mostly struck Scotch and other readers of Burton, certainly, is his impartiality. To the former, accustomed to see sides locally taken with a more than religious fanaticism as to the character of Mary, the Reformation, and the Covenanters, there is something tranquillising and creative of confidence in Burton's dispassionate tone and treatment, which leaves even his militant readers concerned rather to cite him when they can on their own side than to complain of his leniency towards the other. To Englishmen, again, his treatment of the ancient quarrel recommends itself by the same qualities; and Dr Freeman, who doubtless admired such a temper the more because himself devoid of it, was long ago led to praise Burton's unbiassed and scholarly account of the respective doings of Wallace and Edward I. Nothing, indeed, could well be more judicial, more free of rhetoric and nationalist sentiment, than the whole handling of the heroic period in the *History*, which at this point is peculiarly worthy the quiet study of the author's countrymen.

But Burton all the while *had* one prejudice of the most robust and aggressive description; a prejudice apparently as intimate and as irreversible as any of those which flourish among his compatriots, and as serious as those which he had been able in his own case to set aside—nay, in a sense more so, because there is no prejudice so potent as one which cleaves to a man who is known and knows himself to be on many points exceptionally unprejudiced. It was not his Pyrrhonism about the Druids and cognate questions—that breaks no bones—but his habitual attitude of tone and temper towards the whole race which, in Scotland and elsewhere, is conventionally called Celtic, with as little notion of the rational significance of the term as can well be in such matters. Burton's use of the name is in itself suspect from the beginning. He early adopts it[1] with no critical investigation of its bearings; and from that point forward he rarely uses it without direct or indirect racial imputation. A restricted racial theory, in fact, pervades his whole history; a theory unchecked by logic, untested by data, unexplained by ethnological or biological science. "Through the mists which conceal from us the details of events," he intimates,[2] "we can yet see the large fact that the Romanised Britons were a debased and feeble people. Races moulded by the influence of others generally are so." Now, the measure of truth in this generalisation is to all intents and purposes vitiated by the total absence of the comparative element from the estimate. The Britons, obviously, were no more "under the influence of others" than were many other races in the Roman Empire—for instance, the Gauls and the Spaniards, or even the majority of the inhabitants of Italy, not to speak of the Greeks and many of the Germans. That they made brave and resolute soldiers is admitted: they get the credit[3] for the stubbornness of the resistance of the army of Albinus to that of Severus; and the province "supplied soldiers above the average proportion of its population, if we may judge from the frequency of their use."[4] The whole point is that "there was no military organisation for local self-defence," and that the Britons later succumbed to the Teutons. But this is substantially the history of the whole Western Empire, from north to south; and the Britons were on all fours with the entire Roman population. It is flatly misleading to name them singly and specially as a "debased and feeble people." They really made a much better resistance to the Saxons

[1] I. 172. [2] I. 43. [3] I. 40. [4] I. 44.

did later to the Danes and Normans, or the Teutons in Spain to the Saracens, or the earlier Teutons to the Romans.

Whether or not Burton viewed the early Britons as Celts, he at least transfers at once to the Celts so-called his low opinion of the former—or rather, he may be surmised to have started with Celtophobia, and decided that the early Britons must have been Celts because they were unfortunate. In his inquiry into the Ossianic poems, considered as a possible clue to the life of the early Scots, properly so called, he notes[1] as a reason for denying the authenticity of the collection, the fact that there "A pure and high spirit of Christian chivalry developed itself in a race yet heathen—a race who, when they afterwards ostensibly belonged to the Christian Church, were so noted for treachery and cruelty that for centuries it was deemed a reproach to any civilised Government to employ them in warfare." We need not here stay to ask what sort of an argument this would be against the Ossianic poems—whether these exhibit a "Christian chivalry," or what that may be; whether a race might not conceivably degenerate under hard conditions; or what is proved by the unexplained language as to the employment of the Celts in warfare by "any civilised Government." What is here to be noted is that along with this hostile view of the Celts, Dr Burton started with an equally strong prejudice in favour of the Teutonic or Scandinavian races so-called, having apparently overlooked the opinion, arrived at by Scandinavian ethnologists, that the Teutonic invaders of Scandinavia had absorbed a previous Celtic population. Throughout the Eddas, he early announces,[2] "there is ever-striving energy, determination of purpose, the physical power seconding the unbending will, a courage that is manifest not only in contempt of death, but in patient endurance of suffering, a distaste of all politic devices and diplomatic intrigues, and a reliance on honest strength to carry out the mighty designs of a never-resting ambition. There are no applications of gentleness and mercy, but there is a strong sense of justice and an aversion to wanton cruelty." The discerning reader of Burton will probably agree that in the strained rhetoric of this passage there is another note than that of the judicial criticism which is his best quality. And as clear as the note of Teutomania here is that of Celtophobia at the same stage[3]:—"It is observable of the Celts, as of *other indolent races*, that the elements of value to them are not the resources capable of development through industry and enterprise, but those which offer the readiest supply

[1] I. 175. [2] I. 230. [3] I. 205.

of some of the necessaries of life." The Norse pirates are thus credited with a sheaf of virtues, and with an aversion to wanton cruelty, on the strength of vague inference from the Eddas,[1] in the face of the abundant historic proofs that they *were* grossly and wantonly cruel: the Celts are assumed to be indolent, on no proof offered, but apparently because in some countries they have remained poor, just as the industrious Norsemen do to this day in Scandinavia. On such a plan you may prove anything against any race against which you cherish a prejudice, and anything in favour of one to which you are attached. If the former are poor and of primitive habits, you convict them of indolence; while you find the latter, in a similar case, give proof of fortitude and elevation of mind. If the race you dislike is rich and luxurious you dwell on its vices: whereas your favourite people in growing rich only give proof of their power of succeeding. Heads, our side wins; tails, the other side loses.

§ 2.

I have said that Dr Burton adopted the name Celt with no adequate investigation of its bearings; but after beginning to employ it he does recognise, what it is indeed impossible to overlook, that the race so called had become mixed to a high degree early in the dubious historic period. His admissions are remarkable. "We know, historically, that in the west, *group after group of Norse invaders were absorbed into the Irish-speaking population.* Although the Norsemen were conquerors of the Highland region, and gave its monarchs and lords, the more civilised language [the Celtic] absorbed the ruder though *fundamentally stronger* [!], and all spoke the Irish together. Thus, in language, the Teutonic became supreme in the eastern lowlands, the Celtic among the western mountains. From a general view of the whole question, an impression—but nothing stronger than an impression—is conveyed, that *the proportion of the Teutonic race that came into the use of the Gaelic is larger than the proportion of the Celtic race that came into the use of the Teutonic or Saxon.* Perhaps students of physical ethnology may thus account for the contrasts of appearance in the Highlands: in one district the people being large-limbed and fair, with hair inclined to red; in others, small, lithe, and dusky, with black hair."[2] And in a

[1] I say nothing here of the later demonstration that the Eddas owe a great deal to Celtic influence. It is sufficient to judge Burton by his own lights.

[2] I. 207. *Cf.* pp. 196, 233.

footnote[1] he quotes from the Danish writer Clement, whom he admits to be a close observer, the observation that "the inhabitants of the Hebrides proper, Gaelic in speech, as in all the Highlands, are in their features nearer to the Norsemen than to the Celts."[2] Here it is assumed that the strictly Celtic type is actually known, though there is no pretence to show that at any one period there was a whole Celtic people who presented none of those mixtures of type which are in modern times found in Teutonic-speaking just as among Celtic-speaking populations. And yet so rooted is the prepossession of the historian that he can without misgiving complain[3] that neither Tacitus nor Cæsar "shows a consciousness of the radical difference that *must* have severed the Teutonic from the Celtic." As if the unconsciousness of Tacitus and Cæsar were not, from a scientific point of view, a reason for suspecting that the types of Teuton and Celt were as much mixed in Cæsar's day as later.

What seems clear thus far is that the history of the Scottish nation commences with the recognition of a large Highland and Gaelic-speaking population, in which a large hypothetically Teutonic element has been absorbed. On one principle laid down by Dr Burton, this absorption would seem to imply great virtue in the Celt, for "we know that after a time the Saxon race, *through its native vigour*, overcame the influences of the Norman Conquest, as in the individual man a healthy constitution works off the influence of a wound or a casual disease."[4] But in Dr Burton's ethnic philosophy it appears to be a property of the Celtic race to throw off (by absorbing) a preponderating Teutonic influence through its native vigour and yet remain as indolent and objectionable as ever. A thousand years later in their history, the Celts still impress him unfavourably. Dealing with the reign of Alexander (1230-45) he notes[5] that "Among the Irish Celts of the western and central Highlands, on the other hand, this policy of planting Norman settlers appears to have been very effective. It is a peculiarity of these

[1] P. 196.

[2] *Die Nordgermanische Welt*, Copenhagen, 1840, p. 301 *n*. "Norsemen" seems to mean, for Clement as for so many others, one Teutonic type, though the Danes of mediæval history are represented as *dark*, and their skulls are described as non-Teutonic. The Norwegians, too, are assumed to have been in general fair, though we find them distinguishing one of their Kings as Harold *Fairhair*. And of course no note is taken of the presumptive Celtic element in the Norwegian as in the Swedish population.

[3] I. 193. [4] I. 431. [5] II. 16.

races that they must have leaders—they cling to the institution by a law of their nature; and if the desired dictator and guide do not come in one shape, they will take him in another." Instead of asking the meaning of the latter clauses, let the reader note that the "other hand" has reference to the practice of the "wild men of Galloway" concerning whom it was that the English ancestor of Robert the Bruce at the Battle of the Standard "cried shame" on King David "for leading that ruffianly band of mixed savages against the gentle Norman chivalry who had befriended him." "It was like," says the historian,[1] "Chatham arraigning the Government for employing tomahawking Indians in the American war." Now, it was to this that Burton evidently alluded in his previously quoted phrase about the cruelty and treachery of the *Celtic race*. But in the present connection it appears[2] that these very Celtic men of Galloway, immediately after the Battle of the Standard, "put to death all the French and English strangers they could lay hands on"—doing exactly the reverse, as we have seen, of what was done by the Northern Celts, but very much the same thing as was done by the early Saxons when they invaded Britain. So that it would seem to be a peculiarity of the Celtic race—a law of its nature—at once to cling to the institution of leaders and to overthrow it, to accept Norman lords and to kill them.

Any dispassionate reader of that sentence about the Celtic need for leaders is driven to ask himself whether precisely the same "law of their nature" is not evidently all-powerful among the southern or Teutonic Scots at every period of their history—whether it is not a law of the nature of all peoples in their military and tribal period. There is only one answer. But it becomes the invariable practice of Dr Burton, as he goes on, to mete out to the Highland people a different measure from that he metes out to those of the Lowlands; to blame the former specially and singly for qualities and habits in which they are on all fours with the latter. Again and again does he gird at Celtic "peculiarities" which are not peculiarities at all. "Their one great craving was for immediate leaders to guide and command them. Such they found in the descendants of those Norse warriors who had been their masters of old. They lived under their chief, and did his bidding," etc.[3] Now, as the historian himself very clearly sets forth, this was exactly what happened in Lowland Scotland among the "Teutons;"

[1] I. 437. [2] II. 15. [3] II. 388.

for the War of Independence, as he makes plain, was carried on by leaders almost wholly of Norman blood—the Flemish Douglases being the only exception.[1] The Lowland Scots in general "craved a leader," and found him in the Norman Bruce: and they clung to that leader, in their national capacity, just as they habitually did in home affairs to their immediate lords, by reason of a "law of their nature." Not only do the feudal strifes of southern Scotland exactly answer to the clan feuds of the Highlands, but Lowland or "Teutonic" Scotland as a whole never showed at any part of her history the slightest fitness for getting along without a King. In no country's annals is the royalist principle more prominent, though in none is there more record of rebellion. King after King was slain or risen against; but every rising claimed a royal head; and nothing is more remarkable in the great Civil War than the unanimity with which Scotland adhered to the monarchic principle while many Englishmen were not only ready but anxious to set up another. In the face of these facts, Burton's generalisation is worthless—the phrase of a partisan who catches at any stick to beat the object of his prejudice.

§ 3.

Other distinctions drawn by the historian will no better bear investigation. "The way of the two" [the 'Goth' and the Celt], he writes, "differed in this wise, that it became the practice of the one to till the soil and enrich himself, while it became the practice of the other to live idly and seize upon the riches of his Lowland neighbour when he could get at them."[2] There could be no idler evasion of a plain scientific principle. Dr Burton knew perfectly well[3] that the Scottish and English Borderers habitually followed exactly the same practices as did the Middle Highlanders, and this because the conditions were substantially the same as regards temptation, gain, and divided government. It was not that in the "dark backward and abysm of time" the Aryan ancestors of the Borderers had perversely developed cattle-stealing propensities, though we know that the early German tribes habitually plundered the Galli and each other; but that actual conditions developed these propensities in the men who were called Borderers because they lived on the boundaries of two hostile States. In precisely the same way the

[1] The reputed founder of the house of Douglas was Theobald the Fleming (1150), who took his title from the Celtic name of the land granted him.

[2] II. 389-90.

[3] *Cf.* VI. 18, 21.

later Highlanders, whose own narrowed territory was unfruitful, took to plundering the rich lands of their Lowland neighbours, doing it with all the more zest because these were an alien race, as Borderer to Borderer. A scientific observer will at once recognise that the case is not one of race bias, but of immediate conditions; but Burton almost always turned his back on science when he had to with the Celts. It never occurred to him to dwell on the fact that those very industrious Lowlanders were the tillers of soil which their justice-loving ancestors had stolen from the Celts. Land-stealing is in a different category from crop- and cattle-stealing. This last is the one form of international piracy that Dr Burton is concerned to blame, because it was the only one which happened to be open to the Celts. He records not only[1] that piracy was more or less officially carried on both by Scotland and England in the days before the Reformation, but that in the beginning of the 17th century[2] the well-to-do skippers of Teutonic Fife[3] acquired their wealth largely by that means. Yet he has no thought here of stigmatising the Scottish seafaring class as habitually living by plundering their neighbours on the high seas. It is only Celts who prove their inherent depravity by systematically levying black mail on those who come in their way. The devices of explanation to which our historian is at times driven are rather more trying to gravity than to temper. Returning to the Celtic problem as it stood at the union of the Crowns, he promptly relapses into what we may call the nescientific attitude after some pages of perfectly sensible analysis of Lowland conditions. The Celts are re-ushered on the scene as "this peculiar people;" and the reminiscence of their Norse elements produces this incomparable reflection:— "It would appear that such mixture of a stronger element with the Celtic races (*sic*) tends to bring the strength and determination of the stronger to the aggravation of the wayward, turbulent, and mischievous propensities of the weaker, as in the English of the Pale, who were said to have become more Irish than the Irish themselves." Grave historiography can thus leave far in the rear the classic case of the Wolf and the Lamb, when it is inspired by a prejudice wearing the guise of a theory. Burton had just been telling of the waywardness, the turbulence, the savagery, the brutal bloody-mindedness, of the Teutonic Border

[1] III. 70, 72. [2] VI. 66.

[3] It is to be noted, however, that Mr Grant Allen holds the people of Fife-shire, with those of Ayrshire, Perthshire, and Aberdeenshire, for Celts. (*Anglo-Saxon Britain*, p. 150).

populations; nay, his whole history up to this point had been a record of chronic civil strife and inveterate lawlessness of the Teutonic Scots, the "flocking and fighting of kites and crows," as Milton summed up the infinite brawling of "God's Englishmen" of the pure Teutonic days. Even historiographical prejudice cannot evade the mute appeal of its own pages, and the parallel of Borderer and Highlander is at last grappled with. As thus:—"There was an old element of similarity between the Highlander and the Borderer in this, that both of them indulged in theft. The Borderer, however, *was by nature a utilitarian and a tradesman.* He drove the beeves of the English because it was the most profitable business he could engage in; when the profession ceased to pay [*i.e.*, when it was suppressed] he dropped it. But it was the *nature* of the Highlander to be idle, and feed on the produce of other men's labours. It was the necessities of this nature that *withdrew them from the Lowland districts*, as those whose nature it was to cultivate the ground *pressed in on them.*"[1] Our historian seems the very person to tell the tale of the lady who fell down stairs and died of a broken heart; and he would seem capable of missing the point of the proposition that "incantations will destroy a flock of sheep—if administered with a certain quantity of arsenic." His writing here has the solitary merit of enabling us to understand how Scotchmen could come to be held destitute of humour.

From this point Burton's treatment of everything Celtic is, so to speak, a mere debauch of the personal equation. His ultra-Ricardian economics (it is a grave injustice to Ricardo to father on him the unscientific erection of a mere generalisation from existing practice into a prescription for all practice to come) exhibits itself in the dictum[2] that it is a "peculiarity of the Celtic nature," in the matter of the land, to be unable to "understand the arrangement by which one man was its owner, while another occupied and tilled it"—a piece of sociology which needs no comment beyond a reference to the rather weightier decision of Mill that it is the orthodox Teuto-British land system which is a peculiar thing in human history. We have once more, too, the elastic theory of the dependance of the Celt on leaders:—"The Lowlander, *self-relying*, gave as little effect as he could to the *feudal restraints that bound him to a leader.* The Highlander could not do without one. He naturally clung to *anyone whom nature placed in a position to command him;* and if he could not find a strong-handed warrior to take the lead, he

[1] VI. 21-22. [2] VI. 23.

would follow a priest or a Presbyterian minister."[1] Even as did his Gothic neighbour at and after the Reformation! But things have come to such a pass with the historian's Celtophobia that as he goes on he unfalteringly cites it as a fresh crime against the Celts that they would *not* obey their leaders. At one point in the campaign of 1715[2] "the Highlanders, still true to their *stagnant principles*, *refused obedience*" to their capable leader Mackintosh, himself a Highlander; and in connection with the earlier campaign of Montrose it is noted[3] that "they had a system of discipline of their own, very lax and precarious, and they would work in no other. They would follow no leaders and obey no commanders but those whom the accident of birth" [which had been somewhat important in Lowland history] "had set over them; and the highest military skill was lost in any attempt to control them"—*even when their clan commanders strove to enforce such attempts.*

The addition of insult to this preposterous tissue of injury is, of course, a small matter. At one place[4] Burton takes up for a moment the suggestion, supported by historical data which he does not pretend to dispose of, that under their own institutions, *in a propitious territory*, the Celts could get on well enough; and this is how he gets rid of it:—"All doctrines are entitled to a hearing (!); but this one leads to conclusions so *unharmonious to all established belief in the blessed influences of peace and industry*, that it will require support from a more consolidated supply of facts, than theorists about the Irish and the Highlanders are generally content with"—this with some of the facts lying in his own footnotes!

"O wad some pow'r the giftie gie us!"

§ 4.

We have seen how his primary prejudice has driven the historian to spurious generalisation, to false comparison, to nakedly unjust inference, and finally into an undisguised fanaticism of resistance to all argument which challenged his bias. It would appear that juster views had been pressed upon him; but that all pleadings had only stiffened his unreasoning antagonism to the race he had maligned. It is in this frame of mind that the historian arrives at his crowning generalisation:—"In a naturally industrious and enterprising population, war and con-

[1] VI. 23. [2] VIII. 301. [3] VI. 363. [4] VI. 29.

fusion, no doubt, desolate the land, not only by bringing actual ruin on the produce of industry, but by cutting off the industrious hands. But here the people are indolent, and content with the bounties supplied to them by nature. If their population increases beyond a balance with the natural supply of these bounties, they starve. Thus do we find, by logical conclusion, a race among whom war and murder have a wholesome social tendency; and it is added to the wrongs committed on the Celt *that the law and order to which he has been reduced under the rule of the Saxon have driven him to starvation.*"[1]

This laborious insult is the one semblance of a suggestion, in Burton's eight volumes (so far as I can remember), that "the Celt" has ever been wronged at all. He at times quotes[2] a testimony to Celtic valour and endurance; he necessarily admits, while assuming Norman influence,[3] the immense effect of Welsh literature on that of Europe; he concedes, suicidally enough, that the simplicity of rank among the Celts, in strong contrast to the nomenclature of the German Empire, "was a contrast, too, at variance with the usual notions of the Celtic character, as being showy and boastful;"[4] and he could not well suppress the fact that when, at the beginning of the 17th century, the Crown confiscated a large part of the Hebrides, including the whole of the Lewis, the Lowland cultivators who were introduced, "after the usual harassments attending an unsuccessful colonisation, returned to their Lowland homes, tired and disappointed, in the year 1609."[5] Nor could he evade mention of the fact that alike in the Highlands and in Ireland "the Celt was excluded from the privilege of the law of peace and war;[6]" though he sought, somewhat like Carlyle, to balance matters by dwelling on the counter atrocities of the Irish. But of any perception that fate may be tyrannous to peoples as to men, of any scientific comprehension of the not very obscure sociological problem in hand, these volumes give no sign. Under stress of prejudice the historian becomes misleading even in his facts. By way of enforcing his fallacious proposition that the Celts are bad sailors, he states that when the whale-fishing was at its height, the whalers "used to complete the complement (*sic*) of their crews from Peterhead, Orkney, and Shetland, but never from the Hebrides or the West Highlands,"[7] forgetting the accepted view as to the large Norse element in the Hebrides, and failing to ascertain the well-known fact that in our own day the royal navy has been largely recruited

[1] VI. 30-31. [2] VI. 28. [3] I. 172. [4] VI. 32.
[5] VI. 37. [6] IV. 341. [7] VI. 25.

from these very Hebrides. In a note on language[1] he asserts that Lowland Scotch has taken virtually nothing from the Celts —only "a few words expressive of things existing in the Highlands, as gilly, claymore, pibroch, and the like." As against this, Professor Mackinnon tells us that Jamieson's Dictionary includes several hundreds of Celtic words; and that where Gaelic-speaking and English-speaking Briton meet on something like equal terms, as in Canada, where the scattered population is not dominated by the presence of a literary order, the reaction becomes increasingly apparent. And when the historian asserts[2] that "men of Irish race, even where they have been for generations severed from their country by the Atlantic, fight out in the streets of the American cities the feuds that shook the British empire in the seventeenth century," we are bound to answer that as a general statement this is not true, and that the Celt in America is not more "clannish" than the Lowland Scot. Where facts thus go astray, it is not to be expected that taste will be right: and we accordingly have from the implacable historian the decision that whereas "the Lowlander's plaid was generally of plain light and dark squares, the Highlander, indulging the natural taste of a lower civilisation, delighted in more gaudy colours."[3] A footnote discloses that the last-century writer Martin, in his Account of the Western Isles,[4] paid tribute to the "great deal of ingenuity required in sorting the colours, so as to be agreeable to the nicest fancy." But no foreigner would have learned from Burton that the "higher civilisation" of the Lowlands had in his own day eagerly adopted the very tartans in question; and it would only be by watchful induction he would discover that the colourlessness of the Lowland garb a hundred and fifty years ago was one of the results of the atrophy of art at the Reformation.

It would be unwarrantable to omit notice of the one passage in which, near the end of his work, Burton does something like justice to the Celt on one item—the good behaviour of Prince Charles' men in Edinburgh. The concession is sufficiently qualified:—"It is among the most remarkable instances of the influence which a change in surrounding conditions may have on a people *signally retentive* of bad practices, that there should have been so little plunder in their marches or their abode in the towns. This may be accounted one of the steps in a moral change which has made the Highlanders of the present day remarkably exempt from predatory offences. There are few humble

[1] VIII. 544. [2] I. 175. [3] VIII. 528. [4] P. 207.

people among whom property is more safe from aggression than the still poor dependents of the Highland thieves of old" [1]

So habituated has the historian become to regarding the Celt as something "peculiar," that even in verbally recognising such an influence as that of "conditions," he must needs term "remarkable" a phenomenon perfectly normal and natural, and in the same breath proceed to speak as if the remaining bad practices of the Highlanders were perversely independent of causal conditions. When he is dealing with the prevalence and the mischief of smuggling in the Lowlands, he never thinks of attributing the evil to a "signal retention of bad practices": here the economist as well as the Teutophile traces the cause to unwise fiscal legislation. But with the Celt it is different. It is no longer his nature to steal: it even becomes his nature to be honest, so that his honesty perhaps does him no great credit; but it is still his nature to be spontaneously objectionable somehow. And after the one concession, the historiographer proceeds to the other detractions above noted, and revels at length [2] in a demonstration of the "peculiarity" that among the Highlanders before the '45 the gentlemen of the clan were large, strong, and well-fed, and the humbler people small and ill-fed; throwing in a final self-annihilative hint that perhaps the ruling caste were at bottom "of a Gothic race" and only the others truly Celts! As if he had not been describing a social phenomenon common to every nation in the civilised world! And as if that ruling caste were not on his own showing a main factor in all the vices of cruelty, indolence, and predacity which he has all along been charging on "the Celt!"

Such is the fashion in which the best and completest History of Scotland deals with that section of the Scottish people which has given its race-name to the nation, and which, since its real union with the rest, has taken an ever-increasing share in the national performance of every order. One does not call the historian's method ungenerous: one does not look to him to be generous but to be in the barest sense just—that is, to be scientific; and on the contrary he is found carrying injustice to the extremes of farce, and compendiously leaving science out of the question. I should be sorry to seem, in discussing such malfeasance, to overlook the merit, the learning, the judgment, which mark the work in other regards, and which will probably keep it long in possession of the field even if all the foregoing strictures become unquestioned commonplaces. They point to an almost

[1] VIII. 458. [2] VIII. 524-5.

unique flaw in the historian's intelligence, which will doubtless be one day classed as one of the follies of the wise. But the flaw is at least serious enough to call for this much exposure. Human folly becomes rather a dismal thing when it strikes a deep rift of unreason through the laborious work of an industrious and capable scholar, and leaves the readers for whom he wrote divided between disgust and derision. In the circumstances the best service all round would seem to be to try to show precisely the extent of the flaw.

§ 5.

It remains to seek for critical explanations; and in looking for the causes of Burton's wrongdoing, as we have sought reasons for more general historic phenomena, one finds some light in the antecedents. To begin with, his Celtophobia seems to have been partly developed by way of a crude sociological reaction against the way of looking at things Celtic which had been set up or strengthened by the sympathetic genius of Sir Walter Scott. After centuries in which Lowland Scots and Englishmen alike had been wont for the most part to regard the Highlander as an insufferable savage, Scott suddenly presented him to the world in colours of poetry on a background of thrilling romance. Scott indeed had not begun the sympathetic movement: the falsetto prose-poetry of "Ossian," concocted by Macpherson on the nuclei of fragments of genuine old Celtic poetry, had had, despite damaging criticism, a wonderful success throughout Europe, supplying as it did a new flavour to a world which was on the way to breaking with worn-out convention and tradition in many things; and the new romantic movement set up in Germany tended in the same direction; so that there was a set of taste towards things Celtic before Scott reinforced it. Indeed, before his time one of the ablest of Scotch scholars, Pinkerton, had had to battle with a good deal of uncritical doctrine concerning supposititious proto-Celtic civilisation.[1] But

[1] The rejection of later forms of this doctrine is the sole reasonable element in the work entitled *Celticism a Myth*, by J. C. Roger, F.R.A.S., etc., (2nd ed. 1889) a brawling book, whose spirit may be gathered from its deliverances:—"I believe that no man of Celtic race 'ever attained real greatness in literature, science, art, political or military life,' only, I very much doubt if such a thing as 'pure Celtic blood' anywhere exists" (pp. 14-15): "I am content to believe myself of that great Teutonic stock which has ruled the world in the past, and will rule it to the end of time" (*pref.*). Such are the judgments and tempers to which Burton's ethnography appeals.

Scott's genius at once multiplied tenfold what movement there was, creating not only in Scotland and England but in France and Germany an æsthetic passion for everything Highland. And the salutary result remains to this day, in the modern habit among Lowland Scots of broadly identifying their country with its "Celtic" population, who are so much the most picturesque element in it—this despite all the efforts of Burton, and despite the fact that in the national poet, Burns, there is practically no trace of the new spirit.[1]

It was against this attitude, which had been popular for a generation before, that Burton reacted; and he did so not merely because of his prejudice but because of the way in which that had been reinforced by his training. One of his earlier works is a forgotten treatise on Political Economy, peculiarly arid in its kind, which shows him to have been one of the narrowest of the post-Smithian school of *laissez-faire* capitalism and competition. Such a thinker, unless safe-guarded by a special sympathy, was almost sure to resist what he would regard as the sentimental way of looking at Highland life, past and present; and it is instructive for progressive people to-day to reflect that much of what stood for Liberalism in Burton's youth—the middle-class revolt against landlordism—could be thus fatally narrow in its view of an important social problem, while the Tory Scott, often narrow and foolish and bigoted enough in his attitude to different problems, could yet in virtue of his literary instincts and sympathies rise to a humaner and saner view[2] where many of the so-called Liberals were hidebound in class prejudice.[3] Nowhere was the narrowing down of Smith to commercial purposes more zealously pursued than in Scotland; and Burton was influenced by the specialists in the study. Somewhat thus it came about that the fibre of wooden prejudice in his personality survived all the rationalising influence of the utilitarianism of Bentham, whose works he edited, and of the analytic philosophy of Hume, whose Life he wrote. Burton seems to have been a man in part naturally cut out for a bigot,

[1] Burns's poem to "Highland Mary"—inferior work as it is—would no doubt help to create good feeling; but he shows none of Scott's interest in the past of the Highland race.

[2] Mr Bonar, it is true, remarks of Scott's pictures in *Waverley* and other novels that "it is the distress of the chiefs that is tragic to him, rather than the misery of the clansmen" (*Malthus and his Work*, p. 189). But, granting this, it remains true that Scott takes a sympathetic view of the clansmen as men. Compare *Rob Roy*.

[3] Cp. Macaulay (chap. XVII., *end*), as to Tories and Irish last century.

who somehow was delivered from the religious bigotry of his native land only to become an unavowed rationalist with a certain sociological bigotry in place of a religious. His sociological training, such as it was, had doubtless much to do with his notably impartial treatment of a number of national and religious issues in Scottish history which before his time had almost never been treated impartially; but his narrow economics, derived from M'Culloch, coinciding with his irrational prejudice against the "race" which a kindlier sentiment had been idealising among his countrymen and elsewhere in recent times, served to make him a typical bigot among historians in regard to that theme. For him, Celtic history was to be read in terms of the gospel, not of Ricardo, who, be it repeated, was a scientific analyst, but of the adaptors of Ricardo, who were the mere champions of the modern commercial form of society. And the fact that the very high-priest of that cult, of whose economics his own was a restatement, bore a Celtic name [1] while exhibiting an ideally "Saxon" stolidity of temperament, seems never to have availed to shake Burton's confidence in his machine-made solution of the Celtic problem. The Celts had remained poor: then it must be because they were not industrious. They had been cattle-stealers at a later period than most of their Lowland neighbours: then they were hereditarily prone to theft. Highland agriculture, albeit on the worst land, was worse than Lowland: then the Celt was anti-agricultural. Q. E. D. His own belief appears to have been that a large percentage of the Highland population was of Teutonic descent; yet he could not so far curb the animus underlying his knowledge as to abstain from setting down the backwardness of the whole Gaelic-speaking population to "Celtic" blood.

The folly of it all is made clear to the intelligence even of the man in the street by the abundant commercial success of the Highland element in Glasgow; and by the all-round success of the same element in Canada and in every other British colony. But the written folly remains, to stimulate still the unreason of the unreasonable when a new question of racial spite arises; yet also to hold up the writer to wiser readers in days to come as a warning of the havoc that a prejudice can work in the intelligence of a historian.

[1] While the Gordons, Frazers, Chisholms, and some other clans, are loosely classed as "Norman" because called by the names of Norman chiefs, and others are similarly classed as Norse and Flemish, the MacCullochs seem to pass as "Celts," though the Macaulays are said to be Norse, like the Macleods and Macdougalls.

V.

J. R. GREEN ON CELTS AND TEUTONS.

§ 1.

It is with much change of feeling that one proceeds from a criticism of Burton's treatment of the Celtic element in Scottish history to a study of John Richard Green's treatment of the Celtic element in early English history. The procedures are as different as the men. Green's sympathetic and kindly nature was incapable of the stolid animosity which, as we have seen, lowers Burton's history in this connection to a mere string of inconsistent aspersions. Green had not had his philosophy of life prematurely moulded, as was Burton's, by a sectarian conception of political economy; and he was constitutionally free of the wilful obstinacy which meets reason with accumulations of sophistry. He seems to have gone on growing mentally to the end, inwardly reshaping his creed in spontaneous loyalty to all new light that reached him. Hence there is something ungrateful in the task of criticising him, especially when one remembers his avowal: "I am only too conscious of the faults and oversights in a work much of which has been written in hours of weakness and ill health," and when one recalls the worn fine face presented by his portrait. It may be possible, however, to set forth some of the shortcomings of his work, in the present connection, without wounding the sympathies he so justly inspired, and without making light of his real merits.

The "Short History of the English People" stands out from its predecessors and rivals in respect of the constant vivacity with which it seeks to bring home all episodes and phases of history to the living recognition of the reader. Green is not content to narrate, or even to comment: he must almost dramatise the most distant and fugitive facts, he must generalise the vaguest forms of knowledge, in a fashion which seems a blend of the method of the literary pulpit and the method of Carlyle. And the wish, in itself so laudable, to make all know-

ledge vital and didactic, finally runs away with the historic function, so that we get word-pictures with colours in them that are not to be found in the authorities, and generalisations so frequent and so far in excess of the real knowledge in hand that they would move us to distrust even if they did not constantly contradict each other. This, however, they do. Green was so possessed by the impulse to generalise that he undertook to reduce to formulas the whole facts of the life of every generation, alike in periods where his matter was too scanty to allow of any save the slightest inference, and in periods where the matter is so abundant and complex that inference must needs be vigilant to the uttermost. And his abundant generalisations are so lightly come by, so hand-to-mouth, so wanting in circumspection, that they upset each other faster than the considerate reader can scrutinise them. To read Green's pages, accordingly, is often to have the sensation of turning a kaleidoscope. Full as he was of a brave industry, it is pathetically intelligible that he should have recoiled from facing the truth that sound thinking is apt to be hard work—harder than even hard reading. His book, in short, has the "defect of its quality." Its great merit is the constant play of ideas, the constant stimulus to thought. Its great demerit is the lack of care with which the ideas are thrown out, the failure to check one by another, and to subject all to critical revision.

We have here to consider how his way of work exhibits itself in his occasional handling of the question of Celtic and Teutonic race-differences. That he set out with an unreasoned Teutonic bias is shown at the outset by his singular dictum that "no spot in Britain can be so sacred to Englishmen as that which first felt (!) the tread of English feet."[1] He wrote for a nation of which millions must be descended from non-Saxon ancestors; and those first comers to whom he points were, on his own showing, troops of ferocious ruffians, who tossed babies on their spears. We might as reasonably reverence the cannibals of an earlier stage in our ancestry, or the pithecoid men of an earlier stage still. Yet Green makes the appeal for reverence in all seriousness. And that he set out with some of the old cut-and-dry ethnological presuppositions is shown by his comment on the literature of mediæval Wales: "In the Celtic love of woman there is little of the Teutonic depth and earnestness"[2]—a phrase which tells of all the arbitrary absurdity that has ever entered into the discussion. In Green's own history before this time

[1] *Short History*, p. 7. [2] *Id.*, p. 157.

there is absolutely nothing to show any special "depth and earnestness" in the Teutonic love of woman; and it is the fact that the earliest English literature in which there is any show of imaginative depth and earnestness in the treatment of sex love—apart from Chaucer, who drew on the French *trouvères*—is Malory's rendering of the Welsh Arthurian legends. The sole basis for the dogma is the old datum as to the monogyny of the ancient Teutons,—a monogyny which, supposing it to be real, we have seen to be presumably a matter of their climatic, economic, and culture conditions, like the monogyny of the working class in Turkey at this moment, since we know it to have been followed by gross profligacy as soon as the race entered on luxurious conditions of life. That Green was but thoughtlessly echoing a current formula is shown by the more spontaneous comments which follow on that cited. On the strength of one sentence from Gwalchmai he finds the Welsh lover a little of a butterfly, but full of a "childlike spirit of delicate enjoyment, a faint distant flush of passion like the rose-light of dawn on a snowy mountain-peak," and so on, as he puts it in a style which may or may not be Teutonic. But after another citation he decides that "the touch of pure fancy removes its object out of the sphere of passion into one of delight and reverence." Then is the spirit of "delight and reverence" something distant from that of "depth and earnestness?" Or is it "passion" that constitutes the latter qualities? And is it in modern Germany, where the average wife is more of a domestic servant to her husband than in either England or France, that we are to look for the deep Teutonic development of "passion," as compared with the "Celtic" forms of it seen in the fiction and the life of modern Gaul?

When we work down to the bases, or at least the first forms, of Green's conception of the two race-natures, we find that his whole plan consists in characterising as special to the race whatever for the time being it happens to say or do. In one page,[1] we read of the Northumbrian peasantry in the days of Cuthbert that "with *Teutonic indifference* they yielded to their thegns in nominally accepting the new Christianity as these had yielded to the king"—an odd illustration of the "depth and earnestness" of the race's character. "But they retained their old superstition side by side with the new worship: plague or mishap drove them back to a reliance on their heathen charms and amulets"—even as fickle Celts might go. Turning the leaf, we find[2]

[1] P. 25. [2] P. 27.

that "Cædmon is a type of the new grandeur, depth, and fervour of tone which the German race was to give to the religion of the East"; and Cædmon and the Germans get credit for a new and lofty conception of the devil. "The human energy of the German race, its sense of the might of individual manhood, transformed in Cædmon's verse the Hebrew Tempter into a rebel Satan, disdainful of vassalage to God"—as if Oriental legend had not given the conception to the West ready made. But even in the defiance of Satan "we catch the new pathetic note which the *Northern* melancholy was to give to our poetry"; and the "English temperament" is declared to have shown "its sense of the vague, vast mystery of the world and of man, its *dreamy revolt against the narrow bounds of experience and life.*" Turning back to the chapter on Welsh literature, we find[1] that "the sensibility of the *Celtic* temper . . . is tempered by a *passionate melancholy that expresses its revolt against the impossible.*" Thus can men draw up characters for nations. Yet again, the Teutonic mind is credited[2] with re-creating the doctrine of the Atonement by "an elaborate code of sin and penance, in which the principle of compensation, *which lay at the root* of *Teutonic legislation*, crept into the relations between God and the soul." As if the said principle of compensation were not developed to the uttermost in the Judaic code to begin with; and as if *that* were an illustration of "new grandeur, depth and fervour of tone," in religious thought.

§ 2.

On the general sociological question, Green's decisions are just as ill-established. He sets out, of course, with the assumption that the Teutonic invaders killed all of the Britons who did not fly to Wales or Cornwall. "The extermination of the Briton was but the prelude to the settlement of his conqueror. What strikes us at once in the new England is, that it was the one purely German nation that rose upon the wreck of Rome."[3] This proceeds upon the phraseology of the Saxon Chronicle, which tells how, for instance, when Œlla and Cissa beset Anderida they "slew all that were therein, nor was there afterwards one Briton left." But we know that this kind of statement is often of no value in old narratives by writers better informed and more trustworthy than the retrospective Saxon chroniclers. Cæsar in the second book of his Commentaries on

[1] P. 156. [2] P. 30. [3] P. 11.

the Gallic War, as we have seen, speaks of the Nervii as virtually exterminated in his great battle with them, whereas they are found energetically at war with him again in the fifth book. He had put down his impression of the facts at the time of the great battle: it afterwards turned out to be a mistake; yet he did not rectify his first statement. It is extremely unlikely, from all we know of the Germanic tribes, that they would not try to take captives, to make them slaves. Green indeed admits[1] in this very connection that "it is possible that a few of the vanquished people may have lingered as slaves round the homesteads of their English conquerors; and a *few of their household words* (if these were not brought in at a later time[2]) *mingled oddly with the English tongue*." Oddly indeed, if there were so few survivors. All the real evidence points to the absorption, despite bloody massacres, of a large part of the conquered race, here as elsewhere. Green expressly states[3] that in the conquest of South-eastern Wales by Offa in the eighth century, "as in the later conquests of the West-Saxons, we find the old plan of extermination definitely abandoned. The Welsh who chose to remain dwelt undisturbed among their English conquerors." Now, the value of the record at this point is high; whereas in regard to the account of the proceedings of the fifth century it is very low. And Green admits[4] that "we hardly know anything of the conquest of Mid-Britain, and little more of the conquest of the North." In all probability Offa compromised so readily with the Welsh just because there was already a great deal of Welsh blood in Mercia. Other scholars are now satisfied that many Britons were left in Central as in Western England, in the district of Deira, now Yorkshire, in Northumberland, Durham, and the East Scottish Lowlands.[5] And that Green had been proceeding less on his own study than on a foregone conception is shown by the oblivious way in which, after inserting the above cited passage on the absorption of the Eastern Welsh, he describes[6] the outcome of the Danish invasion of the ninth century:—

"The first sight of the Danes is as if the hand on the dial of history had gone back three hundred years. The same Norwegian fiords, the same Frisian sandbanks, pour forth their pirate fleets as in the

[1] P. 10.

[2] *Query*, What time? The "few" words are found to amount to some scores.

[3] P. 39. [4] P. 15.

[5] Prof. Sullivan, in *Encyc. Brit.* art on *Celtic Literature*.

[6] Pp. 42-43.

days of Hengest and Cerdic. There is the same wild panic as the black boats of the invaders strike inland along the river reaches, or moor round the river islets, the *same* sights of horror—firing of homesteads, slaughter of men, women driven off to *slavery and shame*, children tossed on pikes *or sold in the market-place*" [this after the express denial that there was any attempt by the first Saxons to keep captives] "as when the English invaders attacked Britain. Christian priests were again slain at the altar by worshippers of Woden, for the Danes were still heathen. Letters, arts, religion, governments disappeared before these Northmen as before the Northmen of old. But when the wild burst of the storm was over, land, people, government reappeared unchanged; England still remained England; the Danes sank quietly into the mass of those around them; and Woden yielded without a struggle to Christ. The secret of this difference between the two invasions was that the battle was no longer between men of different races. It was no longer a fight between Briton and German, between Englishman and Welshman. . . . Nowhere over Europe was the fight so fierce *because* nowhere else were the combatants men of one blood and one speech. But just for this reason the fusion of the Northmen with their foes was nowhere so *peaceful* and complete."

All the risks of the didactic-picturesque method of writing history are here signally illustrated. We had just been told of the complete and peaceful fusion of a mass of Britons with the Saxons under Offa, despite the difference of race and language; and we are to learn a few pages further on[1] that in the Scotch Lothians "the Scot kings were absorbed into the mass of their English subjects, and renounced their old Gaelic for the English tongue." We are in the same breath told that the fusion of Saxon and Dane came by way of an excessively fierce struggle, and that it was exceptionally "peaceful and complete" *because* of the identity of race. We are further told that "Woden yielded *without a struggle* to Christ." Yet on the next page we learn that the readiness of Northumbria, Mercia, and East-Anglia to accept of the Danish overlordship, as being preferable to that of the West-Saxons, "was another sign of the *enormous difficulty* of welding these kingdoms together into a single people"; and for a number of pages further we are to read of the retention of Danish laws where the Danes were strong, of the treacherous massacre of Danes in the year 1002, and of the four years of Swegen's revenge; the chapter closing with the statement that "Wessex, Mercia, and Northumbria remained separate political bodies which no efforts of force or policy seemed able to fuse."

[1] P. 53.

The formulas as to fusion without change are merely haphazard rhetoric, which is summarily quashed by the fresh generalisation in the next chapter[1] that

"Under Dane, Norman, or Angevin, *Englishmen were a subject race, conquered and ruled by foreign masters; and yet it was in these years of slavery that England really became the England that we know.*"

It becomes clear that Green generalised on the spur of the moment, as he went along, without pausing to check one thesis by another, without any going back to reconcile the medley. The result is that one almost ceases to attach any value to his summaries of periods. In the revised and illustrated posthumous edition published a few years ago, some of his generalisations are silently transformed, such as that on the legendary outcry of England against King John's submission to the Pope; but that is only one of many hasty propositions, being indeed partially based on apparent documentary evidence, whereas many of his general statements are gratuitous formulas, reached by imagination.

§ 3.

Returning to his estimates of Celtic and Teutonic character values, we find him yet again cancelling some of the most notable of his own generalisations. At the outset we are struck by the fact that, churchman as he was, he is ready to see more good in heathenism than in the contemporary Christianity; and indeed it is notable that, with his temperamental bias to a religious view of things, he is as a rule unhesitating in his avowals of the historic demerits of his order and his church. But it seems as if often it were only sentiment driving out sentiment. "The rage of the [Saxon] conquerors," he writes[2] "burnt fiercest against the clergy. River and homestead and boundary, the very days of the week, bore the names of the new Gods who displaced Christ. But if England for the moment seemed a waste from which all the civilization of the world had fled away, it contained within itself the germs of a nobler life than that which had been destroyed." Now, it is possible to construe the last sentence in a way which will reduce it to abstract truth; but the process reduces it at the same time to insignificance. As it stands, it inevitably suggests that the old British society was not only imperfect but contained within itself no "germs" capable

[1] P. 60. [2] P. 12.

of development. That would be a monstrous statement, seeing that on a similar basis to that of British Gaul was reared whatever of progressive civilisation Europe reachieved. The Britons certainly had among them as many "germs" of nobler life as had the ferocious horde who invaded them. Nor does Green's own history, finally, give the slightest proof that there *were* any "germs of nobler life" among the first Saxon invaders. He explicitly admits later, as we have seen, that after five hundred years of chronic intestine war the English seemed no nearer peaceful organisation than at the start; and the slight progress the race made in civilisation in that immense space of time was wholly due to foreign influences—the influence of the lettered Romish priesthood, Irish and Continental, and of European commerce. Why then is the formula about "germs" presented to us? All that survives of the proposition, on scrutiny, is the abstract fact that after some six or seven hundred weary years of semi-barbarism and bloodshed, including a fresh murderous conquest of Saxondom by Danes, and a further murderous conquest of the whole by Normans, there were to ensue some developments of art, science, and letters. If more then be asserted—if it be meant that the life of the first Saxons was nobler than that of the Roman Britons, the disproof lies in the next few pages. The invaders were admittedly semi-savages, who tossed children on pikes, flogged slaves to death, and burned alive women who ran away from bondage. It is only the long subsequent life of their remote descendants, mixed with foreign races, that can be pretended to show any progress in ethics. Would the historian then have ventured to suggest that the same or higher developments could not have taken place on the bases of the Romano-British civilisation had these been left untouched by Teutonic barbarism? It seems inconceivable; yet if he did not mean that the whole passage is but verbiage.

And when we turn to his record of and comment on the early history of the Irish Church, it would seem as if the idea of there being some "nobler germs" in Teutonic than in Celtic blood had been at least temporarily in Green's mind. He has a passage on the relative development of the Irish and English churches which almost necessarily implies that assumption, though it is confounded many times over by his own later propositions.

"Trivial, in fact, as were the points of difference which severed the Roman Church from the Irish, the question to which communion Northumbria should belong [in the seventh century] was of immense moment to the after fortunes of England. Had the church of Aidan

finally won [in the dispute on the keeping of Easter by the Eastern or the Western calendar] the later ecclesiastical history of England would probably have resembled that of Ireland. *Devoid of that power of organisation which was the strength of the Roman Church*, the Celtic Church in its own Irish home took the clan system of the country as the basis of church government. Trivial quarrels and ecclesiastical controversies became inextricably confounded : and the clergy, *robbed of all really spiritual influence*, contributed no element save that of disorder to the state. Hundreds of wandering bishops, a vast religious authority wielded by hereditary chieftains, the dissociation of piety from morality, the absence of those larger and more humanizing influences which contact with a wider world alone can give, this is the picture which the Irish Church of later times presents to us. It was from such a chaos as this that England was saved by the victory of Rome in the Synod of Whitby." [1]

Here again we have a generalisation made from hand to mouth, under some sectarian side-influence, without regard to the bulk of the relevant facts. It might be summarily disposed-of by reference to the simple facts that Ireland later became the typically docile branch of the Roman Church, and that a few pages earlier [2] the historian had been exhibiting the early Celtic Church as possessing an unparalleled power of organisation.

"While the vigour of Christianity in Italy and Gaul and Spain was exhausted in a bare struggle for life, Ireland, which remained unscourged by invaders, *drew from its conversion an energy such as it has never known since.* Christianity had been received there with a burst of popular enthusiasm, and letters and arts sprang up rapidly in its train. The science and Biblical knowledge which fled from the Continent took refuge in famous schools which make Durrow and Armagh the universities of the West. The new Christian life soon beat too strongly to brook confinement within the bounds of Ireland itself. Patrick, the first missionary of the island, had not been half a century dead when Irish Christianity flung itself with a fiery zeal into battle with the mass of heathenism which was rolling in upon the Christian world. Irish missionaries laboured among the Picts of the Highlands and among the Frisians of the northern seas. An Irish missionary, Columban, founded monasteries in Burgundy and the Apennines. The canton of St Gall still commemorates in its name another Irish missionary . . . [beside] . . . the Lake of Constance. For a time it seemed as if . . . Celtic and not Latin Christianity was to mould the destinies of the Churches of the West."

[1] Pp. 28-29. [2] P. 21.

This is a sufficiently headlong account of the matter; but in any case it quashes once for all the other passage cited as to the inherent lack of power of organisation in the primitive Irish Church. It is difficult to understand how one man could write both.

What happened in Ireland later, obviously, was not any mysterious loss of "power" of organisation, but simply a natural absorption of the sections of the Church into the different political interests, just as the Romish Church itself broke up later, and the Anglican still later, and as the Churches in England at this moment are being divided by the conflicting interests of classes. The early missionarism represented no united Irish Christianity, but simply certain centres of Christian zeal set up in Ireland. That the clergy "contributed no element save that of disorder to the state" is true of ancient Ireland as it is substantially true of all Christendom, age after age. And the historian, after speaking of the Irish priesthood as being in a special degree "robbed of all really spiritual influence," goes on obliviously to avow again and again that the English clergy, despite their Romanised organisation, were in the same case. We track these avowals through centuries of the record. Of the sequelæ of the Norman conquest we are told[1] that

> "The occupation of every see and abbacy by strangers who could only speak to their flocks in an unknown tongue *converted religion from a superstition to a reality as it passed from the priest to the people*, and *hermit and friar* carried spiritual life home to the heart of the nation at large."

Just before, under Edward the Confessor,

> "The Church sank into lethargy. . . . Stigand, the Archbishop of Canterbury, was the adherent of an anti-pope, and the highest dignity of the English Church was deliberately kept in a state of suspension. No ecclesiastical synod, no Church reform, broke the slumbers of its clergy."[2]

Again:[3]

> "The Conquest, as we have seen, *had robbed the Church of all moral power*"—

—exactly what was said to have happened in Ireland through Celtic deficiency in "power of organisation." To be sure, there

[1] P. 60. [2] P. 66. [3] P. 86.

is a fresh somersault to be turned when, after the account of the horrors of cruelty and anarchy in the reign of Stephen, we learn [1] that "England was rescued from this chaos of misrule by the efforts of the Church"—the simple fact being that the then Archbishop of Canterbury took an active part in inviting Henry the Second to come to England to secure the succession to the crown. After that, we revert to the *status quo*. In the satire of Walter Map, in the thirteenth century,

"Picture after picture strips the veil from the corruption of the mediæval Church, its indolence, its thirst for gain, its secret immorality." [2]

As for the Roman organisation, Archbishop Langton, "churchman as he was, protested against the royal homage to the Pope" [3] rendered by King John; and the Pope in turn formally annulled the Great Charter. [4] As regards culture, physical science, "so long crushed as magic by the dominant ecclesiasticism," [5] was only revived by Moslem contact. The Roman organisation flourishing, "presentations to benefices were sold in the papal market, while Italian clergy were quartered on the best livings of the Church," so that a large section of the population declared that they "preferred to die rather than be ruined by the Romans." [6] Thus the salutary organisation found that "its religious hold on the people was loosening day by day;" [7] and when an Archbishop of York was excommunicated, "the people blessed him the more, the more the Pope cursed him," even as might have happened in Hibernia. And it was not only the gifted organisation of Rome, with its power of curing chaos, that thus worked ill. England, saved from chaos, was yet tolerably chaotic:—

"The same loss of spiritual power, the same severance from national feeling, was seen [13th c.] in the English Church itself. Plundered and humiliated as they were by Rome, the worldliness of the bishops, the oppression of their ecclesiastical courts, the disuse of preaching, the decline of the monastic orders into rich landowners, the non-residence and ignorance of the parish priests, *robbed the clergy*"—once more! "*of all spiritual influence*." [8]

Thus it came about that, when forced by Edward I. to take part in Parliament, the clergy "sat jealously by themselves," and finally "flung away a power which, had they retained it, would

[1] P. 99. [2] P. 115. [3] P. 122. [4] P. 125.
[5] P. 133. [6] P. 139. [7] P. 143. [8] P. 144.

have ruinously hampered the healthy development of the state."[1] So that the generalisation as to the blessed differentiation between the systems of the English and Irish branches of the Catholic Church ends in smoke.

Who will may follow the track further, noting the English Church in the fourteenth century as "shrivelled into a self-seeking secular priesthood"[2]—"Never had her spiritual or moral hold on the nation been less[3]"—small as it has seemed at all points of our survey. "If extortion and tyranny . . . severed the English clergy from the Papacy, their own selfishness severed them from the nation at large."[4] And so on, through the ages, till we learn,[5] after the Restoration, that the Church of England "stands alone among all the religious bodies of Western Christendom in its failure through two hundred years to devise a single new service of prayer or praise." We are forced to conclude that the historian, after putting down certain generalisations at a venture, has forgotten all about them, making fresh generalisations of contrary purport with no sense of anything being wrong. Thus one by one every general principle he has laid down concerning Celtic and Teutonic characteristics is destroyed by his own commentary as well as by his narrative.

It is unnecessary, in this connection, to carry criticism of Green's work any further. I am the less desirous to do so because, apart from the conventional falsisms above dealt with, he shows no persistent racial animosity. His account of the later relations between Ireland and England is substantially impartial, and when he speaks[6] of the "tenacious obstinacy" of the Celtic race, it is not with any air of making "tenacity" a vice in Celts, as is done at times by those wiseacres who quote Cæsar on the fickleness of the Galli and make "persistence" a merit in Teutons. Green's history, in fact, becomes more solid and more sober as he approaches the modern period, in which he was supposed to take a less vivid interest, but for which he had so much more material, so much better guidance, than for his presentment of what he later called "the making of England"—in defiance of his own avowal that the making of England took place from the Danish Conquest to the time of Edward the First. His weakness for hand-to-mouth generalisa-

[1] P. 174. [2] P. 216. [3] P. 227.
[4] P. 230. [5] P. 610. [6] P. 444.

tion subsists, of course, even when he gets past that period; so that among others we have the unhappy dictum[1] that the invention of the Cabinet system by Lord Sunderland, "a man whose political character was of the lowest type," at a time when the character of Parliament had fallen about as low, proves the "inborn political capacity of the English mind." But it is significant that Green's worst miscarriages occur where, dealing with the remote facts of race history, he catches at those formulas of race characterisation which, as we have seen, are in origin but the devices of unscientific men to make ignorant prejudice pass for knowledge. That such a sympathetic spirit could be satisfied with such formulas is indeed a reason for refusing to suppose that they always promote malice, or that it is merely malice which embraces them; but on the other hand the tissue of contradiction into which they have led such a historian is one more lesson to others, if any more be needed, of the utter vanity of racial prepossessions as lights on racial history. Green was without doubt a conscientious historian; but the study of him leaves us realising that the ideal historian must be more conscientious still. He must learn that his reflections, his theories, his generalities, need to be as narrowly tested as his facts—nay, much more narrowly, because where a fact may be established by a few documents, a sound generalisation can be framed only by taking into account at once all the relevant facts known, and reasoning on them with a vigilance of logic proportionate to the scope of the truth at stake.

[1] P. 681.

VI.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL ON IRISH HISTORY.

It is a somewhat piquant fact in the sociological discussion over Ireland that one of the most zealous, vivacious, and ingenious of the special pleadings against "the Celt" in his Irish aspect is the work of one who is commonly regarded as a Celtic chief. Whether the Duke of Argyll be really a Celt in any sense is put by himself in a little doubt. He speaks[1] of "Scotchmen who, like myself, have the same special share that he [Edward Bruce] had in the ancient Celtic blood of the Irish Scoti." Now, the Bruces were a Norman house, who had married into the Scoto-Celtic royal family after it had been mixed with the Saxon line, so that the "special share" of the ancient Celtic blood in their veins must have been very special indeed to be recognisable. If the Duke is not more Celtic than that, he may feel quite complacent over the difference between his ancestry and that of most of the men who pay his rents. Under the guidance of Dr Hill Burton, many of our modern Highland chiefs have had that solace.

For the purposes of this discussion, however, it matters very little how "the MacCallum More"[2] came to have his Celtic name and following. We have to do with his Grace's politics and historiography, not his pedigree. He has the creditable status of being one of the very few Dukes who can write; and in his *Irish Nationalism: an appeal to History*, he has done something to meet the reproach of Mr Gladstone, that Unionists as a rule fight very shy of history. He has indeed given Mr Gladstone a fall on the very ground on which he so confidently challenged attack; the Duke's great advantage in the polemic being that he had some of Mr Gladstone's historic formulas to

[1] *Irish Nationalism*, p. 114.

[2] "The great MacCallum"—the proverbial Gaelic appellation of the head of the house of Argyll. Callum seems to equate with Campbell, which is pronounced Cammel; but the name as spelt is traced to the form Campobello, and so connected with the Normans.

grip upon. Mr Gladstone is an inexact and unscientific writer and thinker, who in a dispute of any breadth is pretty sure to give fine opportunities to an antagonist; and the Duke of Argyll in this case makes the very most of those presented to him. Not that he in turn is exact or scientific: he is really not more so than Mr Gladstone, whose intellectual history corresponds rather closely in some ways with his own. In both men the decisive intellectual limitation exhibits itself in their way of maintaining the opinions in which they were born and bred; and if Mr Gladstone has in certain respects delivered himself from his inheritance where the Duke has not, it may be rather by reason of the pressure of accidents, of political circumstances, than by force of any greater capacity of overruling prejudice at the behest of truth. What neither man has ever done is to pass through the discipline of reluctantly realising that certain of his inherited beliefs are delusions, and of reaching sounder conviction, not by way of mere adaptation to circumstances but by dint of patient analysis and loyal logic. And it may be said with confidence that no man ever attains efficiency as a thinker who has not gone through that experience. The final mark of philosophic mediocrity (by which is not at all meant mediocrity in general capacity) is a persistent adherence either to inherited dogmas or to opinions which are merely the expression of self-interest. When it is possible to feel concerning a disputant, that if born a Mohammedan he would have defended Islam as he defends Christism, or that if born a workman or peasant he would have disliked landlordism as much as he now esteems it, he ceases to be for us anything like a first-rate intellectual force. And that, unfortunately, is how Mr Gladstone and the Duke of Argyll, industrious reasoners as they are, have taught us to feel concerning them. In the case of the Duke one sometimes wonders whether a totally different fortune, to begin with, might not have developed in him a more valid capacity. Born to the purple, and desultorily educated, he began in his youth vindicating the opinions he had received from his surroundings, exhibiting in the process intelligence, dexterity, fair application, literary talent—everything but that vital power of reconsideration, that height of outlook, which marks a man out as really a true or great thinker. Had the young peer been a young commoner, born to labour rather than to dilettantism, he might perchance have turned out differently. But then a peer has such boons of leisure and freedom of view, that if he has but the requisite brain convolutions he ought surely to come to the

use of them. We end by suspecting that the defect is congenital, and that, save for what might have been gained to each mind by a rational culture and discipline from childhood, the Duke and Mr Gladstone alike have made the most of their potentialities.

In this case, the result is indirectly edifying. Mr Gladstone, after living to a ripe age in the midst of affairs, suddenly published his decision that it would be a good thing to concede Home Rule to Ireland. He states as the reason for the suddenness of his decision that he could not before 1885 have foreseen that Mr Parnell and his party would be willing to accept Home Rule without Separation.[1] Yet Mr Gladstone does not pretend that he had ever indicated willingness to concede Home Rule to those who formerly asked for it, without Separation. He avows that the subject had been in his mind before the time of his decision, and that he had yet never taken one of his colleagues into his confidence. He contends that this was a perfectly proper line of action.[2] And such is his idea of the way in which great political reforms are to be carried, that he apparently expected his party in mass to accept his decision, and to grant Home Rule to Ireland, without preparation, without gradual persuasion, without any semblance of a transition stage between the attitude of utter repudiation of Home Rule and the attitude of acceptance. To judge from this and other declarations, Mr Gladstone believes that the business of a political leader is not to educate the electorate, not to plan future courses on principle, not to create any body of coherent political opinion, but simply to wait for the upshot of elections, and propose bills in terms of the position of parties. This last, as a matter of fact, is what he did in the case of Home Rule. But inasmuch as he continued to agitate vigorously for Home Rule after his first defeat, in the face of a heavy majority, it is clear that he does not consistently adapt his policy to the state of parties, but that on the contrary he strives determinedly to bring the balance of parties round to his policy, *once he has embraced one.* The trouble is, that his choice of policy to begin with, though always the expression of a real concern for justice and righteousness, has never been guided by any reasoned set of political principles. He is, in brief, an opportunist; and the reason why he has had so much success of esteem as well as of achievement is that after all he is an opportunist with a conscience—a paradoxical combination which has bewildered as well as exasperated opponents. If Mr

[1] *Special Aspects of the Irish Question*, p. 5. [2] *Id.*, p. 6.

Gladstone had fought connectedly and foreseeingly for good causes, taking them up on principle before he was in any way coerced to it, with half the zeal and power with which he has fought for them after they had become identified with his leadership and his retention or recovery of power, he would easily rank as the best and greatest of modern statesmen. As it is, he still ranks among the most benevolent; but for the advantage given by his moral prestige the cause of Liberalism has had to pay a heavy penalty in chronic confusion and loss of character for consistency.

As regards the Irish question, Mr Gladstone's later utterances of course condemn his earlier practice, or at least convict him of long failure to see what he now declares to be the truth. When he was of mature age, he applauded the Act of Union, which he now declares to have been a disgraceful performance. In his old age he began to indict England as the cause of all Ireland's woes from the Strongbow invasion onwards. If the truth be so, he ought to have known and acted upon it long ago, the history of the matter being as legible to him then as now. Reaching his conclusions thus behind time and in haste, he has put part of the case loosely and rhetorically: and here it is that he gives the Duke of Argyll his opportunity. "Who," Mr Gladstone asked, in reply to some of the customary charges of Englishmen against the Irish,—"Who made the Irishman? The Irish, in very old times indeed, if you go back to the earlier stages of Christianity, were among the leaders of Christendom. But WE went among them: WE sent among them members of our own race. These were mixed with the Irish; and ever since our blood has been mixed with theirs there has been endless trouble and difficulty."[1] This, of course, is very loose rhetoric. The Irish had ceased to be in any sense leaders in Christendom for centuries before the Norman invasion; their life had been full of trouble and difficulty during these centuries, and before; and their civilisation showed few or no signs of progress at the moment of Norman intervention. The "WE," too, is of course a very loose way of speaking. To identify ourselves with our supposed ancestors of seven hundred years ago can help nobody to realise past events. By the use of such language, Mr Gladstone has given critical people the right to distrust him as an interpreter of political history. Even when he asserts that "Ireland for more than seven hundred years has been part of the British territory, and has been with slight exceptions held by

[1] Speech cited from *Times*, May 12, 1887.

English arms, or governed in the last resort from this side of the water,"[1] he is gratuitously misleading, seeing that during whole centuries of the period marked-off, Ireland was only in small part held by English arms, or governed from England in first or last resort. Such assertions as these, with many others by less responsible politicians than Mr Gladstone, are among the stumbling-blocks of the cause of Irish Nationalism. False historic statement gives opponents their best opportunity. And the Duke of Argyll's book on Irish Nationalism, which he calls an appeal to history, is in the main a forensic parade round these random sentences of Mr Gladstone, varied by cuts at similar utterances of O'Connell, and politer attacks on some of the historical verdicts of Professor Richey and Mr Lecky.

For its own part, as might have been expected, the Duke's book is as one-sided in spirit, and fully as misleading in purport, as the accounts given by the school of O'Connell, which was merely forensic with a difference; and it can in no way compare as a sociological survey with the works of Dr Richey and Mr Lecky. The Duke admits these writers to be in the main laudably impartial historians. No critic could make that admission concerning the Duke. He begins by vehemently lamenting that "Truth in the hands of a casuist, morals in the hands of a Jesuit, facts in the hands of a special pleader,—all these combined are but a feeble image of the fate of history when it is put to use by professional politicians. And when this position is held by any man who is, or finds it convenient to assume the character of an Ethnogogue,[2] then the corrupting influence is aggravated to an intense degree." On this one is led to ask what character the Duke supposes himself to be playing in this work? Does he suppose he is not a special pleader, not a professional politician? Does he suppose that if it constitutes a man an Ethnagogue to plead the cause of Ireland against England, he is no Ethnagogue who maintains on the contrary that England has been substantially blameless, and Ireland always to blame?

For that is the Duke's thesis, put baldly. As we shall see, he feels bound occasionally to assume the virtue he has not, and to avow that in a certain sense, under special qualifications, and with careful reservations, "England" may be said to have sometimes played an ill part in regard to Ireland. But that is only an agreeable forensic strategy: the Duke's purpose, the purport

[1] *Special Aspects*, p. 109.

[2] This word has been coined by Mr Gladstone, who however spells it "ethnagogue." (*Special Aspects*, p. 269.)

of nine-tenths of his book, is to make out that Irishmen have been generally in the wrong and Englishmen generally in the right, in regard to Irish troubles. To this task he brings the methods of all the types whom he has so ingenuously subordinated to the professional politician—to wit, the casuist, the jesuit, the special pleader. And it remains a historic fact that he is all the while a professional politician—as much so as Mr Gladstone, whose colleague he once was. He has held office; he seeks to influence elections; he has his personal and his class interests to serve as a legislator.

But, putting aside questions of qualification, let us take the Duke's work on its merits. We may pass as substantially valid the bulk of his polemic against Mr Gladstone and O'Connell on the subject of the so-called conquest of Ireland in the twelfth century. We may even admit that it was worth while to controvert erroneous statements on that head. It is the device of the disingenuous critic, when a point in controversy has been made clear by polemic, to pretend that the polemic was not worth while. When errors are reiterated by prominent men, it must always be worth while to expose them, if there is to be any concern at all for truth as truth. The Duke, then, is entitled to his measure of triumph, though, to be sure, it cost him no great research to get at the facts about the invasion of Ireland under Henry II. Even at this stage, however, it is necessary to expose the misrepresentations with which the Duke contrives to pack his side of the case while protesting against misrepresentations on the other side.

1. He asserts[1] that "even the Romanised natives of Britain" had a "splendid literature and art" beside which those of early Christian Ireland "pale a feeble and ineffectual light." This is simple nonsense. The sole literary work left by Roman Britain is the history of the monk Gildas, which is certainly not splendid.

2. He deliberately takes[2] one of the oldest entries in the Annals of the Four Masters, that for the year 10 of the Christian era, telling of a massacre by Carbre the Cat-headed, and sets it down as genuine history; proceeding next to take an entry for the year 227, which tells how Dunlang king of Leinster killed in Munster "thirty royal girls" and "a hundred maids with each of them." No critical reader can accept such a record, with such a date, as real history. It has every appearance of being a redacted myth.[3]

[1] *Irish Nationalism*, p. 17.

[2] *Id.*, p. 23.

[3] Cp. Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., pp. 63-64.

3. In picturing the Irish people during the first seven centuries of our era, the Duke carefully suppresses the fact that the peoples of Anglo-Saxon England lived just such a life of internecine war as did the tribes of Ireland, and that the Saxon invaders of England killed not only women but babes.

4. Alleging that the condition of Ireland from the date of the establishment of Christianity, about 450, went "from bad to worse" for six hundred years—a statement as loose as any of Mr Gladstone's—the Duke asserts[1] that "this steady and continuous decline had gone on *notwithstanding long contact and perfect familiarity with the high civilisation of Roman Britain.*" This is really a much worse sample of "inflated fable" than anything the Duke cites from Mr Gladstone. The sole justification offered for the statement I have italicised is the following:—

> "Hundreds, and even in some cases thousands, of Roman coins have been found in Ireland—coins of the first and second centuries. For some centuries the Irish were continually attempting to conquer Britain. For ten years in the middle of the fourth century they are said to have at least partially succeeded, till beaten and expelled by Theodosius in 369. It cannot be said, therefore, that isolation alone, so far as mere knowledge is concerned, was the cause of the long continuance of Irish barbarism. They had seen what civilisation was, and what government meant. And having seen both, the Irish chiefs returned to their own country as chaotic as before, and as incapable of laying even the rudest foundations of civilised condition among their own people."

From this it may be seen what manner of critical conscience rules the Duke, with all his indignant outcry over the "inflated fable" of Mr Gladstone. He builds up a case of concrete censure of the early Irish on the merest shadow of foundation. He has not given the semblance of a proof of a "long contact and perfect familiarity" on the part of the Irish with the civilisation of Roman Britain. Hoards of coins prove nothing but plunder. Such a statement, on such evidence, really amounts to fabrication. The statement that the Irish chiefs "had seen what government meant," and that they returned "incapable of laying even the rudest foundations of civilised condition," is mere reckless romancing. The Duke cannot possibly know whether the Irish chiefs in question did or did not try to set up new foundations among their own people, or what they saw in Britain. He is making a series of specific assertions without the slightest

[1] Work cited, p. 25.

knowledge to justify them. And it is after the extravagant passage above cited that he has the phrase, "But even *these facts, striking though they be*, are an inadequate exposure of Mr Gladstone's 'inflated fable.'"

Already it is easy to see in what a spirit of prejudice and partisanship the Duke had entered on his task. It may be said for him that he was provoked by the inaccuracies of Mr Gladstone, and by the common Irish tendency to make out Ireland always white and England always black in their interrelations. But if he had looked into the matter with some of the philosophic temper to which he constantly makes pretension, he would have seen that the Irish charges against England are constantly being inspired by gratuitous English attacks on Ireland. A hundred times during the present century Irishmen have approached England with simple appeals for legislative redress, saying nothing of old wrongs; and invariably they have been met with the answer that their troubles are their own fault; that it is their incompetence for industry or agriculture or what not, their shiftlessness and their Celticity, that keeps Ireland backward. It was Mr Bright who pointed out, in his pre-Unionist days, how the appeals of Ireland for help had been met "often by denial, often by insult, often by contempt." That stupid English censure should be met by sharper censure of England as the immemorial oppressor and barbariser of Ireland is a matter of course. And if Englishmen are never to be wiser than the Duke of Argyll, the recrimination may go on forever. As we have seen, he meets extravagance with extravagance, and spleen with spleen. Always claiming to be dispassionate and philosophic, he never for more than a breath gets outside of the atmosphere of reciprocal vituperation.

At times, as I have said, he does come within sight of a scientific standpoint. For instance, such a passage as this:—

"The first and most fundamental of all Irish disadvantages is geographical position. It was a condition involving a long train of consequences. It segregated Ireland from the great stream of European history. It precluded her from the unspeakable benefits of Roman conquest. It kept her away from the civilisation of the Latin Church. It effectually prevented her later subjugation by any superior race. It stereotyped barbarous customs, and prolonged them even to our own day. All happier influences seemed to stop when they landed on the shores of England. There they remained; and nobody cared to push across that narrow sea, into a land covered with dense forests and bogs, inhabited by fierce tribes with no posses-

sions tempting to a comparatively civilised intruder. In later days England seemed to intercept geographically even the benefits of commerce. I have heard the feeling on this matter strikingly expressed by a very clever woman of Irish blood and of Irish marriage, the late Lady Clanricarde—the daughter of George Canning, and the sister of Lord Canning, Governor-General of India. 'You,' she said addressing an Englishman, 'have always been like a high garden wall standing between us and the sun.'"

But even here we have the Conservative animus. The writer here suppresses facts which he has elsewhere recognised: he even states the reverse. It is not true that the geographical position of Ireland "effectually prevented her later subjugation by any superior race"—unless the Duke means that the English were after all not a superior race. He knows that Ireland *was* effectually subjugated by England at least thrice,—under Elizabeth and James, under Cromwell, under William. And when he says that England *seemed* to intercept geographically even the benefits of commerce, he knows perfectly well that England had first of all wilfully and zealously *striven* to destroy the commercial advantages of Ireland. And when he further puts it that every enemy tried to get at England through the back door of Ireland, he will not see that if England had conciliated instead of oppressing Ireland the enemy would have had no more chance at the back than at the front door.

The Duke goes on to point out how far the lack of coal in Ireland has determined the different development of the parts of the British Islands in recent times. But he is evidently much more happy when he is charging economic sins on the Irish Parliament of last century. And the why is obvious. To recognise the past relation of the countries as one in which the people of Ireland suffered inevitably in the nature of things, "England" helplessly playing the part of the high wall between them and the sun—to recognise this would be to admit that it is now the business not only of "England" but of the English legislature to do something to counteract the fatality, which ceases to be irresistible when it is understood. But of course the Duke of Argyll cannot agree to any such course. He is pledged to keep Ireland subordinate to England; pledged to keep the mainly agricultural country under a system of government which, relatively tolerable in a mainly industrial country, is in the other fatal to well-being. So he must perforce fall back on all manner of charges against the Irish people—must seek to convince himself and others that the fault lies not in the

land system of which he is a champion and a representative, and from which he gets his wealth, but in the people who pay the rents and get the worst of it.

When the Duke is not directly scolding the Irish, ancient or modern, he is indirectly representing them as congenitally inferior to their neighbours. Thus when he is dealing with the Hibernization of the Normans in Ireland (a fact which might serve to illustrate for any one the truth that it is environment and not race that determines civilisation), he treats the phenomenon as a sad succumbing of the good to the bad, a deplorable yielding not merely of good manners to evil communications, but of the higher species to the lower.

"Even in Scotland," he writes,[1] "we did not altogether escape the Irish danger. Those colonists of Norman blood—and they were many—who pushed forward beyond the central and eastern area in which all the civilisation of Scotland has begun, and from which alone it spread—those Normans who wandered far into the predominantly Celtic area, and who married and settled there—were often tempted to fall, and did sometimes actually fall, under the same influences by which the Anglo-Irish were so fatally seduced."

Now, from the point of view of rational sociology, the phenomenon dealt with simply proves that the Normans in question were themselves but slightly civilised, and had in them no civilising virtue. It is not true that, as the Duke says, they "carried onwards and upwards" the preceding civilisation in England. It was not they, not the invaders, who did the carrying on; it was the culture behind them. Their civilisation was absolutely dependent on the post-Roman, with which they had been lightly inoculated in France; and save for fresh and prolonged contact with Europe, Norman England would have stagnated just as did Saxon England. The Norman, in fact, got his civilisation, such as it was, through the medium of a race which was presumably kindred with that which he encountered in Ireland and in "Celtic" Scotland. There were civilised "Celts" before there were civilised Normans. Then the Duke of Argyll's way of putting things—the tactic of ascribing to the Normans "strong and manly natures" and to the Irish an innate bias to anarchy—is a mere appeal to race prejudice. Believing himself to be in the main a Norman, he does but play the ethnagogue in his own house.

In no other way does it seem possible to explain the Duke's

[1] P. 47.

chronic relapse from the semblance of social science into the language of the race-partisan. He quotes in one place[1] with approval the remarkable utterance of Henry the Eighth's Irish Council in 1533 :—"As to the surmise of the bruteness of the people, and the incivility of them, no doubt, if there were justice used among them, they would be found as civil, wise, and polite, and as active as any nation." "*This*," says the Duke, "*is the truth*"; and he admits the abundant testimony of English writers in the Tudor period to "the many elements of natural genius and virtue in the Irish character."[2] Yet he leaves standing, without a misgiving, such phrases of his own as : "that great body of the Celtic people in the *very soil of whose mind* these ancient [semi-barbaric] customs were *indelibly rooted*";[3] and "a flaw due to the *ineradicable effects* of the old Irish character."[4] His admission as to the excellences of the Irish character in Tudor times is of itself enough to overthrow his whole anti-Irish case ; for by his own showing these merits had been developed in an age in which England had only partially begun to control Irish life. He is always arguing that in the centuries between Henry II. and Elizabeth there had been no possibility of effective English rule, and that the native life was a mere tissue of warfare, massacre, and anarchy. Yet it is out of that state of things that there comes a people for whom, by the admission of English men of affairs, there was needed only justice to make them "as civil, wise, and polite, and as active as any nation." Then there is something wrong with the Duke's picture. Speaking with his own voice, the voice of the landlord and the hereditary legislator, he says,[5]

> "It cannot be too often repeated that what was peculiar to the Celts of Ireland was the survival and even the exaggeration of this custom [coyne and livery] and other equally barbarous customs for long centuries, *during which all other races had grown out of them and cast them off*."

Here again we have something worse than inflated fable. The implication is that other northern races by virtue of their progressiveness rose above customs in which the Celts remained immovable. This is essentially untrue. Not one of the northern races "grew" out of barbarism. One and all were aided or levered out, by the direct or indirect force of the political and cultural civilisation which had anciently grown up in the region of the Mediterranean, and which spread to north-western

[1] P. 147. [2] P. 149. [3] P. 59. [4] P. 114. [5] P. 58.

Europe by way of Italy. It is true that the northern races, once moved, repeatedly reacted for good: such reaction is one of the great forces of progress in civilisation; and the recognition of it, one would think, might once for all lead all civilised races to bury their animal jealousies and barbaric antipathies, knowing that each can in some way help all. But that the northern races would never have reached civilisation save for the southern contact is clear from every stage in their early and mediæval history; and the one difference between the Irish and the other northern peoples was simply that, as the Duke of Argyll elsewhere unwittingly admits,[1] they were "geographically so situated as to be cut off from all the reforming and renovating currents of European history"—England supplying no such aid. Even this admission the Duke cannot make without interjecting that the effect of survivals "is enormous *among Celts especially*, and most enormous of all among Irish Celts"—this in speaking of Irish life at a period when Ireland had been three times colonised by England, and concerning which Mr Lecky (whom the Duke at this point does not attempt to impugn) decides, on the authority among others of Sir John Davies that the Irish population had by that time become predominantly Anglo-Saxon![2]

If the reader has any doubt left as to the element of race bias in the Duke's mind, he may have it cleared up by the passage in which his Grace expresses himself on the subject of the Irish share in the English invasion of Scotland. It is a singular sample of self-revelation:—

"If we are to allow ourselves to be irrationally affected in our readings and judgments of history by either racial, family, or even the lower forms of national sentiment, I should heartily sympathise with the famous attempt of Edward Bruce to do in Ireland a work at least superficially like the great work his brother had done in Scotland. Scotchmen who, *like myself*, have the same special share that he had in the ancient Celtic blood of the Irish Scoti—who admire as we all do the heroic character of 'The Bruce'—who *are disposed to remember with resentment* the ready help which *Irishmen* then gave, and often have since given, to the enemies of Scottish liberty,—we might be tempted to cherish a natural sympathy with the invasion of Ireland by the Bruces in 1315. But for those who look in History, above all

[1] Pp. 233-234.

[2] As above stated, I do not accept the estimate of Davies. But the Duke does not reject it; and in any case the English ingerence had been overwhelming.

things, for the steps of human progress, and who desire to know the causes of its arrestment or decline, *it is impossible to be guided by such childish sentiments.*"[1]

The last sentence is open to question, if the Duke means it to apply to himself. The only way to escape being guided by childish sentiments is to cease to entertain them. But the Duke ingenuously confesses that he does entertain them. He is actually "disposed to remember with resentment"—resentment against Irishmen — the fact that when the Edwards invaded Scotland they had in their host Irish contingents, these contingents being led by *Anglo-Irish barons*, who brought into the field, at their overlord's behest, their Irish retainers. Knowing this, stating this, the Duke asserts[2] that "*the Irish* of *both breeds* did their *very best* to rivet the yoke of England on the rising kingdom which had been established in Scotland by the happy union and common allegiance of both the Celtic and Teutonic races there." I can only say that this way of writing history seems to me miserably unworthy of a statesman. Before reading the Duke's book, I could not have believed that any educated man in Scotland was capable of harbouring a grudge against Irishmen in the mass because certain Norman barons in Ireland about the thirteenth century led to Falkirk and to Bannockburn some troops of the poor devils of kerns over whom they ruled. I have seen nothing in anti-English writing by Irishmen to compare with the Duke of Argyll's remark that in respect of that episode "the Irish of both breeds did their best" to subject Scotland, when as a matter of fact, as he has just been noting, a number of the really Irish chiefs just afterwards invited Edward Bruce to come and be their king and deliver them from the English. The Duke may well talk of being "irrationally affected" by racial and familial and the lower forms of national sentiment. His own avowed sentiment is irrational to the last degree. If it were in any way rational it would be extended to England, the real aggressor in the case; whereas the Duke (being a "Norman" and an English landholder) is resentful only towards the supposititious descendants of the Irish kerns whose Norman leaders led them against Robert the Bruce — descendants who are in these days to be presumed to be Home Rulers. Perhaps the finishing touch of the whole absurdity is this, that the predecessor (I suppose he was not the ancestor: the Duke's family got its lands in another fashion) of the lord of Argyll

[1] Pp. 114-115. [2] P. 113.

in the time of the Scottish War of Independence *was the zealous liegeman of the English king.* I do not remember how the genealogies go; but when I went to school in Scotland we were taught, among other things, that the Lord of Lorne was one of the most determined enemies of Robert the Bruce, who on one occasion had much ado to escape his blood-hounds. Surely his Grace of Argyll might have let those sleeping dogs lie.

It would be unprofitable, if it were not a little wearisome, to go in close detail through the polemic of a writer who meets the charges of Irishmen against England by taunting them with the fact that some of the presumable ancestors of some of them assassinated the elder brother of Brian Boru. Let it suffice, then, to summarise the Duke's argument against Irish nationalism. It may be condensed thus :—

1. England, after intervening in Ireland, was not at all in a position to complete her conquest. Therefore she is not to be blamed for having failed to civilise Ireland in the period between Henry II. and Henry VIII. Besides, anything the Irish suffered for a long time after 1315 was due to their own fault in inviting Edward Bruce.

2. England was nevertheless bound to keep her foot in Ireland, and so to prevent any civilising contact between it and any other European State.

3. Irishmen having been thus "left to themselves," they alone are to blame for all their troubles between 1172 and 1534, as in the ages before. "The Irish made themselves."

4. In 1535, Irish Catholicism set up a new danger for England, so that she had to conquer Ireland afresh. Confiscation was a natural part of such fresh conquest, and was justified "upon *every* ground which has been *universally* acted upon by *all* nations and governments in the history of the world. There is not a civilised people now existing in Europe which is not living on 'confiscated land.'" [1]

5. In the same way, Ireland had to be subjugated afresh under Elizabeth in the interests of Protestantism, Protestant England being then "the one great mainstay and defence of *all* the liberties, political and intellectual, of the civilised world." [2] Anything done to that end cannot be chargeable against England.

6. As the seventeenth century was "mainly occupied by the completion of the necessary work of conquest," it "*must be withdrawn absolutely from our reckoning of the time during*

[1] P. 174. [2] P. 183.

which Ireland was in any proper sense of the term under the Government of England."[1] As for the stealing of Irishmen's land by covetous Englishmen, "we may well ask whether it is worse to covet land for the purpose of planting a higher civilisation than to covet cattle for no other purpose than that of mere plunder and robbery."[2] And as regards the persecution of Catholics, we must remember that on the continent Catholics persecuted Protestants. Besides, Catholics in general were always wanting to destroy Protestantism. Therefore England was quite justified in wanting to destroy Catholicism in Ireland. And whereas Catholics were religious persecutors, Protestants were thus acting merely on political grounds. They had to harry the Irish people in order to spite the Pope, because the Catholic Church had "inspired the atrocities of Alva in the Low Countries, and dictated the Massacre of St Bartholomew in France"[3]—in the previous century. In short, the conduct of England towards Ireland in the seventeenth century was "dictated by motives, and under conditions, of almost insuperably coercive strength."[4]

7. In the eighteenth century it was very much the same. England no doubt acted on a selfish policy towards Ireland, "but England was not one whit more selfish than all other nations at the same time; and she acted on precisely the same policy, not only *towards Scotland* but towards her own Colonies and Plantations."[5] So Irishmen had nothing special to complain of. Besides "commercial restrictions are harmless examples indeed" of exclusive dealing "compared with other applications of the same doctrines," to wit, boycotting. So that Irishmen to-day are worse than the Englishmen of last century. Q.E.D. Finally, the Irish Parliament of last century gave bounties to encourage Irish agriculture against English, even after England had "begun to relax her selfish policy" and was "on the way" to other improvements. They thus reached "about the high-watermark of human folly." So much for the eighteenth century.

8. On the whole, England did a great deal of good to Ireland by substituting, in the seventeenth century, English tenures for the old Irish tenures. "*But it was too late.* Many centuries of archaic usages . . . had left the Irish people in a condition of extreme poverty, and of utter helplessness as regarded any power of emerging from that condition."[6] So it is clear that no blame can attach to England.

Such is the Duke's argument, reduced to its logical essentials,

[1] P. 195. [2] P. 194. [3] P. 212.
[4] P. 204. [5] P. 216. [6] P. 236.

and relieved of a quantity of irrelevant or self-contradictory rhetoric. I am disposed to pronounce it the most grotesque process of quasi-sociological reasoning in recent literature. The only thing that saves it from being quite ridiculous even in the Duke's pages is his tactic of inserting every now and then a phrase of concession to common sense and common justice. Every little while, when it is necessary to urge that the politics of distant times cannot be adjudged of in terms of the codes of to-day, he will admit that the Irish of the past are not to be so judged any more than the English. But the real object of the concession is always to whitewash England; and as soon as her defence is thus accomplished the tar-brush is rapidly applied once more to Ireland. Thus the worst crimes of England are made light of on the score that she was no worse than other nations, and did no worse by Ireland than by Scotland and the American Colonies; while the alleged economic errors of the Irish Parliament of a century ago are denounced through page after page, and branded as "the high-water mark of human folly." In the same way, all Protestant persecution of Irish Catholics is made out an act of purely political self-defence against continental Catholicism; while the Catholic action, on the other hand, is without any excuse.

I am in doubt whether it may not be well to leave the Duke's precious argumentation to do its own work, without hampering the process by further explicit corrections of any of his misrepresentations. When one reflects, however, that such a book as his can pass current as good reasoning with a powerful party, and can keep for him the status of an eminent politician, it seems as well to supply some of the simple historical knowledge needed for the full comprehension of his untrustworthiness. It may be put, like the gist of his own thesis, in a compressed form. And it may begin by showing that on the Duke's own admission the English kings after Henry II. *might* have done much better by Ireland than they did.

1. The Duke's words on this head are:—

"Their long, bloody, and exhausting wars to establish a separate kingdom in France were, in the light of our day, not only useless, bu mischievous and even wicked. If they had only spent one-half the energy thus worse than wasted, in completing the civilisation of their own country, and in effectually establishing their authority over Ireland as an integral part of their dominions, the gain to themselves, and so far as we can see, to us even now, would have been untold."

Of course, after such a passage the Duke had to explain that he meant nothing by it, going on: "*But such judgments and speculations are worse than idle*—unless, indeed, we take them as lessons in the mysterious course of human follies since the world began." And of course no sound Conservative will meddle with such considerations as that. He will indulge in "such judgments and speculations" only by way of showimg what a bad lot the Irish always were. Still, it appears from the Duke's reverie[1] that the blindness and egoism of the English kings wrought evilly for Ireland. And though that is a point hardly worth proving now for its own sake, it is quite relevant as part of the proof to living Englishmen that England in the past has been a "high wall between Ireland and the sun," and that it is their duty to change the situation. If England was bound to keep Ireland from healthful contact with other States in the past, the more reason why she should do something in a contrary direction now.

2. The introduction and maintenance of an alien and bitterly hostile force in Ireland was a clear hindrance to any Irish solution of the problem of tribal warfare. Irish potentialities did not end with Brian Boru, whose fate was that of a score of "Teutonic" leaders, from Arminius to Barneveldt.

3. The formula that "Irishmen made themselves" is simple folly as science, and is worse than folly in an argument which is always showing that the wrong-doing of Englishmen is a matter of "conditions of almost insuperably coercive strength." The Duke's teaching is in effect that while Irishmen are "made [bad] by themselves," Englishmen are made [bad], if at all, by circumstances over which they have no control.

4. The Duke's account of the poverty and backwardness of the Irish before the sixteenth century, in respect of the operation of some of their ancient customs, is uncritical and often misleading. When he asserts[2] that Sir John Davies declared Gavelkind to have been a custom which would have been "enough to ruin Hell, if it had been established in the kingdom of Beelzebub," he makes a bad blunder. Davies' phrase referred to the practice of Coyne and Livery—an utterly different thing. Gavelkind wrought no general ruin. There is a great deal of evidence, to

[1] His Grace's remarks here may be regarded as reminiscent of the time when, in regard to the wanton English invasion of Afghanistan, he vigorously attacked the leaders of the party with which he now coöperates, and who are now just the politicians they were then.

[2] P. 107.

which the Duke gives no heed, showing that despite the system of Gavelkind and the inter-tribal wars, the condition of the Irish people was not always one of miserable poverty—was often not so miserable as that of English farm labourers has often been in later times, or as that of many tenants of the Duke of Argyll has been in our own generation. Take the account given by the English chronicler Holinshed of the state of Munster before it was depopulated by massacre under Queen Elizabeth :—"The land itself, which before these wars was populous, well inhabited, and rich in all the good blessings of God, being plenteous in corne, full of cattel, well stored with fish and sundrie other good commodities, is now become waste and barren, yielding no fruits, the pastures no cattel, the fields no corne. . . ." Take again the testimony of Spenser :—"Notwithstanding that the same was a most rich and plentifull countrey, full of corne and cattel . . . yet, ere one yeare and a half, they were brought to such wretchednesse as that any stony heart would have rued the same." Concerning the same episode, Sir William Pelham wrote to the Queen, of "the poor people that lived only upon labour and fed by their milch cows."[1]

5. To speak constantly of the barbarism of the Irish, as if other nations were then relatively to them as civilised as we are to-day, is sufficiently disingenuous. The Duke's picture of mediæval Ireland loses much of its colour if compared with an English picture of English life under Henry II. :—

"The universal want of respect for human life is shown in all the chronicles of the period. In London, where Jews were frequently massacred by hundreds, the streets were after sunset given to rapine and murder. That which would now be called crime became the favourite pastime of the principal citizens, who would sally forth by night, in bands of a hundred or more, for an attack upon the houses of their neighbours. They killed without mercy every man who came in their way, and vied with each other in their brutality. . . . False weights, false measures, and false pretences of all kinds were the instruments of commerce most generally in use. No buyer could trust the word of a seller ; and there was hardly any class in which a man might not with reason suspect that his neighbour intended to rob or even to murder him."[2]

If we go back a generation before Henry II., we find the historian declaring that "no more ghastly picture of a nation's misery has

[1] See the citations in Mr J. A. Fox's *Key to the Irish Question*, ch. 29.

[2] Pike, *History of Crime in England*, i. 141-142.

ever been painted"[1] than that of the horrors of Norman anarchy under Stephen; and no Irish atrocities of any period can outgo those there described. It never occurs to the Duke of Argyll to mention that Henry II., in a campaign in Wales, caused the eyes of the boys whom he held as hostages to be rooted out, and the ears and noses of the girls to be cut off. Yet historians agree[2] that Henry's reign "'initiated the rule of law' as distinct from the despotism—tempered in the case of his grandfather by routine—of the earlier Norman Kings." "For the fifty years which followed the Assize of Clarendon [1166] the trial of accused persons was solely by ordeal or 'judgment of God.'"[3] The Brehon law in Ireland was certainly more civilised than that at a much earlier date. And after Henry II. had established eighteen itinerant justices—a measure apparently suggested by his French experience—the corruption among them was so great that he had to reduce the number to five, reserving appeals from their courts to himself in council.[4]

At a later period Sir John Davies declared that "there is no nation or people under the sun that doth love equal or indifferent justice better than the Irish, *or will rest better satisfied with the execution thereof although it may be against themselves*"—this at a period at which the Duke of Argyll represents them as wedded to barbaric custom. If we turn further to the history of the highly civilised Italy of that period, we find a record of ferocity and wickedness which far outgoes the story of Irish barbarism. *Relatively to their culture*, the Irish were not more but less bloody and turbulent than their contemporaries in England and Europe. During the Wars of the Roses, again, English life indisputably retrograded to a frightful degree. Quantity for quantity of happiness, Ireland was probably not the more miserable country. It is true that the pro-Irish writers who speak of Irish life since Strongbow as an "agony of seven hundred years," set up the same kind of misconception as does the Duke of Argyll, though speaking with a different purpose. His is to depict the Irish people as unparalleled savages and anarchists for their time. Speaking of Shane O'Neill, he observes[5] that "it is useless and irrelevant to lay any stress on this man's personal character." All the same, he proceeds to lay great stress on it, noting that Shane was a murderer, bloodthirsty and merciless, false and treacherous, profligate in his life, a drunkard, a tyrant, and barbarous in his manners. Now, Queen Elizabeth was false and

[1] Green, *Short History*, p. 98. [2] *Id.*, p. 106.
[3] *Id.*, p. 107. [4] *Id.*, *ib.* [5] *Irish Nationalism*, p. 180.

treacherous. If ever a liar lived, she was one. Her minister, Cecil, was another. Her loyal subjects reputed her grossly "profligate" in her life. Her father was "bloodthirsty and merciless, a tyrant, and, in the opinion of many, a superlative murderer;" and her successor James was offensive "in his manners." The renowned Bruce, flower of Norman chivalry, murdered Comyn at a tryst in a church. The Duke of Argyll overlooks all these items, but makes an inventory of the sins of Shane O'Neill. Let us have all, or let us have an end of *ad captandum* characterisations. Telling of Shane O'Neill's death, the Duke skilfully mentions that "he was in true Irish fashion hacked to pieces"—by Scots, be it observed. Shall we also say that Shane would have died in "true English fashion" had the Lord Deputy, Sussex, succeeded in his attempts to poison him? Shall we say it was in "true English fashion" that St. Leger, Lord President of Munster, caused a pregnant woman to be ripped up, and let his soldiers spear the three babes they found in her?[1] Shall we say it was in "true English fashion" that the feet of Archbishop Hurley were roasted before he was sent to the gallows? Had not his Grace better leave comparisons alone in these matters?

6. The duke is at great pains to insist that England was driven to aim at the extirpation of Catholicism in Ireland. "Let it," he modestly demands, "be clearly understood and universally admitted"—the Duke is quite ducally peremptory—"that *nothing that England might really find it needful to do*—however severe it might be in itself—in order to keep out her foreign enemies from Ireland, and in order to secure her own dominion in it—can now be considered in any other light than as the necessary steps in a long battle for self-preservation and for life."[2] Yet in the previous chapter he had declared that "the island [of Ireland] *was practically inaccessible from the European Continent.*" Then the pretence of keeping out foreign enemies was—"inflated fable"? However that may be, it will be observed that the Duke has categorically laid down an ethical formula *which would perfectly justify every action of the Irish political dynamiters in our own day.*

7. As regards the confiscations under Elizabeth, under James, under Strafford and under Cromwell, the Duke's defence is so extraordinary that it is difficult to believe that he knows the facts. It was not merely that the estates of vanquished rebels were con-

[1] Letter from Lord Upper Ossory, in Carte's *Life of Ormond*, ed. 1851, v. 279.
[2] *Irish Nationalism*, p. 152.

fiscated. It was that after all rebellion was at an end, when nominal peace reigned, there went on an incessant process of plunder. As the Unionist Mr Lecky puts it :—

"A race of 'discoverers' were called into existence, who fabricated stories of plots, who scrutinised the titles of Irish chiefs with all the severity of English law, and who, before suborned or intimidated juries, and on the ground of technical flaws, obtained confiscations. Many Irish proprietors were executed on the most frivolous pretexts, and these methods of obtaining confiscations were so systematically and skilfully resorted to, that it soon became evident to chiefs and people that it was the settled policy of the English Government to deprive them of their land." Desmond "would probably never have drawn the sword had he not perceived clearly that his estate was marked out for confiscation." [1]

The Duke lays great stress on the judgments of Burke in his Tory period. Well, it is Burke in his Tory period who tells how

"The war of chicane succeeded to the war of arms and of hostile statutes ; and a regular series of operations was carried on, particularly from Chichester's time, in the ordinary courts of justice, and by special commissions and inquisitions, first under pretence of tenures, and then of titles in the Crown, for the purpose of the total extirpation of the interests of the natives in their own soil—until this species of subtle ravage being carried to the last excess of oppression and insolence under Lord Strafford, it kindled the flames of that rebellion which broke out in 1641." [2]

After the formal settlement made by James, "a perpetual effort was made to deprive the Irish of the residue which remained to them." "The commissioners appointed to distribute the lands scandalously abused their trusts, and by fraud or violence deprived the natives of the possessions the king had reserved for them." [3]

Either the Duke knew these things or he did not. If he did not, he must have handled his sources in an incredibly careless manner. If he knew them, his general vindication of the confiscations is a proof of the essential corruption of his ethics. And that seems to be the truth. He excuses, as we have seen,

[1] *History of Ireland in the 18th Century*, i. 14, 15, citing Captain Lee's memorial in the *Desiderata Curiosa Hibernica*, and Hallam, *Const. Hist.*, iii. 370.

[2] *Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe*, Bohn ed. of Works, iii. 320-321.

[3] Lecky, i. 27, citing Leland, ii. 467 ; and Carte's *Life of Ormond*, i. 24, 25 ; and Prendergast's *Cromwellian Settlement*, pp. 45-47.

the rascality of the confiscators with the suggestion that they coveted land "for the purpose of planting a higher civilisation" —a thesis which is probably matchless in the serious literature of the subject. He is great on the "Unseen Foundations of Society," but he will not see the visible ones. He can palliate the most systematic wickedness of rascally English adventurers in Ireland in a past age: it is the struggles of the peasants of to-day to hold to their natal soil that move the ducal indignation.

One of his rebuttals of objections to the confiscations deserves to be preserved. It runs [1]:—

> "Considering the further fact that the whole population of Ireland, *without exception, have inherited whatever rights they possess in land* from either the new race of owners who got the land for the first time, or from the old owners who were not disturbed in their possession, it does seem to be an 'Irish idea' indeed *to connect any of the evils which now exist or which have arisen within the last three hundred years with the 'confiscations'* of the sixteenth or the early part of the seventeenth century."

From this peculiar proposition it logically follows that, in his Grace's opinion,

(*a*) All Irish land has been *inherited* by its existing owners, and none has been bought since the seventeenth century.

(*b*) People who have *no* land cannot without absurdity suppose that unjust confiscations can have evil results.

(*c*) People who inherit confiscated land cannot conceivably entertain the idea that their ancestors' misdeeds did any harm.

(*d*) People who inherit land that never was confiscated cannot rationally suppose that any harm was ever done by confiscating other people's land.

(*e*) The people whose ancestors' land was confiscated cannot suppose so either.

It certainly cannot be retorted that any of these is an "Irish idea." That expression has always been held to apply to a more exhilarating form of nonsense. But gentlemen who deal in this kind would perhaps do well not to allude to the other.

8. As regards the penal laws against Catholics, the Duke makes great play with the argument that the principle of punishing and suppressing heresy was always insisted on, and where possible acted on, by the Catholic Church. That is substantially true. The Catholic Church is the great mother of

[1] P. 173.

persecution. But as between England and Ireland the question was not whether the Pope persecuted but whether Irishmen did. And nothing in history is more certain than the absolute indisposition of Irish Catholics to the religious quarrel which was forced upon them by Protestant England. Even at the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was no positive religious element in the Irish animus against England. The Irish Rebellion of 1641 itself was a movement not of fanaticism but of revolt against the crowning wrong in a long series of iniquitous confiscations. It was the Puritans of England who, by demanding an absolute extirpation or expatriation of all Irish Catholics, established once for all a distinctly religious resentment in addition to the racial. And to all pretences that the Puritan animus was merely political, we are entitled to give a flat denial. The Puritans persecuted as did the Catholics of the Continent, because they were bigots. In France, before the pacification under Henry IV., the Huguenots were to the full as bent on persecution as the Catholics, nay more so, for they were unanimous, which the Catholics were not.

In his struggles to palliate Protestant persecution, the Duke arrives at a significant contradiction. He resorts first to his usual absurd *tu quoque*. How, he asks,[1]

> "How stand the ferocious hatreds and the cruel deeds of clan and intertribal wars as compared with those which have their origin in conviction, however false and misdirected, as to the duty of enforcing religious truth. . . . Which of them stands nearest to the dawn of a rising day?"

And he goes on, in confused rhetoric, to decide in favour of fanaticism. As to Cromwell's massacring of unarmed priests, he asks: "is it fair—if we are to be philosophical—is it fair to forget that the very feelings of indignation and of horror with which we now read of Cromwell, in respect to the massacre of rebellious Catholics [rebellious against Cromwell, himself a rebel] are feelings *which have arisen out of the very conquest he effected*, and even out of the triumph of the special sect to which he belonged." The first trouble is that Cromwell's "special sect" did not triumph. The next is that the Duke's peculiar ethic seems to commit him once more to applauding the dynamiters and the moonlighters, since his indignation at them arises out of what they have done. But a few pages on there arises a third and crowning perplexity, for the Duke protests[2]

[1] P. 193. [2] P. 211.

that he regards "the tyranny involved in pure religious persecution as the most wicked of human tempers and the most atrocious of human crimes." What does it all mean? Simply this. The Duke at first decided to brazen out the fanaticism of the persecuting Puritans, and he did so. Then it occurred to him that he might excuse the Puritans as acting on political motives, and brand the Catholic Church as the purely religious persecutor. But he forgot that he had already[1] described the Catholic Church as representing, "in a pre-eminent degree, politics in its most fundamental principles," and that he had *defended*, as above, the spirit of pure religious persecution. So the curse finally flown at Catholicism, as the representative of principled persecution, flies straight to roost on Protestantism. There is no such muddle in contemporary polemics.

Putting aside the Duke's distressing self-stultifications, one is disposed to ask whether the common run of his party can see no point for discussion in the matter save the ignoble question whether Protestants or Catholics persecuted most? Does it never occur to them, one wonders, to reflect that, ethics apart, the attempt of England to crush Catholicism in Ireland was one of the most monstrous blunders in all political history? The tolerant tactic of Richelieu in France caused Protestantism to lose alike virulence and energy, and to dwindle down to a quiet minority, which it would be still, even if Louis XIV. had not insanely expelled the bulk of it. The persecuting tactic of England in Ireland caused Catholicism there to increase and multiply, till Ireland became one of the typically Catholic countries. The policy is utterly condemned by the result. May there not be as gross a blunder in the present English treatment of the cause of Home Rule?

9. The Duke's account of the political crimes of England in the eighteenth century is worthy of his treatment of the confiscations of the sixteenth and seventeenth. His remark that "England was not one whit more selfish than all other nations of the same time," if true, would suggest the rejoinder that he should not condemn the Land Leaguers of to-day, in that they are clearly not a whit more selfish than the landlords. But it is not true. It is impossible to point to any other civilised power which in that period (or indeed in any other) deliberately sought to destroy the trade of one of its own provinces in order to please the others. The statement that England "acted on precisely the same policy" towards Scotland and towards her colonies is

[1] P. 187.

ridiculously wrong. As the Duke is perfectly aware, Scotland was admitted to absolute equality of trade with England at the Union; and the English rulers before the Union never dared attempt the suppression of any export trade in Scotland as they did in Ireland. It is amazing that a Scotch peer should hazard such an assertion. The worst attempts at interference of the English Government in the colonies were trivial compared with those they carried out in Ireland, to the ruin of industry after industry. Beside such indecent special pleading as this, the worst prevarications of Irish patriots are venial. A disputant who describes the wilful destruction of a whole series of Irish industries, in the interests of the traders of England, as "harmless indeed" compared with the boycotting of opponents in the Ireland of to-day, gives us a decisive test of his ethics. Boycotting is bad enough, whether as practised in Ireland or as practised socially and commercially in England by multitudes of the Duke's political allies; but it is a transient form of evil compared with the purposive turning of a whole nation's path for a whole age into industrial shallows and miseries.

10. The Duke's attacks on the Irish Parliament of last century for its protective policy, which he resents so much more than he does the destructive policy of the English government, only serve to put his whole case fatally in the wrong. He is one of those politicians who go far to discredit the principle of Free Trade by a mechanical and unscientific way of stating it. It is really of varying value in varying circumstances. As regards modern England, it is easy to show its benefits. But open-minded economists know very well that Free Trade is no panacea, and that so far from making an end of industrial trouble it facilitates the arrival of certain industrial troubles, and can promote special misery alongside of special gain. It is clear, further, that bounties on the production of food are not the same thing with taxes on the importation of food; and that in particular cases the bounties may promote well-being while in particular cases the import duties may cause fearful misery. The latter result accrued in England from the Corn Laws, which were strenuously maintained, in its own interest, by the class of whom the Duke of Argyll is the mouthpiece as regards the Irish question. Hence there is a weight of general opinion against the policy of agricultural "protection;" and it is mainly to this general opinion that the Duke appeals when he denounces the "protection" practised by the Irish Parliament last century. That, however, was vastly different alike in intention and in effect from the Tory protection-

ism of the next generation in England. The latter aimed above all things at keeping up landlords' rents, in utter disregard of the contingent misery inflicted on multitudes of workers in the towns. The Irish Parliament, on the other hand, gave bounties with the express object of making employment for the peasantry, in a country in which pasturage and agriculture were the one great industry.

No one could ever learn the merits of the case from the Duke's polemic. He quotes Arthur Young as showing that the bounties on native corn caused the turning of good pasture into bad cornland; that the corn produced was inferior; that the premium on land-carriage to Dublin discouraged Irish shipping, and so on. Yet Arthur Young's indictment, when all is said, only amounts to asserting that the bounty system had meant a money loss to Ireland of £143,510 *in seven years*,[1] in terms of the old doctrine of balance of trade, whereas the arrangement had secured, by his own avowal, the employment of a "prodigious number of men and horses."[2] Here we have the side of the matter which Young did not rightly consider, and which the Duke will not consider.

"All writers," he says, "are agreed that these bounties did produce a great increase of tillage in Ireland—that it displaced *more than a corresponding amount of much more valuable produce*, that it did terribly scourge and exhaust the ground, and that it did tend to stimulate artificially that rapidly swelling population living on the lowest possible diet, which had ultimately to be swept off by famine and emigration."[3]

Let us look at the case for a moment from another side. For a hundred years, English policy had more or less completely restricted all Irish industry, with the result that tillage had greatly decreased in favour of pasturage. This meant, production of food for export—either as live or as dead meat—the native demand being checked by the suppression of native industry; and as pasturage depopulates in comparison with tillage, more and more people were thrown idle. On the other hand, in the absence of tillage, the people were more and more encouraged to cultivate the potato, and so to live at a low standard. For this state of things, obviously, Arthur Young had no cure, as the Duke would have none to-day. Young merely denounced the bad tillage, and exhorted the Irish to stick to pasture and de-

[1] The Duke (p. 223) puts the matter in this way, whereas a few pages further on he makes Young set the annual loss at £53,000. This is the sum given under one of the items of loss in the seven-years calculation.

[2] P. 227.

[3] Pp. 238-239.

population. Now, in an age in which a scientific and comprehensive solution of the problem was impossible (as it still is, for that matter) the Irish Parliament chose a really remedial course, and the result was a promotion of Irish prosperity,[1] Arthur Young notwithstanding. Where a country has suffered artificial suppression of tillage, as Ireland had done through the commercial action of England, it may quite reasonably resort to artificial encouragement of tillage. To say that much of the new tillage was secondrate is nothing. How was it ever to be improved? Young does not pretend that the soil was bad: rich pasture will mostly make rich arable land. Then only by experiment and competition could the agriculture be made better; and this is what actually happened. Whereas the average annual export of Irish grain during the year 1771-73 was only 31,423 barrels, during the years 1787-89, under the bounties, it rose to 517,338 barrels; and during the year ending 25th March 1791, it amounted to 863,047 barrels, despite a great increase in the Irish consumption of barley for brewing and distilling.[2] As against such facts, Arthur Young's calculation of money loss has no significance whatever.

It is quite true that the increase of tillage tended to stimulate population. But it gave both employment and food for the increase, whereas the policy of pasturage had simply made multitudes homeless, forcing them either to emigrate or to sink to lower levels of potato-eating poverty.[3] From about the beginning of the century, there had been an almost continuous emigration of thousands of people every year. About 1728, at the lowest estimate, there was an exodus of 3000 a year to the American colonies. For the years 1771-73 we have exact figures, the annual average being 9553. Over and above this, there was abundant annual emigration to England; and it is further established that between 1691 and 1745 a host of Irishmen, sometimes estimated at 450,000, had died in the military service of France.[4] Here then was abundant misery and forced

[1] "We know that almost every species of labour is more than twice as highly rewarded in Ireland as it was about five-and-twenty years ago." Newenham, *Inquiry into the progress of Population in Ireland*, 1805, p. 143.

[2] Newenham, pp. 48-50.

[3] "Boulter, Swift, Berkeley, Dobbs, Madden, Prior, and Skelton, all agreed in representing the excessive amount of pasture as a leading cause both of the misery and idleness of the people." (Lecky, *Ireland*, i. 223.)

[4] Newenham, pp. 58-64. Cp. Lecky, i. 245-252. In bad years the rate of emigration from Protestant Ulster had been as high as 12,000.

emigration long before the Irish Parliament was re-established. The Parliament sought to mend matters. We know that that is not the Duke of Argyll's way. His prescription is eviction and forced emigration—the eviction of whole communities of healthy rustics to make place either for sheep who shall feed the decadent millions of the towns, or for deer for the hunting of which the plutocrat will pay a monstrous ransom. To him and his class, that spectacle seems to have nothing perturbing or repellent. The Irish Parliament, on the other hand, though certainly not the wisest of witenagemotes, and though perhaps willing to retaliate on England as well as to help Ireland, took the view that the expulsion of thousands of inhabitants every year from a land which could easily maintain them was, in the words of the Unionist Mr Lecky, a loss of "all those classes who were most essential to the development of the nation."[1] That was said of the process by which the "planted" Protestants had been thinned out in the earlier part of the century. On the Duke of Argyll's Free Trade principles, state-aided "plantations" are as bad as any other form of protection; yet he had eulogised those in question, calling them "successful," though they were later turned to naught in this fashion by the operation of the economic process which he finds so salutary.

As for the alleged injury to Irish shipping by the bounties, the least independent inquiry would have shown the Duke, what common-sense might have led him to infer, that the Irish carrying trade was mainly in English hands,[2] Irish shipping having been ruined by the English commercial policy. The premium on land carriage was designed to promote native industry as against English.

It seems needless to carry any further the process of exposing the "inflated fable" by which the Duke of Argyll seeks to quash the "inflated fable" of Mr Gladstone. I will but group a few more of his worst self-contradictions and mis-statements.

(*a*). He states (p. 188) as a proof that the plantation of Ulster was successful, that "*to this day* it is the most industrious and peaceful part of Ireland." Later (p. 250) he admits that "at one time Protestant Ulster was as bad [in point of misery resulting from sub-letting] as Catholic Connaught."

(*b*). He alleges (p. 253) that "through long centuries the Irish

[1] As cited, i. 245.

[2] Tonnage of Irish ships in 1802, as returned to Parliament, 199,320. Tonnage of *British ships employed in Irish trade* at same time, 1,018,081. Newenham, p. 140.

had neglected what we now call popular education." Considering that the Protestant penal laws had deliberately sought to compass the destruction of all Catholic education, there is something peculiarly odious in the Duke's falsification of the case. In the words of his fellow-Unionist Mr Lecky, "the alternative offered by law to the Catholics was that of absolute and compulsory ignorance or of an education directly subversive of their faith."[1] By way of charging the whole harm on the Catholic creed, the Duke goes on to assert that "the system of Scotch education was purely the product of the Reformation. It did not exist before: it was no part of the Catholic system; and there were no materials out of which to construct any such system in Ireland. *It is absurd to blame the English Government for this defect.*" Absurd is hardly the word to retort on the Duke here. If he had but consulted the standard modern history of his own country, he would have found that popular education in Scotland stood exceptionally high before the Reformation as well as after.[2]

(*c*). Of the penal laws the Duke asserts (p. 207) that they "did not prohibit or proscribe Catholic religious worship, pure and simple. On the contrary they expressly permitted, and provided for its lawful celebration by registered Priests, and in registered Chapels." What are the facts? By the Treaty of Limerick it was "expressly stipulated that the oath of allegiance and 'no other' should be imposed upon the Irish Catholics. Yet . . . at a time when not a single act of treason or turbulence was proved against the Catholic priests, the Irish Parliament enacted in 1709 that . . . all the registered priests must take the oath of abjuration, under the penalty of banishment for life, and, if they returned, of death." As the abjuration oath was framed so as to be impossible to honest Catholics, the system of registered priesthood was thus annihilated, in breach of a solemn treaty.

(*d*). Of the rebellion of 1798, the Duke alleges[3] that "sympathy with the French Revolution in its wildest excesses, and in its fiercest passions, was the heart and soul of that rebellion." I will say of this, once for all, that it is a wild untruth; that that rebellion was provoked by what Lord Moira called "the most absurd and the most disgusting tyranny that any nation ever groaned under;"[4] and that the excesses and ferocities on

[1] *History of Ireland*, i. 149. [2] Burton, iii. 399-401. [3] P. 254.

[4] "I have seen," said Moira in the House of Lords, "a country held by military force; but never did I see, in any conquered country, such a tone of insult as has been adopted by Great Britain towards Ireland." This was in 1797.

the loyalist side, in the suppression of the rebellion, not only far outwent those of the rebels but proved the men responsible to be as bad as the worst of the maddened revolutionists of France. The Duke pronounces Wolfe Tone "a villain of the deepest dye," offering as evidence nothing but furious rant against Tone's "hatreds," and against his taking mass in a Catholic church. Such an estimate may serve us as a final ethical landmark. Wolfe Tone, with plenty of bad faults of character, was as much more civilised a man than the typical Orangemen on the other side as was John Brown than the typical slaveholders of the Southern States. I might add that his "hatreds," in comparison with those of the Duke of Argyll, are, to use a phrase of the latter, "nearer the dawn of a rising day." Hatred of oppression is a healthier thing than hatred of every strenuous attempt to end oppression; and the fanaticism which in an age of violence contemplated a slaughter of aristocrats as a possible result of a reforming revolution is not at bottom more inhumane than the class fanaticism which to-day fights to maintain for landholders the power to compass by law the annual ejection of hundreds of starving men, women, and children into the highways.

The Duke ends by quoting and endorsing the words of Burke in the years of his complete capitulation to all the worst ideas of his age: "I must say that all the evils of Ireland originate within itself: but it is the boundless credit which is given to an Irish cabal that produces whatever mischiefs both countries may find in their relation." That, for his Grace, is the end of the whole matter: all Irish nationalist claims, protests, and discontents are utterly unreasonable, and are the manufacture of unscrupulous men. All details apart, this judgment is his own sufficient condemnation. When a man gets into the way of regarding any great and continuous national movement, any long and importunate cry of popular complaint, to be absolutely unreasonable and unscrupulous, he is already outside the standing-ground of political science. He may argue and declaim as he pleases; he may set himself to track down the inevitable errors and untruths on the other side, while adding to those which swarm on his own; he may impute what faults of character he will: all the while he is manifesting a fatal fault on his own part, and his polemics will die with him. It is of no avail to indict whole nations, in the name of neighbour nations, for groundless perversity of complaint: history finally casts all such indictments as rubbish in the void. We know that the ruling Turks consider the Armenian Christians a set of turbulent and rascally

unbelievers; we know that the French *noblesse* traced the French Revolution, both at the time and afterwards, altogether to the wicked teachings of democratic philosophers; and we know what we think of the judicial weight and intelligence of these estimates. It is the memory of the wiser and better actions in the Duke's career that withholds me from putting his treatment of the Irish problem on a level with these. He has but followed in the path of Burke, who, after making a maxim by his refusal to frame an indictment against a whole nation, came to owe his highest prestige to the doing of that very thing. The Duke will win no such success; and we can the better afford to pass on him the lighter blame.

VII.

MR GOLDWIN SMITH'S POLEMIC.

Dr Goldwin Smith is a writer of a type supposed to be peculiarly English, and believed to be much esteemed in England on that score. His manner is one much cultivated in the universities, and by writers who come thence: the manner of self-restraint and judicial curtness, the air of understating a case and putting an irresistible truth more in sorrow than in anger, with perfect recognition of the faults on both sides. As manners go, it is a good manner, and the impression it makes is a testimony to the general respect for accuracy and solidity of judgment. In no nation, however, are accuracy and solidity of judgment common, and it is therefore possible to get credit for them at times, and with many people, by carefully cultivating the semblance without attaining the substance. Of the many generalisations as to national characteristics, perhaps the least fallacious are those which deal with foibles, airs, the lighter qualities which come of institutions and way of life; and it may be said that one of the foibles of Englishmen is the parade of dispassionateness and reason in matters of passion and prejudice. They love to think they are above the French mania for rhetoric, the hysteria of the Irish, the methodism of the Germans, the Russity of the Russians, whatever it may be. And though the bias be a good one, the success hitherto attained in suiting the action to the word is not dazzling. A certain irrelation of mental states and literary manner is still the rule, especially in political writing; and men are found getting much credit for hard-headedness on the strength of being merely hard-mouthed. In view of the status given to some writers, it begins to be questionable, if it ever was otherwise, whether the English are any less led by rhetoric than the French, or by prejudice than the Irish; whether their average reasoning is anything but rhetoric and prejudice with a difference.

Nobody's writing raises the question more pressingly than that of Dr Goldwin Smith. There are other political writers whose

tone and tactic come near enough to his; but none covers so many fields, and few can rival him in the variety of their doctrine. His recent volume of collected *Essays on Questions of the Day* deals with the "social problem"; the "political crisis in England"; the special questions which mainly constitute that crisis, to wit, Disestablishment and Home Rule; "the Empire"; woman suffrage; the Jewish question; and protection in Canada and the United States—notable questions all. To discuss them all soberly and wisely would be to render a service to the commonweal. There is a place for the hard-headed critic of new ideals and new schemes, if he can only be hard-headed enough. The weak side of reform is the optimism of reformers; and though hope is a prime factor in progress it need not be any the less efficient for being controlled by criticism, as a steam engine by its governor. But a close study soon reveals in Dr Smith's criticism the very defect of balance which he imputes more or less all round. His relation to the things he antagonises is at best a checking of the puerile by the puelline. As we go through his essays one by one, and note the method and the conclusions, it comes home to us that instead of a scientific tester of theories and theses we are listening to a gentleman in a state of covert irritation against things in general, with whom an instinct of opposition does duty for a body of principles. Let anyone make the study, as an exercise in analysis and appreciation, taking Dr Smith's essays in succession. It will be found that he is the bubble of his moods, as our ancestors would say. In every essay he reaches a conclusion which in some other he disclaims, unless it be that in one essay he combines the condemnation of his doctrine with the statement of it. There are men from whom you can get a denial of any doctrine you please, by simply putting it to them a little baldly or a little aggressively. Such men are supposed to speak commonly—and indeed they often do—with an Irish accent, which recalls to their opponents an Irish anecdote. But it will be found that there is no more perfect specimen of the type in the literary world than Mr Goldwin Smith, whose main inspiration in his recent discussion of the Irish question is his sense of the radical wrongness of the Irish character; and who yet figured for the last generation of Englishmen as the vindicator of the Irish character against just such charges as he now heaps upon it. He is the weathercock of criticism: the opposite-of-all-things to all men. When optimists are about, he becomes strongly appreciative of the evil side of nature; when Socialists denounce the

evils of society, he discovers in society a wonderfully happy arrangement. In the opening essay of the present volume, entitled "Social and Industrial Revolution," these two positions are taken up alternately. We set out with a black picture of the constitution of the universe, by way of setting us against the idea that mankind will ever be able to attain general felicity. "Can anything," asks our philosopher, "be less like perfect justice than the distribution of lots amongst living creatures of every kind through the whole scale?" and the thesis is elaborated in a forcible manner, man and his methods being shown to share the universal imperfection. "This is economically, as well as physically, an imperfect world." But after a little, when we have to deal with Socialist protests against the social system, the case alters, and the Socialist is exhorted to "consider how, by the operation of economic law, under the system of industrial liberty, the single penny is distributed among all industries justly, 'even to the estimation of a hair,'" and then to "ask himself whether his government, or his group of governments, is likely to do better than nature!" "Nature," be it observed—not the established systems of men. This from an author who on another pretext will rail with anybody against the appeal to "Nature." So with every other issue in turn. When we are considering Mr Gladstone, he becomes the leader of the nation to perdition, though we are to "be just and remember the share which the Conservative party, as well as the Gladstonian party, had in bringing all this disaster and disgrace on the country." But again, the methods of democracy are at the bottom of it all. Parliamentary verbosity is a terrible thing; but on the other hand, we learn that "by the closure" the House of Commons is "reduced to a voting machine of which the caucus turns the crank. Its members . . . regard themselves as delegates of the caucus, pledged to do its bidding, and, if their conscience rebels, to resign." Then a little further on we learn that, "incapable of self-guidance, the masses blindly follow a leader." So that the Commons are under the caucus, and the caucus under the electors, and the electors under Mr Gladstone and his colleagues; and yet Mr Gladstone and his colleagues are in the clutch of the caucus. So was it when Mr Gladstone led; now that he no longer leads, Dr Smith will have no difficulty on his method in making out an equivalent case.

By the law of his temperament, Mr Goldwin Smith must again proceed to confute himself when he deals with Woman Suffrage. When he is contemplating the political crisis over Home Rule,

he finds all political virtue gone out of the British male. But inasmuch as women claim to have a hand in politics, it must be shown that the male is after all doing very well. In the battle of life men learn "caution, prudence, the necessity of compromise, the limitations of their will"; and they further "feel as a sex the full measure of responsibility in public action." This after all the disaster and disgrace and degeneration represented by the caucus and Home Rule and Mr Gladstone. Finally the British male must be rehabilitated once more by way of disparaging the Irish. In the essay on the "English" Crisis, which is just the Irish Crisis, Dr Smith, as we have seen, makes out that English politicians have in the mass become worthless. In dealing separately with the Irish question, he must needs put back English politicians on their pedestal, in the customary English manner, in order to belittle the Irish. The gist of Dr Smith's argument against Home Rule is just an attempt to show that the Irish character is extremely bad while the English character is good. England is going to ruin politically, as England; but as the contrary of Ireland she becomes the perfection of political development. The English are "incapable of self-guidance"—until it is necessary to show that the Irish are. Dr Smith ought really to be thankful to the advocates of Home Rule and Woman Suffrage: they enable him to feel he has something in common with his fellow-countrymen.

Here then we are dealing with a literary character in itself incurably vacillating, weakly capricious, and untrustworthy, but skilled to put on airs of sangfroid and "Saxon" superiority. It might be thought that such a writer would discredit at once himself and his cause; but, as we have seen, the trouble is that there are thousands of Englishmen who want just such a mouthpiece; and such minds, even if so disposed, are mostly too dull to do for themselves the work of analysis which reduces the special pleading to its elements of random prejudice and self-contradiction. Hence Dr Smith has been able to do more harm than any recent writer save one by his profoundly malicious treatment of the Irish question. His tone being measured, his knowledge wide, and his detail judgments often just, credit for justice and moderation is given to his whole argument, when what he has done is merely to tithe the mint and anise and cumin of minor issues in order to pervert the weightier matters of justice, mercy, and truth. It is his tendency to do this to some extent in all he writes; but in the case of Ireland his animus is at its worst and his chances of doing harm greatest.

As has been said, it is part of the method of quasi-moderation to make a show of impartiality. This Dr Smith does with great address, as thus:

"Irish history is a piteous tale. But there is no sailing up the stream of time. We must deal with things as they are now, not immolate present policy to the evil memories of the past. *Detestable is the art of the demagogue who rakes up those memories to obtain for his schemes from passion the support which reason and patriotism would not give.* No living man is now responsible for anything done seven centuries or a single century ago. He who persists in accusing England of cruelty to Ireland, when the last three or four generations of Englishmen have been as much as possible the reverse of cruel, only gives way to his temper and darkens counsel" (p. 266).

Here, if we had not read the preceding pages, the tone of judicial calm, or at least of earnest wisdom, would seem perfect. We cannot accuse Dr Smith of overtly losing his temper. He is sufficiently English in respect that, whereas a "typical" Irishman perverts truth in a passion, our Saxon does it with deliberation and strategy. A cold baseness and a ratiocinative iniquity are certainly more "Saxon" than "Celtic," to use for the nonce the old terminology of English prejudice, adopted by Dr Smith. But the sequel shows the amount of sincerity in Dr Smith's detestation of the art of the demagogue. Will it be believed that after the exordium above quoted he proceeds just to rake up all that has ever been said against so-called Celts by non-Celts in all ages, from Paul to Mommsen, in order to prejudice the Irish claim for Home Rule, and "to obtain for his schemes from passion the support which reason would not give"? Of all who have judged the Irish question by the test of Celtophobia, no one has raked together more systematically than Dr Smith the aspersions which, in the miserable conflict of racial egoisms and stupidities, have fallen to the share of "the Celts." Dr Smith begins by citing Dr Mommsen as having pronounced the race "politically worthless," but affects to put his testimony aside, because "Mommsen has Bismarckian iron in his blood, as he has the tramp of the German armies in his style." Well, the "Bismarckian iron" of Mommsen is a metal of which there has never been any lack in any nation. Any wordmonger, scholar or otherwise, himself incapable of action, can pose as a man of iron by extolling Cæsarism and affecting contempt for whole races. We have had plenty of that in our own tongue from Carlyle, and we are beginning to estimate how much of

coherent character there was behind it all. We have had more of it from the Saxon Lord Salisbury, whom the actual Bismarck —or, as some say, a diplomatist of Italy—has summed up as "a lath painted to look like iron." And doubtless Cæsar and Severus had in their antechambers no lack of Mommsens and Salisburys, acclaiming them in their march towards the morass in which imperial Rome and ancient civilisation ended.

But Dr Smith, scrupulously waving aside the too Bismarckian Mommsen, goes on to quote the characteristic passage in which Bishop Lightfoot, who "has no Bismarckian iron in his blood," comments on Paul's "Ye foolish Galatians," which for the Bishop's purpose becomes "Ye senseless Gauls." The Bishop supports the inspired epithet by the testimony of the Romans, who found the Gauls impetuous in onset, but not enduring; and of Cæsar, for whom the Gaulish inconstancy was "the great difficulty with which he had to contend." For Dr Smith all this is now valid testimony against the modern Irish. Any stick will do. Paul himself had become a violent Christist after violently persecuting the Christists; but when his converts in Galatia accepted "another gospel" he was hotly indignant; just as he was indignant with the Corinthians, where also he "laid a foundation and another builded thereon." For the men to whom he prescribed the rule of love, and to whom he appealed "by the meekness and gentleness of Christ," Paul when crossed had always in pickle the rod of his vituperation; and his commentators of the apostolic succession see in his endless see-saw of benediction and bitterness, humility and protestation, a stability of character which gives irresistible weight to all his estimates of his fellow-creatures. Oddly enough, however, Dr Lightfoot finds that a condemnation which fell equally on Galatians and Corinthians—the latter living in a Roman colony —proves only the fickleness of the Gauls. All the while, there is nothing whatever to show that the converts in Galatia were Gauls, any more than that the first converts in Rome were of Italian birth. The presumption is that many of them, like so many of the first Christists everywhere, were Jews, members of the "stiff-necked race," which was also the race of perpetual "backsliding" and seeking after "strange Gods." Such are the data on which some men found their generalisations of national character. Dr Lightfoot's jurisprudence is buttressed by Dr Smith's; deep answering unto deep.

The testimony of Cæsar and the Romans is of similar value. To be eager in onset and quick to disperse is the characteristic

of all uncivilised races in war in all ages. It was the noted characteristic of the Scotch Highlanders of last century, whose children and grandchildren, when disciplined, have made the most stedfast soldiers in the world, even in the judgment of Mr Kipling, who holds that "Celtic" practices are unalterable through posterity when the Celts happen to have been born in Ireland. It was the characteristic of the Germans of the Roman period[1] as well as of the Celts. And to revolt against an alien rule at every opportunity is simply the course which has been taken by high-spirited peoples of all races in all ages—Greeks, Italians, Spaniards, Poles, Swiss, and Scotch. The Austrians notoriously found "difficulty" in dealing with the Italians, as did Edward First with the Scotch; but it is not now common to argue that the fact served to prove the fatal instability of the insurgent race. It is left for an obscurantist bishop, whitewashing Paul, and an English publicist, blackening Home Rule, to turn such facts to such account.

When Dr Smith proceeds to rely on his own sociological resources, however, he leaves the Bishop far in the rear. To simplify his task, he makes the ingenuous assumption that it is in the nature of Celts to make no progress of their own accord, while all other Aryan races are self-civilising.

> "In France the Celt underwent Roman and afterwards Frankish training. What he would have been without that training, Brittany, amiable but thriftless, slatternly, priest-ridden, saint-worshipping, legendary, is left to tell. We know how even the Celt who had undergone Roman and Frankish training behaved in the French Revolution."

Thus "all occasions do inform against" the Celt. The Irishman, albeit his country has been again and again overrun and "settled" by Saxons, is a Celt; the French Celt, after his country has been overrun and subjugated by Franks and other Teutons, remains a Celt; but England, after being overrun and subjugated by those same French Celts, remains Saxon. When the merits of France have to be explained by your Celtophobe, he decides, with Carlyle, that the Teutonic Franks who conquered the Celt have "ridden him ever since." When the question turns on French misdeeds, it is the Celthood of the Celt that explains. Thus do the complexities of human things become clear to the British Unionist, strong in that primeval

[1] Cp. Tacitus, *De moribus Germanorum*, cc. 1, 4, 6, 7.

virtue which an impartial Providence alloted to his race along with its no less signal endowment of critical insight.

Of the value of the racial *a priori* test, as against the other apriorism of the detestable demagogue, Dr Smith is quite satisfied.

"Between the general influence of race and that of the local circumstances of the Irish Celt, a character was formed which is as distinct as that of any individual man, and which it would be as absurd to overlook or to pretend not to see in dealing with the race as it would be to overlook or to pretend not to see personal character in dealing with a man."

Taking this view, Dr Smith will of course not object to my prefacing an examination of his anti-Celtic argument with an account of his own character. But may not the principle be carried too far? Because I find Dr Smith loading the dice of argument and reasoning alternately like an Old Bailey lawyer and a thimblerigger at a fair, am I entitled to say he would cheat at cards or in trade, or personate another citizen at the ballot-box? Because he is the shuttlecock of his varying moods, perpetually confuting himself, saying "no" to every doctrine in turn, though the last itself consists in saying "no" to the one before, am I entitled to call him a lunatic, and advise his being put under restraint? Because his views on political problems are finally chaotic and nugatory, am I entitled to demand that he be disfranchised? Am I even justified in denying that he says many true and reasonable things, because I find him uttering systematic falsity and folly about what he calls "the Celt"?

If we were to judge him by one page of his essay on "The Irish Question" it would certainly be difficult to speak too strongly against his literary character. The passage I refer to begins thus:—

"That the Irish Celt has gifts and graces, or that under a good master or commander he makes a good worker or soldier, nobody who knows anything of him denies. Nobody who knows how Irish emigrants have been assisted by their kinsmen in America will deny that the Irishman has strong domestic affections and a generous heart. But nobody who is not angling for his vote will affirm that in Cork, in Liverpool or Glasgow, in New York or the Australian colonies, or anywhere, he has as yet become a good citizen under free institutions. Nobody who is not angling for his vote will affirm that he is by nature law-abiding, or that when his passions are excited, whether his victims be his agrarian enemies in Ireland or the hapless negroes in New York, he is not capable of dreadful crimes. The

Anglo-Saxon, when he takes to rioting may be brutal: in the Lord George Gordon riots (!) he was brutal enough; but he does not card or hough, nor does he cut off the udders of kine. The Phœnix Park murders were a Celtic, not an Anglo-Saxon deed."

It is something that Dr Smith should admit that "the Irish Celt" can work and fight well under a good master or leader, which is the most that can be said for nine-tenths of mankind, Saxons included. Other Saxons are industrious in asserting that "the Celt" is a sluggard; Dr Smith certifies that they know nothing about him. It is something that he grants to the Celt strong domestic affections, which some people deny to the thousands of Saxons who let their fathers and mothers die in the poorhouse. But it is difficult to see the point of the generalisation that Irishmen do not make good citizens in Cork, Liverpool, Glasgow, New York, or Australia. Are the other inhabitants of Liverpool, Glasgow, New York, and Australia predominantly good citizens, and are the Irish never so? Is there proportionally more wickedness in Cork than in—say—Newcastle? Were the members of the Tammany ring all Irish? And why is it now only the Irish Celt who is to prove the cursedness of Celticity? What now of the Galatians and the French? And what now of that demoralisation which at other times Dr Smith depicts in the entire political life of England?

Testimony is a ticklish thing: we see how Dr Smith testifies with the fear of God avowedly before his eyes; but there happens to be abundant testimony to the good citizenship of multitudes of Irishmen in the United States and in Australia. Such testimony was borne by Mill, who was on the whole a better, a wiser, and a more truth-loving man than Dr Goldwin Smith, and who passed this judgment on the kind of talk which fills so many of Dr Smith's pages:

"*Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inherent natural differences.*"

That the Irish in America are not on the whole represented in politics by their best men is true. So much was admitted by Mr McGuire, a sufficiently sentimental Irish Catholic who wrote on *The Irish in America* a generation ago. But it is no more and no less true than that the native-born Americans are not represented on the whole by their best men. And what of that? Has not Dr Smith just shown us that Mr Gladstone has brought

"ruin and disgrace" on England, and that the Conservative party had their share in the performance?

As to capacity for crime, does Dr Smith propose to show that "Saxons" are devoid of it? Does he mean to say that there is more crime per head in Ireland than in England? Does he suggest that the worst slave-torturers of the Southern States forty or fifty years ago were Irish? Does he pretend that the lynchers and torturers of negroes in the Southern States in our own day are mostly Irish? If he does not imply these things, his argument is quackery: if he does imply it, what shall be the comment?

"The Anglo-Saxon, when he takes to rioting" *is* brutal. Most peoples are. That "he" does not often hough or mutilate kine is a negative circumstance due to the fact that "his" brutality is evoked in other ways than those which evoke the brutality of Irish peasants. But "he" used to set dogs to worry rats and bait bulls, and cocks to hack each other to death, for his Saxon sport; "he" still does strange things with the aid of Her Majesty's buckhounds; and if "he" were waging an agrarian war with grasping landlords, "he" would probably hough his landlord's cattle too. The English and the Lowland Scotch of past centuries did that sort of thing with small scruple; and they were "Saxon" all.

And why put the Phœnix Park murders and cattle-hacking on one side, with only the Gordon riots on the other? Why not give a glance at the literature of Saxon wife-beating? And why not take a "Saxon" political murder? Such a murder was the murder of Archbishop Sharp by Scotch Presbyterians, two hundred years ago; and there is preserved for the sickening of civilised men a contemporary record of the beastliness of that business, which makes the Protestants concerned, in contrast with the later assassins of Phœnix Park, somewhat as the satyr to Hyperion in the scale of ferocity. In the sixteenth century, again, when the Lowland Scotch had been driven to the extremity of fury by the oppression of the English, and were gradually driving them out by the help of French allies, Scotch men-at-arms, we are told, used to buy from those French (Celtic!) allies their English prisoners, in order to tie them to a stake and tilt at them with lances till they were bled to death. It was Saxon to Saxon then, presumably: the "Celts" seem to have turned their backs. It was Saxons, too, and Saxons whom Dr Smith particularises as the flower of the race, who in New England two hundred years ago bored through the tongues of Quakers with a red hot iron. And it is not recorded that they were Irish officers and soldiers who

in recent years smoked natives to death—men, women, and children—in caves in South Africa.

When a writer who deprecates the raking up of old abominations proceeds to make his own case by just such means, he forces these odious comparisons. In a rational discussion of the Home Rule question they would never arise; but we are dealing with disputants who mask with judicial airs a sophisticated malice filtered down from ages of crass race hatred. The way to compare English and Irish brutality is to go back to the story of English doings in Ireland, when the conquerors stood by and saw the surviving vanquished devouring the corpses of their kindred in the green ditches, where they crawled trembling on hands and knees like dying beasts. Detestable indeed is the "art" of the English publicist who, claiming for the nonce to put out of sight all the crimes of his race towards Ireland, yet heaps up every evil thing and evil word that stands written against the race which his own has for centuries deliberately brutalised.

There is an extravagance of partisanship in Mr Goldwin Smith's ethnology which would discredit him among educated men in any country save Unionist England. His indictment becomes a farce.

"Lists are given," he observes, "of Irish statesmen and commanders, such as Canning, Castlereagh, Clare, Wellington, Wellesley, Grattan, Plunket, the two Lawrences, Napier, Roberts, and Wolseley. These are Saxon, not Celtic Irish. Even Parnell and Butt before him were of that intrusive race *which it was the object of their movement to expel.* Of Parnell, Mr T. P. O'Conner tells us that his manner was Saxon in its reserve and his speech was still more Saxon in its rigidity. Parnell probably owed largely to the cool tenacity of his Saxon character his despotic ascendancy over his train. There has been no Celtic leader of eminence except O'Connell, who was an agitator, not a statesman. Burke *had in him a Celtic strain* which showed itself in his more declamatory and passionate moods. *That the Celt is politically weak, ten centuries of wail without achievement are surely proof enough.*"

The conclusion, be it noted, is that the Irish ought not to have Home Rule now because they did not get it before; and the premiss is that the strongest element in Irish character is English. Thus "the Celt" gets the blame for failing in the demand which has been pushed by "Saxon, not Celtic Irish." It was not Saxon weakness that caused the failure of achievement,

albeit it was Saxons who failed. For the rest, the men of Norman descent, who in France at revolution times are "Celts," are in England "Saxon." If we were to cite Scotch-Celtic statesmen and commanders, such as Sir Colin Campbell and Sir John Macdonald, we should doubtless be told that these are "Scotch, not Irish Celts"; and if we made a list of French commanders from Condé to Macmahon, we should be told that they were "Frankish, not Irish Celts." Roberts, a Welshman by paternal name, becomes Saxon for Dr Smith's purposes. Parnell, as Home Ruler, is a liar and a trickster; as "born leader of men" he is Saxon and superior. Burke is to count to Saxondom in respect of what was best in him, since so many Saxons have sat at his feet; but his vices are to count to his Celticity; while Burke of Phœnix Park goes wholly to the Celtic side of the account. There is a certain felicity in the way in which Dr Smith tempers his black art by burlesque. But the farce is fitful, and shades into the other thing. He goes on:

"In the North of Ireland are prosperous industry and commerce with *Protestant liberty of conscience*. In the South are unthrift and poverty under the dominion of the priest. *The political institutions and the relation to Great Britain* ARE *exactly the same in both cases; it seems to follow that the character of the people is not.*"

It would be difficult to beat that "*are* exactly the same" in modern sociology. Catholic Ireland has lain till within living memory under a penal law unmatched for wickedness in European history; her commerce was for generations systematically stifled by England; her land laws have for centuries represented the high-water mark of iniquitous absurdity. But inasmuch as the agricultural south is thus less prosperous than Protestant Belfast, the difference must be due to race character. "Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the consideration of political influences—!"

In Protestant Belfast, bigotry reaches the worst developments now to be seen in northern Europe. Certain groups of streets are allotted to Catholics, and if a Catholic dare to take a house in a Protestant street he is "fired out." If the dominion of the Irish presbyter is less deadly to culture and judgment than that of the Irish priest, it is not to be proved by the tone of society, political or ecclesiastical. And there is no other. In France, again, somehow we have Celtic "thrift" under the auspices of the priest; and in the Scotch Highlands we have Celtic poverty under the auspices of the "Free" Church. But these intractable

quantities are left out of Dr Smith's equation. Heads, the Saxon wins; tails, the Celt loses. The sauce for the goose must not be served with the gander. Dr Smith proves the hereditary viciousness of the Irish by recalling the fashion of the feudal retainers of the earl-chieftains of three hundred years ago. "*The historic thread if slight, is not invisible, which connects these Bosses with the Bosses of New York.*" But we must not look for threads from the English of those times to Lord Salisbury and Dr Goldwin Smith. "Detestable is the art of the demagogue!" And as for the fact that the old Bosses were as often as not "Saxon, not Celtic Irish," why, the answer is that "when, *by the degeneration of the Anglo-Norman lords*, the chief was blended with the feudal baron, the result seems to have been a mixture of the evils of both systems." Only when the Anglo-Norman degenerated, of course, did his system evolve evils. As for the domestic affections of the Celt, it could doubtless be shown (were not Dr Smith merciful) that these are Saxon survivals.

Attention tends to flag over Dr Smith's demonstration, even when stimulated by a sense of its burlesque. He covers most of the ground. "Cromwell proclaimed to the Catholics *liberty of private conscience*"; and as for the suppression of Catholic worship, when we consider it as Protestants "we may be rather disposed to wink at this departure from religious liberty." We may. We may also be disposed to put our tongue in our cheek, surmising that Dr Smith has done it to begin with. Even when denouncing the penal code as "cruel and hateful," he puts a Saxon saving clause.

"Mark, however, that the penal code was not intended, like the religious codes of Roman Catholic countries and the Inquisition, to rack conscience and compel apostasy, but to keep the Celts disarmed, socially and politically as well as physically, and prevent them from repeating, *as, if the power had reverted to their hands, they would have repeated, the acts of Tyrconnel's Parliament.* Remember too what was being done in countries where Roman Catholicism reigned. . . . Forty years after this the Roman Catholic Prince Bishop of Salzburg expelled the whole Protestant population from his dominions."

Even in Saxon Salzburg! But "mark," as Dr Smith says, the ethic of the comparison. The pretence that laws putting a premium on apostasy were not meant to compel apostasy, may be left to dispose of itself: the practical issue is as to whether the penal code was an act of self-defence. That Catholics in those days would have persecuted if they had the power may be

taken for granted; but that is not the question. The question is whether freedom of worship in Ireland would have given them the power; and the only way of pretending to show that it would is to point to "Tyrconnel's Parliament." The very phrase is a fraud. Tyrconnel had power simply in virtue of the Catholicism of King James, under whom there was Catholic tyranny in England at the same time. In his customary manner, Dr Smith writes that "Ireland was put into the hands of Tyrconnel, who, *though* a reckless ruffian, was accepted as the leader of the Catholic Celts at the time." And what about the Catholic Saxons? Tyrconnel was appointed by James: would Catholic Saxons, as a rule, in such a case have rejected him? Tyrconnel *was himself a "Saxon"* according to Dr Smith's own precious classification. That is to say, he was a Talbot, of Norman descent. And did the High Church Saxons, save at the crisis of 1688, ever hesitate at a pinch to accept as their leader either a reckless ruffian or a reckless adventurer, a Strafford or a Bolingbroke? Be that as it may, the pretence that a penal law was needed under William and the Georges to prevent Irish Catholics from reinstating "the Parliament of Tyrconnel" is an absurd perversion of the plainest historical fact. One wearies of an argument that grows devoid of even decent plausibility, keeping up the manner of restraint and judicial summary over a piece of the worst special pleading on record.

Even Dr Smith flags in his course. After his incomparable defence of the penal code he is fain to admit the indefensibleness of the commercial code, the English refusal of commercial union. Of course nobody is to blame. "*If* the sons could ever deserve to suffer for the sins of the fathers, the England of our generation would deserve to suffer for *this* misdeed." But it is only Irish Celts who deserve to suffer for the faults of their ancestors, even unto the generation of the Galatians. "Commerce has served civilisation well; but there is also *a heavy account against her*." So we can justly blame "commerce," and trust that "she" at least will get her deserts at the day of judgment—with "the Celt."

For the rest, the refusal of union to Ireland in the early part of the eighteenth century was a "calamitous blunder." How far Dr Smith would allow this concession to countervail the deep damnation of "the Celt," it is impossible to say; but such gleams of concession leads us to the point which we have been withholding in order to meet Mr Smith's case on its merits—the point, namely, of his former and very different teaching on the

Irish question. For it is the fact, as aforesaid, that the Mr Goldwin Smith of a generation ago figured as the rational defender of Irish character against English prejudice, and, what is more, the propounder of a scheme for the solution of the Irish problem by a political arrangement not wholly alien to the ideal of Home Rule. It is instructive, as to his own character, to contrast some of those early deliverances with the language held by Dr Smith to-day. It is no discredit to any man to have honestly and consciously changed his opinions. We have all been forced to it at times : indeed it is reasonable to suspect that a man who denies having changed in any particular between youth and age has simply been idea-blind. But a man should show argumentative cause for his changes if he is to have us believe that he has changed for any better reason than temper and constitutional instability. And Dr Smith shows no cause whatever for his resort to the views, so irrational in themselves, above discussed, after having held the following :—

"If they [the Irish people] are wanting in industry, in regard for the rights of property, in reverence for the law, history furnishes a full explanation of their defects, without supposing in them any inherent depravity or even any inherent weakness. They have never had the advantage of the training through which other nations have passed in their gradual rise from barbarism to civilisation. The progress of the Irish people was arrested at an almost primitive stage, and a series of calamities following close upon each other has prevented it from ever fairly resuming its course. The pressure of overwhelming misery has now been relieved ; government has become mild and just ; the civilising agency of education has been introduced ; the upper classes are rapidly returning to their duty, and the natural effect is at once seen in the improved character of the people. . . . There are still speakers and writers who seem to think that the Irish are incurably vicious, because the accumulated effects of so many unhappy centuries cannot be removed at once by a wave of the legislator's wand. Some still believe, or affect to believe, that the very air of the island has in it something destructive of the characters and understandings of all who breathe it. These absurdities are of old standing."[1]

Here is an explanation of things Irish which Dr Smith's recent diatribe in no way sets aside, which in fact it absolutely ignores. He seems to have forgotten that such opinions were ever held by anybody, not to say by himself. As utterly does he seem to have forgotten how he once wrote that Ireland is "the standing

[1] *Irish History and Irish Character*, by Goldwin Smith, 1861, pp. 194-195.

confutation of our boasted statesmanship and of our boasted love of justice,"[1] and added: "*I have myself sought and found in the study of Irish history the explanation of the paradox that a people with so many gifts, so amiable, and naturally so submissive to rulers,*" [in spite of the Gauls and the Galatians!] "*and everywhere but in their own country industrious, are in their own country bywords of idleness, lawlessness, disaffection, and agrarian crime.*"

In those days, he could see that the Irish Rebellion of 1641 "was simply a natural episode in the Irish land question." He could then be wroth that "contempt for humanity and sympathy with cruelty is cultivated by feebleness as a proof of vigour." He could see with Adam Smith that Ireland was cursed by "an aristocracy the most odious of all"; and he could admit that "Ireland was ruled, and her policy kept in union with that of England, by systematic corruption"; though to-day he is satisfied to quote Dr Dunbar Ingram as unanswerable on the subject of the Union, without troubling to meet or mention the answer of Mr Gladstone. When in that forgotten frame of mind, too, Dr Smith could tell the story of 1798 with much force. His present curt account is to the effect that the practices of the Protestants "were flogging, pitch-capping, picketing, and half-hanging, as those of the Catholics were shooting, carding, and houghing." A generation ago he told how the Protestants committed rape and murder; and instead of using terms now unintelligible he told how Catholic Celtic victims were made to stand on one foot on a pointed stake, and had their scalps torn from their heads, by chivalrous Saxons. He told, too, how when Sir Edward Crosbie was hanged, "the remains of the murdered gentleman were abused in a manner shocking to humanity." He told among other things how a Protestant yeoman shot an already wounded boy dead in his mother's arms. To-day he is concerned to tell at length only how Whiteboys committed *their* murders. "It is *useless* to recount the infernal history of 1798, the passions of which only the vilest demagoguism would wish, for political purposes, to revive." If there is a worse demagoguism anywhere than Dr Smith's own, it is at least denied the advantages of literary status, the use of the reviews, and the services of leading publishers. The tactic of denouncing the revival of all memories telling in favour of Ireland and against England, in the very act of parading all memories which seem to tell the other way, is surely a shade more execrable than the

[1] Second Lecture on Pitt, in *Three English Statesmen*, ed. 1867, p. 93.

unsophisticated malice of ignorance. Dr Smith can forget anything save his acquired prejudice. He claims, as we have seen, that for generations "Englishmen"—all of them—have felt nothing but kindness towards Irishmen, himself giving the lie the while to his assertion. He flatly denies that "the Irish since the Union have been subject to social disparagement in the slightest degree"; as if every middle-aged man could not still remember how the insult "No Irish need apply" was once a common stipulation in advertisements. He does but prove either the worthlessness of his memory or the worthlessness of his testimony.

And this is the gist of Dr Goldwin Smith's service to the cause of "Unionism." His recent essay is a party pamphlet of the worst description, all the worst for its drab style and mock dispassionateness. If he had desired to discuss the issue without reviving old passions and prejudices, he could have quietly left them alone, and argued the point of Home Rule on the grounds of the existing situation. But it is death to "Unionism" to do that. It must stand on race prejudice or disappear. If we take Ireland as a moderately civilised nation, backward but improvable, priest-ridden but capable of superseding priest-rule like France and Italy, the argument against Home Rule becomes only an argumentative protest against incurring the risks of federalism, as seen in the history of the United States and of dual monarchies; and such deprecation of risk, reasonable ten years ago, is now completely overruled by the proved incapacity of most Englishmen to treat Ireland as an integral part of the State, as well as by the proved determination of most Irishmen to accept only a federal union. The political situation has made a federal union inevitable, whatever its risks. Accordingly a so-called "Unionism" which repudiates federation even while pronouncing it the only logical course, must needs rally to its support the forces of hereditary passion and ill-will. Thus we have the spectacle of a party calling itself Unionist while urging a propaganda of pure interracial repulsion. There is not one unional argument in the Unionist repertory. The overt motive of the teachers of the party is bitter aversion to the race whom they propose to keep in a desperate union with England on English terms; while on the contrary the first effective approach towards Irish reconciliation with Englishmen has been set up by the policy which the Unionists denounce.

And here again, as it happens, Dr Smith is blindly denouncing a principle which his own earlier writing went far to ratify. "The

Fenian movement," he wrote in 1868, "is not religious, not radically economical (though no doubt it has in it a socialistic element), but national, *and the remedy for it must be one which cures national discontent.* This is the great truth which the English people have to lay to heart."[1] Still more explicitly he went on:—"The chief malady of Ireland, as I am convinced, is the void created in the national heart by the want of any institutions commanding the reverence, love, or confidence of the nation; and the only cure for the malady, I repeat, is such a measure of decentralisation as will satisfy the national aspirations. The difficulty, of course, is to frame such a measure without an actual dissolution of the Union."[2] In the spirit of that doctrine he went on to propose "an occasional session of the Imperial Parliament in Dublin," a solution which might perhaps have been effective then, but which is plainly inadequate now. Yet, in face of the tenser strain, he not only does not offer a fresh suggestion: he does not so much as suggest that any accommodation is needed. The answer to the caveat against dissolving "the Union" is that to dissolve *the* Union is not to end union, but rather to open the way for a Union politically and morally worthy of the name. But the Dr Smith of to-day will not even approach that issue in a rational spirit.

So far is Dr Smith from discussing the matter in the spirit of rational statesmanship that he again and again drops covert menaces of civil war. It is typical of his latter-day personality that, while loudly denouncing the politics of revolution or violence as against Socialists, he is ready to threaten both in the most reckless fashion as against Home Rulers. In his more restrained style, he contrives to bluster as virulently as any Ulsterman, telling how in the siege of Derry "the stronger race showed in extremity a force which in extremity it may show again," and finally declaring that "Civil war is a dreadful thing; but there are things even more dreadful than civil war. Submission to the dismemberment of the nation by the sinister machinations of a morally insane ambition, would in the end work more havoc than the civil sword." Well, some of us have been saying for years that there is a species of moral insanity apparent in the intellectual development of Mr Goldwin Smith.[3] Three years

[1] *The Irish Question. Three Letters.* By Goldwin Smith, 1868, p. 5.

[2] *Id.*, p. 16.

[3] It may be not uninstructive to recall to Dr Goldwin Smith's present allies one of the many criticisms of their ideals which used to appear in *The Bystander*, Toronto, edited by him. Here is a passage dating from 1881:—"Our free ex-

ago, he came forward with an essay on the thesis that criminals are "moral agnostics," in the course of which he alleged that the murderer Palmer (who was really a zealous religionist) had no religious belief, and proceeded to suggest that unbelief was correlative with criminality. And this moral controversialist now sets up as the censor of the political morality of half the nation, and proposes to get up a civil war rather than submit to the decision of the majority to remake the constitution. The malice of a neurotic invalid, with more than his mental vacillation, is the moral stock-in-trade of Dr Smith.

In one of the few paragraphs in which, after exhausting his gall and bitterness on the character of the Celt, he comes to the

pression of opinion as to the intense vulgarity of the view of life presented in *Endymion* seems to startle some Endymionists in England. Journalism on this side of the Atlantic, at all events, may speak without reserve of matters on the other side. . . . Was criticism needless? Is nobody to protest when young men setting out in public life are taught that they owe nothing to their country or to their kind, that all they have to do is to get as much of gilded luxury as they can, and that so long as they get a full measure, it signifies nothing what course they take? This is the moral of *Endymion*, which, from beginning to end, never hints at a public motive, never suggests any law of action but success, or makes success consist in anything but money, titles, the society of people of rank, gorgeous furniture, and sumptuous dinners. Again, is the lurid light which this piece of oblique autobiography throws on the history of England and Europe during the last forty years to be utterly disregarded? England has poured out blood and money; she has incurred military disgrace, mingled with dishonour, in South Africa and the East; she has had her best Governments overthrown by intrigue; she has had her representation degraded, and her Parliamentary institutions placed in jeopardy; Turkey has been plunged into a hideous war with Russia . . .; Afghans defending their country have been slaughtered, and their women and children driven out to die upon the hills—all this, not for any of those great objects which make up to nations for temporary loss and suffering, not even to fulfil the vision of a grand and soaring though perhaps irregular ambition, but to realise a day-dream of Houndsditch." To-day Dr Smith is the champion and mouthpiece of the very men and types whom he thus bitterly aspersed in 1881. In the tragical farce of human tergiversation, it will not be easy to find a more dramatic antithesis. The student, relaxing from rigour into compassion, can but speculate on the physiological secret of this writer's long series of declarations for and against a hundred things in turn, consistent only in the shrill note of the constrained temperament. What is certain is that two such literary careers as his and Mr Froude's, to say nothing of Carlyle's and Ruskin's, go a long way to make shipwreck of the conventional English discrimination between "Saxon" and "Celtic" characteristics. The reaction of Taine was decent and dignified in comparison; and the temper of Renan simply out of the comparison altogether.

point, he argues that there can be no confederation save in "a large group of tolerably equal States." Who is to decide it? The question is open; and it would take a good deal of political sagacity to settle it in advance. And what of political sagacity has been shown by Dr Smith? He has stultified himself on every great topic he ever discussed. In this one book he destroys in each essay some of the positions he takes up in others. In writing on Pitt thirty years ago, he declared that "the income tax is a tax which ought to be resorted to only in time of war or in some national emergency which excites the national spirit as much as war. It is only when the national spirit is so excited that there is a chance of true returns." Will any one now dispute that these are the words of a bumptious blunderer? In the same lecture he wrote, apropos of the founding of Botany Bay: "Leave nature to herself and she will choose the germs of new nations well. . . . Careful in selecting the right seed for a plant, she is not careless in selecting the right colonists. *Left to herself she selects the flower of English worth, the founders of New England.*" Whether it is "nature" or "man" that floods the United States with "Irish Celts," is left to our speculation. There are doubtless still some people in England who will not admit that this is the sociology of fools. But is there any country save England where such folly would not destroy a writer's status as a sociologist? It was the counterbalancing effect of saner sayings that made some of us continue to credit Dr Smith with some intellectual and ethical influence for good; but he has by this time spent his credit. Once he denounced the men who made the aggrandisement of England their sole political motive. Now he hunts in couples with them, preaching, to use his own former words, "under the thin disguise of rhetoric, doctrines which in their naked form could be avowed only in the cavern of a bandit or on the deck of a buccaneer." And this weathercock of perversity presumes to threaten civil war to those who contemn his doctrine as they contemn his character.

Enough of the personality of a writer who is in all sobriety and sadness to be classed, after many years of not undistinguished mental activity, as a mental invalid. But the discussion of the questions he raises, and of this of "The Saxon and the Celt" in particular, ought not to be made to stand or fall with that of his personality. To settle it merely by exposing his characteristics would be to imitate his own evil ways. If the foregoing criticism

suggests or makes out anything, it is that the judging of the Home Rule question in terms of English hatred of Irishmen as a race is a course unworthy of rational men. It simply gives full and final justification for the cherishing of the deepest Irish hatred of Englishmen. The analysis of racial character is a sufficiently complex and precarious business for a scientific and impartial sociologist; it is the idlest of occupations for men professing to advise how their neighbours should vote on a political issue. There are Liberals who explain Mr Chamberlain in terms of the civic character of Birmingham, and Tories who detect in Mr Gladstone a sinister blend of Liverpool and Oxford, giving Scotland credit for his "speculativeness." When it comes to this ethnology of the Galatians, the Ephesians, the Philippians, and the Colossians, we had better go back to the principles of the "doctrinaires" of an earlier generation, who would have pronounced Mr Goldwin Smith's essay an embodiment of the philosophy of the taproom in the language of the schools. That Irishmen in the mass have grave faults is just as certain as that Englishmen in the mass have grave faults. Let there be no dispute about that. But to say that Irishmen are not fit for self-rule is only to reduce all political argument to absurdity; for it is part of the case to make out that Mr Gladstone and those who follow him are unfit to judge rightly for themselves in politics; and it is plainly impossible to deprive Gladstonians of the power of acting on their political opinions. Therefore it is neither here nor there to say that Irishmen are not to be trusted with the machinery of government. That is just what all Liberals and Tories say of each other.

Every single judgment passed by Englishmen on Irishmen as such, recoils directly or indirectly on themselves. The charge of quarrelsomeness is made by Englishmen who have quarrelled bitterly with their own former colleagues. Even if Irishmen be specially turbulent, misgovernment has made them so. If they are relatively backward in culture, it has been mostly since England interfered with them. If they are anti-English, what is gained by Englishmen being in turn anti-Irish, now as before? The one aversion justifies the other. The risks of federalism, again, are an argument against federalism if there be an alternative of amicable progress under the old system; but who can now say there is any such alternative? "A federation of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland," says Dr Smith, "would be an everlasting cabal of the three lesser States against the greater." Then what is going on at present? The cabal is even now

insoluble just because all of the lesser States alike in an increasing degree desire Home Rule; and it cannot conceivably end till they get Home Rule. Given federalism, there is no ground left for caballing—no ground, that is, on which the lesser States can possibly unite. If need be, the question whether England should have one or several Parliaments within the federation can be discussed. Dr Smith devotes thirty pages to gossip against Gauls, Galatians, and Celts, in the manner of the man in the smoking-room, and glances in a sentence at the real political problem.

"To a moral certainty," he declares, "Ireland would become a thorn in the side of Great Britain. To sustain herself against her powerful neighbour, she would attach herself to some foreign enemy of England, as the tribes attached themselves to Spain in the sixteenth century, and *as Scotland attached herself to France before the Union.* This Great Britain could not and would not endure. Ireland would be reconquered and the circle of woes would revolve again."

"To sustain herself against her powerful neighbour!" There is one ground on which candid men will admit a possibility of Ireland becoming hostile to the other parts of the State, and that ground is religion. If she should remain devoutly Catholic, she might conceivably sympathise with a Catholic enemy of England. Let us give the possibility its full force. But on the face of the case, that very possibility has double force in the case of an Ireland struggling for Home Rule; and what are Unionists doing to lessen the risk? They are simply intensifying it. The one way to make Ireland less fanatically Catholic is to remove the motive which keeps her Catholicism identified with her national aspirations. In the long indictment of English stupidity and wickedness in the matter of Ireland, the five main political counts are (1) that Ireland was first of all driven into Papalism when she was on the whole non-Papal, and when the Pope had injured her by giving away her primitive autonomy, such as it was; (2) that Ireland was kept Papal by specifically Protestant oppression; (3) that after she had been Anglicised under Elizabeth, James, and Cromwell, the new English element itself was rapidly driven into hatred of England by insane injustice; (4) that she was so continuously misgoverned that, in the words of the Dr Smith of the last generation, "the Protestant Republicans of the North of Ireland — they, mind, not the Catholics," were driven into revolt; and (5) that she is kept intensely Catholic by the unreasoned policy which is partly based

on hatred of her Catholicism. The last is the point of present importance. So long as Ireland is kept fighting for national existence, so long will she be bound to the priesthood which sanctions her struggle. England shrieks against the power of the priest; but it is England that makes the power of the priest. Let Ireland be left to develop politically in her own way, and there will inevitably arise in Ireland an anti-clerical Liberalism such as has arisen in Italy, Spain, France, and Belgium. The reason why there is yet no such Liberalism in Ireland is precisely the adherence of the priesthood to Nationalism—a state of things which never arose in the popular movements of France, Italy, and Spain. The Redmondite party is at present in a sense anti-clerical; but its anti-clericalism is bound to be pragmatic and ineffective so long as the priesthood are just as Nationalist as itself. It dares not attack the Church as Church even if it were so disposed, which it is not. But under Home Rule the Church can no longer be identified with the people; anti-clericalism will begin to mean rationalism; politics will become secularised; and Ireland will cease to be an Ultramontane community in politics even as France and Belgium and Italy have ceased to be, and as Spain is ceasing to be. Thus the main conceivable risk of Anglo-Irish federation begins to lessen from the very moment of federation.

Nor is there any other way in which Ireland can be made less Catholic. Protestantism is of no avail: it is simply the stone in the wound. The one permanently effectual foe to Papalism, as the history of France and the history of Germany have shown, is rationalism. The Catholic Church is now very much more powerful politically in Germany than in France, in Belgium, or in Italy, because rationalism in Germany is academic and non-political, and the composite State is fatally committed to defending the Catholic Church everywhere from popular criticism. Only in Germany can a layman be sent to jail for a jest against the Virgin Mary on the lecture platform or at a café table, or an editor for a printed jest at the Holy Coat of Trèves. The Catholic Church is a united and clearly defined force in the Empire, fighting for her own hand: she waxes, while Protestantism wanes; and nothing but a straightforward application of rationalism to the whole range of life will ever stay her advance and her tyranny. In the so-called Catholic countries, on the contrary, she is powerful in virtue only of the surviving superstition of the most uneducated, and she is jealously resisted by the growing mass of instructed men. The rationalists of Italy

have set up the statue of Giordano Bruno on the very ground where the Papacy burned him; and the Papacy can but impotently curse the defiant deed.

Given the conditions of severance between priesthood and people, then, the severance will arise in Ireland as elsewhere: even Dr Smith can see that. The Church cannot continue to be the church of the tenant-farmers as such under Home Rule, whether or not the State becomes the landlord. Nationalists in their own Parliament must inevitably divide into parties: and she cannot be the ally of both. What then becomes of the danger of Ireland as a whole siding with a Catholic enemy of England? On what ground will she have to "sustain herself against her powerful neighbour"? If Ireland needs to do it, still more will Scotland, which is smaller than Ireland, and Wales most of all. The Unionist argument will then run that England, Ireland, and Wales cannot endure Home Rule for Scotland, and will have eventually to "reconquer" Scotland; and so with Wales. But Dr Smith has also thought fit to say, as we saw, that on the contrary Scotland, Ireland, and Wales will be in an everlasting cabal *against England* under a federal system. These two mutually destroying propositions occur within two leaves of each other. Thus does prejudice reason.

May we not now reasonably argue—even those of us who twelve years ago feared that Britanno-Irish federation would open the way to such a civil war as that of the United States—may we not now rather reason that a small federation of unequal States, such as England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, is after all *less* open to such a risk than a large federation of "tolerably equal" States? A federation of the latter sort evolved the American Civil War. Could ours do worse? If it be so plain—and it is indeed plain—that Irish secession from the federal union would instantly lay Ireland open to being "reconquered," with no hope of another emancipation, is not that a very good reason for expecting that Ireland will not attempt to secede? And is there any surer way of giving England her reasonable predominance in the affairs of these islands than to create a federation in which the representatives of the federated States will vote, not on each other's domestic claims, but only on their joint international and fiscal policy? That England is at present constantly out-voted is the complaint of the very men who propose to maintain the conditions under which she is bound to be out-voted.

It is sad and strange that men should thus perpetually frustrate their own aims as well as their own good by sheer stress of sub-

rational animosity. The present state of continuous fever and friction is the very surest means of preventing England and Ireland alike from getting the good which Ireland might otherwise attain to; and the malady reaches wherever the English-speaking race groups itself in communities. By keeping Ireland abject, we insure a perpetual efflux of inferior Irish. They swarm in American politics; and Americans rage vainly. They endow the Home Rule agitation, and will continue to endow it. Possessing qualities which as clearly admit of high culture as do those of the French, they are to-day in a relatively lower stage of culture than the Irishmen of last century. Belfast is no longer capable of republicanism and rationalism; Dublin is no longer noticeably literary. The recent efforts to revive culture can come to little while the country is convulsed by political struggle. The swarming peasantry—who will never learn conjugal prudence till better economic conditions outweigh in influence the counsels of the priest—flock in shiploads to America, where for a generation they serve to illustrate the crudity of the civilisation that is made by suddenly plunging primitive ignorance into undreamt-of material well-being. And so it comes that we get no more Goldsmiths, no more Burkes, no more Sheridans, no more Moores even; although even now the race shows here and there its old qualities of relative freshness of feeling and wayward genius.

"The race," we finally say, whatever "the race" may really be; the race not in the sense of the descendants of the Gauls and the Galatians, or of the Danes and the Normans and the English, but in the sense of a changing complex of gifts and defects wrought out of so many generations of certain conditions—even bad conditions. If grimy English factory towns can yield elements of good, may not Irish hovels do as much? Corsica has yielded only one Napoleon, and England only one Shakspere; but they count for a good deal when they come. And Napoleon, was he not an "Italian Celt"; and Shakspere, is it not surmised that he came of a blend of Wales with Warwickshire? The crucibles of race are deeper than our alchemy. If rich England yields herds of fools and praters as well as strong men and sane thinkers, may not Ireland yield clear heads as well as hot ones? Dr Smith finds that we have no trustworthy English politicians: why then so much fear of Irish? Tennyson talked of "the blind hysterics of the Celt"; and all the while he made his literary effect mainly in virtue of his own hysterics, which may or may not have been Saxon. We do not all esteem

him as he esteemed himself; and perhaps these pages may partly show that Englishmen in general would be the better of a little self-criticism.

The truest, tersest, and most scientific sentence that has been said in this century on the Irish question is the utterance not of an English publicist or politician but of an Irish landlord, whose written remains were published two years ago. He was not a highly-cultured man: he was—be it duly recorded by a rationalist—a warmly evangelical Christian. But he had an excellent heart, and if the heart be only good enough, it can at times wonderfully enlighten the head. John Hamilton of St Ernan's, Donegal, met with Irish peasants of both religions, did well by all, and was well done-by by all, as he shows in many a simply touching tale. And though, dying before the Home Rule issue took its present shape, he was no Home Ruler, he gave this judgment on the Irish question:

"*Ireland has to attain an adult state*, which was certainly retarded in bygone years by misgovernment and oppression. A great deal of what is attributed to the character of *race* is really due to national *youth*, and time with national advancement will, with the blessing of God, show it."[1]

The "blessing of God" is on the side of the nation which knows how to bless itself, even as it is on the side of the strongest battalions. The man who wrote that sentence, with its simple wisdom and its touch of childishness, could never have been a "Unionist." Unionism cannot afford to admit that the faults of the Irish are the faults of national youth artificially prolonged.

We have only to go back a generation to find Lowland Scotchmen charging Scotch Celts with all the vices which the Goldwin Smiths find in those of Ireland. Hill Burton's History of Scotland is flawed and stained throughout by irrational imputations on the Celts who gave their name to his own race, imputations which point to their own answer in his own pages. The simple secret of it all is the evil instinct which makes the prosperous impute others' unprosperity to a vice of character, carrying into class relations and race relations the baseness which makes them shun their unlucky acquaintances, especially those they have helped to ruin. Burton like other Scotch publicists was faced by the trouble of Highland poverty, and like the most vulgar ignoramus he framed a simple theory to the effect that Highland

[1] *Sixty Years' Experience as an Irish Landlord*, 1894, p. 327.

crofters were poor by reason of their hereditary character. All the while he inadvertently made it clear that the Gaelic-speaking people of the Hebrides, where the poverty is as serious as anywhere, are mostly of Scandinavian descent; and that Lowland settlers have utterly failed to make a living at all where native Hebrideans have managed to get along. Himself ostentatiously sceptical about the Druids, he accepted the worthless traditional terminology of Celt and Saxon without the least critical scruple. All the while he was falling, in his own history, into hundreds of inaccuracies, as if to show how slovenly a scholarly "Teuton" can be. To-day, we hear much less of the vices of Celticity in Scotland, seeing that the Scotch Celt visibly holds his own with the Lowlander wherever he meets him on equal terms, and supplies the most energetic element in half the colonies. It is the Irishman who is to-day under the insensate ban of "British" prejudice; and we are now told that the Scotch Highlander is a wholly different type from the Irish peasant. So much change can one generation work in the babble of the partisan. A difference of character there certainly is between the average Highlander of to-day and the average Irish tenant-farmer. But what made the difference? Last century the ancestors of both were classed together as irreclaimable: last generation Burton found the Highlander's case hopeless. Prejudice can never stop to analyse and think: the Saxon's temper is as near his tongue as the Irish Celt's, albeit the Saxon tongue is slower in its motion. The fact is that the Highlanders of to-day are going through something like the intellectual evolution that the Lowlanders began at the Reformation. They are developing all the narrow and obstinate bigotry which for two hundred years distinguished the "Saxon" Scotch of the south. It is they who now reinforce the party of Calvinistic orthodoxy in the Presbyterian churches and repel all rational criticism. They show the brute strength of purpose that goes with brute strength of body. They recruit the towns, and tend to keep the level of town culture fixed at the ecclesiastical orthodoxy of the past. In fine, their faults are just the faults of previous generations of the other "race" in the same environment. *Absit omen!*

If racial prejudice can but unseal its eyes, it may read in every history the lesson that not national characteristics but national conditions determine a nation's well-being. Given different conditions, causes of one class may work to wholly different ends. Englishmen are wont to point to intestine discord as the mark of racial failure or unfitness. As if any nation ever sank lower

from intestine discord than did England in the Wars of the Roses, or Germany in the Thirty Years' War! Dr Smith decides that "there is nothing in the Irish horoscope at the time of the Norman conquest or in any subsequent manifestations to lead us to assume that Irish history without British connexion would have been bright and happy." "Horoscope" is the right word for the purpose of such a sage, in such an undertaking. But it would tax even his gift of sophistry to point to promise of bright happiness in the English horoscope of the tenth century, when the Saxons, turned religious cowards, basely bought off the Danes; or in the twelfth century, under King Stephen, or under King John, or under Richard the Second, or under either Charles or James the Second. With Dr Smith, the wish is father to the thought. And so, while deciding on one page that a federated Ireland is sure still to be united against England, he decides on another that the Irish on the contrary will fight disastrously among themselves. "The torch of intestine discord" will be "re-kindled once more." So that while the rule of the priest is "sinister," the dissension which will destroy it is sinister all the same. Sinister in a sense it may be; but Englishmen ought surely to be the last men to impute intestine discord to other nations as a crime. It is the strict scientific truth that all political progress is made by intestine discord, in England as everywhere else; and when Dr Smith is not bent on making a pariah of the Celt he is lugubrious over the intestine discords of his own race, which point to a social readjustment more profound than the world has ever yet seen. For Irishmen as for Frenchmen and Germans, discord is the natural parent of social progress. The one sort of intestine discord that is incurable and merely ruinous is the discord of a man's reason when divided against itself. Into that discord has fallen the intelligence of Mr Goldwin Smith. He crowns his criticism of the Home Rule principle with the claim that nearly all the "wealth and intelligence" of Ireland are on the side of the old state of things—this after making out that the "Celtic Irish" have no intelligence worth reckoning with, and that it is "Saxon Irish" who lead the "Celtic Irish." When an English intelligence which might be expected to be impartial puts the case thus, the value of the Irish intelligence which joins cause with Irish "wealth" may be quickly calculated.

And there is something more amiss in Dr Smith's polemic than even the prejudice and self-contradiction which have been passed under review. The line between passion and disingenuous-

ness is deliberately crossed, as it happens, at the very outset of his essay. He begins:

"It is proposed that Celtic and Catholic Ireland shall be made a *separate nation* with a Parliament of its own, and that into this nation Saxon and Protestant Ulster shall, *against its will* and in spite of its passionate appeals to the honour of the British people, *be forced*."

What are the facts? Many Home Rulers, recognising the Ulster difficulty, have proposed to meet it. Among other schemes, one has been broached for the erection of Protestant Ulster into a separate State with a separate Parliament, to stand in the same relation as that of Catholic Ireland with the future Federal Parliament. And how was this suggestion met? By loud Ulsterical protests that Ulster would never abandon the scattered Protestants of Southern Ireland; that she would share their fate, whatever it might be. After this, the initial statement of Dr Smith is a specific imposture, sought to be palmed off on the whole English-speaking world. There is a limit to the toleration of false witness in the name of Saxonism and Protestantism and Ulsteria. The Ulsterite may, if he likes, demand separate treatment: he may not go on protesting that he is denied separate treatment when he has expressly refused to accept such treatment. If we are to infer Ulster character from Ulster symptoms, in Dr Smith's fashion, we shall be tempted to decide that the man of Ulster is typically a blatherskite and a braggart, and that the truth is not in him, whatever else may be. At present his main function is to help the cause of the Catholic South by showing how much more brutal and fanatical and hysterical a Protestant may be than a Catholic. But even he, scientifically considered, is capable of improvement, like other people.

VIII.

MR FROUDE ON IRELAND.[1]

§ 1.

A MORE interesting question for a literary plebiscitum than a good many that have been propounded would be this, Who is the most mischievous English writer of the day? I cannot pretend to guess how the decision of the majority would be likely to go, but I should have little hesitation in casting my own vote for Mr James Anthony Froude. That is a grave thing for a conscientious person, however obscure, to say of anybody else; but fairly weighty reasons can be given in this case in support of the charge. Let the reader ask himself concerning Mr Froude's last three books, say, what is their aim, what kind of counsel they give on the social problems of the age, and what kind of effect they are likely to have on political thought and action; and unless he happens to belong to the Bismarckian school he will find it hard to give answers that will sound eulogistic. *Oceana* was a sample of the higher book-making that gave painful proof of the extent to which literary faculty can be turned to evil purposes. Written with abundant fluency and vivacity, it secured attention for a set of fractious sentiments unconnected by any statable theory, undignified even by a stedfast misanthropy, but breathing at best a pessimism never far from commonplace literary spleen. Go to that book for light on imperial policy, for calm analysis, for wise forecast, and you find instead the wavering marsh-lights of an insincere and theatrical unbelief in humanity, dashed by the gusty empiricism of the mess-room. But Mr Froude, all the same, is a brilliant writer; his book sold very widely, its facile rhetoric putting no strain on any man's

[1] This article, written in Mr Froude's lifetime (1889), is left in the present tense, because the writer could not well put the same stress of criticism in a retrospective discussion of a dead man's work as he could in a censure which the subject was alive to answer; though he has no doubt as to the strict justice of all the blame passed.

thinking power; and so we got next *The English in the West Indies, or the Bow of Ulysses.* The sort of political wisdom communicated by that book can be conveniently sampled by the passage which explains the sub-title:

"I do not believe in the degeneracy of our race. I believe the present generation of Englishmen to be capable of all that their fathers were, and possibly of more; but we are just now in a moulting state, and are sick while the process is going on. Or to take another metaphor. The bow of Ulysses is unstrung. The worms have not eaten into the horn or the moths injured the string, but the owner of the house is away and the suitors of Penelope Britannia consume her substance, rivals of one another, each caring only for himself, but with a common heart in evil. They cannot string the bow. Only the true lord and master can string it, and in due time he comes, and the cord is stretched once more upon the notch, singing to the touch of the finger with the sharp note of the swallow; and the arrows fly to their mark in the breasts of the pretenders, while Pallas Athene looks on approving from her coign of vantage."[1]

I will not here pause to analyse Mr Froude's precious metaphor, in which Penelope and Ulysses may each be Britain, the suitors being portions thereof, or Ulysses may be the coming dictator of the Carlyle-Froude gospel. Nor is it necessary to ask what Mr Froude exactly means by the shooting of the pretenders. What is worth doing is to note first what sheer claptrap is the whole passage, and, second, how perfectly boyish is the political philosophy which the historian thus lays down for us in his old age. He has never outgrown the schoolboy conception of his nation as being an ideal aggregate existing for the purpose of attaining corporate glory either by war or by simple bigness. The nation as a concrete aggregate in which the multitude are crushed by joyless toil, while the few live in varying degrees of idleness and sensual luxury—this he cannot see, though the voice of it goes before his face, "steaming up, a lamentation, and an ancient tale of wrong." It is the barest justice to Carlyle to say that he never sunk to such hebetude as this. He *could* see that the modern problem of England is not the maintaining of a vaporous glory—of that *prestige* which, as he pointed out, etymologically meant a lie. He saw and taught that the problem was the actual lot of the men and women who make up England —their relation to each other, as rich and poor, workers and idlers, governors and governed. Not in his last senility could he have penned the fustian of his disciple.

[1] Pp. 15, 16.

And yet Mr Froude does catch a glimpse of the truth after all, only in order to read it backwards and add positive to negative folly. "Perhaps," he decides in conclusion,

"Perhaps if we look to the real origin of all that has gone wrong with us . . . we shall find it in our own distractions, in the form of government which is fast developing into a civil war under the semblance of peace, where party is more than country, and a victory at the hustings over a candidate of opposite principles *more glorious than a victory in the field over a foreign foe.* Society in republican Rome was so much interested in the faction fights of Clodius and Milo that it could hear with apathy of the destruction of Crassus and a Roman army. The senate would have sold Cæsar to the Celtic chiefs in Gaul, and the modern English enthusiast would disintegrate the British Islands (!) to purchase the Irish vote. Till we can rise into some nobler sphere of thought and conduct we may lay aside *the vision of a confederated empire.*"

Thus deeply can Mr Froude see into the riddle of his generation, with the history of Rome to help him. After a special study of the fall of the Republic, he cannot tell that the real cause of that was the collapse of Republican society by its dissolution into two groups of iniquitously rich and hopelessly poor. For him, transcendental to the last, the cause was simply low "ideals" of thought and conduct, and his prescription to his time is just to get high ideals. And the high ideals are to be—what? Aspirations, not for the dignifying of individual and national life in itself by removing squalid misery and idle wealth, but for "the vision of a confederated empire," and for "victory in the field over a foreign foe." Is it worth while to reply to such a prophet of the music-halls that a victory of ideas *is* as much more glorious than victory in a field of carnage, as the ideal of the civilised thinker is better than that of the Pawnee?

From a book so begun and so ended, what good to mankind can come? We do not even have facts that we can trust in regard to the things Mr Froude professes to have studied in the West Indies. After reading Mr Salmon on the "Caribbean Confederation," one feels that the historian is as little trustworthy in West Indian matters as scholars have proved him to be in the affairs of ancient Rome; and his name appears to be becoming literally a byword in the Indies and Australia for hasty and baseless statement.[1] But Mr Froude's vivacity of style continues

[1] Some reader in the British Museum, zealous for truth but oblivious of the rules of the library, has made a terse comment on the margin of its copy of *The English in the West Indies.* In his account of Trinidad (p. 63) Mr

to secure him readers, and "Penelope Britannia" listens more or less to the voice of *this* pretender.

§ 2.

Now comes *The Two Chiefs of Dunboy, or An Irish Romance of the Last Century*, in which Mr Froude essays to write at once a novel and a homily on Irish affairs, combining the art-methods of the literary generation before last with a temper and a sociology all his own. This is not the place to discuss the book as a work of fiction. Suffice it to say, on that head, that Mr Froude does not appear to recognise any progress in the art of novel-writing since Scott; that his power of character-drawing is very limited, though he sketches some good old conventional types with considerable vigour; and that quite the best passages in the book are those describing fights, particularly the sea chase of a privateer by a British frigate. He has founded his hero, apparently, on the historic Colonel Eyre, and has drawn some quasi-humorous local colour from the Memoirs of Sir Jonah Barrington. His vacillating and valueless doctrine concerning Ireland and the Irish problem he drew from his own perturbed and capricious judgment.

"Colonel Goring," he says of his murdered hero at the close, "belonged to an order of men who, if they had been allowed fair play, would have made the sorrows of Ireland the memory of an evil dream; but he had come too late, the spirit of the Cromwellians had died out of the land, and was not to be revived by a single enthusiast." That is to say, Colonel Goring was too late, but yet was not too late if only he had been allowed fair play and had not been otherwise too late. What then was the late Colonel Goring's policy? Let his fluent creator tell:

"He had studied Ireland anxiously. He had observed with disgust the growing weakness of the Protestant settlement and the reviving energy of the Catholics. To him, *an Englishman of the old Puritan School*, the Pope was anti-Christ. He absolutely disbelieved that Irish Popery could be brought *either by connivance or toleration* into loyal relations with the English Crown. *He did not like penal laws.* He knew that the relations of his own country with the Catholic Powers of Europe *made the enforcement of such laws impossible*, ex-

Froude makes the statement: "cocoa and coffee plantations and indigo plantations increase." The pencilled comment is:—"Not so—no indigo there. TRINIDADIAN." The chances are that the Trinidadian is right.

cept spasmodically and uncertainly, and he thought that laws which were not meant to be obeyed were *better off the Statute Book. But he was convinced also* that Ireland could only be permanently attached to the British Crown if the Protestants were there *in strength enough to hold their own ground.* Cromwell's policy of establishing Protestant settlements South as well as North was the only rational one."[1]

I would call attention to this as a compendious illustration of Mr Froude's habits of political thought. Written with every appearance of confidence, the passage is but a string of self-stultifications. First we are told in Colonel Goring's scheme that there is to be *no tolerance whatever* of Catholicism (as there was none in Colonel Eyre's practice); and it is obvious that not to tolerate Catholicism means to enforce penal laws. In the next breath we learn that Colonel Goring did not like penal laws because they could not be enforced in the face of the protests of Catholic States which had it in their power similarly to oppress Protestants. Finally we are told that Goring's idea was to make all over Ireland, on Cromwell's principle, Protestant plantations which should be able to "hold their own"; and we are left to imagine how Catholicism is to be suppressed as Anti-Christ without penal laws. It would be difficult to cite from the writings of any man who ever claimed to speak with authority on matters of conduct, such another display of irrelevance and inconsequence. But the confusion of the passage, I take it, will surprise nobody who has sought to extract from Mr Froude's *English in Ireland* any coherent doctrine as to the Irish problem; and as little will the student of Mr Froude's earlier works be astonished at the primitive barbarism, the pre-Burkean blindness, of the political prescription he lays down in his novel.

The Two Chiefs of Dunboy, as a whole, serves chiefly to raise afresh the question raised formerly by its author's books and by his lectures in the United States, namely, What is his real opinion about the Irish? It might have been supposed that, conscious as he must be that his *English in Ireland* said nothing, or rather said everything by turns, on that head, he would have seen in his novel a useful means of expressing an intelligible opinion, the more so as his book is no dispassionate Shaksperean presentiment of life, but as explicitly didactic as *Robert Elsmere.* But the novel is, if possible, more self-contradictory, more vacillating, more distracted in its doctrine than the historic treatise. The truth is that Mr Froude never did and never will hold to a consistent opinion on any subject whatever.

[1] Pp. 59-60.

§ 3.

We have seen how he gives to his hero his own distraction of doctrine in sum: let us see how the confusion fulfils itself in detail. Again and again do we have the cheap and commonplace assumption of a "double dose of original sin" in the Irish or "Celtic" race. "So far as accurate knowledge goes," he makes a shrewd character say (p. 350) as against a crotchetty one, "the Irish race have always been noisy, useless, and ineffectual. They draw their picture in their own annals. They have produced nothing, they have done nothing, which it is possible to admire. What they are they have always been, and the only hope for them is that their ridiculous Irish nationality should be buried and forgotten." Then we have Mr Froude's own allusion, in a description of the villain (p. 130), to "the abject manner under which *every Irishman* knows so well how to conceal his real feeling"—this though he introduces many Irishmen who show no trace of abjectness. If this be not enough, we have the leading Irish patriot and hero in the story made to say of his race (p. 371): "What were we when we had the island to ourselves? If you can believe those glorious ballad singers and annalists of ours, we were no better than the cannibals of the Pacific. If we were again free, we should cut one another's throats in the old style." There is no hint in any of these or similar passages that the barbarism of the Irish was much the same sort of thing as the barbarism of the Saxon Heptarchy. There is no reminder that England had her Wars of the Roses. There is not a word of reflection as to how Ireland might conceivably have developed if England had left her alone. There is no question as to how far Welsh development has been a success under different auspices. It is just taken for granted that the Irish are an unimproveable race.

And yet, as of old, we have the *per contra*. Colonel Goring is made to say (p. 175): "I have heard others say that the faults of the Irish are the faults of a noble nature, which has been wrenched out of its proper shape. I believe it now; for in no race in this world could I have found man or woman who would have risked what you [a girl who saved his life] have risked to save one whom you have been told to look on as the enemy of your country." And we have (p. 158) the old admission that the Normans settled in Ireland became more Irish than the Irish themselves; Teutons being thus confessed to develop Irish characteristics under Irish circumstances. The upshot of which

is—? This or nothing—that the way to settle the Irish problem is (or once was) to flood Ireland with English Protestants, refusing to tolerate Catholicism but making no law to put it down.

The grotesque nugatoriness of all this, I repeat, does not come of any artistic impartiality of Mr Froude the novelist, but from the incurable intellectual instability of Mr Froude the thinker and publicist. He is repeating in the form of a novel the see-saw of his former explicit argumentations. It is worth while going back on the old medley, if it were only to show more fully how worthless is the counsel which does so much to inspire English policy at the present moment. At the beginning of *The English in Ireland* Mr Froude appears to lay down a tolerably positive if ill-digested doctrine:

"In a world in which we are made to depend so largely for our well-being on the conduct of our neighbours, and yet are created infinitely unequal in ability and worthiness of character, the superior part has a natural right to govern; the inferior part has a natural right to be governed; and a rude but adequate test of superiority and inferiority is provided in the relative strength of the different orders of human beings. Among wild beasts and savages might constitutes right. Among reasonable beings right is for ever tending to create might. Inferiority of numbers is compensated by superior cohesiveness, intelligence, and daring. The *better sort* of men submit willingly to be governed by those who are *wiser and nobler* than themselves,"[1]

—*i.e.*, by those who are better than the better sort.

Yet even in the opening section the fatal infirmity of the writer's mind destructively asserts itself.

"When resistance has been tried and failed—when the inequality has been proved beyond dispute by long and painful experience—the wisdom, and *ultimately the duty*, of the weaker party is to accept the benefits that are offered in exchange for submission: and a nation which at once will not defend its liberties in the field, nor yet allow itself to be governed, but struggles to preserve the independence which it wants the spirit to uphold in arms, by insubordination and anarchy and secret crime, may bewail its wrongs in wild and weeping eloquence in the ears of mankind—may at length, in a time when the methods by which sterner ages repressed this kind of conduct are unpermitted, make itself so intolerable as to be cast off and bidden go upon its own bad way: but it will not go for its own benefit; it will have established no principle and vindicated no natural right; liberty

[1] *English in Ireland*, ed. 1881, i. 1-2.

profits only those who can govern themselves better than others can govern them, and those who are able to govern themselves wisely have no need to petition for a privilege which they can keep or take for themselves."[1]

I doubt whether a more aimless and pointless piece of mock reasoning was ever concocted by a serious historian. It is the declamation of a hysterical weakling. Evidently enough Mr Froude does not feel the slightest confidence in his preaching as to the "duty" of the Irish or the natural tendency of things. And the same vacillation comes out still more ruinously at the close of the book. We have, of course, some positive doctrine:

"As the Asiatics are, so are the Irish. An Englishman would revolt against a despotism, however just the despotism might be. The Irishman is instinctively loyal to an authority which is not afraid to assert itself. He respects courage; he despises cowardice. Rule him resolutely, and he will not rebel; rule him justly, and he will follow you to the world's end."[2]

It is quite needless to rebut this happy stroke of sociology, of which the whole basis is the assumption that the political ideals of Irishmen in the nineteenth century are those of barbarian Irishmen in the fourteenth. Mr Froude himself makes it abundantly clear that his generalisation amounts to nothing:

"England will never touch Ireland except under pressure of agitation: she then finds something must be done; she does the 'something' in a hurry to get rid of the subject, and she finds she has created more harm than she has cured."[3] Again: "The English people do not see that to remove even just grounds of complaint is made useless by the form in which the concession is made. They never legislate beforehand with a desire to be just; they wait for rebellion or danger of it, and then they yield without dignity and without deliberation. What they give is accepted without gratitude, and is regarded only as a victory won in the campaign which is being fought for the independence of Ireland. If there was a hope that anything which we could give would make the Irish contented and loyal subjects of the British Empire, no sacrifice would be too great for such an object. But there is no such hope. The land tenure is not the real grievance. It is merely a pretext. The real grievance is our presence in Ireland at all."[4] And again: "Mr Gladstone is a statesman. . . . He has perhaps recognised that from the date of the Conquest we have neglected every duty which a ruling power owes to its subjects."[5]

[1] *Id.*, p. 6. [2] III. 558. [3] *Id.*, p. 574.
[4] P. 581. [5] P. 583.

Of course these sweeping admissions are sweepingly contradicted in other parts of the book, where it occurs to Mr Froude to assert that "England" as a whole is naturally just in her disposition towards weaker States in her grasp:

"Everything which she [England] most valued for herself—her laws, and liberties, her orderly and settled government, the most ample security for person and property—England's first desire was to give to Ireland in fullest measure. The temper in which she was met exasperated her into hardness and cruelty . . . till it seemed at last as if no solution of the problem were possible save the destruction or expulsion of a race which appeared incurable."[1]

Against this it is sufficient to place the previous quotations, with, say, Mr Froude's admission in his novel (p. 159) as to the insane iniquity of "England" towards the *English* planted in Ireland:

"When the last rebellion was crushed, Ireland was a sheet of paper on which England might have written what character she pleased. Like a wanton child with a toy, she had no sooner accomplished her long task than she set herself to work to spoil it again. *She destroyed the industries of her colonists by her trade laws.* She set her Bishops to rob them of their religion."

So that Mr Froude, the most destructive opponent of Mr Froude, recognises with his usual versatility that England, even in recent centuries, has seemed more incapable of rational justice to affiliated communities outside of her own borders than any State since the time of Carthage. Still the see-saw goes on:

"Were England, even now at this eleventh hour, to say that she recognised the state of Ireland to be a disgrace to her, that . . . the constitution would be suspended, and that the three southern provinces would for half a century be governed by the Crown, the committee of the Land League are well aware that without a shot being fired in the field their functions would be at an end."[2]

Much virtue in an "if." We are seeing at present how it serves to *half* suspend the constitution; and the effect on Irish discontent is not hard to discover. It does not tend to satisfy Mr Froude. The prescription is that "England," the hypothetical national unit of one mind, bent on acting towards outsiders as a master or officer towards his subordinates, is simply to forget that she is herself the scene of a struggle of the poor against the rich, and of a progressive democratism, and is to

[1] *Id.*, i. 14. [2] *English in Ireland*, iii. 583.

make believe to be a good healthy Oriental despotism. Of course the accommodating Mr Froude admits that there is no more practical meaning in this than in his other generalisations; so we get this final double somersault;

"But I am told that it is impossible. . . . Despotism is out of date. We can govern India; we cannot govern Ireland. Be it so." [*Weeps.*] "Then let Ireland be free." [After all these volumes.] "She is miserable because she is unruled. We might rule her, but we will not" [wilful "we," "thirty millions, mostly fools"], "lest our arrangements at home might be interfered with. In an independent Ireland the ablest and strongest would come to the front, and the baser elements be crushed. The state of things which would ensue would not be satisfactory to us" [strange to say, "we" don't want the best in Ireland to get uppermost, and the worst undermost!] "but at least there would be no longer the inversion of the natural order which is maintained by the English connection, and the compelled slavery of education and intelligence" [*alias*, absentee landlords] "to the numerical majority. This too is called impossible—yet if we will neither rule Ireland nor allow the Irish to rule themselves, nature and fact may tell us that whether we will or no, an experiment which has lasted for seven hundred years shall be tried no longer."[1]

—World without end, Amen! It is a free country, and you may hold about Ireland whatever opinion you please, even as Mr Froude thinks everything he pleases, that is to say, everything by turns and nothing long.

§ 4.

Is it possible, one asks, to regard with any respect an empiric of this kind? One says once more that there was never a more flagrant case of saddling the wrong horse than the proceeding of holding up as Mr Froude's principal literary misdeed his publication of the Carlyle documents. There, with of course his usual frailty in detail, he was helping the world to some truth: in his own books, expressing his own message, he is a perpetual influence for moral darkness. Any reader who peruses Mr Froude without arriving at a clear view of his mischievousness is either demoralised by his contagious confusion or hardened by him in similar empiricism and prejudice. It was truly said of him long ago that his historic researches on Ireland only opened up an old wound, for he went to work with a view, not to calmly

[1] Pp. 584-5.

showing that in the past both sides had been brutal, wicked, and mad, but to showing contemporaries how much reason they had to harbour old grudges. A man of his temper, whose convictions are sentiments and whose sentiments are moods, could only work on mood and sentiment, zealously reminding Protestants of the massacre of 1641, and anon reminding Catholics of Protestant tyranny, and leaving them recriminating, without a hint that the true lesson of the past was that we should turn our back on it and bring cool reason to bear on the present. His own leading quality is just that which he is always condemning in the Irish race, infirmity of purpose;[1] and he covers it with just the bluster that he attributes to them as constitutional. Condemning their racial vanity, he displays his own in claptrap worthy of a schoolboy, intimating[2] that "Englishmen are not easily frightened at the sound of danger," and so forth.

And withal, when challenged, as he was by Father Burke in New York in 1872, he affects the *bon enfant* and claims to be himself a warm friend of Ireland. As thus:

"I have been accused of having nothing practical to propose for Ireland. I have something extremely practical. *I want to see the peasants taken from under the power of their landlords, and made answerable to no authority but the law.* It would not be difficult to define for what offence a tenant might be legally deprived of his holding. He ought not to be dependent on the caprice of any individual man. If Father Burke and his friends will help in that way, instead of agitating for a separation from England, I would sooner find myself working with him than against him."[3]

That was sixteen years ago. And in the interval Mr Froude's whole pernicious influence has gone to inflame the dogged and stupid English obstinacy that has at length made Home Rule a necessity and a certainty; Liberal and Tory leaders equally leading up to the issue, and the Liberal only saving appearances at the last moment by suddenly turning a somersault without a warning to the bewildered multitude.

[1] Curiously enough he has developed a tendency to the so-called Irish "bull." As here: "*Two* of the boats chosen were *the fastest* the Colonel had. . . . *The third* was smaller and lighter, and was the *swiftest of the three*" (*Two Chiefs of Dunboy*, pp. 186-7).

[2] *Two Chiefs*, p. 185.

[3] Lecture in answer to Father Burke, New York, December 1st, 1872: printed in *Froude's Crusade. Both Sides.* New York, 1873, p. 35.

IX.

MR BALFOUR ON IRISH CIVILISATION.[1]

A GOOD deal of cross-swearing goes on over the question of the condition of Ireland before the English Conquest, and the precise effect of English rule in checking Irish civilisation. In his recent speech in the House of Commons,[2] Mr Davitt made the often-repeated remark that Ireland was a Christian country with a high civilisation while England was in a state of heathen barbarism. This is one extreme in the clash of sweeping assertions. A little reflection might show Irish patriots that if Ireland was thus civilised while England was barbarous, Ireland must of her own nature have retrograded before the Conquest of Ireland under Henry II. It is true, nevertheless, that before the conquest Ireland was in parts much richer and happier than it has been during more than one long and frightful period under English rule; and it is this fact that English Tories sedulously ignore. The extreme of false history on their side is reached in Mr Balfour's speech on the second reading of the Home Rule Bill in the House, on the night of the division.[3] Among other things he said:

"He had not been indisposed to admit that in the history of Ireland, England had often played a sorry part; but he did not admit that in the great tragedy extending over all these centuries England had been the villain of the piece. (Hear, hear.) It was not true. He felt disgusted at the creeping hypocrisy—when it was not ignorance—(hear, hear)—which threw upon this country, and this country above all, the responsibility or more than half the responsibility for Irish ills. The Prime Minister was fond of quoting the opinion of the civilised world. The civilised world took its opinion, with other sources, from the speeches of English politicians; and if English politicians went about abusing England—(loud Opposition cheers)—no wonder that foreign writers, unaccustomed to our peculiar method of political controversy,

[1] Written in May, 1893. [2] March or April, 1893. [3] 1893.

took English politicians at their word. (Opposition cheers.) What was the fact? Before the English power went to Ireland, Ireland was a collection of tribes waging constant and internecine warfare. All law, all civilisation in Ireland was the work of England. (Opposition cheers, and Nationalist cries of 'Oh,' and laughter. An Hon. Member: 'Destruction.') The perfect unity that Ireland now enjoyed was also the work of England, and the Parliament which Ireland desired to have restored to her—what was that but the work of England?"

There is certainly a good deal of creeping hypocrisy in England; and there is also a fair amount of perpendicular misstatement. Mr Balfour affects both methods. It is easy to say that before the conquest Ireland was a scene of internecine war. So was Scandinavia at the same or an earlier period. So was England before the Danish and again before the Norman Conquest. Then does England owe all its civilisation to the Danes and Normans? Is it not reasonable to surmise that Ireland would have reached some sort of law and order as other countries were doing, if only she had been left to work out her own salvation? There as elsewhere a strong central power would tend to arise in the ordinary course of military evolution. If this be denied by Mr Balfour's party, as they are wont to deny every reasonable sociological proposition as to the potentialities of the Irish people, let them turn to the authority of one of the few eminent students of political science on their own side. It is the anti-democratic Sir Henry Sumner Maine, of Tory and legalist memory, who writes:

"The Anglo-Norman settlement on the east coast of Ireland acted like a running sore, constantly irritating the Celtic regions beyond the Pale, and deepening the confusion which prevailed there. If the country had been left to itself, one of the great Irish tribes would almost certainly have conquered the rest. All the legal ideas which, little conscious as we are of the source, come to us from the existence of a strong central government, lending its vigour to the arm of justice, would have made their way into the Brehon law; *and the gap between the alleged civilisation of England and the alleged barbarism of Ireland during much of their history, which was in reality narrower than is commonly supposed,* would have almost wholly disappeared."[1]

All that can be urged in rebuttal of this is that the Danish cities constituted already an open sore; and that they had set up an

[1] *Early History of Institutions*, pp. 54, 55.

ecclesiastical strife in addition to the racial enmity by adhering to Rome through England. But this last was really a phase of the English connection; and if Danes and Irish had been left to fight matters out, the Danes would in all likelihood have been absorbed as they were in England and Scotland. The Danes alone could not have permanently kept Ireland distracted as the English power did. There as elsewhere there were forces of change; and though Ireland's capital disadvantage was that she lay to the west of England, and could not so easily as England catch the culture influences of the Continent, some continental intercourse she must have had; and the intercourse of nations has in all ages been the great cause of progress. What is more, though war in early stages of culture is a grievous hindrance, many of the arts of civilisation may flourish and go far among warring tribes. It was so in Ancient Greece; it was so among the warring Italian Republics, which had a marvellously high culture at a time when strongly governed monarchies to the north were sunk in barbarism. For the rest, Mr Balfour's proposition as to England having civilised Ireland, put as he puts it, is really one of the most perverse assertions that have been made in the whole course of the Home Rule dispute. In order to see fairly and squarely the truth all round, let us first cite an able and impartial summary of the condition of Ireland before the conquest, written by a lover of Ireland, an authority to the full as high as Maine in Maine's own field, a Scotchman and not much of a pietist, but strongly resentful of the English misgovernment of Ireland from the first. It is J. F. McLennan who writes:—

"The law of succession was a powerful obstacle to political progress. The Sept had always a chief, and a tanist, who was to be the chief's successor. When a chief died the tanist became chief, and a new tanist was elected. Any male of full age, belonging to the leading family group, was eligible for the office. The brother of the chief, or the male next to him in age of the same family, was usually chosen; but frequently the appointment was the occasion of a contest; in which success lay with the most cunning and high-handed. These contests frequently led to feuds, and divided the sept into hostile factions. The law which gave the septmen the power of election was tanistry; the same law regulated the succession to the headship in all the groups, and even to the kingship. It is needless to say that it favoured social disintegration. It divided the sept; it divided the tribe; and it rent the kingdom. The law of property, on the other hand, was a powerful obstacle to industry, and, in particular, to agricultural improvement. The septs were the only landholders; the sept-

lands were enjoyed according to the law of gavelkind, which rendered all the land tenures uncertain. By this law the common was divisible among the family groups, on the principle of relative equality ; practically the stronger got the larger shares. When death threw lands vacant, the chief, as trustee for the sept, assumed the whole lands, and re-divided them—a partition called a gavel. Had the arts of agriculture been known, they could not have been exercised to any great extent under a system which, constantly changing the occupancy of lands, rendered it uncertain whether the labourer would enjoy the fruits of his labour. The consequence was that the people were mainly shepherds or herdsmen.

"With such customs and laws, the Irish were in the rear of most of the peoples of Europe. No doubt, in some parts of France and Germany, in Finland, Sweden, and Norway, races were to be found quite as low. But the majority of the European races were almost as far ahead of the Irish, as the Irish of to-day are of the Maoris. The forms which make the real distinctions between nations are organic, hidden as it were under the surface. And European society generally rested on a framework of a higher type than the Irish—a superior family and political system, with superior laws of property and succession. Superficially viewed, the races of the Continent may have appeared quite as barbaric ; they may have been more lawless and turbulent. Moreover, as these races were mostly pagan, it is easy to understand how, in the sixth and seventh centuries, the Irish, burning with the zeal of recent conversion to Christianity, and possessing some schools of Christian learning, might appear to be in advance of them. Missionaries from Ireland were carrying the new light into the dark places in which paganism was still enshrined. Her music and poetry —products of Keltic genius—were celebrated. Her sons were distinguished by wit as by piety. All these were distinctions bespeaking a species of superiority. Yet might they all of them have been presented by a nation of even still lower organisation. The really distinctive marks of inferiority remained ; common property, the gavel, tanistry, an imperfect system of kinship. Most of the Europeans had left these behind. Even the Kelts of Britain had got rid of them under their Roman masters, and were separated by a gulf from their congeners of Ireland. At the time of the Roman Conquest they were probably lower in the scale. Cæsar found among them customs which throw light on the Irish institutions. But it was their good fortune, for four hundred years, to be under the influence of the most advanced civilisation the world then knew. To this day the Irish have not received an equivalent training. They were long left to work out their own advancement: and unfortunately for them, Christianity, which for a moment seemed to make them superior to their pagan neighbours, from incidents attending its introduction, did much to

stereotype their laws and customs, and to render a spontaneous onward movement next to impossible."[1]

All that need be said on McLennan's summing-up is that he does not quite rightly discriminate the importance of property laws in determining the grade of a people's civilisation. It may be that only by way of a system of individual property can a primitive people reach a high civilisation; but it does not follow that wherever such a system is introduced the civilisation rises. And inasmuch as common property is in the end the highest Utopia of civilisation, there might have been a fair degree of civilisation alongside of it among the pre-Christian Irish, as there was certainly much brutality and barbarism with individual property among other nations. In any case, be it remembered, a measure of common property in land, with periodical division by the chief, is exactly the state of things described by Cæsar as existing among the Germans of his day. If it was bad for Celts, it was bad for Teutons. As a matter of fact, the institution has often been cited by Teutophiles as a proof of the idyllic beauty of primitive Teutonic life. But gavelkind is not really equivalent to community of property, as McLennan himself shows: it was a system which excluded the advantages alike of private property and of corporate cultivation, and practically frustrated progress in agriculture. Thus the early Irish were bad agriculturists, as were the Teutons in the time of Cæsar and of Tacitus.

For the rest, tanistry obviously was a system lending itself to strife; but it would be difficult to point to any northern people at that time in which, under whatever system, strife was not chronic. Tanistry was in fact an expedient to prevent military disaster through the sudden death of a chief: the "brennus" or commander in the campaigns of the Gauls seems always to have had a tanist with him; and in time of war the arrangement may have been very useful, though in times of peace it may have stirred strife. In any case, it should be remembered that alike among the English before the Conquest, and under the feudal Normans for long afterwards, desperate civil war was constantly breaking out. No people that I can remember has ever found for itself a short cut from barbarian militarism to orderly government.

What is clear is that Christianity, as usual, did nothing in itself to promote the necessary development; and on this head

[1] J. F. McLennan's *Memoir of Thomas Drummond*, 1868, pp. 190-192.

the facts must be squarely opposed to the prevailing Catholic delusion :

"The Brehon or ancient Irish laws had been reduced to a written code, under the immediate authority of St Patrick, or of one or other of the persons who have been rolled up into the Saint. They included gavelkind, tanistry, and the law of the Eric or money compensations for murder. And such was the veneration of the Irish for the instrument of their conversion to Christianity, that they reverenced the code as much as the religion. Patrick's law, as they loved to call it, was declared to be unalterable ; and with that code no people could advance beyond a state of comparative savageness.

"Such was the social and political state of the Irish when their relations with England commenced. The septmen—rude herdsmen, probably not long settled from nomad life—are represented as living, on the whole, in a miserable condition, borne down by the exactions of their chiefs and kings—'cuttings and cosheries' and 'coyne and livery.' Beneath them were the Betaghs or slaves, in a condition still more wretched. Above them were the chiefs, exercising lavish hospitalities at the expense of their inferiors ; constantly intriguing against and quarrelling with one another. In the palaces of the greater chiefs was maintained no small degree of luxury, and even of barbaric splendour."[1]

That is to say, the condition of the Irish was very much the same as that of the Teutonic nations at the same period, and later. Modern research is now making havoc of the German theory of the "free institutions" and "common tenure of land" of the early Teutons ; and it is pretty clear that whatever their system of tenure they had slavery and poverty among them when they migrated to England, and that they did not escape them there. The question is whether the Irish were progressing between the time of their Christianisation and the English connection. Historians ready enough to say a good word for the civilising effects of Christianity have decided that they were not, that on the contrary they had greatly retrograded. Green writes that in the reign of Henry the Second the civilisation of Ireland had

"fallen far below the height which it had reached when its missionaries brought religion and learning to the shores of Northumbria. Learning had almost disappeared. The Christianity which had been a vital force in the eighth century had died into asceticism and superstition in the twelfth, and had ceased to influence the morality of the people at large. The Church, destitute of any effective organisation, was powerless to

[1] *Id.*, pp. 192-3.

do the work which it had done elsewhere in Western Europe, or to introduce order into the anarchy of warring tribes. On the contrary, it shared the anarchy around it. Its head, the Coarb, or Archbishop of Armagh, sank into the hereditary chieftain of a clan; its bishops were without dioceses, and often mere dependents on the greater monasteries. Hardly a trace of any central authority remained to knit the tribes into a single nation."[1]

It would be difficult to find a more decisive negation of the current formula that Christianity is a civilising force. Yet the churchman probably overstated the backwardness of Christian Ireland. As McLennan suggests, it is easy to over-estimate the value of the early "learning"; and it is very certain that the religion of the eighth century was just superstition and asceticism, like that of the twelfth. We must carefully hold the balances between Irish claims which recoil against Ireland, and English claims which ignore comparative tests. Above all we must note how much is due to the irruption of alien barbarism. McLennan puts it thus:—

"The Irish were then, as they have often since proved, their own worst enemies. There were other enemies, however, with whom they had to contend. They might live peaceably, if they would, in the midland, and on the coast to the north and west. But on the south and east were points of terror and danger. These were the towns—almost the only places in Ireland worthy of the name—all in possession of the Danes.

"The Danes had now been firmly planted for upwards of three hundred years on the land. Had the tribes united, they might have swept the scourges of God into the sea, as afterwards they often might have swept the Anglo-Normans. But they were not united, nor capable of union for more than a moment and a single success. So the scourges remained, finding the coast towns convenient ports of departure on their predatory excursions by sea, and safe retreats from the tribesmen on occasions of despoiling them. Resistance to the same invaders had in England established the monarchy. In Ireland, no political benefit had accrued, as a set-off to the centuries of suffering. At the end of the Danish period, as at its commencement, there was still the pentarchy, and in the separate kingdoms the same low order of political organisation. On the other hand, the presence of the Danes checked the course of social improvement.[2] Indeed, if those

[1] *Short History*, p. 431.

[2] [Here there is perhaps room for doubt. The Danes in some respects could give an object lesson to the Irish. See above, p. 133. And it is not easy to see how any social improvement could have arisen save in terms of foreign

writers are correct who take such high ground as to Irish civilisation in the sixth and seventh centuries, we must hold the Danes to have been a cause of social retrogression. The presence of such an enemy, it can be believed, may have had such an effect."[1]

This view may be held alongside of a moderate estimate of the civilisation of the sixth, seventh and eighth centuries. Some retrogression there may have been; and there certainly appears to have been no progress; but the retrogression can hardly have been very great.

But whereas religion had done nothing to promote Irish civilisation, it was at length to do something that should decisively hinder its progress. In the words of McLennan:

"The primitive Irish Church was Christian, but not Roman Catholic. Though, in 1152, a synod of its clergy acknowledged the See of Rome, no Peter's pence seem to have been paid, and Rome was dissatisfied. In 1154 Pope Adrian IV., as 'King of all islands,' by a bull granted the lordship of Ireland to Henry, for the express purpose of 'broadening the borders of the Church.' As his authority had two years previously been acknowledged in Ireland, his simple object would appear to have been to fill the Church coffers. The interests of Rome jumped with the ambition of the Normans. It was decent, however, that greed and rapine should cloak themselves with an ostensibly noble purpose, and none could be more excellent than the extension of the Faith. Let the Irish take what comfort they can from the fact that the Conquest and its train of evils had such an origin."[2]

To make the picture complete, we have to note that the Danish coast cities were now also Christian, and that, in their hostility to the native Irish and their Church, these cities "applied to the see of Canterbury for the ordination of their bishops, and acknowledged a right of spiritual supervision in Lanfranc and Anselm."[3] It is fair to add that the Irish had given the English King pretext for invading them in the Pope's name, inasmuch as they carried on a slave trade in kidnapped Englishmen; but let us also remember what this testifies as to the condition of England itself, where men kidnapped their fellows and sold them into Irish slavery. Further, we must remember that the English "Strongbow" was a "broken man" who went over in the pay of the native King Dermot. The

influence. On the other hand, the Danes as a matter of fact played a most destructive part as regarded the monasteries, which were the centres of Irish culture, such as it was.]

[1] *Id.*, pp. 193-4. [2] *Id.*, p. 195. [3] Green, p. 432.

question now is, what has the English connection done to develop Irish civilisation?

It is admitted by all historians that for centuries after the first contact under Henry the Second no good was done to Ireland by the English connection, but only harm. Whatever Mr Balfour may mean by asserting that England brought order and civilisation into Ireland, he cannot pretend that it did so during the Middle Ages. McLennan rightly says:

"It is important that the primitive state of the Irish should be understood, because it was preserved almost unchanged till near the beginning, and, in some parts, even till near the end, of the seventeenth century. In the long interval between the landing of the Anglo-Normans and the final suppression, by James I., of the Brehon law, no organic improvement whatever had taken place. The sept system was still in force, with gavelkind and tanistry, and all the other impediments which it presented to progress. The political system, such as it was, had crumbled beneath intestine feuds and the pressure of the English enemy: instead of the five provinces of the earlier time there were ninety 'regions' in Ireland—beyond the Pale—under absolutely independent chiefs. If, then, the nation of the tribes has been trained to respect the settled order of government, or laws and institutions of a type higher than its own, this has been effected within comparatively recent times." [1]

Now, this fact alone, rightly considered, is the confutation of Mr Balfour's pretence. Nothing worse could have happened to Ireland, left to itself, than to remain wholly unprogressive for four hundred years; and no amount of civil war could work more awful evil than was wrought under Elizabeth on behalf of Protestantism. The Papacy, which as we saw literally gave Ireland away to England, would not in ordinary course have stifled her nascent civilisation as it tended to do higher civilisation in general. But the power of England was even what the Papacy itself proved to be in distracted Italy—"a stone in the wound." The curse of the English connection was that Ireland was neither conquered nor let alone. The Anglo-Normans were not the people to civilise or improve any other race by contact with them. Europe has perhaps never seen a ruling race less gifted with the Roman power of orderly administration. Their brutality lashed into fierce and undying resistance the virtually English people of Lowland Scotland, who might easily have been amalgamated under the first Edward if only his officials could

[1] Work cited, pp. 194-5.

have ruled provincials with decent judgment. But there was in the feudal Norman a barbaric recklessness, a puerile insolence, which wholly unfitted him to wield Roman rule. Prince John, who to more than average Norman ability joined a more than average Norman offensiveness, made himself so intolerable to the Irish chieftains that his father had to recall him. Soon afterwards, the Saxon and Norman elements, joining to secure constitutional freedom in England, wrung from John the Magna Charta; but there was no thought in England of a Magna Charta for Ireland. She was left to stew in her own juice. The English of the Pale naturally tended to become Irish; and so John made war on them and exiled the leading barons. But the re-established Pale, cut off from native Ireland, cut off by sea from England, remained as before a fountain of national disease. It still tended to become Irish; and if only England had stood aloof the island would in time somehow have shaken down into a stable system, as systems then went. England, however, must needs chronically exert herself to keep the Pale English, professing horror at the "degradation" of the English in Ireland, but caring not a jot for the native Irish. So Ireland was reinvaded with reformative intent by Richard Second, who might have set up a real English rule if he had not immediately had to look to himself at home. His work was left barely begun. Then for several generations English distractions left Ireland to gravitate again towards the primitive and comparatively healthy barbarism, the condition from which, in normal course, a native system would tend to arise. The Pale shrank mile by mile towards Dublin, the last English foothold. But then came Henry Eighth, with his hands free enough at home to allow him to "reconquer" Ireland, that is to say, to give the English element there just vigour enough to renew the old inflammation, the old clash of forces, to an extent that made real settlement hopeless. At the hands of Henry came the most clinging evil of all —the erection of a religious division in addition to that of race. Peace was now not to be even planned for. So much more of evil was religion to do. Ireland was always having to be "reconquered," by invasion, by massacre, by beast-like ferocity, by brutally stupid expulsion of natives, by settlements of English and Scotch, by penal laws against Catholics, by laws against Irish trade, by one atrocious wickedness or another, down to our own era of convulsive and senseless Coercion Acts, the end of which is at hand. She was reconquered under Henry, under Elizabeth, under Cromwell, under Pitt; recolonised under James

and under William; commercially repressed under William and Anne and the Georges; administratively coerced under Victoria by Liberals and Tories alike; bedevilled and misgoverned by all for lack of the root principles of pacific statesmanship; till at length the Liberals, driven to admit that the problem is finally insoluble on English lines, have resolved to let the Irish settle it on their own.

Let us once more listen to McLennan's analysis of the process of the disease set up by the English intervention:

"The four centuries which followed [the Conquest] were centuries of constant feud and slaughter between the invaded and the invaders, of wrongs and retaliations ever increasing with the lapse of time. They were centuries in which the Anglo-Irish and the Irish were both being brutalised by their conflicts—in which, at least, they were receiving the worst possible training for future peaceable cohabitation. The peoples were in effect all the time enemies, living under different laws and government. The law of England was 'by law' established within the Pale; practically there was no law but the will of the stronger. There were at one time within it nine Counties Palatine—unmitigated despotisms. Beyond these, the rule of a rude aristocracy, unrestrained by the presence of sovereignty, was a virtual anarchy. Outside the Pale were the tribes—their laws, language, and customs all unchanged. There was one main source of the never-ending conflict between the races, namely the land, which the barons were there to take and the Irish to defend. When the barons were united, they held what they took; when they fell out, the Septmen regained their own. And the area of the Pale was always broadening or contracting. Sept and tribal wars—wars with the barons—baronial wars, in which the Septs took sides — were the stock incidents of the miserable drama. On an unusual parade of English power, the chiefs hurried to do homage—lip submission, over with the danger which evoked it.

"The conflict of the laws was, perhaps, as productive of bad blood as the conflict of the land; at least, the native historians have made rather more use of it to keep alive the English hatred of England. A Septman who slew an Englishman was, by native law, liable only in the Eric—a money payment to the relatives of the slain. By the English, however, if they caught him, he was hanged, in defiance of the Cain Patric. By English law, on the other hand, to kill an Irishman was no murder. He was an outlaw and enemy of the Crown. To break a contract with him was no wrong; he could not sue in the English courts. The slaughter of the Irish and seizure of their property were acts rewarded by the Government. They helped to give the substance where there was little beyond the name of dominion. So the Irish were plundered and massacred at will, subject only to the

restraints imposed by the fear of retaliation. Five of the Septs, more fortunate than their neighbours, were treated differently, being allowed the benefit of the English law. A common defence in charges of murder was that the murdered man was of 'the mere Irish,' and not of the *quinque sanguines*—the five favoured bloods. It might be imagined that the Septmen in love with the Cain Patric were beyond the law because they chose not to come within it. This was not the case. To get rid of the disadvantages of their position, they repeatedly petitioned for admission to the benefits of English law, and were always refused.[1] The petitions, indeed, were uniformly treated with contempt. To have granted them would have been to abandon the privilege of oppression. Even the Irish within the Pale were not yet within the law. They were the subjects of special enactments which practically excluded them from its protection. By a statute dated 1465, for example, anyone might kill 'any person GOING TO rob or steal, *having no faithful man of good name or fame in his company in English apparel.*' This, of course, exposed every Irishman to be killed at the discretion of any Englishman. It should be stated, however, that by the next Act of the same Parliament, the Septmen of the Pale were directed to take English names, and to wear English apparel."[2]

Here we have conditions of strife and anarchy so factitious, so abnormal, that no nation in the world could have thriven under them. To say, as even McLennan does, that the Irish if united could have driven the aliens into the sea, is to ignore the great fact of the case—the presence behind all of the preponderating power of England, inevitably used to maintain so much of the Pale as sufficed to keep Ireland divided against itself. The half-savage Irish were at the worst little worse in their divisions than the highly-civilised ancient Greeks, who first showed the world how far self-government was possible. They were the victims of a vast misfortune.

To say, in face of all this, that what civilisation Ireland has attained is due to England, is, I repeat, to exhibit either hardy "hypocrisy" or—what is probably the matter with Mr Balfour—essential incapacity to understand the processes or the laws of political growth. His formula is the formula of an empiric. He puts together the two premisses: Ireland was barbarous when England began to intermeddle: she is now partly civilised; and he draws the conclusion: Therefore she has England to thank for her civilisation. It is the absurdest case of *non sequitur*.

[1] [On this point, see above, p. 139.]

[2] Work cited, pp. 198-200.

Had Ireland been left alone, she could easily have become more civilised through non-English influences than she is at present; and she could not conceivably have suffered from any other hands such horrors as she has done at the hands of England. Mr Balfour absurdly assumes that she would have remained exactly as she was in the time of Henry the Second. She could not possibly have done so, any more than England has done. English civilisation has developed under pressure of the general forces of European culture: Irish civilisation would of necessity have developed to some extent under the same forces. The greatest strides of European progress have been made since the invention of printing; and printing would have affected Irish life as it has done English. One of the greatest impulses to European commerce for thousands of years was the colonisation of North America. Ireland, left to herself, would naturally have profited by American trade in a high degree. The fact that English and Irish passengers for the United States embark for the main passage at Liverpool, and not on the west coast of Ireland, is one of the standing evidences of how the chances of Ireland were deliberately frustrated by English and pro-English action. It is not a hundred years since Irish trade was relieved of the wicked English laws made to repress it; for when Pitt in 1785 wisely strove to make an end of them, he was baffled by the Irish Parliament itself, which represented merely the land-owners connected with the established Church, who cared nothing for Irish manufactures, these being mostly carried on by Papists and Dissenters. And it is just sixty-five years since Irish life was relieved of the wicked sectarian laws framed in the interests of English Protestantism.

English wickedness—that is one half of the story: English blundering, that is the other half. The extent of the blundering might alone suffice to dispose of the idle boast that the English race has a special faculty for politics. No country in Christian Europe, not even Russia with Poland, has such a colossal failure standing to its account. Brutal Englishmen saw long ago—the sentimentalist and idealist Spenser saw—that the only way to make peace in Ireland was to make it either all English or all Irish. English statecraft never got further than to introduce enough of the alien element to keep Ireland for ever distracted under English supremacy. And the English supremacy has wrought in addition to other desperate evils the profound economic evil of drawing the land-owning class to England, so that a large share of the produce of Ireland—what she was

allowed to produce—has for generations been exported as sheer tribute. Now, a self-governed country situated as Ireland is, if its landowners went voluntarily to reside in England, would be led in natural course of policy to deal with that evil by specially taxing rental; and a self-governed Ireland, under a democratic system, would infallibly legislate in that direction. Such legislation was eagerly proposed last century.[1] But the old Irish Parliament was a mere preserve of the landowners, who ruled in their own interest; and the predominant English landowning class has since ruled Ireland according to its own class policy, from which Ireland has suffered immeasurably more than England has done, owing precisely to the special factor of absenteeism.

I am well aware that all the evils wrought in Ireland by bad government have been terribly aggravated by the blind multiplication of the people: I have elsewhere pointed this out in confutation of the one-sided doctrine of Mr Henry George, who refuses to see the force of the law of population. But I will here add, on that head, that in all reasonable probability overpopulation in Ireland would never have run to the extent it has done if the Irish people had been left in modern times to deal with their own land question. Of all the senseless catchwords of English race prejudice the most execrable is that which alleges the innate recklessness of "the Celt." Parental and other prudence has nowhere been more rigorously practised than in France; and English prejudice, as represented by Tennyson, sees "the Celt" personified in France whenever Frenchmen do a foolish thing that England does not happen to be doing at the moment. For that matter, however, the fact that Englishmen have any given state of things inside their own doors has never hindered them from exclaiming at the same state of things among their neighbours. Within the past six months we have had endless head-wagging in England over the "corruption" revealed in France by the Panama scandal, while we have had on our own hands at least three scandals of the same sort, all of them gigantic, if singly less gigantic than that of the Panama undertaking, which is simply the greatest because France is unhappily the most parsimonious and investment-seeking nation.

Mr Balfour was loudly applauded by his followers, as was to be expected, when he protested against English politicians going about denouncing England. That is none the less the best service an Englishman can do to England, in connection with

[1] See the *Wealth of Nations*, B. v., ch. 2, M'Culloch's ed., p. 405.

the Irish issue; and we shall never put our politics on a scientific basis till we have substituted for the childish and vulgar habit of national self-praise the habit of national self-criticism. Mr Balfour's plan is the immemorial method of the empiric, fooling his hearers with elementary flattery, and turning all history to the account of the most puerile instincts. To tell in plain English what England did to Ireland under Elizabeth, and under Cromwell, is to tell one of the most awful tales of blood and devastation that human history retains. The bare recital of the facts haunts one like a nightmare. Again and again we read of systematic massacres of men, women, and children; but that is next to nothing in comparison with the rest. It is the ever-recurring picture of subterhuman misery among the survivors that burns itself in on the mind—the picture of tribes of human beings driven to die of slow hunger in the wilderness, like wild beasts; of gaunt wretches, unable to stand erect, crawling out of ditches to feed on corpses by way of change from feeding on weeds. Englishmen have in the past recorded these things without a thought of remorse for bringing them about; and at the very time that these Irish horrors were happening, or still fresh in memory, Englishmen were vociferous in denouncing the cruelties of the Spaniards and the Dutch to the lower races who fell into *their* clutches. "Creeping hypocrisy" could not go further than blatant national self-righteousness had done in these matters. The nation which has wrought the wickedness has ever had a hundred words of abuse for the victim against one word of self-reproach. If there were any utility or any sense in keeping up national animosities, Irishmen might well hate England with a desperate hatred; and the wonder is, not that they have so hated her, but that so many of them have been so soon able to put the old passion aside. They have learned or are learning the lesson that national animosities are only the reverse side of the old insane ferocities which gave rise to them; and that to hate our fellow creatures because their ancestors injured ours is to approximate to the ethical standards of the dead wrongdoers. And the lesson would be learned still more rapidly on the Irish side—that is, on the Irish Nationalist side—were it not for the fatuity and the prejudice displayed on the so-called Unionist side in England; in the speeches of Mr Chamberlain, who vituperates the men with whom he once caballed against his own colleagues; in the speeches of inept aristocrats like Sir Henry Chaplin, the very types of the political incompetence that has created the Irish problem; in the speeches of perverse

partisan leaders like Mr Balfour, who elect to be the political hewers of wood and drawers of water for fanatics in whose religion they can only sham belief, and for dullards in whose ideals of life they can only wearily affect to share. It is strictly accurate to say that there are not now more than two prominent Unionists in Parliament who ever exhibited the true spirit of union towards Ireland in the days—as late as ten years ago—when some of us still vainly hoped that England might learn to treat Ireland in Parliament as an integral part of the Union. The men who now call themselves Unionist are almost invariably those who are incapable of real unionism. All things considered, we shall be wonderfully lucky if, with such a dead weight of unreasoning prejudice among us still, we can so much as cut the knot of the Irish problem by Mr Gladstone's measure, leaving the loose ends to be dealt with later.

EPILOGUE.

A PROGRAM FOR IRELAND.

Since 1886 it has become clear that the English Parliament cannot be looked to for any solution of the Irish problem save that which is a solution on the English side—the letting Ireland manage her own affairs. As Mill put it thirty years ago, "the difficulty of governing Ireland lies entirely in our own minds: it is a difficulty of understanding."[1] That lack of intelligence is palpable still, and it will long subsist, inasmuch as the interest of the rich idle class is bound up with the misunderstanding of other people's. England, with her enormous industry resting on a basis of vanishing coal, is still too far from being face to face with the fundamental facts of her existence to permit of her people being driven to put it on a scientific footing. With Ireland, the case is different. She has been only too long at handgrips with nature not to know, throughout her population, exactly where at least half of her problem lies. And it may be hoped that when the Irish people get Home Rule they will approach the solution.

Inasmuch, then, as Home Rule is the indispensable first step, any program for Ireland must include a Home Rule scheme; and as the failure of Mr Gladstone's is in large part due to its own faults, it may be worth while to offer an outline of another.

§ 1. *A Federal Constitution.*

The obviously indefensible point of Mr Gladstone's plan is the illogical relation it would create between Ireland and the imperial Parliament. On his lines there are open only the alternative courses of (*a*) excluding all Irish representatives from the imperial Parliament, while taxing Ireland for imperial purposes, and (*b*) admitting Irish members to the imperial Parliament, in any number to be agreed upon, thus permitting Ireland to have a share in controlling English and Scotch home affairs while

[1] *England and Ireland*, p. 47.

Englishmen and Scotchmen have no control over those of Ireland. Between these hopeless alternatives Mr Gladstone helplessly oscillated. He had seen long ago the desperateness of the problem, when he declared that it would pass the wit of man to devise a Home Rule scheme which should escape both difficulties; and it is one of the illustrations of the demoralising influence of the hand-to-mouth habit in politics that he later turned his back on his own avowal and protested that the solution was tolerably easy. As all the world knows, his solution was only an impossible proposal from which he had to make a humiliating retreat—the proposal that Irish members should in perpetuity go in and out of the imperial Parliament according to the nature of the business being done: a thing possible as a temporary expedient in an emergency, but out of the question as a permanent arrangement. Such are the shifts to which a statesman can be driven for want of general principles.

The dilemma is of course set up by the presupposition that the Parliament at Westminster is to remain the general legislature for the rest of the country after Ireland is separately provided for. Mr Gladstone would not face the logical conclusion —that the central Parliament must be reconstituted when a subordinate Parliament is created. He cannot have overlooked this solution—the establishment of a true Federal Constitution for all the parts of the United Kingdom, giving a subordinate legislature to each, and putting over them a new central imperial Parliament, to which each province shall send representatives in proportion to its weight. He knew that a scheme of federation was actually said to have been contemplated by the Liberal leaders as a solution of the Irish problem fifty years ago.[1] It must be that he recoiled from an undertaking so vast, craving rather a course not too long and arduous for his closing years. The ambition thus to heal an ancient breach, as a last task before the end come, is indeed a high and a worthy one; but the destinies of nations cannot fitly be shaped by such velleities. Mr Gladstone's well-meaning haste has come to nothing: his scheme stands discredited on its merits; and the cause of Home Rule cannot make headway until a better be framed. There were not wanting signs, before Mr Gladstone's resignation, that a number of his colleagues saw the Federal solution to be inevitable, and that he had become aware of their conviction. But no such scheme has been officially formulated; and it is important that the Irish people should turn its agitation to the desirable end, by way of putting the Nationalist

[1] *Special Aspects of the Irish Question*, p. 294.

cause on a fresh footing. If the Irish members continue to recoil from such a systematic policy, on the score that it is their business to get Home Rule speedily, and not to reconstruct the entire British Constitution, they will but doom themselves to impotence and leave the whole matter to be dealt with by another generation. There is no escaping from the fact that Mr Gladstone's Home Rule Bills were both bad measures, in respect that they struck respectively on the two horns of the dilemma above stated. Several of his colleagues have let it be seen that they have little heart to fight for ever on unsound ground. It is for the Irish Parliamentary party then to accept the unalterable, and recommence the campaign on lines that can be fought without flinching. The greater task, logically laid out, is more feasible than the smaller, laid out in defiance of reason. The immemorial disease of Irish life is not to be cured without long travail; and to refuse to attempt to do the work systematically and coherently is simply to show unfitness for all leadership therein.

Let us posit briefly the main gains that will accrue to a systematic settlement by way of a Federal Constitution for the United Kingdom.

1. The arrangement will leave no opening for fresh agitation or extension of claims; whereas a Dublin Parliament with one hand tied by arbitrary vetoes, looking always on the free action of a British Parliament not so hampered, would infallibly strain at its tether, and struggle for further powers. Under a Federal system, the legislatures of all sections of the composite State will have exactly the same powers and lie under exactly the same limitations.

2. If Ireland were put on a footing analogous to that of the colonies, she would be encouraged by the very nature of the arrangement to demand as much independence as the colonies possess, and above all their right to tax imports. Under a Federal system, free trade between all sections of the Federation is a matter of course.

3. Under a Federal system, the imperial Parliament will be specially charged with the enforcement of the obligations of each of the federated provinces, whereas the position of the present Parliament, with a Dublin Parliament subordinated to it and striving to elude its control, would be almost hopelessly difficult.

4. No sense of grievance could be felt by the other provinces; whereas, were Irish members to sit at Westminster under Mr Gladstone's second scheme, the grievance of the British popula-

tion would be as intolerable as that of the Irish people would be under his first scheme, which taxed them for imperial purposes yet gave them no voice in imperial affairs.

As for the prospect of realising such a program, it may be remarked that not only are there no weak points in the position such as left Mr Gladstone's open to unanswerable criticism, but a number of politicians now on the side of Unionism have avowed that they could not resist a Federal scheme as they have resisted Mr Gladstone's. What is no less important is the gain of power that would come of throwing nearly all the main forces of Liberalism on one line; for the movement against the House of Lords would be literally embodied in a movement for Federation, since there could be no House of Lords under a scientific constitution; and the movement for Welsh Disestablishment would be equally embodied in a Welsh claim for Home Rule.

§ 2. *Provision for Ulster.*

Next to the crux of the retention or exclusion of Irish members, the most assailable point in Mr Gladstone's Home Rule policy was certainly the Ulster difficulty. Before he adopted a Home Rule policy, those of us who discussed the theory on its merits often put to Home Rulers of old standing the question how the principle would work for Ulster. The result was invariably quite unsatisfactory: the problem had not been thought out; and the questioner was usually led to the conclusion that for Home Rulers nationality was defined by sea-beach. Either they admitted and postponed the Ulster difficulty, or they flatly declared that Ulster must be coerced if need be. This was a sad outcome of the principle that peoples ought to decide for themselves how they should be governed, and that alien rule should be forced on none capable of self-rule. It is perfectly clear that if Irish Catholics have a right to object to English rule in Ireland, Irish Protestants have a right to object to Catholic rule. One does not say they have as good reasons: they cannot have; for England has actually misgoverned Ireland for ages, while Catholic Ireland has never yet had a Home Parliament at all. But the Home Rule principle does not admit the question of sufficiency of reason; it insists on the right of every people to choose; and the Ulster Orangemen choose as emphatically as do the Catholics.

The one-sidedness of the Home Rulers, however, is very well balanced, ethically speaking, by the one-sidedness of the Orangemen. Perhaps no party in modern times has taken its stand

more undisguisedly on injustice. The Home Rulers, English and Irish, do propose that Orangemen should have equal rights in an Irish Parliament; the Orangemen expressly declare that they will not only not have Home Rule for themselves, but will, if possible, prevent the Catholics from having it. What they resent as an injustice to themselves—alien authority or partnership—they would brazenly enforce on their neighbours. Whatever may be the solution of the difficulty, this tone cannot be listened to by principled Radicals. The inspiration of Orangeism is primarily mere religious hate; that lies on the surface of the boasted fraternisation of Ulster Radicals and Tories. Never was there a better illustration of the law that men must love to hate, fraternise to fight. But, all the same, popular religious hate is a factor that must be carefully reckoned with, especially in the politics of backward and fanatical communities like those of Ireland. The Orangemen, whatever the orderliness of the 1892 Convention, are many of them blatant and violent men. But legislation must take account of the existence of blatant and violent men; and there are plenty of them in the Home Rule party.

If, then, no change comes over the attitude of Protestant Ulster when the Home Rule problem is definitely taken hold of, Ulster must be rationally provided for. It may very well be, of course, that a change will occur: there are signs of one even now, in the dissatisfaction of Ulster farmers with *their* situation, and with the first course of the Coalition Government, which was pledged to the landlord interest. The real interest of the peasantry being the same throughout Ireland, it is only gross religious bigotry that can keep those of Ulster hostile to Home Rule. But religious bigotry is obviously a tenacious passion, and there is plenty of machinery in Ulster to keep it alive and active; and as it is impossible to plan a policy on the mere chance of its rapid decline, we must face the probability of its continuing to sunder the Protestant faction from the Irish population proper.

Shortly put, the question for Radical Home Rulers is, What arrangement is to be made for Ulster? But that question instantly evokes another—How much of Ulster? Ulster is not wholly Protestant. Even in the Protestant towns there are strong Catholic contingents; and some constituencies are predominantly Catholic. Clearly, if Ireland is not a unity, if it is politically only a "geographical expression," Ulster is on the same footing; and if Orange communities in Ireland are to be separately legislated for, so must be Catholic communities in

Ulster. Four out of the nine counties, Donegal, Fermanagh, Monaghan, and Cavan, were in the 1886-1892 Parliament wholly represented by Home Rulers; Tyrone returned two Home Rulers out of four members; Armagh one out of three; and Down one out of four; the town of Londonderry, almost equally divided, returned a Home Ruler; and even in Belfast one was elected out of the town's four members. If those elections be found to represent the lasting state of opinion, those constituencies would on the abstract Home Rule principle be entitled to a share in an Irish Parliament, which they join in demanding; that is, unless it be decided that Belfast and the counties are to be reckoned as unities, and the minority divisions are to succumb to the majority.

It is hard to see, however, how this can be plausibly proposed as regards the counties. A Home Rule section even of Belfast, as of County Down, is theoretically a separate community relatively to the town or the county, just as Orangemen are a separate community relatively to Ireland, or Irish Home Rulers relatively to England. Indeed, when we work out the question of communities, it is clear that, from the point of view of principle, an Orange minority in the Home Rule division of Belfast is logically entitled to cast in its lot with Orangedom. But here we come to the end of the tether of principle, so to speak. We must work on a basis of possibilities; and for the purposes of our practical politics communities cannot be reckoned with in terms of anything less than constituencies. If the Home Rule principle not fully applied, in respect of there being recalcitrants within a constituency, it is because it cannot be.

Here, however, rises the question, If the minority of a *constituency* must succumb, why should not the minority divisions of a town or a county? In the case of the constituency, we lay down a *non possumus*: in the case of the town or the county we cannot strictly so plead; but it is very obvious that to divide a town into different State jurisdictions must be extremely inconvenient, if not insufferably so. Government must finally be squared with public peace; and if we gave a Dublin legislature rule over one quarter of Belfast, thus enforcing a breaking up of the municipality, we should be running the gravest danger of public strife. It would indeed be a practical certainty; and probably no government or party would propose such a division. And here we come to the practical definition of a community for the purposes of this discussion, namely, *A population in which rival jurisdictions cannot be set up without constant danger of feud.*

It is a somewhat unexpected conclusion. To solve a problem of oppugnancies we are forced to a negative definition.

With the counties the case is different. If we contemplate the cutting-up of Ireland into two jurisdictions at all, we may as well re-arrange the shires or provinces, leaving out of the Dublin-Home-Rule jurisdiction Antrim, Londonderry, half of Tyrone, two-thirds of Armagh, and three-fourths of county Down, or otherwise as voting may now go. But here again there will be one source of friction almost incompatible with order. The town of Londonderry would have Home Rule, and the surrounding county something else, unless future elections go differently; and it is difficult to imagine such an arrangement working without quarrels. It would probably be well to leave Londonderry town with its county. Part of county Down, on the other hand, would be under Dublin Home Rule, and Belfast otherwise; but, as it happens, and as might be expected, it is in the south divisions of Down and Armagh that the Nationalists have the majority; and a line drawn across those portions of these counties, and across Tyrone up to the west border of county Londonderry, would leave a compact north-eastern province representing Orange or Conservative Ulster. Some division might indeed be practicable in Londonderry; while on the other hand it might be difficult to divide Tyrone; but such difficulties might be settled by a small amount of compromise on both sides. Such partial compromise would be justified by sheer necessity, which forces the leaving of Belfast as a whole to Orangedom.

Given a real Orange province, then, cut out of and different from the present semi-Catholic province of Ulster, the question arises, What is to be done with it? The first and most satisfactory answer, from the Radical point of view, is that Orange Ulster may be constituted a separate community or State with its own local legislature, on the United States plan; while the rest of Ireland is constituted a separate State, with its legislature at Dublin or wherever else it pleases. (An impartial outsider would be disposed to suggest Cork, which is close to one of the best harbours in the world, and is more essentially "national" than Dublin, which looks to England.) These two province-States would alike have Home Rule; and a comprehensive and logical scheme would empower them both to send representatives to an "imperial" Parliament, created by a reconstruction of the British constitution on a federal system, under which, say, Scotland (or North and South Scotland), Wales, and England (or two or more sections of England) should alike have their local legis-

latures, while sending representatives to an imperial Parliament that should have *nothing but* imperial affairs to deal with.

Some Orangemen, however, declare that they will not accept Home Rule of any sort, and demand that their present connection with England shall be maintained. This attitude is obviously inspired by the religious malice which makes them hostile to the self-government of Catholics by Catholics. They are anxious to be "part of England" primarily in order to spite Catholic Ireland. But it cannot for a moment be admitted that Orangemen have a claim on England to the extent of its keeping up a dangerous source of strife in Ireland. Orangemen indeed hate Catholics about as much as many Home Rulers have been prepared to hate England; but the psychological provocativeness of a specifically alien jurisdiction is more permanent and more intense than that of difference of creed in a race with the same accent and the same name. A Protestant state and a Catholic state in Ireland, with separate state legislatures, could get on much better together than the latter could with an *English* state ruled from London. Englishmen are indeed in a manner bound to see that Orangemen are constitutionally safeguarded against intervention by the Catholic Irish legislature, but that is all. The cry about "abandonment" would be the merest perversity in the face of such an arrangement as is above proposed; and would be entitled to no respect as coming from people who have repeatedly talked of resisting legislation proposed to be carried in the British Parliament. Orangemen would have a clear choice. Either they could be constituted into a separate federal state, independent of the Catholic state, and sending like that representatives to the imperial Parliament; or they could be left *without Parliamentary government altogether*. The chances are a hundred to one that they will not make that choice. Religious malice prevents them from seeing the plain expediency of making Ireland into one state, with one legislature, but it will hardly lead them to deny themselves representative government. The inevitable movement of democracy within Orangedom, once the pretext of danger from Popery is nullified, would force either the establishment of an Orange legislature or coalition with the Catholic state. In any case, the whole responsibility of choice would lie with the Orange faction, who would be left without any show of grievance. The plan of two Irish state legislatures would take the main ground from under Lord Salisbury's appeal, and would cancel the one valid argument against a Home Rule policy as generally conceived. I recollect to have seen, in 1885 or 1886, a scheme

of provincial legislatures for Ireland; but I cannot remember whether in this scheme the provinces were to send representatives to London or to a central Irish Parliament at Dublin. There seems, however, to be no necessity for having anything but one Protestant and one Catholic province; and in that case there could be no superior Parliament save the "imperial."

It will be necessary, however, on the plan proposed, to have a clear understanding as to what are to be imperial affairs and what are not. On this point Home Rulers have been much wanting in clearness. They often allude to "local" affairs as if these consisted mainly in municipal and county administration. But local government in a system of Federal States would include the making of land laws, and, if the American example is to be followed, marriage-laws and criminal laws. Difference of laws in these matters is a grave drawback; but the line cannot be drawn short of some such devolution of legislative power on the States if the arrangement is to meet Irish needs. The vetoes of Mr Gladstone's original Bill were reducible to no consistent principle; and it would be bad statesmanship to set up a constitution which the mass of the Irish people would be constantly burning to alter. All that the English and Irish aristocratic party can reasonably ask for in the matter of the land laws is that there shall be provision against confiscation of landlords' rights; and this may be effected by a previous purchase transaction on the lines of Mr Gladstone's proposals. If the "English majority" will not trust an Irish Parliament to deal fairly by landlords, their alternative is to employ English credit as Mr Gladstone proposed. But the policy of Ireland, to be permanently successful, must go beyond mere purchase of landlords' rights and provision for the transfer of ownership to the tenants. The events of the past twenty-five years have shown that, though the creation of peasant proprietorship fifty years ago might possibly have enabled the peasantry to meet the new situation, a system of transfer which presupposes a regular power of payment on the tenant's part is practically sure to break down. Were it only for that reason, another solution must be found if Ireland under Home Rule is not to be merely miserable with a difference.

§ 3. *Nationalisation of Rent.*

Even if, indeed, there were a fair prospect that in a generation the present tenants might carry through a process of purchase which should make them owners of their farms, it is not at all

likely that Ireland would then be at an end of her agrarian troubles. It is indeed odd that any one should suppose so. A system involving five hundred thousand small proprietors is of course much more conducive to national happiness than a system which keeps the land in the hands of a thousand landlords with five hundred thousand tenants, provided that under the small-proprietor system agriculture is not worsened, and that the standard of life is not lowered by multiplication of families and holdings. And we may suppose that, despite the influence of the priesthood, the Irish peasantry, like the French, would be gradually led by simple proprietorship to restrain their families and so avoid the progressive reduction of size of holdings to absurdity. In Ireland, however, the reform, so long delayed, will be extremely hard to begin; and there would be for a time a strong tendency to cut up farms under the new system as under the old. Such subdivision infallibly means misery; and such misery means the purchase of broken men's lands by others. Thus the cutting-up process would be followed by one of estate-making. And even without widespread subdivision, in the absence of a law forcing the divison of estates that are above a certain size, the normal process of capitalism tends to the creation of large estates. Under a system of peasant proprietary, there would be no hindrance to the purchase of various holdings by any one man who could persuade the holders to sell; and the simple fact that farms vary in quality would further tend to bring about the old inequalities. Men with large families to provide for, sufferers from sickness, men with bad luck in live stock, would tend to lose their property, and others would acquire it. In France at this moment, under the law of equal division of the property of parents among children, it constantly happens that a peasant farmer has to borrow money to pay to his sisters and brothers the value of their share; so that, though the statistics are hard to get, it is notorious that the French peasantry in general are an indebted class. In a country where there was a tendency to capitalistic farming, such holdings would be very apt to be sold. It would only need, then, a generation or two to produce in Ireland a number of new rich landowners, who would let their land to tenants as did the old; and the agrarian problem, supposing it to have disappeared in the interim, would reopen. For what mining and manufacturing industry is in England, that agriculture (including pasturage) is in Ireland—the main source of the subsistence of the nation; and as industrial trouble is inevitable in England, pending the coming of a scien-

tific social system, so agrarian trouble is inevitable in Ireland, pending the creation of a scientific land system.

Now, it is a much easier matter to settle the land problem on scientific lines, howbeit not on a final footing, than it is to reduce the industrial problem to any scientific footing at all; and it is relatively easier still when, as in the case of Ireland, the public intelligence has already been brought to contemplate a sweeping measure of land purchase, by State action.[1] It only needs that instead of turning its effort to the creation of peasant proprietors, the State should retain all property in the land, and make the farmers and cotters *its* tenants, giving them not only the security of tenure which they need but the further security that their rents shall never become impossible for them in respect of bad seasons or unforeseen competition.

That is to say, the State should fix the rent due from each holding, first, on the basis of the market value of the farm under the existing laws before the commencement of the State's ownership, and afterwards, year by year, on the basis of the average prices of (1) market produce, or (2) of the produce special to any district or class of farm; or (3) in respect of new outside conditions, such as the rise of towns, roads, and railways. The rent, in short, should be on a sliding scale. In this way and in this way only is it possible to prevent chronic strife, and the chronic ruin of thousands of cultivators. As the rent would be fixed each year with regard to the variations of market prices from the level at which it was first fixed by valuation, and to the variation of the advantages of site, the same tests would apply everywhere, and tenants who were specially industrious or specially skilful would duly profit by their industry and their skill. This may not be the final principle of remuneration in human affairs; but it is an immense advance on the existing system; and if a still higher scheme is ever to be reached, it can the more easily proceed from such a basis. In the meantime, the nationalisation of economic rent would leave in full play all the individualistic forces which would work for the fullest utilisation of the land. Wherever tenants choose to undertake special improvements of a durable kind, they can and indeed should be

[1] "To say the truth, all parties are agreed *in petto* upon the necessity of abolishing landlordism. It is only a question of settling who shall have the credit of doing it, and how it shall be managed so that neither the landlord's creditors nor the public exchequer should suffer too much by that unavoidable liquidation." (M. Philippe Daryl, *Ireland's Disease*, author's Eng. ed., 1888, p. 213.)

bought up by the State at a valuation. Thus there need be no discouragement of any species of improvement whatever, though the final property in improvements, and the right to raise rents on account of these, would still vest in the State. If under this system serious inequalities still arise, they will at least not take the form of large estates; while the community will still have at its command the machinery of taxation of incomes. Should it be found that Mr George's principle, of making the economic rent the "single tax," works to the general advantage, well and good; if not, other taxation can be applied. Indeed, while the State is paying off the purchase price of the landlord's rights, it clearly must retain the present system of taxes. The "single tax" will be possible, if ever, only when the burden of purchase is cleared off.

Under a system of rent-nationalisation, it will be observed, security of tenure will be carried to the highest possible point without involving any risk of injury to agriculture. As rents will be fixed on a regular principle, any man's inability to pay will obviously mean either special misfortune on his part—which would be matter of common knowledge, and so would constitute a case for charitable leniency on the part of the State—or incompetence. In the latter case, he will be identifiable as a bungler who would have gone bankrupt if he had been the owner of his farm; and his removal will be an evident expediency.

For the rest, as the fixing of rates of rent will be a public matter, like the fixing of taxes, and the proceeds will be national revenue, there would be no risk under such a system of the tenants cheating the State. It will be to the interest of each to see that every one else pays his due. And to this end, perfect publicity should be given to the whole procedure.

§ 4. *Promotion of Agriculture and Industry.*

In the special circumstances of Ireland, however, an Irish Parliament would do well to attempt more than the maintenance of agriculture at its present level. It is certain that the land can support a larger population than it does, and it is to the immediate interest of all to create the possibility of such maintenance. Provision can also be made, without any infringement of the principle of free trade between the sections of the Federal State, for the promotion of industry, the necessary complement of the promotion of agriculture. Given such provision, the hitherto perpetual pressure of relative over-population—a pressure

at work even in years of actual depopulation—would be for the time relieved, and the people could be lifted to the higher standard of comfort which is the first ground of security against future relative excess of numbers. Over-population means simply excess of persons relatively to the *available* resources. Let the available resources be speedily increased, and the over-population is absorbed, with a chance of not re-appearing as such. It should be a main part of the business of an Irish Parliament, then, to stimulate and outstrip the "natural" growth of Irish agriculture on its new footing by special means.

And it happens that both the need and the feasibility of such promotion of agriculture is being freshly recognised among politicians of different parties. Just after the headline and first paragraph of this section had been written, there appeared in the *Times* the following item of news :—

"A noteworthy occurrence affecting Ireland is the publication of the report drawn up by Mr Horace Plunket's 'Recess Committee,' which, composed of men of various opinions, has been considering the welfare of the country. This recommends the establishment of an Irish Governmental Department of Agriculture and Industries. Whether the suggestion be carried into effect or not, the work of the committee will nevertheless be memorable, since it has achieved the rare feat of bringing into practical unanimity a collection of Irishmen of all parties and beliefs."

To no one was this publication[1] more noteworthy and more welcome than to the present writer. It provides, from a wide knowledge of the subject, and from a ripe reflection on the practical problem, a demonstration of the need for and the feasibility of a State promotion of agriculture and industry in Ireland, where he had been about to undertake the thesis with extremely imperfect qualifications, mainly on lines of economic theory and analogy. It is now, happily, unnecessary to do more than refer to the Report in question as a perfect store-house of information and argument, to summarise its proposals, and to point to its political significance. It is first of all to be remarked that the proposal for a State Department of Agriculture and Industries follows upon a movement, begun a few years ago by Mr Horace Plunket, for the development of coöperative methods among Irish farmers, which has already led to great improvement

[1] *Report of the Recess Committee on the Establishment of a Department of Agriculture and Industries for Ireland.* Dublin : Browne & Nolan. Belfast : Mullan & Son. London : Fisher Unwin. Price 1s.

in Irish dairy produce.[1] Thus it is from an organisation with the best means of knowing what can be done by private initiative that we have the weightiest plea yet made for State aid to industry in Ireland.

Taking agriculture to begin with, we find the Recess Committee proposing to promote (*a*) normal agriculture by means of a system of Travelling Instructors, Experiment Stations, and Agricultural Laboratories, all of which may be applied in connection with and furtherance of the movement of coöperation now being guided by the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society; and (*b*) a variety of other field and cottage industries in which instruction could be given by the same means. In this connection it is to be specially noted that attempts were actually made in Ireland in the last generation (1838-1848) to improve agriculture by means of model farms and travelling teachers; and that the effort was frustrated by the opposition of the English Treasury, which then stood for the principle of unqualified *laissez-faire*, then the ruling economic doctrine in England. Thus, after ages of direct oppression of Ireland, involving the deliberate destruction of her industries, England in the name of Liberalism blindly wrought her fresh injury by refusing to permit of the special measures needed to counteract the results of the wrong-doing of the past. At every step, it would seem, the English hold on Ireland must needs prove a curse, ignorance continuing to do evil even when the will to do it has ceased. And it may here be said that, though the Recess Committee's Report carefully abstains from suggesting anything like State control of the land, it points to the need and possibility of developing certain Irish resources which are not likely to be greatly developed save under State auspices, seeing that to do so means competition with the State-aided output of other countries. These resources are mainly:—

1. The improvement of the existing flax-culture.
2. Creation of beetroot-culture and tobacco-culture.
3. Improvement of pig-breeding and rearing.
4. Substitution of a dead-meat trade for the cruel and wasteful transport of live cattle.
5. Promotion of the poultry and egg trade by improved means of transit.
6. Promotion of market-gardening by horticultural schools, and by rewards.

[1] For a sketch of this movement see the article *The New Irish Movement*, by Mr Standish O'Grady, in the *New Review*, December, 1896.

7. Reforesting and reclamation of waste lands.
8. Development of the sea fisheries, of oyster culture, and of inland fisheries.
9. Utilisation of water power, so abundant in Ireland.

In regard to every one of these items it may be affirmed that a Home Rule Government, with a national land system, could and probably would do far more than is likely to be done in the imaginable future by a Ministry of Agriculture and Industries under English auspices. The English and Scotch unpreparedness for State aid to industry is so great that nearly all of the small existing schemes, such as stations for fish culture, are regarded with disfavour by many members of Parliament. Foreign competition, indeed, is goading the commercial class out of its *laissez-faire* into a more and more emphatic demand for the extension and improvement of technical schools; but this very fact is a warning that, under English auspices, Irish technical instruction would be kept relatively backward, when it is pressingly important that it should be as efficient as possible. On technical instruction would largely depend that development of (10) Cottage Industries which is so necessary in agricultural Ireland, where there are only some 240 days in the year in which a man can work upon the land. Such industries have been developed to a wonderful extent in Würtemberg, by a method of productive technical instruction under State management. But who believes that an English Department would in the near future develop industry as has been done by the Government of Würtemberg?

So with the development of the dead-meat trade, and of the poultry and egg trade. In regard to the former the Report observes[1] that "*The difficulties in the way of organising this trade will be less formidable when the country is more in command of its means of transport, by land and sea.*" Now, there is very little prospect of any great development of Irish means of transport by land and sea save through a measure of either nationalisation or State subsidisation of the railways, so as to bring about their unification. The need for such unification has long been felt; but nothing short of a gigantic Syndicate can bring it about without State interference; and a State does ill to encourage gigantic Syndicates. Were Home Rule established, on the other hand, a measure of railway nationalisation could be carried far sooner than we are likely to carry any measure of the kind in England. As regards sea transport, again, there might very well

[1] P. 19.

be enough influx of capital under Home Rule to establish by private enterprise the shipping needed ; but here again provision could be made against future industrial difficulties by setting up such a system of State shipping as exists in Norway, the profits of which would go into the public treasury.

Finally, as regards reforesting, reclamation of waste lands, and development of the culture of flax, beetroot, and tobacco, it is abundantly clear that English control is so much sheer hindrance to progress, as compared with the possibilities of advance under Home Rule, especially under an ideal of land-nationalisation. English public opinion is not within measurable distance of such measures of land reclamation as have been carried out in the French *landes* and in the shallow waters of Holland ; whereas a Home Rule Government would readily follow such leads, and would not defer to English prejudice and precedent. English supervision would represent all the inertia of English habit—the habit of industrial *laissez-faire* in a country where *laissez-faire* could for a time work with special facility by reason of the historic and natural conditions, differing as they do so profoundly from those of Ireland. It is further morally certain that a mere Department of Agriculture and Industries under English auspices would be hampered at every turn by the jealousies of English parties. Conservatives would tend to oppose every grant made by a Liberal Ministry ; though their leaders when in power might propose larger grants ; and Liberal human nature would hardly be equal to helping Conservatives to reap a harvest of credit in such circumstances. Only a Home Rule Government could have the necessary financial freedom. And that the financial problem could be best handled in Ireland is finally made clear by the virtual admission of the Financial Relations Committee,[1] in its recently published report, to the effect that after all the denials of Liberal and Conservative financiers in turn, Ireland has since the Union been heavily overtaxed. It has taken generations to bring us to this admission. Now that it is made, it should surely be followed by the national admission that Irishmen had better be left to manage Irish affairs.

In this connection, it only remains to point out that all the possible forms of progress indicated in the Recess Committee's Report, however beneficial they might be in the near future if conducted on an individualistic basis, would in course of time develop for Ireland on a larger scale the ultimate social problem.

[1] See this summarised in the article *The Financial Grievances of Ireland*, by Mr J. J. Clancy in the *Nineteenth Century*, December, 1896.

All forms of individualistic improvement whatever tend in time to come under the control of capitalism; and supposing Ireland in the next twenty years to make the most satisfactory progress in agriculture by means of coöperative methods, and in industry by means of systematic technical instruction, it is reasonable to surmise that in twenty years more the gains would be seen in process of being turned to the advantage of invested capital, which could soon compete triumphantly with the coöperation of small farmers and small producers. Then would arise on a wider scale than before the old strife of capital and labour, grown all the bitterer by reason of the new growth of wealth and the past growth of well-being. There is no evading this law of industrial evolution save by controlling the conditions under which it comes into play. Hence the profound importance of providing for Ireland now in the spirit of statesmanlike foresight, rather than in that of simple opportunism. The Recess Committee are not at all to be censured for adapting their demonstration to the prevailing political ideas. Indeed the special value of their Report lies in the fact that it represents an appeal to no faction whatever, but sets forth what needs to be done and what can be done in Ireland irrespective of the assumptions and ideals of either Home Rulers or Unionists. But when their part is done, and admirably done, it remains for political students to take into account all the factors in the problem, and to scheme for Ireland accordingly.

It is, indeed, an obvious matter for the consideration of practical politicians that if capital has been withheld from Ireland in the past on the score of her political unrest, it will tend in the future, under the same auspices, to be withheld on the same ground. The Irish Americans are not likely to pour in capital while the English ascendancy subsists; and English capitalists are not likely to come freely forward in the face of a continued struggle for Home Rule. And the struggle for Home Rule will surely continue. It has now become something of an axiom that a political aspiration once aroused in a nation is not likely to die of prosperity, though prosperity may weaken or end movements arising from temporary industrial distress. Therefore whatever gain may accrue to the spread of coöperative agricultural methods in Ireland will in itself, in all probability, tend to the strengthening of the Home Rule cause. Everything points to that central principle.

§ 5. *Education and Religion.*

It remains to consider the most thorny of all the problems of Irish administration—that of the course to be taken with the Churches, whose action and attitude on education constitute the special difficulty of that case. It is not at all likely that the suggestions here made will be acceptable to either the English or the Irish majority; and they are thrown out rather by way of completing the outline of a rational program than with the hope of seeing them adopted. For religion in Ireland is a twofold force of hindrance, inasmuch as it sunders men who would otherwise readily agree on a political solution, and further prevents agreement on any plan for the sorely needed schooling of the mass of the people. It is safe to say that all nations are under-educated; but Ireland is to-day under-educated relatively to other countries,[1] inasmuch as the claims of the Catholic Church and the jealousy of Protestantism concur to prevent an effective system of State education. Even in England, the feud of Church and Nonconformity is a constant danger to popular education: in Ireland it is a standing obstacle. It is true that the school attendance and the number of schools latterly increase, despite the decline in population;[2] but though the annual grants to primary schools are proportionally greater for Ireland than for England and Scotland,[3] the results were certainly not better. For much of this backwardness the blame has properly lain, in the near past, with the Irish Education Board, which carefully made the schools anti-national;[4] but whatever be the causes,

[1] In London in 1891 the proportion of men who signed the marriage register with marks was 3·7 per cent.; and of women, 5 per cent. In Ireland in 1890 the proportion was 20·4 men and 20·9 women. This represented progress since 1874, when the figures were: 30·1 men and 36·4 women.

[2] In 1886 there were 8,024 elementary schools under the Education Commissioners, with 490,484 scholars: in 1891 there were 8,346 schools, with 506,336 scholars. In 1834 there were only 789 national schools, with 107,042 scholars. In 1859, with a population of about 5,800,000 there were 5,496 schools, with a nominal attendance of 806,510. But at that time the whole number on the registers was taken. The average attendance would be about 600,000.

[3] The grants for 1892 were: England, £3,498,078; Scotland, £546,997; Ireland £969,853. It is to be noted, however, that Ireland is relatively very poor in other endowments. The elementary schools in England in 1891 received from rates, fees, donations, and other sources, £4,480,162; those of Scotland, £654,036, and those of Ireland 128,637.

[4] See Mr Fox's *Key to the Irish Question*, pp. 186-187. See also above, p. 174; and compare *Modern Ireland*, by an Ulsterman, 1868, pp. 271-303, as

the fact is that to-day the Irish people, though constantly spoken of as anxious for education, possesses relatively little, and is, as above noted, little given to reading, even in its own history. This holds true of the Protestant and Catholic populations alike: indeed, if both sides really studied their history instead of living on garbled and envenomed traditions, the religious bitterness could not subsist as it does. While it remains, however, it seems to make impossible even such a compromise on religious education as has subsisted in the Board Schools of England. Catholics will accept neither simple Bible-reading in the schools nor simple secular teaching: Protestants of course will tolerate neither Catholic nor secular teaching. The minds of the children are made the battleground of the fanaticisms of their parents, priests, and presbyters. For the time being, there exists a working compromise of a very peculiar kind, which might even suggest, when separately considered, a possible disappearance of the religious difficulty, as regards the schools. In the schools under the National Board of Education, religious instruction is given for one hour each day, and the nature of the teaching varies according as Catholics or Protestants preponderate in the district. For each school the Board appoints a Patron, who may be either a private individual, such as the landlord of the property, or a school committee; and the Patron in turn, if an individual, may either act directly as school manager or appoint a local correspondent as is done in the case of a committee. If the Catholics are in the majority in the district, the Patron is Catholic and the religious teaching is Catholic; and *vice versa;* the pupils belonging to the minority-sect being withdrawn from religious teaching. This state of things prevails in the case of all schools under the Board which were built and are still retained by denominations, and in the other "non-vested" schools belonging to localities. In the "vested" schools, on the other hand (those built by Government grant) the local clergy of each denomination are entitled to have access to the pupils of their creed during the hour for religious instruction; but in these also the tendency seems to be that Protestants and Catholics aggregate in different schools.

This arrangement, though it must in a number of cases exclude children of both sects from all religious teaching, seems to give sufficient satisfaction to permit of its continuance; but it is difficult to see in it a tolerable permanent solution. The segrega-

to the official treatment of O'Curry; and Gustave de Beaumont, *L'Irlande*, 7e édit., i. 319-320, as to the distrust established in the past by Protestant proselytism.

tion of children everywhere into virtually denominational schools is in itself very undesirable from the point of view of good citizenship ; and seems to promise an endless stimulation of the sectarian spirit in the future. It is hard to see a practicable way out of such a deadlock ; but on the whole the best plan seems to be the extension to all schools alike of the system in use in the vested schools. It is bad enough that the different clergy should have to get leave to teach the children of their flocks different creeds for one hour a day ; but it seems better that this should be so than that each school as a whole should be under the control of either a Catholic or a Protestant as such. Already the National Schools are so far unsectarian in principle that they are all open to children of all creeds. It remains to establish all round an unsectarian management ; and to this end a Home Rule Government would do well to establish for the schools in general the system of control now applied to the "Model" Schools of the Education Commissioners, which are managed by the Inspectors for the districts in which they are situated. On such a footing it may be possible to raise education above the level at which rural use and wont would fix it, and to set against the religious tradition of separateness the civic example of unsectarianism. There would still remain, of course, the problem of the specifically sectarian schools, which would present in Ireland the same difficulties as it does in England. For these it is difficult to see any ultimate solution save that of the State taking over the whole burden of maintenance, paying to the previous owners a sum down for their property, and guaranteeing to the sects concerned the same right to teach their dogmas for one hour a day as is given in the other national schools.

Under such a system, the clergy of all denominations would be in a certain indirect way servants of the State ; and it would be hard to suggest a better palliative for the present antagonisms of the sects than the frank adoption of the French plan of a Budget of Cults, under which the clergy of *all* sects possessed of a certain minimum of registered adherents should receive a fixed stipend from the State, which in turn ought either to receive, under one or other of its departments, all fees for burials, marriages, and christenings, or to enact that these functions be performed gratuitously for all citizens who desire it. Here, of course, there is the maximum of unlikelihood that the proposed solution will be adopted. Once upon a time the Catholic clergy were grateful for the proposal that they should be salaried by the State. To-day, in view of the small stipend that the State must

needs fix if it gave any, they would perhaps look askance, even if the Protestants consented to an all-round arrangement; while even if the Churchmen agreed, rationalists—few as they are in Ireland—might protest. To the latter, the present writer would say that in France the system of State payment all round seems to restrict the political power of the priest more than would any other arrangement. This, of course, is not a recommendation of it to the priests of other countries; but those in Ireland may even now reflect that unless Ireland is to remain a complete exception to the ordinary course of intellectual development in Europe, their successors of a generation hence may be glad to get from the State a moderate stipend, while the State may then see much less reason than now for granting it. The Irish clergy of to-day have been described by an impartial foreigner as "a corporation greatly enamoured of its comforts, endowed with good incomes, and whose sleekness forms a striking contrast with the general emaciation of their parishioners."[1] It seems possible that when the parishioners grow less emaciated the priests may grow a little more so. At present they are increasing in numbers while the population decreases; and doubtless their incomes are on the increase also. "It is generally admitted," says M. Daryl, "that each of these priests, with his church and his house, cannot cost much under £300 or £400 a year. That would give about £1,200,000 coming annually from the pockets of those labourers and servant girls. *The tithe was never so heavy.*"[2] An outsider may take leave to predict that a prosperous and educated Ireland will not go on paying its priests as a battling and starving and one-idea'd Ireland has of late done those who helped to organise its agrarian and constitutional struggle for self rule. It is probable that the "British majority" will see fit, in any Federal constitution it may accept, to insist on the veto against all religious endowments, preferring to count on the decline of Catholicism from the spread of culture, without considering whether Protestantism is not equally likely to decline in Britain, as it has done in Germany. Meantime, clerical incomes are just as much a drain on the total resources of the community as they would be if paid directly by the State; and they will probably increase before they decrease. Hence the expediency, in the eye of sociological reason, of an arrangement under which the burden will tend to be minimised, while yet preventing that state of impoverishment on the part of the clergy which would tend to make them specially active for a

[1] Daryl, *Ireland's Disease*, as cited, p. 220.
[2] *Id.*, p. 229.

revival of fanaticism. It is the bare historic fact that religion has wrought more evil in Ireland than in any country in northern Europe. The more reason, theoretically speaking, why Ireland should in her own interests attempt the control of religion. But we have, of course, religion itself to reckon with, and that will doubtless long avail to ward off a reasonable solution of its own problem.

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